JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal is by an unsuccessful plaintiff. whose suit for eviction from the suit premises which is a shop on ground floor, on the ground of reasonable and bona fide personal requirement, has been dismissed by the two courts below. 2. The facts pleaded in the plaint were that the suit shop was let out to the defendant respondent on 16.1.1958 on rent of Rs. 15/- per month which was increased to Rs. 25/- per month later on. The plaintiff was a registered Revenue Agent originally and thereafter started serving with Shri Mahavir Chand Bhandari, Advocate after getting the Revenue Agent's (sanad suspended. However, not he is enrolled as an Advocate with the Bar Council of Rajasthan under the Advocates Act and has started his own practice and left the services of Shri Mahavirchand Bhandari. 3. He pleaded that the suit premises are required by him for establishing his independent office as an advocate the suit shop is suitable premises for his requirements. Presently, on account of lack of accommodation, he has to work with said Shri Mahavirchand Bhandari. It was also stated in the plaint that the said shop is surrounded by four other shops and the premises about the shops is residential one, in which he is in possession of two rooms and one store room. The plaintiff is living in the first floor with his family and accommodating in the residential premises is not suitable for the office and, presently the petitioner has to go to the office of Shri Bhandari at both times, which is time consuming as well as inconvenient in itself as well as to his clients. It was also pleaded that the defendant-respondent who is carrying on the business of hair cutting saloon, will be put to less hardship and he will be able to secure other premises on rent. The suit was filed on 7.3.1975. 4. The defendant denied plaintiff's plea of reasonable and bona fide necessity. He pleaded that the room above the shops have been let out to others and two rooms have been vacated in September, 1975 and December, 1975 that is to say, after filing of the suit, which could have been occupied by the plaintiff. 4. The defendant denied plaintiff's plea of reasonable and bona fide necessity. He pleaded that the room above the shops have been let out to others and two rooms have been vacated in September, 1975 and December, 1975 that is to say, after filing of the suit, which could have been occupied by the plaintiff. He also pleaded that five shops belongs to the plaintiff but he picked up the suit shops for the suit, with malafide intention against the defendant while 'not taking action for eviction against others, particularly, against occupant of one shop which is closed for about one and half years. He also pleaded that he will suffer greater hardship if the suit is decreed. 5. The plaintiff examined himself and Mahavir Chand Bhandari whereas the defendant examined himself as D.W. 1 and Nizamuddin as D.W. 2. 6. The trial Court came to the conclusion that plaintiff neither requires the suit premises nor his requirement is bona fide. It also found that eviction would result in defendant's seeking accommodation elsewhere which would affect his established business, hence, the question of comparative hardship was also decided against the plaintiff. On this finding, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. The appeal of the plaintiff was also dismissed by judgment and decree dated 25.11.1982. Hence this second appeal. 8. The Court, while admitting the appeal, framed the following questions of law to be arising out of orders of the courts-below: "Whether the finding of the lower court that the plaintiff's necessity for the shop is neither reasonable nor bona fide, is based on misreading of evidence and therefore, the same is vitiated?" 9. During the course of hearing on 18.8.1993, the following additional, question of law was also framed: "Whether the finding of the low court about the reasonable and bona fide necessity and comparative hardship is based on irrelevant consideration and therefore vitiated?" 10. Before examining the contentions raised before me, one fact that needs to be noticed is that two rooms in the first floor, which were in occupation of tenants at the time of filing of the suit, fell vacant during the course of trial and one was let out by the plaintiff and another was then occupied by the plaintiff but not converted into his office. The plaintiff while admitting that the two rooms were vacated has also stated that he did not occupied the rooms situated on the first floor because the same was not suitable for the purpose for which he were seeking the suit premises and his against let them out. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent had, at the out-set, raised objection as to the maintainability of the second appeal. He contended that the findings as to the existence of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord is a finding of fact and is not liable to be reviewed in second appeal. The proposition is well settled that the finding of fact cannot ordinarily be reviewed in second appeal and the scope of the second appeal is not to re-appreciated the evidence. However, it is equally well settled that where a finding of fact is challenged on the ground that the same is based on misreading of the evidence or have been arrived at by taking partly relevant and partly irrelevant material into consideration, or the finding of fact is arrived at by not considering the relevant material and by considering the irrelevant material, such a finding is not binding as it stands vitiated and is open for the second appellate court in those circumstances to re-appreciated the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. It is also well settled that whether a finding is vitiated for the reasons aforesaid, is a question of law. The Court also has framed the very same question. Therefore, it cannot be said that no question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal. 12. The first question that has to be examined is whether the finding on reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff is in fact stand vitiated by misreading of evidence or by taking into consideration irrelevant material. 