J. P. SEMWAL, J. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the notice dated 3-10-1991 issued by the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the petitioner directing him to appear before him on 24-2-1992 at 10 a. m. 2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition, are that proceedings under the Act were initiated against the petitioner on the police report dated 1-4-1991 and a notice under Section 3 of the Act was sent to the police on 3-10-1991 for service on the petitioner which was not received back after service. The Addl. District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar then sent letters as well as D. O. letters to the Superintendent of Police (City) for returning the notice after service. Even the notice was not returned, nor any report was sent by the police in this regard. The Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar then on 24-2-1992 passed an order that the police is not keen to pursue the matter and has failed to serve the notice, hence there is no alternative but to consign the file (Annexure No. 2 to the petition ). The Additional District Magistrate (City), Kanpur Nagar thus consigned the file of Case No. 42 of 91-State v. Faiyaz Ahmad, and sent a copy of the said order to the Superintendent of Police (City ). 3. It is alleged by the petitioner that when the petitioner made a com plaint the Station Officer concerned Sri H. S. Shukla then he again moved an application in the court of respondent No. 2, the Additional Distt. Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, for taking action and issuing notice under Section 3 of the Act on the basis of the police report dated 1-4-1991. The Additional District Magistrate (City) passed an order dated 4-4-1992 on the said application for issuing the notice against the petitioner. A copy of the said application moved by the police concerned before the respondent No. 2 is Annexure No. 3 to the petition. The Additional District Magistrate (City) passed an order dated 4-4-1992 on the said application for issuing the notice against the petitioner. A copy of the said application moved by the police concerned before the respondent No. 2 is Annexure No. 3 to the petition. It appears that on the basis of this application of the police, the Additional District Magistrate (City), Kanpur Nagar issued a notice under Section 3 of the Act to the petitioner fixing the date for appearance of the petitioner on 22-4-1992 (after scoring the original dated 31-10-1991) at 10 a. m. (Annexure No. 1 to the petition ). The Case No. 42 of 91, which was consigned by the Additional District Magistrate (City) by his order dated 24-2-1992 (Annexure No. 2 to the petition) was given new no. 40 of 1992. The petitioner has challenged the notice dated 3-10-1991 under Section3 of the Act as well as the order of the Magistrate dated 4-4-1992 for issuing notice again on the application of the police (Annexure No. 3 ). 4. I have heard Sri A. C. Nigam, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri P. K. Bisaria, learned Additional Government Advocate and have perused the record. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the scheme of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, which provides for a summary procedure for taking action against the person whose activities jeopardise peace and safety of the citizens in a particular locality, may be examined. The preamble of this Act shows that it was enacted for the control of Goondas and safety of the citizens with a view to maintain the public order. The Act confers powers on the District Magistrate or any other person specially authorised in that regard by the State Government to extern a Goonda outside the district or a part thereof for a period not exceeding six months. The Act confers powers on the District Magistrate or any other person specially authorised in that regard by the State Government to extern a Goonda outside the district or a part thereof for a period not exceeding six months. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines "goonda" in the following manner :- "2 (b) "goonda" means a person who- (i) either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitu ally commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offence punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code; or (ii) has been convicted under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic it Women and Girls Act, 1956 ; or (iii) has been convicted not less than thrice under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910 ; or (iv) is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community. " 5. It is thus clear that any person who falls within one or more aforesaid clauses will be a "goondas" within the meaning of this Act. 6. Section 3 of this Act gives power to the District Magistrate for externment of Goondas. This is a very important section which the District Magistrate or any other person specially empowered in this regard by the State Government must comply strictly. This Act is extraordinary in nature. The provisions of this Act permit the externment of a citizen without a judicial trial. The first requirement of Section 3 is embodied in sub-section (1 ). The District Magistrate has to satisfy himself that any person is Goonda and his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof are causing, or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property ; or there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to engage, in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of any offence punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code, or under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, or under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910, or in the abetment of any such offence and further witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. It is on this satisfaction of the aforesaid requirements regarding the existence of provisions of Section 3 (1) that the District Magistrate is empowered to issue notice in writing to the person against whom an order of the externment under Section 3 is proposed to be made and inform him of the general nature of material allegations against him in respect of clauses (a), (b), (c) and give him a reasonable opportunity to tender an explanation regarding them. 7. Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Rules, 1970 provides that action under sub-sections (1) to (3) will not ordinarily be taken by the District Magistrate except on information in writing received from the Superintendent of Police of the District or Magistrate Incharge of the Sub-Division or on information in writing received from two respectable citizens of the locality in which the person proceeded against ordinarily resides or is active. It will not be necessary for the District Magistrate to disclose the identity of the informant and particulars from which such identity can be ascertained to the person proceeded against and only general nature of the material allegations shall be intimated to such person This Rule also provides that the notice under Section 3 (1) shall as far as possible may be on Form I. 8. The impugned notice dated 3-10-1991 (Aunexure-I) is also in Form No. I. It contains (a), (b), (c) portion of Form No. 1 which relate to the requirements laid down in Section 3 (1), (a), (b), (c ). After this opening part the prescribed Form I states: "and whereas the material allegations against him in respect of the aforesaid clauses (a), (b), (c) of are the following general nature: (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". 9. It is in respect of blank space of the prescribed form that the Magistrate has to set out the general nature of the material allegations against the person against whom an order under Section 3 is proposed to be made. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". 9. It is in respect of blank space of the prescribed form that the Magistrate has to set out the general nature of the material allegations against the person against whom an order under Section 3 is proposed to be made. In the impugned notice dated 3-10-1991 (Annexure-I) the Additional District Magistrate, City Kanpur has set out six general allegations and has given list of 13 first information reports filed against the petitioner during the period 1971 to 1991. 10. What is required is to set out the general nature of the material allegations in the notice. The question is whether the notice sets out the general nature of the material allegations in the notice. This point came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Harsh Narain v. District Magistrate, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 762, wherein it was held. "the defect of not setting out the general nature of material allegations in the notice is a fatal delect as it results in non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 3 (1 ). The notice cannot be deemed to be a notice under Section 3 (1 ). " 11. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramji Pandey v. State of U. P. and others, 1981 Cr LJ 1083, has discussed this point elaborately and has made a reference to the decisions of this Court in 1972 ALJ 762, Harsh Narain v. District Magistrate, Allahabad ; AIR 1992 All 498, Raja v. State of U. P. ; 1974 AWR (SC) 21, Pannu v. Commissioner ; 1969 Cr LJ 26 ; State of Gajarat v. Mehboob Khan and 1973 Cr LJ 612, Pandhari Nath v. State of Maharashtra. The Full Bench has distinguished between "general nature of material allegations" and "particulars of allegations" in the pres cribed Form I. The notice need not give any details of any allegation, instead the requirement of law could be satisfied if the notice contains the general statement of facts, which need not contain any details or particulars. The Full Bench has distinguished between "general nature of material allegations" and "particulars of allegations" in the pres cribed Form I. The notice need not give any details of any allegation, instead the requirement of law could be satisfied if the notice contains the general statement of facts, which need not contain any details or particulars. The names of the witnesses and the persons who may have made complaint against the person against whom action is proposed to be taken or the time, date and place of the offence committed by the person need not to be mentioned in the notice. It has further been held: "it is true that validity of a notice is generally upheld if it substantially conforms with the requirement of law but while considering the validity of a notice issued under Section 3 of the Act the same considerational cannot be applied. As noted earlier, the Act is extraordinary in nature. Its provisions permit serious inroad on the liberty of a citizen as the provisions permit externment of a citizen without a judicial trial. The power conferred on the autho rities and the procedure provided by the Act seriously impinge upon the fundamental rights of a citizen and it makes a serious inroad on the personal liberty. The provisions of the Act provides blander safeguards to a citizen in requiring the District Magis trate and other authorities to give notice to the person against whom action is proposed under the Act and to set out the general nature of material allegations in the notice with a view to give opportunity to the person concerned to submit his explanation and to defend himself. The