JUDGMENT 1. - In this criminal misc. petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. both the petitioners, who arc husband and wife, (Dr. B.S. Tomar & Dr. Shobha Tomar) seek direction to quash F.I.R. No. 124/92 registered on 23.9.1992 at police station Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur. 2. It is not in dispute that Dr. B.S. Tomar joined Rajasthan Medical Service in the year 1977 as Lecturer in Paediatric Medicine. He is M.D. in Paediatrics and holds numerous fellowship in (i) Paediatrics in Nephrology, University of California San Diego, U.S.A., (ii) Paediatric Ganstroenterology, Howard University of America, Boston and New England Medical Care of America, (iii) Commonwealth Medical Fellowship, Commonwealth Scholarship Commission, London (iv) Paediatric Gastroenterologist, Kings College Hospital, London. He has been a visiting Professor to Libya and European Universities of France, Switzerland and Italy. In the year 1987, he was working as Assistant Professor (Paediatrics), S.M.S. Medical College, and Sir Padampat (Jaykaylon) Mother & Child Hospital, Jaipur. 3. Dr. Shobha Tomar (petitioner No. 2) who had married to Dr. B.S. Tomar (petitioner No. 1) in the year 1979, holds degree of M.B.B.S., apart from being a Fellow of Women's Diseases, Kings College of London, and presently posted as Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Dispensary, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur. 4. It is also not in dispute that both the petitioners submit their returns in individual capacities besides on behalf of the HUF; and his mother, Smt. Rajeshwari Tomar submits her individual return separate and further that wealth tax returns have also been accepted by the department. 5. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner had purchased a semi-constructed house located at B-4, Govind Marg, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur in March 1990 for a consideration of Rs. 17,60,172/-, and a raid by the Income-tax department was made on 17.9.1992. And, after the income tax raid, an F.I.R. NO. 124/92 came to be registered on 23.9.1992 for offences punishable under Sections 13(l)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 34, IPC at police station Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur, alleging therein that both the petitioners are public servants and from known sources, their income comes to Rs. 10,34,338/-only whereas the property owned by them is valued at Rs. 62,20,748/- and therefore, their income is disproportionate to the known sources of income. 10,34,338/-only whereas the property owned by them is valued at Rs. 62,20,748/- and therefore, their income is disproportionate to the known sources of income. The investigation commenced and was in progress and not yet completed till filing of the present petition on 9.2.1993. 6. The first information report is sought to be quashed alleging grave malice, bias of investigating agency consisting of Shri Sunderlal, Additional Superintendent of Police, & Shri Rohit Mahajan, Additional Superintendent of Police, Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur, who have also been impleaded as respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in this petition. The first information report is also sought to be quashed on the ground that it does not constitute basic ingredient of the offences alleged against the petitioners, punishable under Sections 13(l)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The F.I.R. has further been challenged on the ground that the Act does not envisage joint or vicarious liability, inasmuch as Section 13 there of comtemplates misconduct of singular/individual public servant and, therefore, Section 34, IPC has completely been misconceived in the controversy at hand, thereby, the FIR suffers from illegality apart from being violative of the provisions contained in the Act, itself. 7. Much reliance has been placed upon the decision in Madhav Rao Scindia's case (AIR 1988 SC p.709) so also in Stale of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp. Vol. 1, SCC p.335) and it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that before registration of the first information report, preliminary inquiry as far as possible is highly desirable, but, no such preliminary inquiry has been conducted. It has also been contended that even otherwise and in either case, the impugned F.I.R. does not travel beyond alleging possession of properties beyond known sources but, mere possession docs not constitute an offence punishable under section 13(l)(e), and that being so, unless the F.I.R. discloses something beyond possession, no cogniable offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act can be said to have been committed, as has been laid down in Bhajanlal's case (supra). 8. 