13. Having carefully examined the judgment of the lower appellate courts and perused the evidence on record, I am of the opinion, that the findings of issue No. 1 about the existence of reasonable and bona fide requirement is vitiated. It may be noticed that at one stage, the lower appellate court found in favour of the plaintiff. 14. The appellate court also found that it is for the plaintiff to choose out of various accommodations that can be available to him which of these accommodations is suitable for his purpose. It may be noticed that at one stage, the lower appellate court found in favour of the plaintiff. 14. The appellate court also found that it is for the plaintiff to choose out of various accommodations that can be available to him which of these accommodations is suitable for his purpose. It is also not in controversy that as on the date of filing of the suit, no alternative vacant accommodation was available with the plaintiff. That is to say, the date on which the plaintiff made his choice of getting the suit premises vacated, it was for him to have decided out of the number of premises let out by him which he considers more suitable for his need and to proceed for getting the said premises vacated. With this premise not in dispute, the whole foundation of the findings of the lower appellate court is that during the pendency of the suit, certain premises were vacated in the suit house which the plaintiff did not occupy and on that basis it came to the conclusion that need of the landlord cannot be considered to be bona fide. In the process is also came to the conclusion that plea of the defendant that the accommodation which fell vacant during the pendency of the suit could not be said to be unsuitable for the plaintiff's purposes. 15. In arriving at this finding, the appellate court has relied on the statement of Shri Mahavir Chand Bhandari, P.W. 1 learned lower appellate Judge held that the plaintiff's witness admits in his statement that the rooms of the first floor are suitable for establishing office of an advocate. For arriving at this conclusion, learned lower appellate Judge has referred to following statement of Shri Mahavir Chand Bhandari in his cross-examination. 16. From this statement, learned Judge has inferred that from the statement of plaintiff's own witness it is proved that the plaintiff had no such requirement of establishing his office. In my opinion, on this statement, no such inference can be reasonably drawn against the plaintiff, as the statement was relating to the suitability of the suit shop and not relating to requirement. Moreover, from the aforesaid statement, lower appellate court has also drawn an inference that the statement of P.W. 1 establishes that the accommodation which fell vacant during the pendency of suit cannot be aid to be unsuitable. Moreover, from the aforesaid statement, lower appellate court has also drawn an inference that the statement of P.W. 1 establishes that the accommodation which fell vacant during the pendency of suit cannot be aid to be unsuitable. In arriving at this conclusion also, the lower appellate court ignored the categorical statement made by P.W. 1 Mahavir Chand Bhandari wherein he clearly stated. 17. The lower appellate court has not taken into consideration at all the above statement of P.W. 1 while deciding the question of suitability of the room in the first floor which had fallen vacant during the pendency of the suit for the purpose of establishing a lawyer's office. Moreover, even that part of statement referred to by the lower appellate court cannot be read to mean that room in the first floor is suitable for a lawyer's office, as has been read by the court-below. It was a clear misreading. 18. Again, the findings of the lower appellate court which is influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had five shops on the ground floor, about which plaintiff's witness P.W. 1 Mahavirchand Bhandari stated that all the five shops are suitable for the office of a lawyer and the lower appellate court has also referred to alleged admission that the shop vacated by Basti Ram and the room above the shop let out to cobbler were vacated during the pendency of the suit, which was to occupied by the plaintiff on the ground of unsuitability cannot be accepted. Obviously, if all the shops situated on the ground floor are of same suitability as stated by plaintiff's own witness and one of the shop is vacated during the pendency of the suit and not occupied by the plaintiff, will be relevant consideration and raised a good ground for coming to the conclusion that the need pleaded by the plaintiff is not bona fide. However lower appellate court has clearly misread the alleged admission. I do not find any such admission on the record that the shop in possession of Basti Ram was ever vacant or left during the pendency of the suit. Contrary to it, the trial court has based its conclusion on the ground that why the plaintiff has not filed suit against Bastiram for evicting him rather than against the present defendant. Contrary to it, the trial court has based its conclusion on the ground that why the plaintiff has not filed suit against Bastiram for evicting him rather than against the present defendant. Therefore, findings about the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff is based on misreading of the alleged admission of the plaintiff and statement of his witness and finding about suitability of the two rooms which fell vacant during the pendency of the suit is also based on not reading the relevant part of statement of P.W. 1 and misreading the other part of the statement. 