persons against whom action is proposed to be taken under the Act has a meagre opportunity of submitting his explanation to the allengations contained in the notice issued to him and to defend himself by producing evidence before the District Magistrate. These are the only safe guards which the provisions of the Act provide to a citizen against whom action is proposed to be taken. In such a situation the question of liberal construction of notice does arise. The provisions of the Act, in our opinion, should be strictly complied by the executive while taking action under the Act. " 12. These are the only safe guards which the provisions of the Act provide to a citizen against whom action is proposed to be taken. In such a situation the question of liberal construction of notice does arise. The provisions of the Act, in our opinion, should be strictly complied by the executive while taking action under the Act. " 12. The power of externment conferred on the authorities and the procedure provided by the Act seriously makes an inroad on the personal liberty. The restrictions imposed by the Act on the rights guaranteed by Article 19 have been held in Raja v. State of U. P. , (supra) to be reasonable in the interest of general public and the Act has been held to be protected by Article 19 (5 ). The aforesaid Full Bench authority of this Court clearly lays down that if the notice fails to contain the general nature of material allegations it will be vitiated and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereof would be rendered null and void. The provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Act are mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the notice illegal. 13. In the present case, the notice dated 3-10-1981 (Annexure-I) sets out allegations of the general nature as follows:- " (1) That he demands money from people and on their refusal to pay he threatens and abuses them. (2) That he attemps to murder people. (3) That he voluntarily causes grievous hurt to people. (4) That he endangers life or personal safety of others. (5) That he commits theft and house trespass. (6) That he criminally intimidates people with intent to provoke breach of peace. " 14. Thereafter the criminal cases registered against the petitioner are mentioned. In view of the authority of the Supreme Court in Mehboob Khan case (supra), and also in the case of Pandhari Nath (supra), in which the scope of the words "general nature of material allegation" was considered, setting out of general nature of material allegations in the impugned notice (Annexure-1) cannot be said to be vague or too general. The word "allega tions" means statements or assertions of facts. The word "material" means "important, or essential or significatant". The word "allega tions" means statements or assertions of facts. The word "material" means "important, or essential or significatant". The requirement of Section 3 (1) is that notice should contain the essential assertions of facts in addition to the matters set out in clause (a), (b), (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It need not refer any evidence or other particulars or details ; the name of witnesses and person who may have made complaint against the person against whom action is proposed to be taken, or time, date or place of the offence committed by the person also need not be mentioned in the notice. There is distinction between "general nature of material allegations" and "particulars of allegations" aa has been held by the Full Bench in the case of Ramji Pandey (supra ). 15. The purpose of setting out the general nature of material allegations is to give the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of tendering his explanation. In the absence of informing the person concerned about the general nature of material allegations as required under clauses (a), (b), (c) he can furnish no explanation in respect of them and he would be deprived of the reasonable opportunity to which he is entitled to under Section 3 (1) of the Act. Consequently, in the absence of a proper explanation he would be deprived of a reasonable opportunity required under sub-section (2) of Sec. 3 of the Act for producing evidence in support of his explanation. Thus, when he is deprived of the reasonable opportunity the proposed action against him must be held illegal as has been held in Harsh Narain& case (supra ). Since the Act permits the District Magistrate to pass externment order without recourse to judicial trial, it imposes restriction on the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed by Aticle 19 of the Constitution. The only safeguard to a citizen in such a case is that the District Magistrate has to give a notice in writing to the person against whom action is proposed and to set out the general nature of material allegations in the notice with a view to give an opportunity to him to submit his explanation. The order of externment can be passed after strictly complying with the provisions of the Statute. The impugned notice does not suffer from the defect of not setting out allegations of general nature. The order of externment can be passed after strictly complying with the provisions of the Statute. The impugned notice does not suffer from the defect of not setting out allegations of general nature. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the criminal cases mentioned in the notice dated 3- 10-1991 (Annexure-I) relate to one individual and do not lead to disturbance of the peace of the community and further that in some of the criminal cases the petitioner has been acquitted. There is nothing on record to support the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It may, however, be noted that U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 has been enacted to make specific provisions for the control and suppression of Goondas with a view to maintaining of the public order. The "public order" is an expression of wider connotation and signifies the state of tranquility in a society or community. "public order" is synonymous with public safety and tranquility. (See Superintendent Central Jail v. Dr. Lohia, (1960) 2 SCR 821 . No doubt, if the activity of a person is confined only to an individual of few individuals directly as distinguishable from a wide spectrum of the public, and not affecting the even tempo of the life of the community leaving the tranquillity of the Society undisturbed, it would not raise a problem of "public order". 17. As regards the other limb of the argument, the mere fact that the person against whom action under Section 3 (1) of the Act is proposed to be taken has been acquitted in some criminal cases is no ground to quash the notice or the order of externment. The main object of the Act is to protect the society or the community from the persons who are terror or menace to the society or the community on account of which the witnesses do not come forward to give evidence against such persons. The impugned notice is not vitiated on the ground that the criminal cases relate to individual and that the petitioner has been acquitted in some of them. 18. The impugned notice is not vitiated on the ground that the criminal cases relate to individual and that the petitioner has been acquitted in some of them. 18. The next point to be considered is as to whether the proceeding under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act can be proceeded against the petitioner on the basis of the notice dated 3-10- 1991 which had already been consigned by the learned Additional District Magistrate (City) by his order dated 24-2-1992. The scheme of the Act does not leave any room for doubt that a notice is necessary before the action proposed to be taken under Section 3 (1) of the Act. The provisions of the Act are preventive in nature and not punitive and the purpose is to extern a Goonda outside the district for a period of six months. The Act was enacted for the purpose of control and suppressing Goondas with a view to maintain public order, it provides for summary proceedings The externment as a preventive measure has been held not to be equivalent with punitive prevention and not contravening the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The fact, however, remains that the Act is preventive in nature and is designed to control and curtail the fundamental rights of the person to move freely or reside and settle in a part of the district. As stated above, after a show-cause notice is given to the person against whom action under Section 3 is proposed to be taken, the District Magistrate after satisfying himself of the existence of the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 may pass an order under Section 3 externing the person concerned for a period not exceeding six months which may be specified in the order. 19. Section 4 of the Act empowers the District Magistrate to permit the person in respect of whom an order is made under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act to enter or return, for a temporary period, into or to the area from which he was directed to remove himself. The District Magis trate has to comply strictly with the provisions of the Act. It cannot be urged that the power given to the District Magistrate is an unguided power [see Raja v. State of U. P. (supra)]. 20. The District Magis trate has to comply strictly with the provisions of the Act. It cannot be urged that the power given to the District Magistrate is an unguided power [see Raja v. State of U. P. (supra)]. 20. Section 5 of the Act empowers the District Magistrate to extend from time to time in the interest of general public the period specified in the order made under Section 3 but such period of externment shall not exceed two years in the aggregate. 21. The Act was made in the interest of general public and to protect them against dangerous and bad characters whose presence in a particular locality may jeopardise peace and safety of the citizens. 22. Under the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, requirements have to be satisfied before a person is dubbed as a goonda calling a person a goonda is a defamatory statement and, therefore, every precaution has to be taken before recourse is taken to the said Act. The present impugned notice was issued at the instance of R. K. Agnihotri, S. I. Police Station Chaken, who had moved an application before the Addl. Districi Magistrate (City), Kanpur Nagar praying that a fresh notice be issued against the accused, vide true copy of the said application - Annexure-3. The Addl. District Magistrate (City) passed the following order on the said application (Annexure-3): "reader : please issue.- Sd. Illegible 4-4-1992 A. D. M. (City)" 23. It is in pursuance of the above quoted order dated 4-4-1992 on the application of S. I. Agnihotri that the impugned notice (Annexure-I) was issued. This is the same notice which was directed to be issued by the Magistrate on 3-10-1991 calling upon the petitioner to appear before him on 21-10-1991 and which notice was not served upon the petitioner by the police, nor any report was cared to be sent by the Police/superintendent of Police (City) in spite of D. O. letters sent by the Addl. District Magistrate (City) to him as mentioned in his order dated 24-2-1992 (Annexure-2 ). 