8. Shri N.L. Pareek, learned Public Prosecutor contrarily stressed much that since the investigation has yet to be completed apart from being at preliminary stage, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed as the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence over it is vested in the State Government and therefore, the Court is not justified to interfer with the investigation. He placed reliance on the decisions in AIR 1992 SC p. 1930, AIR 1991 SC 1308 (State of Bihar v. Raj Narain Singh) , AIR 1992SC p. 604 (State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal) , and 1992 Suppl Vol. 1 SCC p. 222 (State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma) , so also 1992 (4) SCC p. 305 (Janla Dal v. H.S. Chaudhary) . 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. Both the learned counsel have filed their written arguments. A reply to the criminal misc. petition has also been filed by the respondents. 10. First question arising for consideration is whether F.I.R. can be quashed and if yes, then is what circumstances? Before arriving at the conclusion on the first question, 1 will like to have a brief resume of the decisions referred to by the learned Public Prosecutor. 11. In M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanya Kumar, ( AIR 1992 SC 1930 ) , the High Court had quashed the investigation and not the F.I.R., and before it, one of the accused in the F.I.R. had filed an application under section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the investigation only which was closed by the investigating officer but that investigation was subsequently transferred to another investigating officer and which had not completed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that further investigation in the offence is legally permissible as contemplated by Section 173(8), Cr.P.C., and then their Lordships observed that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without any compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation. Thus viewed, even according to the decision cited by Shri Pareek, supra, the Court is justified with compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation; and further, keeping in view facts of the decision, ibid, it has no application to the facts of the present case, wherein the F.I.R. is sought to the quashed on the grounds, supra, other than those urged in the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. (supra). 12. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, (1992 (4) SCC p. 305) , the High Court has suo motu initiated action and interfered with F.I.R. and investigation which was held to be illegal and perverse by their Lordships of the Apex Court. In the present case, there are no circumstances as were in Janata Dal's case (supra), and in this view of the matter, no help can be derived therefrom in favour of the present respondents. As against it, if the decision cited by Shri Pareek (supra) is read over carefully, their Lordships of the Apex Court held in para 132 that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise, and Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. Their Lordships observed that the power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Having carefully gone through the decision, ibid, I find that only bar while exercising the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. upon the High Court is to giving of a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and such power should be exercised in appropriate cases ex debito justitiate to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary , ibid, was delivered by the bench consisting of S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jaya Chandra Reddy, JJ., who were also parties and had occasioned to deal with the question as to exercise of the inherent power conferred by Section 482, Cr.P.C., in State of Haryana v. Ch. The decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary , ibid, was delivered by the bench consisting of S. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jaya Chandra Reddy, JJ., who were also parties and had occasioned to deal with the question as to exercise of the inherent power conferred by Section 482, Cr.P.C., in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) , Therefore, their Lordships in Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary , (supra) in para 137 observed as under "This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajanlal to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. WE do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Section 397, 401 and 482 of the Code." In para 154 at p. 360, their Lordships quoted the principles of law on the scope of the inherent power of the High Court laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (supra), and then in para 158, observed as under "After the proposition of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in Bhajanlal case, we have given certain category of cases by way of illustrations wherein the power of quashing could