19. That apart, one relevant consideration which the courts-below have not taken into consideration is that merely because sore accommodation falls vacant during the pendency of the suit and is not occupied by the plaintiff for the alleged purpose, though relevant, does not lead to only conclusion that the bona fide necessity pleaded by the plaintiff c es to exist or the . requirement pleaded is not bona fide. The question of pleading arose on the date when the plaintiff filed the suit. Undoubtedly on the findings of lower appellate court itself, the plaintiff had a choice to decide which of the several accommodations which he can get evicted for his own purposes. On that day, the plaintiff did not have any vacant possession to choose. Therefore, it cannot be said that when the plaintiff filed the suit he malafidely acted or that his need was not bona fide because he filed the suit against the defendants and not against others. 20. The next stage for considering the existence of the need may be as on the date when the question arises before the Court whether to pass or not to pass decree in favour of the landlord. It is also not disputed that on the date when decree was passed no vacant alternative accommodation was available with the plaintiff. In these circumstances, when the existence of need of the plaintiff for an accommodation to establish his own independent office was found in favour of the plaintiff, by the lower appellate court, as noticed above, the real question was, to be determined by the courts-below, whether on that day the need of the plaintiff was bona fide or not? In these circumstances, when the existence of need of the plaintiff for an accommodation to establish his own independent office was found in favour of the plaintiff, by the lower appellate court, as noticed above, the real question was, to be determined by the courts-below, whether on that day the need of the plaintiff was bona fide or not? The other relevant question which would arise for consideration is whether the plaintiff did not occupy the other accommodation which fell vacant during the pendency of the suit with ulterior motive? 21. It may be noticed that the plaintiff has pleaded from the very .beginning that the rooms in the first floor are not suitable for his office premises at it affects this privacy. That was the reason given by him for choosing shop in the ground floor, for establishing his office. If he had the choice on the basis of his own evaluation/judgment about the suitability of his need at that time, and if that choice is bona fide at that time, if the plaintiff does not choose to occupy those premises which fell vacant during the pendency of litigation which according to his own pleading cause does not conform to his norms of suitability and therefore, he does not occupy, it cannot be said that on account of such non-occupation of such premises, it would automatically result in the finding that the need of the plaintiff was not bona fide, even if the court ultimately comes to the conclusion that the premises which the plaintiff bonafidely thought unsuitable. for his purpose are in fact in the eye of law not that suitable. 22. The question of bona fide is a state of mind of a person and is not dependent upon ultimate conclusion of the court deciding upon whether decision of the plaintiff in that regard is right or wrong. Therefore, what is relevant is to adjudge the state of mind of the plaintiff about occupying or not occupying the premises which has fallen vacant during the pendency of the suit and not the ultimate findings about the suitability of such premises by the Court. 23. There is no findings of the court that the plaintiff held this belief that the rooms situated in first floor, which are admittedly adjacent to residential premises, are not suitable for his office purpose, malafidely and not in good faith. 23. There is no findings of the court that the plaintiff held this belief that the rooms situated in first floor, which are admittedly adjacent to residential premises, are not suitable for his office purpose, malafidely and not in good faith. In arriving at conclusion, the lower appellate court has been unduly influenced by the fact that ordinarily offices of lawyer's are established in their residence. Neither any material has been placed for raising this presumption nor this presumption is otherwise well-founded. There are cases and cases where offices of lawyers have been far away from their residence, there have been cases where lawyer's office is established at distance from his home. It all depends upon individual perception of the person concerned, depending upon various circumstances which also include his own sense of privacy and the interference which running of the office within the house is likely to cause in day-to-day home affairs and personal convenience. Therefore, in the absence of any such material it was not justified for the lower appellate court, in law to raise presumption that office of a lawyer within the house is more suitable than in commercial premises. 24. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court stands vitiated and cannot be termed as binding on this court in second appeal. 25. In this connection, it may be stated that learned counsel for the respondent has cited number of decisions to emphasise that the fact that the plaintiff has acquired other alternative accommodation and has failed to occupy the same is the relevant consideration and the courts-below have committed no illegality in taking into consideration the fact about the two rooms having fallen vacant during the pendency of the suit and the fact that plaintiff did not occupy the same. There cannot be any quarrel with the said principle that the acquisition of accommodation during the pendency of the suit and its non-occupancy by the plaintiff are relevant consideration, but the question is that, that is not the sole ground for arriving at the conclusion one way or the other-and it depends upon other circumstances as well as and if the court had arrived at its decision to on the basis of other attending circumstances but merely on the basis of acquisition of alternate accommodation and non-occupation of the same, such finding cannot be considered as binding in second appeal. 