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged this notice on two grounds. Firstly, that this notice could not have been issued afresh when the same had been considered by the order dated 24-2-1992. Secondly, that the Magistrate has not applied his mind while passing the order dated 4-4-1992 directing the Reader to issue notice. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged this notice on two grounds. Firstly, that this notice could not have been issued afresh when the same had been considered by the order dated 24-2-1992. Secondly, that the Magistrate has not applied his mind while passing the order dated 4-4-1992 directing the Reader to issue notice. Let us examine these contentions in the context of the facts and the circumstances of this case. 25. Regarding first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as referred to above, the order of consignment dated 24-2-1992 is Annoxure-2, which is set out in extenso as hereunder: "these proceedings under U. P. Control of Goondas Act were initiated against Faiyaz Ahmad s/o Iftikhar Ahmad r/o Dargah Sharif, P. S. Chakeri, Kanpur on receipt of a report from S. P. (City ). A notice under Section 3 of the Act was sent to police on 3-10-1991 for service on the opposite party. When the notice was not received back after service, a letter dated 12-11-1991 was sent to S. P. (City ). There after, two D. O. letters dated 19-12-1991 and 4-2-1992 were sent to S. P. (City) requesting him to get the notice returned to this court after service on the opposite party. It was clearly mentioned in the D. O. letters that if the notice is not received back duly served by the date fixed the case will be consigned. Even then the notice has not been returned to this Court, nor any report has been sent by the police in this regard. Thus, it is apparent that the police is not keen to pursue the matter against the opposite party. It is mandatory provision of law that notice under Section 3 of the Act must be served on the person against whom action is to be taken under the Act. In the instant case, the police has failed to do so, so there is no alternative but to consign the file. The case is, therefore, consigned. Let a copy of this order be sent to S. P. (City) for information and necessary action. Sd. R. K. Pandey, Addl. District Magistrate (City) Kanpur Nagar, 24-2-1992". 26. In the instant case, the police has failed to do so, so there is no alternative but to consign the file. The case is, therefore, consigned. Let a copy of this order be sent to S. P. (City) for information and necessary action. Sd. R. K. Pandey, Addl. District Magistrate (City) Kanpur Nagar, 24-2-1992". 26. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the aforementioned order of the Magistrate leaves no room for doubt that the proceeding, initiated on the report dated 1-4-1991 of Superintendent of Police (City), on the basis of which notice dated 3-10-1991 was issued came to an end on consignment. It is not disputed that after passing of the aforementioned order the case was consigned. It is also not disputed that initially the case registered against the petitioner was numbered as Case No. 42 of 1991 on the basis of the notice dated 3-10-1991, which case was consigned. It is also not disputed that on the application of S. I. Agnihotri the same notice dated 3-10-1991 was ordered to be issued afresh and the case was registered as Case No. 40 of 1992. 27. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the proceedings which were initiated on the report of Superintendent of Police (City) dated 1-4-1991, came to an end on a consignment and the proceedings were dropped. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner takes us to consider the term "consign". 28. The word "consign" is derived from the Latin "consignare", meaning to seal, "for it was formerly the practice to seal up the money thus received in a bag or box. " 29. The radical meaning of the "consign" which is of Fresh Orgin, is to deliver or transfer as a charge or trust, and in English definition of it, means to commit, to entrust, or to give in trust; to transfer from ones self to the care of another or to deliver into the care and control of another (See Corpus Juris Secondum Vol. 15-A, page 584 ). 30. The term "consign" has not been defined in legal terminology but it has come to acquire significance when used in judicial proceedings or cases before a court. In the absence of any definition of the term "consign" it is permissible to refer to the Dictionary meaning of this word. 15-A, page 584 ). 30. The term "consign" has not been defined in legal terminology but it has come to acquire significance when used in judicial proceedings or cases before a court. In the absence of any definition of the term "consign" it is permissible to refer to the Dictionary meaning of this word. Accordingly to the various Dictionary meanings in common parlance, the word "consign" means to commit it or deliver to or hand over or entrust or to transmit. Word "consign", however, is not synonymous with "dismiss", "reject" "discharge" The word "consign" is of wide connotation and there is no reason to restirct its meaning. The common parlance meaning of this term may be accepted even in case of judicial proceedings or other legal proceedings but this generally may be restricted by the context. 31. Though the use of the term "consign" by itself does not mean termination of the proceeding but it may imply the said meaning in the context it is used. Let us make it clear by taking simple examples. When in a case the sole party dies and the case is consigned, it would be continued that proceedings have come to an end. Similarly, in the case of proceedings under Section 116, Cr. P. C. consignment of the case after expiry of six months, would be construed that proceedings had terminated. 