V. B. Bansal ( 1 ) THE short question for decision in this application,viz. CM. 6475/93 is as to whether the respondents 3 and 4. i. e. Directorate oftraining and Technical Education and Government of the National Capitalregion of Delhi can restrict the admission of 85 per cent of the jointseats to the students of Delhi to the Pharmacy Course in Maharaja Surajmalinstitute of Pharmacy, respondent No. 2, as provided in Clause 5 of theprospectus for the year 1983-84 for admission to Engineering and Pharmacycourses for Government/privately managed institutions, issued byrespondent No. 3. ( 2 ) S/s. Arvind Kumar and Satender Kumar have filed a petitionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the respondents inwhich it has inter aha been pleaded that Clause (5) of the aforesaidprospectus, providing for reservation of 85 per cent of the seats for thestudents of Delhi, in the Institutions located in the National Capital Regionof Delhi for the year 1993-94 may be quashed, being ultra vires of Articles14, 15 (1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) MAHARAJA Surajmal Institute of Pharmacy, respondent No. 2. (hereinafter referred to as the Institute), started diploma course in Pharmacyin July 1983. This Institute was recognised. by the Council of Technicaleducation and is duly affiliated to the Board of Technical Education, Delhi,for the diploma Course. ( 4 ) ONE of the main aims and objects of the Institute has been topromote the advancement of knowledge and education in all fields for thebenefit of people of India. It has been running a number of diploma courseand it has been admitting students from all over India. It is an unaidedprivate recognised Institute having about 47f0 members in all from all overthe country. For admission to the Engineering and Pharmacy courses atdelhi in the Institutions located in the Union Capital Region of Delhi thedirectors of Training and Technical Education has issued a prospectus forthe year 1993-94 in which it has been provided that 85 per cent of the seatswould be reserved for the students residing in Delhi. The grievance of thepetitioners infer alia has been that they have passed their 10 plus 2examination in 1st Division and are resident of Uttar Pradesh, but desirousof seeking admission in Pharmacy Course in respondent No. 2 Institute. The grievance of thepetitioners infer alia has been that they have passed their 10 plus 2examination in 1st Division and are resident of Uttar Pradesh, but desirousof seeking admission in Pharmacy Course in respondent No. 2 Institute. Ithas also been claimed that there are many students like the petitioners whoare also interested in seeking admission but on account of this unreasonableand illegal restriction they all are deprived of such an admission and it hasput an unreasonable and arbitrary embargo, which is violative of thefundamental rights. ( 5 ) THE writ petition as also the application are being contested bythe respondents No. 3 and 4, who have taken up the plea that a Scheme hasbeen formulated by the Central Government following the judgment of thehon ble Supreme Court in Case Unni Krishna J. P. and Others v. State ofandhra Pradesh and Others reported as (1993) 1 S. C. C. 645 and the prospectushas been issued following the guidelines laid dawn by the Union of India. It has also been pleaded that the reservation of seats for Delhi students isin accordance with law and, thus, a prayer has been made that the application for stay, viz. CM. 6475/93 may be dismissed. ( 6 ) ANOTHER writ petition being CW. 3257/93 has been filed bymaharaja Surajmal Institute of Pharmacy and Technology against thedirectorate of Technical Education and Government of the Nationalcapital Region of Delhi as also the Union of India, in which also thechallenge has been made to the issuing of the prospectus and makingreservation as per Clause (5) of the said prospectus. An application, viz. CM. S177/93 has been moved in the said writ petition in which an orderwas passed that no admission should be made to the aforesaid Institute. The pleadings in CW. 3257/93 are similar to the pleadings in CW. 4065/93. The present order would, thus, dispose of both the applications regardingstay in the said two writ petitions. ( 7 ) I have heard Shri D. S. Tewatia, learned Senior Advocate forshri Arvind Kumar and Shri Satender Kumar (petitioners in CW. 4065/93);shri Sildhir Nandrajog for Maharaja Surajmal Institute of Pharmacy; andshri S. K. Mahajan for the Directorate of Training and Technical Education and the Government of the National Capital Region of Delhi. ( 7 ) I have heard Shri D. S. Tewatia, learned Senior Advocate forshri Arvind Kumar and Shri Satender Kumar (petitioners in CW. 4065/93);shri Sildhir Nandrajog for Maharaja Surajmal Institute of Pharmacy; andshri S. K. Mahajan for the Directorate of Training and Technical Education and the Government of the National Capital Region of Delhi. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that theinstitute is an unaided recognised Institute imparting education in Pharmacyand it is controlled by a registered society having membership all over thecountry and mating contributions for its functioning. It has also beensubmitted that the purpose of running this institution has been to imparteducation to students from i II over the country and there has not been anyjustification to restrict the admission to students belonging to the Unionterritory of Delhi only. He has also submitted that the guidelines inrespect of the technical education issued by the Department of Education. Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, inpursuance of the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the caseunni Krishnan. JP. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (Supra)does not make any provision for providing such a clause which is unconstitutional and, thus. submitted that Clause (5) of the prospectus may he setaside so that the Institute may make the admissions of the students to thepharmacy Course. ( 9 ) SHRI S K. Mahajan. learned Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 hason the other hand submitted that Clause (5) of the prospectus restrictingadmissions of 85 per cent of the student from Delhi is in compliance ofthe mandate of the Hon ble Supreme Court in its judgment in Unnikrishnan, J. P. and Others v. State of Andhra pradesh and Others (Supra) anda prayer has, thus, been made that the application may be dismissed and thestay may be vacated so that the admissions are made to the Institution. ( 10 ) UNNI Krishnan, J. P. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (Supra) is a case in which the question of correctness of Mohini Jainv. State of Karnataka. (1982 (3) S. C. C. 666) was raised. In Mohni Jain scase (Supra) three questions were framed by the Hon ble Supreme Court,which were as under : 1. Whether the Constitution of India guarantees a fundamental right to education to its citizens ? 