26. In view of my this conclusion, I need not discuss in detail the cases cited before me as the same also depend upon the facts of individual case and nature of controversy involved. So far as the principle governing the present controversy is concerned, there is no dispute. In this connection, reference may be made to decision in Dr. Saroj Kumar Das v. Arjun Prasad Jogani, (1987) 4 SCC 262 which fortifies my view which I have taken above. In that case, the landlord who was a Doctor and doing medical practice, filed a suit for eviction against the defendant who he let out the premises when he has gone abroad. When he intended to return to India, he filed the suit for vacating the suit premises. The suit was contested that the plaintiff owns another building at Calcutta itself. During the pendency of the suit, the landlord acquired possession of a flat in the town of Calcutta itself and let it out to a third party. On that count, plea of the plaintiff about his bona fide and reasonable requirement was sought to be defeated. The Court negated the plea and held as under: "The alternative accommodation must be reasonably suitable and if it is not so then mere availability of alternative accommodation will not be a ground to refuse a decree for eviction if otherwise the courts are satisfied about the genuine requirement of the landlord." 27. As I have noticed above, the lower appellate court was satisfied that as a result of plaintiff having got himself enrolled as an. Advocate, he requires accommodation for establishing his independent office. As I have noticed above, the lower appellate court was satisfied that as a result of plaintiff having got himself enrolled as an. Advocate, he requires accommodation for establishing his independent office. However, by considering that the plaintiff had acquired alternative accommodation which was suitable for establishing a lawyer's office, during the pendency of the suit, and has let it out to others, went on to hold the need to be not genuine. As I have noticed above that finding about the suitability of the alternative accommodation stands vitiated on account of misreading of statement of P.W. 1 Mahavirchand Bhandari. Therefore, the question will have to be re-examined. 28. In this connection, it may be stated that the defendant or his witness have not stated a word about the suitability or non-suitability of the alterative accommodation acquired by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff has categorically stated that the room acquired by him during the pendency of the suit were not suitable as they were close to his residential premises, affecting his privacy. P.W. 1 Shri Mahavirchand Bhandari, has also clearly stated in his statement that it is wrong to say that the rooms in the upper story are suitable for a lawyer's office. He reiterates that he cannot say that the rooms in the first floor are suitable. Therefore, this un-rebutted evidence of the plaintiff cannot be brushed aside merely on the general impression of the court that usually lawyer's offices are situate in the residential premises and it is most suitable. In this connection, reference may also be made to C.K. Daphtary, Sr. Advocate and Ors. v. Shri O.P. Gupta and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1132 , wherein profession of a lawyer was held to be a 'business' for the purpose of seeking eviction from non-residential premises under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Eviction and Control Act. This is only for the purpose of showing that in the context of Rent Control Law, the profession of law is to be treated a 'business' giving ground of eviction of a commercial premises as well. This is only for the purpose of showing that in the context of Rent Control Law, the profession of law is to be treated a 'business' giving ground of eviction of a commercial premises as well. If that be so, the findings about suitability of residential premises for the profession of law could to be arrived at, without cogent evidence on record, merely on the assumption/ supposition that ordinarily people carry on their profession, of law, in their residence, without taking into consideration the state of mind of the appellant concerned about the place which is more suitable for him to carry out his profession and, the question of privacy affected by an office being carried within a house which is undoubtedly, a relevant consideration for deciding the suitability of a particular premises for need of a person concerned, and, further that no alternative accommodation was available on the date when the decree was going to be passed, the fact that on his bona fide assumption about the suitability of the premises, non-occupation of premises which fall vacant during the pendency of suit by the plaintiff, cannot result in finding that his need which is found to exist at the time of filing of suit as well as on the date when decree is passed, is not bona fide merely because the court assumes the alternative premises to be suitable. 29. It has also been laid down by their Lordships in Saroj Kumar Das's case (Supra), that, ordinarily the statement of plaintiff about the suitability of the premises concerned has to be accepted and cannot be ignored without any cogent and specific material against it. 29. It has also been laid down by their Lordships in Saroj Kumar Das's case (Supra), that, ordinarily the statement of plaintiff about the suitability of the premises concerned has to be accepted and cannot be ignored without any cogent and specific material against it. As I have noticed above, as against the statement of plaintiff himself as P.W. 2 and his other witness P.W. 1, about the non-suitability of the rooms in the first floor and about the suitability of the shop situated in ground floor, there is no evidence in rebuttal and there is no other material not to accept the statement made by the petitioner in this behalf which he pleaded right from the beginning in the plaint, I am of the opinion, that the plaintiff has been able to prove that during the pendency of the suit, the premises which has come in his acquisition, were not suitable for his purpose and, therefore, the fact that he did not occupy the same on that count cannot result in cessation of his need or inference that the need pleaded by him is not bona fide. I therefore, hold that the plaintiff has proved that he needs the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own requirement, namely, for the purpose of establishing him as an independent lawyer. 