be exercised either for preventing abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice staling that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficient channelised infrangible guidelines and rigid formula to give an exhaustive list of various kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised . We do not like to prolong the discussion on this point any more." In this view of the matter, the decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary cited by Shri Pareek does not help and support him. 12. We do not like to prolong the discussion on this point any more." In this view of the matter, the decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary cited by Shri Pareek does not help and support him. 12. In State of Bihar v. Raj Narain Singh ( AIR 1991 SC 1308 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 393) , the High Court had quashed the trial after analysis of the first information/investigation report and the statements of witnesses recorded during investigation and the discrepancy appearing therein mainly in regard to the implications of the respondent (accused) by name. But their Lordships held that the High Court could not have prejudged on the basis of certain discrepancy in FIR and statements of witnesses recorded during investigation, without affording reasonable opportunity to prosecution to substantiate its allegations. Since as the facts stated above reveal, it was a case of quashing of the trial by the High Court, whereas in the case at hand, F.I.R. is sought to be quashed on the grounds urged above, I do not think that the ratio therein is 6f any assistance to the facts in this case. 13. In State of Bihar v. P.R Sharma, (1992 Supp (2) SCC 22) , their Lordships of the Apex Court dealt with scope of High Court's power to quash criminal proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India at a stage anterior to trial Court's decision on taking cognizance of offence on the basis of police report submitted to it. The High Court had appreciated the documents and affidavits produced before it treating them as evidence delving into the disputed questions of fact in its jurisdiction under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution. The High Court in that case even did not permit the Special Judge to pronounce the orders. Their Lordships observed that the High Court fell into grave effort in appreciating the documents & affidavits produced before it treating as evidence. Thus viewed, the decision in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (supra) cited by Shri Pareek is also of no assistance to the respondents in the case at hand. 14. Now last decision referred to by Shri Pareek, learned Public Prosecutor-which has also been cited by Shri Bajwa on belief of the petitioners in support of their contentions, is state of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (1992 Supp (1) SCC p. 335) . 14. Now last decision referred to by Shri Pareek, learned Public Prosecutor-which has also been cited by Shri Bajwa on belief of the petitioners in support of their contentions, is state of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (1992 Supp (1) SCC p. 335) . In this decision their Lordships categorised the cases by way of illustrations wherein the extra ordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers under Section under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. These categories of cases are following "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Whereas the allegations- in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Whereas the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 15. Confronted with the principles of law (supra) enunciated by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (supra), Shri Pareek fairly and frankly conceded that the F.I.R. can be quashed but he stressed that inherent powers should be exercised very sparingly in rarest cases. Having benefited by the enlightens decried from the above quoted principles of law laid down in Bhajanlal's case (supra), now the decks arc clear that the F.I.R., prosecution, criminal proceedings, and investigation can be quashed by this Court in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, at least in the cases enlisted/illustrated by their Lordships of the Apex Court in case the matter does fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated above. However, the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly as inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. And, the caution has also to be taken that the Court will not embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability, or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. And, the caution has also to be taken that the Court will not embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability, or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. Further, as laid down in para 60, in Bhajanlal's case (supra), if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudices to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. 