B. N. Kirpal ( 1 ) THIS is one of those cases where a scheme of the State for the benefit of young entrepreneurs has resulted, according to the State, in endless litigation and losses to the petitioner. ( 2 ) 26 acres of land in Delhi was placed at the disposal of the petitioner, which is a Government Corporation, for purposes of constructing sheds. These sheds were constructed during the year 1973-74 under a scheme which had been formulated for the benefit of educated engineers who were unemployed. The sheds were constructed partially from the loans which were taken by the petitioner from the banks. ( 3 ) THE scheme, which envisaged the allotment of sheds, was given wide publicity in the year 1973 and it invited applications from unemployed degree holder or diploma holder technicians who were bona fide residents of the Union Territory of Delhi and were interested in getting gainful and productive self employment by setting up a small scale industry to apply to the petitioner Corporation. The scheme envisaged a training programme during which period stipend was to be paid and, on successful completion of the training the applicants were to be considered for allotment of built up industrial sheds at the Okhla Industrial Area. Assistance was also envisaged for getting machinery and plant under hire purchase scheme. ( 4 ) UNDER the said scheme allotment letters were issued to the successful applicants which contained similar terms. The allotment letter informed the successful applicants about the particular shed which the petitioner was willing to allot and it also stipulated the rent which was payable by the allottee. The allottees were required to complete necessary formalities and thereafter registered monthly lease deeds between the petitioner and the individual allottees were executed. The terms of the lease deed to different allottees were more or less identical. The respondent in the present case was given on lease shed No. 115 on a monthly rent of Rs. 730. 00. The said document held out no promise of transfer of any right, title or interest in the said shed in favour of the respondent or any other allottee. The respondent in the present case was given on lease shed No. 115 on a monthly rent of Rs. 730. 00. The said document held out no promise of transfer of any right, title or interest in the said shed in favour of the respondent or any other allottee. The lease deed contained the usual terms requiring the lessee to pay rent regularly and gave a right to the petitioner to terminate the lease and re-enter the resume premises if the lessee was in arrears of rent for two consecutive months after the execution of the lease deed. ( 5 ) THE State invited trouble when a new scheme was sought to be formulated. Possibly with a view to further help or assist the allottees, the Lt. Governor issued a statement on 9th March, 1977 to the effect that the petitioner will give to the entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis the sheds which had been constructed by it. Reference was made in this behalf to an announcement of the then Chief Executive Councillor, who probably had made this promise before 9th March, 1977. It was further stated that the price will be determined after proper evaluation and that the mode of payment will be over a long period to help the young entrepreneurs. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid statement of the Lt. Governor, issued at the time when the elections were in the air, was followed by a circular dated 15th March, 1977 issued by the petitioner. This circular REFERRED TO to meetings held with banks, who had financed the sheds, in order to decide the modalities of the hire purchase. It was envisaged that there would be two patterns for the disposal of the sheds, firstly it could be by outright sale to the entrepreneurs wherein the bankers would advance term loans to the entrepreneurs for purchasing sheds and credit the same to the loan account of DSIDC and the second pattern was where the entrepreneurs would pay hire purchase premium to DSIDC over a period of 10 years. The said circular further indicated that the entrepreneurs would be required to clear the arrears of rent due to be paid to DSIDC before any hire purchase agreement could be entered into. It is contended by Shri Swatantar Kumar, counsel for the petitioner that by this time the arrears of payment of rent had started mounting. The said circular further indicated that the entrepreneurs would be required to clear the arrears of rent due to be paid to DSIDC before any hire purchase agreement could be entered into. It is contended by Shri Swatantar Kumar, counsel for the petitioner that by this time the arrears of payment of rent had started mounting. On the other hand, as far as the DSIDC was concerned, it was obliged to pay interest to the banks on the amounts which it had borrowed for construting the sheds. ( 7 ) THE accummulation of arrears of rent led to a meeting on 23rd January, 1979 being held under the Chairmanship of the Executive Councillor wherein it was decided that arrears payment and current payments would be cleared by the end of May, 1979 in five equal instalments to be paid by the 10th of each month. It was further stipulated that the amount so paid would be adjusted against hire purchase instalments "if and when hire purchase is decided" (emphasis added ). A similar exercise was again undertaken subsequently and on 1st May, 1982 letters were written to various allottees setting out the time schedule according to which payment of rent arrears could take place. Before 15th May, 1982 25% of the arrears were required to be paid and the balance amount was to be paid within a total period of four months. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Swatantar Kumar the aforesaid concession, allowing the allottes to clear the arrears within a stipulated period and the petitioner not exercising its right to cancel the allotments, did not have any effect and till today a very large sum of money is outstanding. ( 9 ) PURSUANT to the aforesaid scheme for transferring the sheds on hire purchase basis offer was first made to the various allottees in November, 1986. Letters were written by the petitioner to the individual allottees stating therein that it was proposed to transfer the said sheds to them on cash down basis or hire purchase basis. The scheme envisaged payment of 100% cash down, in which case a discount of 2% on the total cost was to be allowed, or transfer on hire purchase basis. There were two patterns with regard to hire? The scheme envisaged payment of 100% cash down, in which case a discount of 2% on the total cost was to be allowed, or transfer on hire purchase basis. There were two patterns with regard to hire? purchase, the first one requiring 75% cash down payment and the balance being paid in 72 monthly instalments, in which case there was to be allowed 1-1/2% discount on the total cost and the second pattern was when the cash down payment was to be of 50% and the balance was payable in 72 monthly instalments but the discount was reduced to 1% on the total cost. The said letter clearly stipulated that the monthly equal instalments have been calculated after charging interest @ 18% p. a. The allottees were required to exercise their option and give their confirmation in writing within one month of the issuance of the letter. A statement indicating the payment already made by the individual allottees by way of rent, which was to be adjusted towards payment of hire purchase instalments, and the balance amount to be paid was also enclosed. ( 10 ) ON 17th June, 1987 another letter was written by the petitioner to the various allottees giving further concession with regard to transfer of sheds on hire purchase basis. This letter allowed entrepreneurs to also opt for the hire purchase by depositing only 25% in cash and paying the balance amount in 120 equal monthly instalments. All the other terms which were contained in the first letter of allotment were repeated including the requirement of the allottee to pay any arrears which may be due from it and it was also stated that if the acceptance was not communicated within 30 days of the receipt of the letter then, the offer was to be treated as being cancelled. This letter of offer was accompanied by another letter of DSIDC also of the same date whereby the allottees were informed of the basis of calculation of the price of sheds which had to be paid. It was stated therein that the sheds have been constructed mainly by taking loans from the financial institutions, and it was decided by the Delhi Administration that the principle of "no profit no loss" should be adopted while working out the price of the sheds and, therefore, price should comprise the following elements: "i. Cost of land. It was stated therein that the sheds have been constructed mainly by taking loans from the financial institutions, and it was decided by the Delhi Administration that the principle of "no profit no loss" should be adopted while working out the price of the sheds and, therefore, price should comprise the following elements: "i. Cost of land. ii) Cost of Construction of sheds iii) Post capitalisation expenses including:- a) Interest on loans raised for construction of various complexes. b) Ground rent payable to DDA c) Municipal taxes payable to the MCD d) Expenditure incurred on maintenance of sheds. e) Insurance charges of complexes. (f) Interest on own funds. " ( 11 ) IT was also mentioned in this letter that the major cost was that of interest to the banks. For exam-ple in the letter dated 17th June, 1987 written to one of the entrepreneurs viz. , Shri Subhash Chand the area of shed was 1875 sq. feet, for which the total price which was being claimed was Rs. 5,42,456. 25. The element of interest in this was Rs. 3,06,112. 50 and the balance cost was only Rs. 2,36,343. 75. The entrepreneur was informed that the interest which was being passed on was actual interest charged by the banks from DSIDC on the loans which had been taken for construction of the complexes. Efforts had been made to persuade the banks to reduce the interest but without success. The Corporation, however, gave further concession and it decided to charge only 6% p. a. simple interest on its own funds which had been invested in the project. It was further decided to charge only 50% of the expenditure incurred on maintenance of the sheds. As a result of the aforesaid concession, in practically all cases the price of the shed was reduced from what had already been communicated in the earlier offers and it was represented by the petitioner that the price of the shed which was now being offered was below the market price of the sheds. As a result of the aforesaid concession, in practically all cases the price of the shed was reduced from what had already been communicated in the earlier offers and it was represented by the petitioner that the price of the shed which was now being offered was below the market price of the sheds. While warning the entrepreneurs that delay in accepting the offer for purchase would result in the element of interest mounting up, the said allottees were told that if the revised terms were not accepted within 15 days of the