2. State of Karnataka. (1982 (3) S. C. C. 666) was raised. In Mohni Jain scase (Supra) three questions were framed by the Hon ble Supreme Court,which were as under : 1. Whether the Constitution of India guarantees a fundamental right to education to its citizens ? 2. Whether a citizen of India has the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution under Article 19 (1 ) (g) or any other provision in the Constitution ? 3. Whether the grant of permission to establish and the grant of affiliation by a University imposes an obligation upon an educational institution to act fairly in the matter of admission of the students ? ( 11 ) THE following answers were recorded : 1. The citizens of this country have a fundamental right to education. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right. Its content and parameters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. In other words every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age fourteen years. Thereafter his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the State. 2. The obligations created by. Articles 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution can be discharged by the State either by establishing institutions of its own or by aiding, recognising and/or granting affiliation to private educational institutions. Where aid is not granted to private educational institutions and merely recognition or affiliation is granted it may not be insisted that the private educational institution shall charge only that fee as is charged for similar courses in governmental institutions. The private educational institutions have to and are entitled to charge a higher fee, not exceeding the ceiling fixed on that behalf. The admission of students and the charging of fee in these private educational institutions shall be governed by the scheme evolved herein-set out in Part III of this Judgment. 3. A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or grant-in-aid from the State, the recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in. 3. A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or grant-in-aid from the State, the recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject only to the conditions set out in. and only in accordance with the scheme contained in Part III of this Judgment No Government/ University or authority shall be competent to grant recognition an affiliation except in accordance with the said scheme. Thesaid scheme shall constitute a condition of such recognition oraffiliation, as the case may be, in addition to such otherconditions and terms which such Government, University orother authority may choose to impose. ( 12 ) A perusal of this judgment indicates that the main dispute inthis case was with regard to the capitation fee charged and a scheme wasframed by the Supreme Court eliminating discretion of management foradmission to the institutions and with regard to fee payable to such institutions and substituting merit of the students as the sole criteria. Reservationof seats was dealt with by the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court andthe pronouncements with regard to reservation of seats were not modified orset aside. ( 13 ) THE basic judgment with regard to reservation is in the casedr. Pradeep Jain etc. v. Union of India and Others, ( AIR 1984 SC 1420 ),it was pointed out in the said judgment that the scheme of admission tomedical colleges may depart from principles of selection based on meritwhere it was necessary to do so for the purpose of bringing out real equalityof opportunity between those who are unequals. It has also been observedthat a certain percentage of reservation on the basis of residence requirementcould legitimately be made for admission to medical institutions on a broaderbasis. It has also been observedthat a certain percentage of reservation on the basis of residence requirementcould legitimately be made for admission to medical institutions on a broaderbasis. It has also been observed that there could be no objection to stipulating reservation or preference for a reasonable quantum in under-graduatecourses for students hailing from the School system of educational hinterland of the institutions and for this purpose there should not be anydistinction between schools affiliated to state boards and schools affiliatedto C. B. S. E. It has also been held that for admission to medical college inno event at least 30 per cent of the open seats should be available tostudents on all India basis irrespective of the State or university from whichthey come and such admission should be granted purely on merit on thebasis of either all India entrance examination or entrance examination to beheld by the State. This. in my view, would also be applicable for admissionto the Pharmacy Course which is covered by the term professional colleges ,as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan, J. P. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (Supra ). ( 14 ) IN the case Dr. Dinesh Kamar and Others v. Motilal Nehrumedical College. Allahabad and Others (1986) 2 SCC 727. the questionfor consideration was about the reasonableness of the fixing of 30 per centof the total number of scats to be filled up on all India basis. It was heldthat in accordance with the suggestion made in the Scheme by the Government of India that not less than 15 per cent of the total number of seats ineach medical college or institution, without taking info account any reservations validly made shall be filled on the basis of all India entranceexamination. ( 15 ) THERE is no doubt that Article 14 of the Constitution forbidsclassification, hut it does not forbid reasonable classification. In the caseof Heramba Kumar Sarma etc. v. State of Assam and Others, (MR 1991gauhati 1) the Director of Medical Education, Planning and. Research, Assamaverted that 15 per cent of the total number of seats were reversed for Allindia category and 85 per cent were reversed for Assam State category ofapplicants to the three medical colleges. This broad reservation is notchallenged and other rules for having studied in an institution within thestate of Assam for three years was challenged. Research, Assamaverted that 15 per cent of the total number of seats were reversed for Allindia category and 85 per cent were reversed for Assam State category ofapplicants to the three medical colleges. This broad reservation is notchallenged and other rules for having studied in an institution within thestate of Assam for three years was challenged. Thus, the mere fact thatthe Institute is not taking any aid from Government would not make anydifference and the respondent No. 3 can certainly have a centralisedmachinery for admission to the institutions. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING all the facts, I am of the view that at this stage nofault can be found with regard to Clause (5) in the prospectus, especiallywhen the time for admission is running fast and the admissions have notyet started. ( 17 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion the application for interim relief viz. CM. 6475/93, stands dismissed.