16. Reverting to the present controversy raised at the bar, 1 may say that the central issue involved for scrutiny is, whether the facts and circumstances pointed out during the course of the arguments as grounds for quashing the F.I.R. do fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated (supra) in State of Bihar v. Bhajanlal calling for the exercise of extra ordinary or inherent powers of this Court to quash the F.I.R. in question, itself. 17. The first and short ground urged on behalf of the petitioners for quashing the F.I.R. is that the investigation is manifestly attended with malafide and/or is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners and with a view to spite them due to private and/or personal grudge. At this juncture, I may say that merely on ground of malafides, the investigation of criminal proceedings if otherwise justifiable, cannot be interfered with. And, the question of malafide exercise of power will assume significance only if an authority acts for unauthorised purpose. That being so, the proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the power is exercised. That apart, undue or post haste in registering the case by police officer, by itself, is not sufficient to quash the F.I.R. Applying this test to the present case it leads me to examine as to what is the dominant purpose of registration and the intended follow up action in the present case. That apart, undue or post haste in registering the case by police officer, by itself, is not sufficient to quash the F.I.R. Applying this test to the present case it leads me to examine as to what is the dominant purpose of registration and the intended follow up action in the present case. Now, I may hasten to anatomize the circumstances leading to registering of impugned first information report which, according to the petitioners, betray grave malice, oblique motive,want of good faith nay personal bias of investigating agency. 18. The first circumstance alleged by the petitioner is that a stage-managed income tax raid had taken place on 17.9.1992 by Shri Dilip Shivpuri - In charge of the Income Tax Raid, who according to the petitioners in one of the cousins of Dr. Deepak Shivpuri whose machination got humiliated because, after return of Dr. B.S.Tomar from London where he had gone upon his selection by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission of London, on deputation for one year, he (Dr. Tomar) was supposed to be posted back as Assistant Professor in Paediatrics but Dr. Deepak Shivpuri who did also happen to return from his sojourn to Libya, had intrigued for his posting against the post of Assistant Professor in Paediatrics for which Dr. Tomar was supposed to be posted, thereby Dr. Shivpuri was not successful in getting himself posted qua the post of Dr. Tomar obviously as a result of better academic qualifications so also an undertaking which had already been given by the State Govt. to post Dr. Tomar on his return to India at the same post. Thus, since intrigue of Dr. Shivpuri felt humiliated, Dr. Shivpuri has been nursing a rancour against Dr. Tomar and Dr. Shivpuri happens to be one of the cousins of Shri Dilip Shivpuri, Dy. Director Income-Tax (Investigation), Jaipur who has admittedly been in charge of the income tax raid which was made by him on 17.9.1992 at the place of the petitioners. 19. In para 6 of the present petition, it has been averred that since the petitioners have never concealed any of their income and since every single penny earned/inherited/arranged by them stood fully incorporated in respective income tax records, the income tax raid which took place on 17.9.1992 at the in charge ship of the above named, Dilip Shivpuri, the raid ended in a whimper and it was a complete fiasco. It has also been averred that since the raid ended in a whimper after having been satisfied on perusing different income tax returns/assessment orders in respect of the petitioners and family members, Dy. Director (Investigation), namely, Dilip Shivpuri, finding no other way except to save their face, could only think of his old college-mate Shri Rohil Mahajan, Add. S.P. Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur City I, who hadodged the impugned F.I.R., being a good friend of Dilip Shivpuri. Though Shri Rohit Mahajan has been impleaded as respondent No. 3, but he has not filed any reply to the aforesaid assertions made by the petitioners. However, a joint reply to the present petition has been filed, wherein at para 6 only thing stated is, `contents of para regarding Shri Dilip Shivpuri and respondent No. 3 (Rohit Mahajan) being old college-mates could not be replied for want of knowledge. However, it has been denied that the FIR No. 124/92 was registered on 23.9.92 at the instance of Shri Rohit Mahajan, Addl. S.P. (RSBI) Jaipur. It has then been asserted in the reply at para 6 that, `but the fact is that on 17.9.1992 the then Director General of Police, RSBI, Jaipur Shri V.K. Thanvi received an information from Dy. Director, Income-Tax (Investigation) Jaipur regarding property and assets of the petitioners. The affidavit in support of the reply to the present petition has been filed by Shri Sunderlal Sharma, Addl. S.P. RSBI, Jaipur City I, Jaipur, (investigating officer). No affidavit of Shri Rohit Mahajan (respondent NO. 3) has been filed. In para 3 of the affidavit, Shri Sunderlal Sharma (respondent No. 2) stated as under:- "3- that the contents of paras 1 to 7 including all the grounds of my annexed reply are true and correct to my knowledge which is based on official record." Obviously the fact of Shri Dilip Shivpuri & Shri Rohit Mahajan being college-mates or good friend could have ween been replied or denied by Shri Rohit Mahajan as respondent No. 3 and not by Shri Sunderlal Sharma (respondent No. 2) inasmuch as such a fact cannot be part of the record of the respondent No. 2. As stated earlier, no affidavit of Shri Rohit Mahajan has been filed to reply specific plea made by the petitioners. As stated earlier, no affidavit of Shri Rohit Mahajan has been filed to reply specific plea made by the petitioners. In the absence thereof, the allegation made by the petitioner as to the fact of Dilip Shivpuri and Rohit Mahajan being college-mates remains un controverted and substantiated duly unrebutted. Be that as it may, as per contents in para 6 of the reply, it is also an admitted fact that the respondents were informed by Dr. Director Income Tax (Investigation), namely, Shri Dilip Shivpuri regarding property & assets of the petitioners and upon that information, the respondents put into motion to register the impugned F.I.R. The fact of the income tax raid by Dy. Director (Investigation) Shri Shivpuri at the house of the petitioner does also stand admitted in para 6 of the reply. 20. From the material placed on record, it stands proved that Shri Dilip Shivpuri being cousin of Dr. Deepak Shivpuri (who, in the circumstances spelt out from the petition, after his machination to get himself posted as Assistant Professor in Paediatrics for which Dr. B.S. Tomar was to be posted after his return from abroad having failed, had been nursing rancour against Dr. Tomar) and being Dy. Director (Investigation), Income Tax, had made firstly raid at the house of the petitioner and when he failed in his machination in the raid which ended in a whimper after anatomizing income-tax returns & assessment orders of the petitioners & family members he approached his college-mate, Shri Rohit Mahajan who admittedly has been Add. S.P. (RSBI) Jaipur City-I, on or after 17.9.1992 and informed Shri V.K. Thanvi, the then Director General of Police, RSBI, Jaipur, complaining of the property & assets of the petitioners, and in this manner, Shri Dilip Shivpuri was the complainant bearing rancour with the petitioners as a result of rivalry in between his cousin, Dr. Deepak Shivpuri, & Dr. Tomar. Thus, it cannot be denied that Shri Dilip Shivpuri, Dy. Deepak Shivpuri, & Dr. Tomar. Thus, it cannot be denied that Shri Dilip Shivpuri, Dy. Director, (Investigation) Income Tax is the first informant and complainant; that, he failed in his machination to get a case registered for an offence punishable under the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the income tax raid supervised, stage-manged by him, against the petitioners, which ended in a whimper obviously after having found no case made out, and that since he failed in his intrigue, so, in order to save their faces and conceal lapses, he informed other administrative authority, i.e. the pre-investigating authority which has been pursued for their own purpose and wreak rancour which arose also out of their failure in intrigue. The dominant purpose, as I wrung out from the aforesaid facts and circumstances pointed out in regard to the malafide exercise of power, supra,to register F.I.R. and investigation thereon after being pursued by Shri Dilip Shivpuri, is unlawful and to make the character assassination of the petitioners and family members. Thus viewed, registration of the impugned F.I.R and intended follow up action is manifestly attended with malafide, with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners and with a view to spite them due to private & personal grudge. 