issuance of the letter then, the petitioner would be left with no option but to take action to resume possession of the sheds besides recovery of the rent and other arrears. ( 12 ) IT seems that the above concessions were not sufficient to motivate all the entrepreneurs to either pay the rent or to opt for hire purchase agreement. The reason obviously seems to be that the Association of Entrepreneurs had filed a writ petition being C. W. 2874/87 challenging the amounts which were sought to be charged by the petitioner towards the cost of the sheds. In a forlorn hope to lure the entrepreneurs to accept the scheme, further concessions were announced by the petitioner by issuance of a fourth revised offer of allotment in April, 1989. The additional concessions which were offered to the allottees were as follows: "i) The allottees/entrepreneurs who accept the present offer in time as stipulated, shall be permitted to put up additional constructions as per relaxed FAR standards. ii) The allottees/entrepreneurs shall be entitled to a rebate of 15% on the up-to-date cost of the shed excluding the impact of property tax, if they accept the offer. iii) MCD shall be asked to levy the property tax from the individual entrepreneurs from the deemed date of their ownership i. e. 1. 3. 1977 and ac- cordingly work out its demand afresh taking the individual to be owner w. e. f. 1. 3. 1977. iv) For taking over the common services of these industrial estates, the amount required as per deficiencies estimates would be provided by the government out of plan funds. v) The industries department would assist the entrepreneur in getting SSI registration if applied for and in securing assistance from financial institutions for additional construction, additional power load etc. 3. 1977. iv) For taking over the common services of these industrial estates, the amount required as per deficiencies estimates would be provided by the government out of plan funds. v) The industries department would assist the entrepreneur in getting SSI registration if applied for and in securing assistance from financial institutions for additional construction, additional power load etc. " ( 13 ) THE said offer informed the entrepreneurs about the amount of rebate and the property taxes and it was again stipulated that the said offer was valid for a period of 30 days within which time the allottees were not only to accept the hire purchase offer but were also expected to make payment as stipulated in the terms of offer. For the first time the allottees were informed about the consequence of their not accepting the offer in the following words: "the allottee/entrepreneur, who does not accept the offer within the specified period, shall revert back to his status as lessee/licencee in accordance with the terms of the agreement and under the provisions of Public Premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971. As the period of license/lease has already expired and that you have committed breaches, you are hereby notified that your license shall stand terminated auto- matically on expiry of the period of this offer and as such you would be treated as an un-authorised occupant. The Corporation shall take all steps for recovery of the dues and if necessary, for eviction under the provisions of Public Premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 and other relevant laws in force. " ( 14 ) YET another offer was made in November, 1989 and the fresh concession offered to the hesitant allottees was that no rent would be charged from the allottees for the period prior to 1st March, 1977 and with interest of 15% maintenance charges would be included in the costing of the sheds on the basis of the investments of DSIDC on year to year basis. It was again repeated that this was a final offer and was valid for a period of 30 days from the date of issue or the date of publication in the newspaper whichever is later and failure to accept the same alongwith payment would deem the offer to be withdrawn. ( 15 ) MR. It was again repeated that this was a final offer and was valid for a period of 30 days from the date of issue or the date of publication in the newspaper whichever is later and failure to accept the same alongwith payment would deem the offer to be withdrawn. ( 15 ) MR. Swatantar Kumar submits that these offers were revised from time to time in view of the representations which were received by the petitioner from the entrepreneurs and the final offer of November, 1989 also, in effect, extended the time for the allottees to accept the hire purchase scheme. ( 16 ) SOME of the entrepreneurs apparently believed in the maxim "eating their cake and having it too". They neither paid the rent nor the hire purchase instalments but continued to retain the sheds and used them for the purpose of their business, they having frustrated the efforts of the petitioner, with the help of stay orders when the petitioner wanted to recover the hire purchase money. The petitioner commenced proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act against such defaulters, including the respondent. The respondent in the present case, after order of eviction had been passed by the Estate Officer, filed an appeal before the Addl. Distt. Judge, Delhi. Vide judgment dated 12th August, 1992 Shri M. S. Rohilla, ADJ, Delhi came to the conclusion that the premises in question were not public premises. The reason for the ADJ coming to the conclusion was, according to him, "having made the offer for hire pur-chase and having received some amount or even to ask the appellant to pay the amount, as per the hire