Honble BALIA, J.—This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for eviction which has been decreed by the two courts below. Plaintiff-Defendant No.l has filed a suit on the grounds that he has let out a shop situated at Bhilwara to defendant-respondent No. 2., Ladu Ram on rent @ Rs. 65/- p.m. on 24th Jan. 1973, evidencing which a rent-note was executed by Ladu Ram on 11.7.1973. Ladu Ram has defaulted in paying rent since Feb. 1974 and that he also parted with possession of the suit shop to appellant-defendant without plaintiffs consent and therefore, he is entitled to a decree for eviction. (2) Defendants took the plea that in fact Parasmal appellant was only inducted as a tenant and Ladu Ram was not the tenant. It is the case of defendants that Ladu Ram had executed rent-note dt. 11.7.1973 only as a surety for Parasmal and not as a tenant of plaintiff Shiv Lal. Execution of Rent Note by Ladu Ram in favour of Shiv Lal is not in dispute and it is also not in dispute that said rent-note does not show that Ladu Ram is surety and not a tenant. (3) Both the courts have not believed, the evidence led by the defendant no. 2 in support of their defence, that Parasmal was the original tenant, and have come to a concurrent finding that Ladu Ram was the person in whose favour tenancy was created by the plaintiff. As a consequence of this finding both the courts have also come to the conclusion that Ladu Ram has parted with possession of suit shop without the consent of landlord- plaintiff. (4) As a matter of fact it was not the case of defendants at any stage, as an alternative to their aforesaid plea, that even if Ladu Ram is held to be tenant, he parted with possession of the suit shop with consent express or implied of the plaintiff -landlord. (5) Aggrieved with the decree of eviction passed by the two courts below the present appellant Parasmal has filed this Second Appeal on the ground that the findings recorded by the courts below, though the said findings are findings of the fact, are vitiated on the grounds that the same are arrived at by misreading the evidence and by ignoring the relevant evidence on record. (6) I have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the caveator and perused the judgment of the courts below and also the evidence that was referred to by the learned counsel for the parties from their record and made available for the perusal of the court, about which other counsel had no objection. (7) Having considered rival contentions and taking into consideration the material placed before me, I am of the opinion that there are no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the two courts below which can give rise to any substantial question of law for entertaining this Second Appeal. (8) There is no denial of the fact that rent-note in favour of plaintiff was executed by Ladu Ram on 11.7.1973 describing himself as tenant of Shivlal in respect of suit-shop and the column about surety in the said document is not filled at all, though there was such a column in the proforma form of rent-note on which the rent note was executed. In the face of this , if the courts below have not believed the evidence led by defendant- Parasmal in this behalf it cannot be said that courts below has committed any error of law in rejecting the plea of defendants about Ladu Ram being a surety & Parasmal being the tenant. The findings on issues no. 1 & 3 are findings of fact and have been arrived at on application of all the evidence on record and is not vitiated on any ground which may give rise to a question of law. (9) Learned counsel for the appellant also urged in the alternative that plaintiff in his statement as PW.l has admitted that he came to know that Ladu Ram has parted with possession of suit-shop in 1974 and from this admission of plaintiff coupled with the fact that suit was filed on 5.2.1977 only, it must necessarily be inferred that Ladu Ram parted with the possession of suit shop with the knowledge and consent of the landlord. According to learned counsel for the appellant, defendant no. 2 is entitled to get relief on the admission of plaintiff himself. (10) Having carefully examined the contention and the statement of PW. 1 Shivlal, I do not find any force in this contention either. According to learned counsel for the appellant, defendant no. 2 is entitled to get relief on the admission of plaintiff himself. (10) Having carefully examined the contention and the statement of PW. 1 Shivlal, I do not find any force in this contention either. As I have noticed above that there was no pleading setting up the case that Ladu Ram parted with possession of suit-shop with the consent of landlord only defence being that plaintiff himself has inducted Parasmal as his tenant in the first instance. In that view of the matter no issue was joined on the point that in case defendants failed to prove their defence parting of possession was with the consent of plaintiff-landlord. In fact in that event the plaint averment that Ladu Ram, tenant, parted with possession of suit-shop without landlord-plaintiffs consent remained uncontroverted in case defence set up by defendants is not proved. Law is well settled that without pleading no amount of evidence can be looked into to establish the same. Law is also well settled that a pure question of fact, which undoubtedly the question of consent is, cannot be allowed, to be raised for the first time in Second Appeal. Even otherwise the contention of learned counsel about admission of plaintiff that he came to know about parting with possession by Ladu Ram in favour of Parasmal in the year 1974 is not correct. No such categorical admission is found in the statement of plaintiff. Moreover, there is no admission of plaintiff that parting of possession of suit property by Ladu Ram to Parasmal was with his consent, express or implied. Therefore, the principle that a party to suit can be given relief on the basis of admission of opposite party even in the absence of specific plea to that effect, cannot be involved in the present case. (11) The appeal is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. Therefore, the principle that a party to suit can be given relief on the basis of admission of opposite party even in the absence of specific plea to that effect, cannot be involved in the present case. (11) The appeal is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. (12) Before parting with the case at the request of learned counsel for the appellant and taking into consideration, the facts and circumstances of the case, it is ordered that the decree for eviction shall not be executed for a period of 6 months from today, provided the appellants pay to the plaintiff-respondent No.l or deposits in trial court, all the arrears of mesne profits at the rate at which rent was payable by defendant-respondent no.2 within a period of one month and continuous to pay mesne profits month by month hereinafter at the same rate until he surrenders vacant possession of the suit premises and also furnishes an undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the suit shop on or before expiry of 6 months from today without compelling the respondent-plaintiff to have recourse to execution proceedings. This undertaking shall be furnished within one month from today.