21. Now, second but fateful issue is, whether the F.I.R. does constitute basic ingredient of the offences alleged against the petitioners, punishable under Sections 13(1) (e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 22. It leads me to first reproduce Sections 13(l)(e) and 13(2) of the Act, 1988 herein below:- "13. Criminal Misconduct by a public servant. A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, - (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation - For the purposes of this sections "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. Explanation - For the purposes of this sections "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine." It is significant to note here that Section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act, 1988 are corresponding to Section 5(1) and 5(2) of the Act, 1947. There arc two ingredients of offence under Section 13(l)(e) of the Act, 1988, one being the disproportionate assets and the other being the inability of accused to satisfactorily explain the said disproportion. Mere possession of any pecuniary resources or property by itself is not an offence, but it is the failure to satisfactorily account for such possession of pecuniary resources or property that makes the possession objectionable and constitutes the offence with the ambit of section 13(l)(e) of the Act, 1988. Mere possession of any pecuniary resources or property by itself is not an offence, but it is the failure to satisfactorily account for such possession of pecuniary resources or property that makes the possession objectionable and constitutes the offence with the ambit of section 13(l)(e) of the Act, 1988. I must hasten to reproduce the contents of the impugned F.I.R. so as to determine whether it discloses facts/material to infer that the petitioners had in any way abused the public office - ------MkW0 ch0,l0 rksej ,oa mudh iRuh nksuksa dh ikfjokfjd i`"Bhkwfe lk/kkj.k gksdj Lo;a ds vykok vU; dksbZ vk; ds L=ksr ugha gSaA MkW rksej nEifRr dk jgu&lgu mPp Lrj dk gksuk ik;k x;k gSA MkW0 ch0,l0 rksej rFkk mudh iRuh MkW0 'kksHkk rksej }kjk lkekU; vk'k; dh iwfrZ ds fy;s vius jktdh; lsokdky esa in dk nq:i;ksx dj voS/k ,oa Hkz"V rjhdksa ls vR;f/kd ifjlEifRr;ka Lo;a ds ifjokj ds lnL;ksa ds uke ls vftZr dh gSA MkW0 ch0,l0 rksej dk jktdh; lsok dky fnukad 6-12-77 ,oa MkW0 'kksHkk rksej dk fnukad 3-4-82 ls 23-9-92 rd psd le;kof/k ekus tkdj mudh osru lk/kuksa ls vk; ,oa vftZr dh xbZ ifjlEifRr;ksa dk fooj.k fuEu izdkj gS %& ( v ) MkW0 ch0,l0 rksej dh vk;%& 1- osru ls vk; yxHkx 25]000-00 :0 dk 33 izfr'kr vly ekuus ij ( fnukad 6-12-77 ls flrEcj] 1992 rd ) 1]72]000-00 2- vk;dj izi= dh x.kuk ls futh iszfDVl ls vk; 1]13]000-00 3- vk;dj izi= dh vk/kkj ij migkj 65]331-00 4- pkanh ds crZu cspus ls vk; vk;dj izi= esa fn[kkbZ xbZ vk; 89]680-00 5- edku HkRrk 1]200-00 6- d`f"k&Hkw&[k.M t;iqj ds cspus ls vk; 4]89]211-00 ( c ) MkW0 'kksHkk rksej dh vk; %& ( flrEcj 92 rd ) 1- osru ls vk; uksV % ,d lkFk ,d gh ifjlj esa jgus ds dkj.k iw.kZ osru dks cpr ekuk tkus ij 2]97]062-00 2- vk;dj izi= esa izkbZosV izsfDVl ls vk; 45]000-00 3- migkj 42]700-00 4- C;kt ls vk; 27]400-00 5- edku fdjk;k 1]200-0 6- lksus ds vkHkw"k.kksa ls fodz; ls vk; 1]31]765-00 dqy vk; v0 4]89]211 + 5]45]127 = 10]34]338-00 ;ksx 5]45]127-00 ifjlEifRr;ka &&&] xksfoUn ekxZ] vkn'kZ uxj t;iqj :0 vfHkys[k ds vuqlkj nEifRr ds uke 17]60]172-00 mDr Hkw&[k.M ij fuekZ.k dk ewY;kadu 42]10]576-00 fuokl ij foykflrk ds lkeku dk ewY;kadu 1]50]000-00 cSad tek 1]00]000-00 blls Li"V gS fd Mk0 nEifRr }kjk vius jktdh; lsokdky ds nkSjku psd le;kof/k rd voS/k lk/kuksa ls yxHkx 62]20]740@& :i;s dh ifjlEifRr;ksa vftZr dh xbZ tcfd bu nksuksa dh oS/k vk; ds Kkr L=ksrksa ls yxHkx 10]34]330@& :0 vftZr fd;s x;sA bl izdkj ( vftZr lEifRr;kWa & vk; ) 62]20]748&10]34]338 = 51]86]410 :0 dh ifjlEifRr;kWa dh psd le;kof/k esa vftZr djuk Kkr gqvk gSA MkW0 rksej nEifr ds cSad ykdlZ rFkk cSad vkQ bUnkSj esa yk[kksa :i;k dh ,Q0Mh0vkj0 gksuk Hkh Kkr gqvk gSA Mk0 rksej nEifRr ds orZeku jktdh; vkokl ij vk/kqfud foykflrk dh lkexzh ekStwn gSA tsojkr ds fodz; ,oa C;kt dh vk; ds lkFk gh lkFk muds dz; dk vkdyu Hkh fd;k tkuk gSA MkW0ch0,l0 rksej] ,oa MkW0 'kksHkk rksej ds fo:) /kkjk 13 ( 1 ) bZ] 13 ( 2 ) Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd vf/kfu;e] 1988 lifBr /kkjk 34 Hkk0na0la0 ds vUrxZr vijk/k cuuk ik;k tkrk gSA vr% eq[;ky; ds vkns'k dzekad 964&67 22-9-92 dh ikyuk esa fcuk uEcjh izFke lwpuk izfrosnu okLrs dzekadu gsrq izsf"kr gSA g0 vij iqfyl v/kh{kd jkt0 jkT; vUos"k.k C;wjks] t;iqj 23. The expression "known sources of income" must have reference to sources known to the prosecution on a preliminary enquiry before registering the F.I.R. It was not, and it could not be contended that "known sources of income" means sources known to the accused. However, in view of the explanation added under the Act, 1988 to Section 13(1) of the Act, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. From the material and facts disclosed in the first in formation report, I find that it does not disclose `known sources of income', nor does it disclose the fact that the petitioners cannot or could not satisfactorily account for the alleged disproportionate property or resources. The only thing stated in the impugned F.I.R. is that the doctor couple have amassed and earned disproportionate income and property by abusing their public offices and corrupt means. The impugned F.I.R. is completely silent whether both