agreement, the shed which ceased to be the property of the respondent corporation for the purposes of Section 2 of the Public Premises Act. " The ADJ also came to the conclusion that even if the premises were regarded as public premises the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Express Newspapers case. AIR 1986 SC 873 applies and the right of re-entry could be exercised only by filing a proper suit for possession. The ADJ, therefore, concluded that no action could be taken against the respondent under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the aforesaid decision of the ADJ. AIR 1986 SC 873 applies and the right of re-entry could be exercised only by filing a proper suit for possession. The ADJ, therefore, concluded that no action could be taken against the respondent under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the aforesaid decision of the ADJ. ( 17 ) COMING to the second reason which persuaded the. ADJ to decide in favour of the respondent, it appears that there is a clear fallacy in the reasoning which has been adopted. In the case of Indian Express no premises had been allotted by the Government but what was transferred was a piece of land. Therefore, in terms, the Public Premises Act did not apply. Further- more, what was constructed by the Indian Express was a building which belonged to it and not to the Government. In the present case, however, what was allotted, and not sold to the entrepreneurs initially were built up sheds which are obviouslypremises within the meaning of that expression under the P. PAct. Once the allotment is validly cancelled then the provisions of the P. PAct could be invoked. The decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Express s case clearly has no application in the present circumstances. ( 18 ) THE fundamental question which, however, arises for consideration is whether the premises in question can be regarded as public premises. ( 19 ) IT is not in dispute that the premises when they were constructed by the petitioner, and allotted to the entrepreneurs including the respondent, were public premises. These premises, as per the terms of the lease deed, had been let out to different allottees and they belonged to the petitioner having been constructed on the land which had been leased by the Government to it. In our opinion the character of these premises would change only if the petitioner ceases to be the owner thereof. The question is has that situation arisen in the present case? ( 20 ) IT is not in dispute that efforts were made for sale of the said premises to the various allottees either on hire purchase or on outright sale basis. We are here dealing with a case where, admittedly, this option had not been exercised by the allottee. The question is has that situation arisen in the present case? ( 20 ) IT is not in dispute that efforts were made for sale of the said premises to the various allottees either on hire purchase or on outright sale basis. We are here dealing with a case where, admittedly, this option had not been exercised by the allottee. No document transferring the title in the said sheds has been executed by the Corporation in favour of any allottee. ( 21 ) THE position in law is that if premises are sold on hire purchase basis then the transfer takes place only after the last instalment is paid. In the present case this situation has admittedly not arisen. The Corporation cannot, therefore, in law be regarded as having ceased to become the owner of the property. To put it in another way, there is no document on record or any paper to suggest that the respondent has become the owner of the property or that the petitioner has lost or relinquished its title thereof. Change of ownership of the sheds is not evidenced by any document registered or otherwise. An offer of sale of the shed was undoubtedly made but the same had not been executed and this has led to the proceedings under the P. P. Act being initiated. Transfer could have taken place if the total consideration asked for by the petitioner had been paid either by instalments or in one lump sum. This has not happened and it is not possible for this Court to come to the conclusion that without the receipt of the consideration DSIDC has ceased to become the owner of the sheds. The conclusion of the ADJ to the contrary is clearly unsupportable on any legal principle. ( 22 ) IT had been contended before us that the entrepreneurs were willing to purchase the said sheds but there was a dispute with regard to the consideration which was payable. This dispute had led to the filing of the aforesaid writ petition (CW 2874/87) which is pending in this Court. A hire purchase agreement is a contract between the two parties. The petitioner had offered to sell the property owned by it at a price which it had fixed. This was the offer which was accepted by some entrepreneurs but not by the respondent and some others like him. A hire purchase agreement is a contract between the two parties. The petitioner had offered to sell the property owned by it at a price which it had fixed. This was the offer which was accepted by some entrepreneurs but not by the respondent and some others like him. After the offer of sale was modified, to the benefit of the entrepreneurs atleast thrice, each time in the letter of offer it was stipulated that the same had to be accepted within a stipulated period. We cannot come to the conclusion that filing of a writ petition challenging the price fixed can by any stretch of imagination be regarded as an acceptance of the offer by the respondent. Intact an regarded as an acceptance of