32. Coming now to the facts of the instant case, it is quite appa rent that Case No. 42 of 1991 had been consigned and it did not survive. It is also apparent that the said case was not revived and another case was registered as Case No. 40 of 1992, against the petitioner. The Magistrate directed the Reader to issue notice on the basis of which a New Case No. 40 of 1992 has been registered against the petitioner. Even if the earlier case had not been decided on merits and had come to an end on the default of the police, even then it is to be seen whether the Magistrate had satisfied himself of the requirement of the pro visions of U. P. Control of Goondas Act. Even if the earlier case had not been decided on merits and had come to an end on the default of the police, even then it is to be seen whether the Magistrate had satisfied himself of the requirement of the pro visions of U. P. Control of Goondas Act. (sic) As already mentioned above, under Rule 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Rules, no action under Sec tion 3 (3) (1) of the Act has to be taken by the District Magistrate except on the information received in writing from the Superintendent of Police of the District. In the present case, it was S. I. R. K. Agnihotri, who had moved the application on 4-4-1992 and not the Superintendent of Police (City ). 33. The U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 is a preventive Act and the purpose of this Act is to control and suppression of Goondas who are dangerous and menace to the public of the locality. Action is to be taken speedily and not at liesure. Thus, time factor is material. Initially the police report was of 1-4-1991 and the order to issue notice after consignment of the Case No. 42 of 1991 vide order dated 24-2-1992, has been passed on 4-4-1992 after the expiry of about one year. Section 3 cannot be construed so as to permit indolence or laxity on the part of the District Magistrate and to keep pending the matter due to inaction of the police. This factur was considered by the Addl. District Magistrate (City) who after intimating the police in advance consigned the Case No. 42 of 1991 on 24-2-1992. 34. In view of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the inference to be drawn from the aforesaid order is that the Magistrate consigned the file as he did not consider it a fit case to proceed further in the case. Thus, Case No. 42 of 1991- State v. Faiyaz Ahmad, which was initiated on receipt of a report from Superintendent of Police (City) dated 1-4-1991, was consigned and no futher action was proposed to be taken in that case. 35. Next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was no application of mind by the Magistrate while passing the order dated 4-4-1992 for issuing notice. 35. Next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was no application of mind by the Magistrate while passing the order dated 4-4-1992 for issuing notice. No doubt, this Court cannot question the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but the subjective satis faction must be based upon some pertinent material. The phrase subjective satisfaction is a common one but not a slippery phrase to be used as and when it suits to the authority concerned. The order of consigning the Case No. 42 of 1991 was in the nature of a default order. The police had failed to serve the notice under Section 3 of the Act on the petitioner against whom action was proposed to be taken. No explanation has come forth from the police for non-execution of the order of the Addl. District Magistrate (City) who issued the notice dated 3-10-1991 under Section 3 of the Act. In fact, there was no material before the Addl. District Magistrate (City) when he passed the order dated 4-4-1992 on the application of S. I. R. K. Agnihotri and he, in fact, did not apply his mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case and the earlier order passed by him on 24-2-1992. The order dated 24-2-1992 was not recalled by the learned Magistrate and, therefore, his direction to his Reader amounts to non- application of his mind and non-exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with law. 36. The object of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act is for the purpose of preventing a person with a view to maintenance of public order. The externment order can be passed only for a period of six months and the same can be extended only upto two years. It cannot be construed from the provisions of the Act that the proceedings on the report of the police in spite of their default and inaction can be allowed to continue for more than six months without any satisfactory explanation. In the present case no explan ation at all has come forth from the police for its default and inaction. The initial report of the police was dated 1-4-1991 and the case remained pending till 24-2-1992 when it was consigned by the Addl. District Magistrate (City) after passing an elaborate order (Annexure-2 to affidadavit of the petitioner ). 37. In the present case no explan ation at all has come forth from the police for its default and inaction. The initial report of the police was dated 1-4-1991 and the case remained pending till 24-2-1992 when it was consigned by the Addl. District Magistrate (City) after passing an elaborate order (Annexure-2 to affidadavit of the petitioner ). 