K. C. BHARGAVA, J. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 30th March, 1990, by which the petitioner has given an adverse entry and denying full pay for the period of suspension. It is further prayed that opposite parties be directed to comply with the order dated 30th June, 1986 passed by the Tribunal and to declare the transfer order, dated 10-10-1990 as illegal. 2. The facts stated in brief are that the petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant in the office of Milk Commissioner (Dagdhshala Vikas) U. P. Lucknow on 1st September, 1977. Juniors to the petitioner were promoted to the post of Senior Assistant but the petitioner was denied his promotion when it become due. Then he filed a claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, which was allowed by order, dated 30-6-1986. In the opera tive portion of the order of the Tribunal. It was directed that the seniority of the petitioner will be counted from 1-9-1977 from the date he was first appointed in ad hqc capacity with all consequential benefits. It was also directed that the petitioner b- treated senior to opposite party No. 3 Snot. Usba Srivastava. 3. Smt. Usha Srivastava was reverted, but the petitioner was not given promotion and other benefits by the opp. parties. In the month of April, 1989 the Officer on Special Duty also issued a letter dated 28-4- 1989 and com municated to the opp. parties that the petitioner should be given the benefits of the period between 3-5-1979 to 30-6-1982 during which period stay order remained in operation, but in spite of this State Government has not given the benefits and promotion to the petitioner. Copy of the said order is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The petitioner was transferred to Pratapgarh by order dated 22nd July, 1988, but he was not allowed to Join there. Thereafter the petitioner was suspended by order dated 11th August. 1988 and was attached to Gorakhpur office but no charge sheet was given nor any inquiry was held against him. 4. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 7271 of 1988 against the suspension order, m which the petitioner was allowed to remain attached a? Lucknow. The. Thereafter the petitioner was suspended by order dated 11th August. 1988 and was attached to Gorakhpur office but no charge sheet was given nor any inquiry was held against him. 4. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 7271 of 1988 against the suspension order, m which the petitioner was allowed to remain attached a? Lucknow. The. aid writ petition was finally decided by order dated 22-7-89 and it was provided that charge-sheet be served within a week and the enquiry be completed within three months from the date of submission of reply to the charge-sheet. The charge- sheet was given to the petitioner but no evidence was given nor any document was furnished to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet. Charge-sheet was also not signed by the appointing authority The petitioner submitted him reply to the charge-sheet No witness was examined in the enquiry m presence of the petitioner and the order of punishment dated 30-3-90 was passed, copy of which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 5. The petitioner was thereafter re-instated and it was found that charges Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 were proved. It is not clear as to what materials were utilised by the punishing authority in arriving at the conclusion that these charges were proved. The first punishment awarded to the petitioner is the adverse entry without mentioning the year to which it relates and the second punishment is that no suspension allowance be paid besides which has already been paid. 6. The petitioner was thereafter transferred to Srinagar (Pauri ). The transfer order was passed by way of punishment. The petitioner was not given any reasonable opportunity to explain the charges during the enquiry nor the petitioner was given the report of the Inquiry Officer to meet the charges levelled against him. No such punishment could have been awarded to the petitioner and it has been done with the intention to defy the order of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. No show cause notice regarding payment of suspension allowance during the period of suspension was given to the petitioner and as such no punishment could have been awarded without giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner was also transferred of order dated 10-10-1990 to Pratapgarh copy of said order is Annexure- 3 to the writ petition. This order has been passed with mala fide intention and opp. The petitioner was also transferred of order dated 10-10-1990 to Pratapgarh copy of said order is Annexure- 3 to the writ petition. This order has been passed with mala fide intention and opp. party No. 2 is not implementing the order dated 22-7-1988. The impugned order of punishment dated 30-3-1990 was stayed so far as it related to the transfer of the petitioner. In spite of the order of the Court the petitioner was not allowed to take charge at Lucknow. The transfer order, dated 10-10-1990 contained in Annexure-3 is illegal and mala fide. 7. Opposite parties have filed counter-affidavit. It is allege that Smt Usha Srivastava has been placed junior to the petitioner in compliance of order of the Tribunal. The petitioner was not given promotion and other benefits beyond the provisions of Service Rules 1982. The transfer of the petitioner to Srinagar was not by way of punishment but was in pursuance of the enquiry. Suspension allowance during the period of suspension has already been paid and the order of denial for rest of the amount cannot be said to be illegal in view of the punishment order dated 30-3-1990. The petitioner was allowed to remain at the headquarter because in whose place the petitioner was trans ferred, managed to get his transfer order cancelled. Some persons senior to the petitioner have not still been promoted. No show cause notice was neces sary before awarding punishment in the disciplinary proceedings in reference to withholding of the suspension allowance, with respect to contents of para 27 to the writ petition, it is alleged that the contents are not committed. 8. Rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner in which it has been averred that the Dy. Milk Commissioner in his letter dated 21-2-1987 has said that the promotion of the deponent is under consideration. The petitioner becomes entitled for 3/4th of suspension allowance under Fundamental Rules after he remained suspended for more than three months. The petitioner is senior and is entitled to be promoted to the post of senior clerk in pursuance of the order passed by the Tribunal as well as by this Court. It is alleged that the preliminary report had to be furnished to the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 10. The petitioner is senior and is entitled to be promoted to the post of senior clerk in pursuance of the order passed by the Tribunal as well as by this Court. It is alleged that the preliminary report had to be furnished to the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the charges were not proved, hence adverse entry could not have been given to the petitioner. He has further argued that after reinstatement the petitioner should have been allowed full pay during the period of suspension as without hearing the petitioner an order adverse to him could not be passed. 11. We take up the second point first. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under Rule 54-B of the Financial Hand book Vol. II, (Part 2 to 4) the petitioner should have been given full pay during the suspension period. According to the learned standing counsel, the petitioner was rightly denied full pay during the suspension period by virtue of order of punishment. The only dispute between the parties is as to whether an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to show-cause for not making full payment during the period of suspension. In this connection Rule 54-B of the Financial Handbook has been referred. Sub-rule (S) of Rule 54-B of Financial Handbook, Vol. II, (Part II to IV) deals with such contingency which may be reproduced below : "54-B (5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3), the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which be would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, sub mitted by him in that connection within such period (which is no case shall exceed 60 days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice. " 12. " 12. A perusal of this rule goes to show that a Government servant whose case does not fall under Sub- rules (2) and (3) of this Rule, subject to the provisions of Sub-rules (8) and (9), such amount of pay and allowances have to be paid to a suspended employee as the competent authority may determine, but a rider has been put on the competent authority and this rider is that order denying full pay during the period of suspension has to be passed only after giving a notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that con nection. 13. Thus a plain perusal of this Rule clearly goes to show that if the competent Authority wants that the Government servant should not be paid full pay during the period of suspension then he has to give a notice to such Government Servant of the quantum proposed and when a representation is received, it has to be considered and then only an order is to be passed. This procedure has to be followed in each and every case in which the competent authority feels that entire pay and allowance should not be paid to the Government servant during the period of suspension and if this notice is not given, it amounts to denial of an opportunity to the Government servant, which has been specifically provided under this Rule. 14. In the present case it is an admitted fact that no notice before passing the impugned order was given to the Government Servant to represent his case. If a notice would have been given to the petitioner, he would have shown some grounds on which the entire pay and allowance should have been paid to him and not merely subsistence allowance which has already been received by him. This opportunity is a valuable right of a Government Servant and it cannot be withheld by the Government. Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of this Rule will vitiate the order passed by the com petent authority with respect to suspension allowance. Proper course for the competent authority, if it has decided not to pay full allowances during the suspension period was to give an opportunity to" the Government Servant to place his case before him for his consideration. Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of this Rule will vitiate the order passed by the com petent authority with respect to suspension allowance. Proper course for the competent authority, if it has decided not to pay full allowances during the suspension period was to give an opportunity to" the Government Servant to place his case before him for his consideration. If this opportunity is given only then a right accrues to the competent authority to pass an order with holding the entire allowances etc, except which has already been paid to him. 15. The law on this point as interpreted by the Court be considered. In the case of Baldeo Rai Gulaini v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, (1976) SCC 201, the question was about the nature of order of suspension. Explaining the position about the suspension Honble Apex Court has observed as under : "the character of the order of dismissal and that of the order of reinstatement in a departmental enquiry is absolutely different. Suspension is a step to dismissal and may culminate in dismissal. When an officer is suspended no work is taken from him but he does not cease to be in service. When there is dismissal the link with the service is snapped and naturally the order of suspension merges in dismissal. Nothing remains to be done about his suspension. When, however, a suspended officer is reinstated an order which is different in content and quality from that of suspension takes effect. The suspended officer, on re-instatement, goes back to service. A further order may have to be passed by the authority as to in what manner the period of suspension will be treated. That will be, therefore, a distinct and separate pro ceeding apart from the earlier department proceeding, in which the order of reinstatement was passed. If, therefore, the order of re-instatement is set aside the officer is bound to revert to his immediate anterior status of suspension. " 16. This goes to show that when the order of re-instatement is passed the suspending officer goes back to service and a further order has to be passed by the authority as to in what manner the period of suspension will be treated. That order will be a separate proceeding apart from the earlier departmental proceeding in which the order of re-instatement was passed. That order will be a separate proceeding apart from the earlier departmental proceeding in which the order of re-instatement was passed. This also goes to show that these two proceedings are entirely different. The competent authority has to pass an order of re-instatement separately and thereafter after complying with