the offer by the respondent. Infact an essential ingredient in the offer which was made viz. , the price, is sought to be challenged. The offer which was made by the petitioner has infact been rejected by the entrepreneurs, who had filed the aforesaid writ petition. ( 23 ) IT is submitted by Shri Swatantar Kumar that the aforesaid offers were revised after discussions had been held by the authorities with the representatives of the entrepreneurs. That may be so but the position in law which remains unaltered is that the petitioner was never divested of its title to the property in question and the hire purchase agreement had to be executed in the terms in which the offer was made. ( 24 ) THE next question which arises is whether the entreprenears who had not accepted the offer for purchase of sheds on hire purchase basis but may have challenged the price which was demanded were entitled to continue to remain in the premises without payment of any money to the petitioner. ( 25 ) ADMITTEDLY the entrepreneurs had been allotted sheds as per the terms of allotment. A monthly lease deed was executed between the parties which stipulated payment of monthly rent to the petitioner. In the offer of hire purchase which had been made it was contemplated that the hire money paid would be adjusted against the instalments which were due. A monthly lease deed was executed between the parties which stipulated payment of monthly rent to the petitioner. In the offer of hire purchase which had been made it was contemplated that the hire money paid would be adjusted against the instalments which were due. Hire purchase agreement not having been entered into between the parties because the offer was not accepted in toto, and an agreement concluded, the liability of the entrepreneurs to pay the lease money in terms of the lease deed could not and did not come to an end. In other words the lease deed was not superseded by any other document. The rights and liabilities inter se were clearly governed by the terms of the said lease. This made it obligatory on the lessee to pay the monthly rent in the manner stipulated in the lease deed. Non-payment of rent for two consecutive months after the execution of the lease entitled the lessor to terminate the lease and re-enter and resume the same. This is precisely what has been done by the petitioner herein when in the letter of April, 1989 it was stated that if the offer of hire purchase was not accepted by the entrepreneurs then the said lessee shall revert back to his status as lessee/licencee. By this letter the lessee was also informed that as the period of the licence deed/lease had already expired and breaches had been committed by the lessee the said licence stood automatically terminated on the expiry of period of the offer con- tained in the letter and the lessee was to be treated as an unauthorised occupant. The entrepreneurs were also put to notice that the Corporation would take all steps for the recovery of dues and, if necessary, for eviction under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. ( 26 ) IT was sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable and the petitioner cannot resile from the offer which was made to the entrepreneurs. The contention of the entrepreneurs is that the Lt. Governor had stated that the sheds will be transferred to the entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis and that price will be determined after proper evaluation by a body which will comprise Government representa- tives and representatives of the entrepreneurs. The contention of the entrepreneurs is that the Lt. Governor had stated that the sheds will be transferred to the entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis and that price will be determined after proper evaluation by a body which will comprise Government representa- tives and representatives of the entrepreneurs. It is with reference to this that Shri Swatantar Kumar has sought to emphasise that the offers of hire purchase were revised, from time to time, after discussions had been held with the representatives of the entrepre- neurs. ( 27 ) THE principle of promissory estoppel is applicable when on a promise having been held out the promisee acts to his detriment. The said principle, in our opinion, is clearly not attracted in the present case. The sheds were allotted to the entrepreneurs long before the aforesaid statement dated 9th March, 1977 which had emanated from the Lt. Governor. The rights and liabilities of the parties were to be determined in terms of the lease agreements which had been signed. It is that relationship which was to be brought to an end and to be superseded by a fresh agreement of hire purchase, which never came into existence. The entrepreneurs did not in any way act to their detriment on the issuance of the letter dated 9th March, 1977 by the Lt. Governor except that they took that as a licence not to pay any more rent to the petitioner herein. ( 28 ) REFERENCE in this connection may usefully be made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of R. K. Kawatra v. DSIDC, AIR 1992 Delhi 28. In that case the DSIDC developed some acquired land and published an advertisement in December, 1976 inviting applications from the general public for allotment of plots for setting up industries in the complex. 20% towards premium was also deposited but then a new scheme was announced in 1987 when again the petitioners therein applied. The contention of the petitioners therein was that the principle of promissory estoppel applied and that the DSIDC was bound by the scheme of 1977. 