30. It is also not in dispute before me that as on the date, today, or on the date of filing of the suit no vacant accommodation except the premises the plaintiff is residing were available with him. In these circumstances, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the hardship caused to the plaintiff will be more if decree is not passed than defendant if decree is passed? 31. The only ground for deciding this issue against the plaintiff given by the courts below is that the defendant is doing business in the suit shop for last 17 years and if he is displaced, he will suffer hardship for establishing new business. This finding, in my opinion, also cannot sustained. In every case of eviction, displacement of occupant is bound to take place and same inconvenience is bound to cause him. It may also happen that alternative accommodation which the tenant had to acquire may cost him more than what is costing to him if he is allowed to continue in the suit premises. In every case of eviction, displacement of occupant is bound to take place and same inconvenience is bound to cause him. It may also happen that alternative accommodation which the tenant had to acquire may cost him more than what is costing to him if he is allowed to continue in the suit premises. If those were the reasonable grounds for refusing a decree, than in no case of eviction, on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement, can be .passed as in all such cases tenant will be put to inconvenience of shifting his business from his established place and that is likely to cost him more as with the passage of time like any other commodity the rents have also increased. 32. The question germane to this enquiry is whether any other alternative accommodation can be available to the defendant if he is evicted within the same locality or other locality where his business can be reasonably carried on with reasonable rent, or that the plaintiff can do without occupying the suit premises. In the present case, the plaintiff has suggested number of alternative accommodation in the same locality which could be available to the defendant. It is not the case of the defendant that he made any efforts during the pendency of the litigation to search out for alternative accommodation and he did not find one. What is the contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff did not ever pointed out that such accommodation is available which the defendant could occupy and that is consistent stand taken before courts below against contention of the plaintiff and, that is the argument raised before me. 33. But the fact remains that while the plaintiff had brought on record that certain shops which have been recently constructed with in the locality, may be available if the defendant approach, the defendant had not made any effort and had not lead any evidence except bald assertion. One could understand that he made certain efforts but could not find any place which could be let out to him for the purpose of doing his business and in the event of eviction he would be totally deprived of his business. One could understand that he made certain efforts but could not find any place which could be let out to him for the purpose of doing his business and in the event of eviction he would be totally deprived of his business. In that view of the matter, the finding about comparative hardship, which is based solely on the ground that on account of eviction the defendant is likely to be displaced from his present place of business, cannot be sustained. Ordinarily, it is the plaintiff who after having a long run of service acquired the status of an Advocate and is wanting to establish his own office compatible with his status as an Advocate at his own premises which is situated below his residential accommodation, the need which has been found to exist by the lower appellate court also, must be held to be reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances or the present case and it must also be held that unless there are grave grounds, the comparative hardship of the defendant cannot be far graver, who is otherwise doing his business in a rented premises and on eviction will also do his business at some rented shop though at a little higher cost, and cannot be such a ground to hold that issue of comparative hardship be decided in favour of the defendant. 34. As finding of the lower appellate court on both the relevant issues, Nos. 1 and 1A, has been reversed, in my opinion, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction in his favour. 35. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, The judgment and decree dated 25.11.1982 passed by Addl. District Judge, No. 2 Jodhpur as well the judgment and decree passed on 18.3.1977 by Munsif City, Jodhpur, are set aside. The suit of the plaintiff for evicting the defendant from the suit premises is decreed. The defendant at his request in the facts and circumstances, is allowed 6 months time to vacate the suit premises. However, during this period he will not part with possession of the suit shop except to plaintiff-landlord and shall continue to pay regularly the mesne profits for use and occupation during this period as well, at the rate at which is payable to plaintiff-landlord. He is to surrender vacant possession to plaintiff-landlord on or before 30th April, 1994. 36. However, during this period he will not part with possession of the suit shop except to plaintiff-landlord and shall continue to pay regularly the mesne profits for use and occupation during this period as well, at the rate at which is payable to plaintiff-landlord. He is to surrender vacant possession to plaintiff-landlord on or before 30th April, 1994. 36. Defendant to file an undertaking in aforesaid terms before the Dy. Registrar (Judicial) on or before 30th December, 1993. 37. Parties to bear their own cost throughout.Appeal allowed. *******