37. Section 3 of the Act cannot be construed so as to permit the authorities to keep pending the matter or to issue a fresh notice every time at the instance of the police on the same allegations on which the initial proceed ings was initiated and the case was consigned. It is evident from the affidavit of the petitioner that he remained at his house and no efforts what so ever were made by the police to serve the notice or to arrest the petitioner and that no person of the locality had made any complaint against the petitioner. It is a mockery of the provisions o the U. P. Control of Goondas Act to initiate proccedings under Section 3 of the Act, which are anticipatory in nature and to keep it pending for more than one year without the service of the notice under Section 3 of the Act or without execution of the order the Magistrate concerned for such a long time. The impugned notice dated 3-10-1991, which was consigned by the order dated 24-2-1992, was again ordered to be issued by the Magistrate concerned on 4-4-1992 without applying his mind on mere asking by S. I. R. K. Agnihotri. There was inordinate and unreasonable delay in issuing as well as executing the notice under Section 3 of the Act on the petitioner against whom action was proposed to be taken. Besides this, there is no denial of the fact that the petitioner was allowed to remain in the locality and the notice was not served on him which indicates that the police had submitted its report earlier in a causal manner and mala fide. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is an active member of the Congress party and Corporator of the Nagar Palika, Kanpur and that he had made a number of complaints against Station Officer Sri H. S. Shukla who used to give shelter to notorious persons. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is an active member of the Congress party and Corporator of the Nagar Palika, Kanpur and that he had made a number of complaints against Station Officer Sri H. S. Shukla who used to give shelter to notorious persons. Therefore, it was urged, the petitioner has been made victim of the police after expiry of one year from the date of the police report dated 1-4-1991 on the basis of which proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner has stated inter alia in his affidavit that he was not served with the notice dated 3-10-1991 aforesaid although the petitioner was residing at the same address and that the police never tried to arrest the petitioner, nor to serve notice upon the petitioner. The petitioner stated that it was on account of the complaints made against Sri H. S. Shukla, Station Officer, Chakeri that the report was lodged against the petitioner after the expiry of one year of the police report dated 1-4-1991. 38. On the facts and circumstances of the case narrated above the purport of the consignment of the case by the order dated 24-2-1992 is that the proceedings came to an end due to default and inaction of the police. As already stated, the police has not given any explanation for the delay and inaction on their part and no pertinent material had been placed before the Addl. District Magistrate (City) for passing the impugned order for issuing a notice afresh on the same facts after inordinate and unreasonable delay of more than one year from the initial report of the police dated 1-4-1991 and for more than six months after the initial notice was issued on 3-10-1991. The authorities have to follow the procedure and the safeguards while taking action under Section 3 of the Act as it effects the constitutional right of liberty of a citizen. The provisions of Section 3 are meant to be followed as an anticipatory measure for externment of the person against whom notice is issued for a period of six months and this has nothing to do with the offence which were committed by the person as he can be prosecuted under the law in respect thereof. The provisions of Section 3 are meant to be followed as an anticipatory measure for externment of the person against whom notice is issued for a period of six months and this has nothing to do with the offence which were committed by the person as he can be prosecuted under the law in respect thereof. It must be made clear that ordinarily criminal proceedings are not to be circumvented or short-circuited by resorting to the provisions of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act on mere asking of the police without applying the mind to the police report and without verifying facts. Commitment in the rule of law is the foundation of a civilised society. It is expected that when powers have been conferred on the executive wing of the State, it would work within the limits of authority in harmony with the object of the Act and not in hostility. The provision being anticipatory measure, delay in service of the notice or in execution of the notice assumes importance and makes proposed action under Section 3 of the Act sham and illusory. The learned Addl. Government Advocate has not been able to make any submission justifying the issuance of the impugned notice afresh on the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 39. In view of the foregoing discussion though the notice dated 3-10-1991 does not suffer from any defect in regard to general nature of material allegations but the issuance of such a notice after it had been consigned on 24-2-1992, on the same allegations afresh after expiry of one year from the initial report on the application of S. I. R. K. Agnihotri on 4-4-1992 is not a valid notice within the meaning of Section 3 (1) of the Act. 40. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned order dated 4-4-1992 issuing the impugned notice afresh against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 41. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order dated 4-4-1992 issuing the impugned notice afresh on the same allegations made in the initial notice dated 3-10-1991 on the application of S. 1. R. K. Agnihotri aforesaid is hereby quashed. Petition allowed. .