20% towards premium was also deposited but then a new scheme was announced in 1987 when again the petitioners therein applied. The contention of the petitioners therein was that the principle of promissory estoppel applied and that the DSIDC was bound by the scheme of 1977. Rejecting this contention it was held by this Court that the brochure which was issued in the year 1977 had made it clear that it was only tentative and no legal commitment was made and, therefore, in the new policy of 1987 the DSIDC could change the sizes of the plots and also increase the price of land. ( 29 ) HERE also we find that the offers relating to hire purchase were made by the DSIDC, from time to time, but they were never accepted. The said offers would have been binding only on the acceptance and payment in terms thereof and as this was not done the question of principle of promissory estoppel applying does not arise. We may also here notice that this Court in Kawatra s case (supra) also held - that in matters of allotment of plots by the Government price fixation of plots is a matter of policy and not within the province of the courts. In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Sugar Company v. UOI, AIR 1990 SC 1277 . Moreover, in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bareily Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh and Others, JT 1989 (1) SC 368 puts the legal position beyond any doubt. It was held by the Supreme Court that where the allottees had accepted the conditions of allotment which, inter alia, envisaged enhancement of the cost of flats and where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is a non- statutory one and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be made so as to compel the authorities to refix the price at which the property is to be sold. In other words it is for the petitioner herein to determine as to at what price it is willing to sell the sheds to the entrepreneurs. In other words it is for the petitioner herein to determine as to at what price it is willing to sell the sheds to the entrepreneurs. Once this price has been fixed it is open to the entrepreneurs either to accept or to reject the same. If the entrepreneurs accept the price then they can enter into hire purchase agreement or purchase the shed by paying 100% of the price. If the entrepreneurs felt that the price was exhorbitant or high they were under no obligation to accept the same and their rights under the terms of the lease executed by DSIDC in their favour would remain un-affected. ( 30 ) THE petitioner is a public sector undertaking. One expects efficiency from such undertakings and they are required to maintain higher standards which are comparable with those of the private enterprises. If that be so they must act in accordance with the known commercial principles. It will be unfair and not just to place fetters in their functioning and still expect them to deliver the goods. The petitioner is a commercial organisation which, at the same time, is required to serve the cause of the industrial growth in Delhi. The agreements which are entered into by the petitioner with various constituents or clients are purely commercial in nature. When a case comes to Court these agreements have to be judged in that light. Can it be said, taking an overall view of the present case, that the petitioner was not entitled to fix the price at which it was prepared to sell the sheds or could the price which it fixed be regarded as unreasonable. ( 31 ) THE petitioner was the owner of the sheds and, according to it, the sheds were offered for sale on the principle of no profit no loss . It has indicated in the offers made as to what are the elements which have gone into ascertaining the prices at which these sheds are to be sold. Apart from the cost of land and the cost of construction an important element which has been taken into consideration is the interest paid by the petitioner to the banks and the financial institutions. Apart from the cost of land and the cost of construction an important element which has been taken into consideration is the interest paid by the petitioner to the banks and the financial institutions. It is not in dispute and in any case we see no reason to disbelieve the statement of the petitioner that the sheds were constructed after it had obtained loans from the banks and other financial institutions. The transaction between the petitioner and the banks and lending institutions, in this behalf, was purely commer- cial in nature. The petitioner is under a legal obligation to pay interest on the loans taken by it. This being so, the interest part has to be taken into consideration while working out the actual cost of the shed. This has been done when the offer of sale was made. In the letter offering the shed it has been stated by the petitioner that though the banks have so far refused to forego the interest claimed by them but still efforts were being made by the Corporation in this behalf. Mr. Swatantar Kumar informs us that some of the banks have filed suits for recovery against the petitioner and the same are still pending. The suits are for the principle amount and the interest leviable thereon. This being the position it cannot be said that the petitioner was not entitled to include the element of interest in working out the price at which it could sell the sheds to the various entrepreneurs. ( 32 ) WE,therefore, do not find any legal justification for the challenge by the proposed purchaser to the price fixed by the proposed seller. At the cost of repetition it is observed that the transaction between the petitioner and the