of the petitioners or either of them abused the public office but, how, and in what manner ? A bare perusal of the contents of the impugned first information report, it cannot be denied that the contents and averments have been stated merely on approximation, estimation and from reliable sources. In my considered view, the impugned first information report is as a result of a preconceived idea of guilt of the petitioners indicted with the alleged offences inasmuch as the investigating agency in the circumstances stated above, subjected both the petitioners to harassment and victimisation, by making allegations of illegal accumulation of wealth. In my considered view, the impugned first information report is as a result of a preconceived idea of guilt of the petitioners indicted with the alleged offences inasmuch as the investigating agency in the circumstances stated above, subjected both the petitioners to harassment and victimisation, by making allegations of illegal accumulation of wealth. The existence of the reason to suspect the commission of the alleged offence against the petitioners has not been disclosed in the impugned first information report, which is mandatory because, existence of the reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence has to be, prima facie, disclosed by the allegations made in the first information report laid before the police officer under Section 154(1), Cr.P.C. Similarly as clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157, Cr.P.C. permits the police officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the ground even before entering on an investigation, it postulates that the police officer has to draw his satisfaction only on the materials which were placed before him at that stage,namely, the first information together with the documents, if any,enclosed. That being so, before a public servant is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty and corruption, and a first information report is lodged against him, there should be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer so as to record and draw his satisfaction as to whether the allegations made in the information report do constitute a cognizable offence warranting any investigation. I have taken support from the decisions in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal (supra, paras 48, 49, 51 and 75). Thus, the contention of the respondents, as alleged in the reply that the provisions of Section 157, Cr.P.C. are not attracted in the present matter as the case has been registered on its merit, is not tenable. In the instant case, preliminary enquiry besides satisfaction as envisaged in Section 157, Cr.P.C. & laid down by the Apex court, is completely lacking. Such a piquant situation has resulted in causing prejudice to the petitioners, thereby miscarriage of justice. 24. Every source of income stands fully disclosed in the income tax or wealth tax returns spanning over last more than ten years, otherwise, the income tax raid which had taken place on 17.9.1992 by the Dy. Director (Investigation) Income Tax) would not have ended in a whimper. 24. Every source of income stands fully disclosed in the income tax or wealth tax returns spanning over last more than ten years, otherwise, the income tax raid which had taken place on 17.9.1992 by the Dy. Director (Investigation) Income Tax) would not have ended in a whimper. The allegations made in the EI.R. are so absurd and inherently improbable, inasmuch as the allegations made in the F.I.R. even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case alleged against the petitioners. As stated earlier, the un controverted allegations made in the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of the offence nor do they make out a case alleged against the petitioners, in the impugned F.I.R. No document has been referred to in the F.I.R. as the outcome of the alleged offences of misconduct on the part of the petitioners or so as to show that the pecuniary resources or property arc disproportionate to known sources of income. Therefore, the F.I.R. deserves to be quashed. 25. It is not in dispute that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a complete Code in itself, so far as penal provisions are concerned, inasmuch as it does not contemplate joint or vicarious liability. A careful reading of Section 13 of the Act, 1988, makes it axiomatic that the Act does not envisage joint or vicarious liability so, Section 13 contemplates misconduct of singular/individual public servant. Nowhere in the Act there is any scope to hold a joint trial against more than one accused. On this count alone, the impugned F.I.R. deserves to be quashed. 26. In the result, I accept this misc. petition, quash the F.I.R. No. 124/92 P.S. Rajasthan State Investigation Bureau, Jaipur, as well as commencement besides the entire investigation, if any, so far done for the reasons stated above costs. *******