the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 54-B, mentioned above, another order has to be passed because alter re-instate ment the Government employee is reverted to his immediate position which he was enjoying at the time of suspension, j 17. The next case on this point is Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 600 , in this case it was held an under : "the order of suspension made against the appellant was clearly one made pending an inquiry. It certainly was not a penalty imposed after an enquiry. As the result of the enquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against to appellant. With that order, the order of suspension lapsed. The order of dis missal replaced the order of suspension which then ceased to exist. That clearly was the position between the Government of the United Provinces and the appellant. The subsequent declaration by a civil court that the order of dismissal was illegal could not revive an order of suspension which did not exist. " 18. This case goes to show that if an order of dismissal is passed than that order replaces the period of suspension which means that no separate order has to be passed in what manner the period of suspension is to be treated, because the period of suspension is merged in the order of dismissal. It was further provided in that case that if a civil court holds that the order of dismissal is illegal, then it could not revive the order of suspension which did not exist. 19. The position in the present case is that when an order of reinstate ment has been passed the Government Servant is relegated to the position which he was enjoying at the time of suspension. The same Principle was laid down by Kerala High Court in the case of Kurvilang S. Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1984 (2) SLR 219. The same Principle was laid down by Kerala High Court in the case of Kurvilang S. Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1984 (2) SLR 219. It also considering the decision of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the order pi suspension will not merge in the final order by which the suspended officer is re-instated. 16 was further provided that in the case of reinstatement in service the suspension order will not merge even if the reinstatement have been done on a lower post. 20. Therefore, in view of the clear provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule S4-B of the Financial Handbook, Vol. II (Part to IV) it is held that the order of the competent authority withholding the entire amount of pay and allowance during the suspension period is illegal and against the provisions of law and is liable to be set-aside. 21. Now we come to the next point with regard to adverse entry which has been awarded to the petitioner on the basis of some proved charges. Annexure 2 is the copy of order passed by the competent authority, a perusal of which goes to show that during the preliminary enquiry tin inquiry Officer has held that charges Nos. 2,4,5,6,7 and 8 have not been proved against the petitioner. The competent authority in his order has held that charges Nos. 2 and 3 have been proved while differing from the opinion of the Inquiry Officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry. Thus, there was a difference of opinion with regard to charges Nos. 2 and 8 between the Inquiry Officer and the competent authority, who has passed the impugned order. Now the question which arises for consideration is as to whether an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner by the competent authority before he could have reversed the findings of the preliminary enquiry. In the case of Narayan Misra v. State oforissa, 1969 SLR 657 a Government employee was acquitted. It was held that if the competent authority wanted to take the charges, on which the civil servant was acquitted, into account and was not in a position to agree then it was necessary for the competent authority that the attention of the civil servant ought to have been drawn and his explanation, if any, called for. It was held that if the competent authority wanted to take the charges, on which the civil servant was acquitted, into account and was not in a position to agree then it was necessary for the competent authority that the attention of the civil servant ought to have been drawn and his explanation, if any, called for. As this was not done and the charge on which the civil servant was acquitted, was also taken into consideration without any warning to the civil servant that he was being against him, which is against the fair principles and natural justice. Thus, this case also supports the view taken in judgment referred to above, passed by the Apex Court. 22. As has been seen in the earlier part of the judgment, if the com petent authority wanted to differ with the findings of the Inquiry Officer then he should have appraised the petitioner of this fact and after he would have given his representation then this order could have been passed. As the competent authority who disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on charges Nos. 2 and 8, should have given an opportunity to the petitioner and after he had submitted reply to the same an order differing from those findings should have been passed by the competent authority. As the same has not been done in the present case, this order making adverse entry in the character roll of the petitioner cannot be upheld. 23. Thus, in view of what has been stated above, it is clear that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed. In the counter-affidavit it has been alleged that persons who are senior to the petitioner have not been promoted. The petitioner can only be promoted when persons senior to him are considered for promotion. It all persons who are senior to the petitioner are considered for promotion then the petitioner has to be promoted in accordance with rules. 24. The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 30-3-1990 passed by opp. party No. 2, copy of which is contained in Annexure 2, is quashed. The petitioner shall get entire pay with all emoluments for the period during which he remained under suspension. Adverse entry which has been awarded to the petitioner in view of that order is also quashed. No orders as to costs. 25. party No. 2, copy of which is contained in Annexure 2, is quashed. The petitioner shall get entire pay with all emoluments for the period during which he remained under suspension. Adverse entry which has been awarded to the petitioner in view of that order is also quashed. No orders as to costs. 25. Let compliance of this order be done with within a period of two months from today. Petition allowed. .