respondent is purely commercial in nature and has to be examined in its proper perspective. Commer- cially speaking it is for the seller to fix the price, and for the purchaser, either to accept or to reject the same. The seller cannot be compelled by the purchaser to re-fixthe price to its detriment. Of course negotiations between the parties had taken place even with regard to determination of price but when the price has been fixed and a firm offer made there is no legal justification for claiming any right, in a Court of law, to the lowering of the price. Of course negotiations between the parties had taken place even with regard to determination of price but when the price has been fixed and a firm offer made there is no legal justification for claiming any right, in a Court of law, to the lowering of the price. In other words it would not be proper for the Court to direct the seller to decrease the price unless of course the Court comes to the conclusion that the action of the seller is arbitrary. There is no reason for us to come to such a conclusion in the present case, even assuming that such a principle can be invoked in a transaction of commercial nature. ( 33 ) IN our opinion, for the aforesaid reasons the decision of the ADJ allowing the appeal of the respondent is bad in law and we issue a writ of certiorari quashing the same. The respondent admittedly had not paid the arrears of rent and there had been a valid termination of the agreement of lease and as no option has been exercised by him for purchase of the shed on hire purchase basis the action of the petitioner under the provisions of the P. P. Act had been validly initiated. ( 34 ) DURING the pendency of this writ petition the offer was once again made by Shri Swatantar Kumar to the effect that the entre- preneurs can still, at the price fixed by the petitioner, buy the sheds on hire purchase basis. The terms of this offer are contained in the order dated 15th September, 1993 of this Court in C. W. 3086/ 92 (Shri R. Sehgal v. Estate Officer and another), the material portion of which is as follows: Counsel for the respondent submits that he has taken instructions and according to him the respon- dent will be willing to extend the offer of 1989 on the terms and conditions contained in the said offer. The said offer of 1989 gives four options to the allottees for purchase of the sheds. The first option was 100% cash down payment; the second was 75% cash down payment and 25% by instalments; the 3rd option was 394 50% cash down payment and 50% by instalments and the fourth option was 25% cash down payment and 75% by instalments. The first option was 100% cash down payment; the second was 75% cash down payment and 25% by instalments; the 3rd option was 394 50% cash down payment and 50% by instalments and the fourth option was 25% cash down payment and 75% by instalments. If an allottee exercised the first option he was required to pay 10% p. a. interest but in respect of other options the rate of interest which was payable was stated to be 18% p. a Mr. Swatantar Kumar states that as a further concession the rate of interest will be reduced to 17. 74% in the case of options 2,3 and 4. This interest will be paid with quarterly rests and the instalments worked out on this basis. The offer also entitled the allottee to make additional construction on the F. A. R. having increased. Mr. Swatantar Kumar will take instructions with regard to the fact whether the allottee will be free to dispose of the extra area which is constructed because such disposal will help the allottee in making the payment demanded by the respondent. Further instructions are sought by him with regard to the time as to when the first instalment is to be paid. Counsel for the petitioner requests that he should be permitted to make the payment of 25% within three months of the isssue of the revised demand. Mr. Swatantar Kumar further states that arrears w. e. f. 1989 will have to be paid and alongwith 25% amount the arrears of interest will also have to be paid. The amount which has been paid by the petitioner will be given credit for. Counsel for the petitioner states that if the respondent agrees to giving the petitioner time to make the initial payment within three months from the date of issue of the demand the offer of 1989 as explained by Mr. Swatantar Kumar is "acceptable to the petitioner. " ( 35 ) ON 4th October, 1993 this Court again directed that any party who wished to accept the aforesaid offer of hire purchase should file an undertaking with the DSIDC before the next date of hearing. Mr. Francis informs us that the respondent has exercised the option in terms of the aforesaid order dated 15th September, 1993 and an undertaking, as envisaged, has been filed with the petitioner and substantial amount also paid. Mr. Francis informs us that the respondent has exercised the option in terms of the aforesaid order dated 15th September, 1993 and an undertaking, as envisaged, has been filed with the petitioner and substantial amount also paid. This being so, while the writ petition is allowed, and the impugned order quashed, the respondent shall, however, be bound by the terms of the undertaking given by him vide letter dated 12th October, 1993 and if the respondent abides by the said undertaking and complies with the said order dated 15th September, 1993 then no action of dispossession of the respondent shall be taken. If the respondent does not comply with the terms of the offer now made and accepted by him then the petitioner will be entitled to take recourse to law. ( 36 ) THERE will be no order as to costs.