JUDGMENT 1. - This is plaintiffs' revision, against the order passed by Addl. District Judge, No. 2, Jodhpur on 18th September, 1993. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioners filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondents, for restraining them from opening the branch of the Central Bank of India, at any place other than Magra Punjla, for which the sanction has been issued by the Reserve Bank of India, in favour of the defendants and, also a permanent injunction that the Bank should be directed to open the branch at the place at which it is permitted to open the branch. An application for temporary injunction was moved which was refused by the trial court by learned Addl. Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, on 24.8.1993. The aggrieved petitioners appealed before the learned Addl. District Judge, who upheld the preliminary objection raised by the defendant-respondents that the suit properly constitute falls within the purview of section 91, C.P.C. which could have been instituted only on permission being obtained from the court or from the Advocate General or has filed by the Advocate General. The court also came to the conclusion that the act of giving permission is an administrative act and, is not a judicial function, for which either side is not required to be heard. However, by holding that the suit is one covered under section 91, C.P.C., the lower appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court for first deciding whether the grant of permission to institute the present suit was right or not ? and, them after decide the application for temporary injunction. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order, the plaintiffs have preferred this revision, on two-fold-grounds. 3. Firstly, it was contended that for the purpose of an administrative function, it was not within jurisdiction of lower appellate court to remand the case by setting aside a judicial order passed after ;Tearing the parties and, secondly; according to learned counsel, it would be wholly against all connons of justice that the case be remanded to the same court for deciding the question of administrative sanction and thereafter to pass fresh orders on the same material and on the same application, which has been already rejected by the trial court. It would, in terms, amounts to sending the case back, for rejecting the application for grant of sanction. 4. It would, in terms, amounts to sending the case back, for rejecting the application for grant of sanction. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the suit itself was not maintainable, therefore, there is no error in the decision of the lower appellate court, which affects its jurisdiction. It was further contended that the order, in fact, is in favour of the petitioner, inasmuch as, that during the pendency of the application, the interim injunction has been granted in favour of the plaintiffs and, thereafter, the trial court has been left free to decide the application, de novo on merit. 5. Having carefully considered the rival contentions, I am of the opinion, that the second contention of learned counsel for the respondents merit acceptance. The order cannot be said, in any way, prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff. The order which contain findings against the plaintiffs has already been set aside, therefore, all the findings against the petitioner-plaintiffs do not exist and the trial court is to decide the application for temporary injunction, afresh in accordance with law, uninfluenced by his previous findings. The present interest of the plaintiffs have been amply safe-guarded by the lower appellate court by issuing temporary injunction, until the decision of the application by the trial court. If the trial court conies to the same conclusion again, remedy against the said order on merit is not barred. 6. In that view of the matter, as the order does not result in failure of justice, 1 am not inclined to interfere in the matter. The revision is dismissed, with no order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******