ORDER The petitioner, who claims himself to be the Secretary of the workers Union of the Village Papers Private Ltd., Mehatpur, (hereinafter called the Union), has preferred this petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 18th July, 1992 passed by the Sessions Judge, Chamba (Additional Sessions Judge, Una) in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 1991 filed by respondent Sardar Man Mohan Singh against the order dated 1st November, 1990 of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, whereby he was summoned in a criminal case No. 16 of 1990. 2. The brief facts of the case are of the petitioner was working as semi-skilled operator with Village Papers Private Ltd., 2 Industrial Area, Mehatpur (hereinafter called the Company). In December, 1985, he had given demand notice, in his capacity as Secretary of the Union, regarding grievances of workmen members. Thereafter, the Company offered the post of General Supervisor to the petitioner, on the condition that he will maintain impartiality in the conduct of his duties and will not take any side with any union and or association of workers so far as the affairs of the factory are concerned. The petitioner did not accept this offer. The relations between the company and the members of the Union further deteriorated and the company terminated the services of about 30 workmen members of the Union with effect from 1-6-1986. At the instance of the Union, the Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court by its reference No. 171 of 1987. The reference was in the following terms :- "Whether the termination of 30 workers (List attached) by the management of M/s. Village Paper (P) Ltd. Mehatpur, District Una (HP) is justified and in order. If not to what relief and amount of compensation these workers are entitled." 3. The Labour Court proceeded with the reference and framed issues. The company felt aggrieved by the framing of issues and filed C.W.P. No. 114 of 1989 in this Court which was later on withdrawn. Thereafter, the company filed another writ petition No. 397 of 1991 questioning the legality and validity of the reference No. 171 of 1987 made by the Government. At the time of issuing rule, the writ petition was ordered to be heard by the Full Bench. Thereafter, the company filed another writ petition No. 397 of 1991 questioning the legality and validity of the reference No. 171 of 1987 made by the Government. At the time of issuing rule, the writ petition was ordered to be heard by the Full Bench. Ultimately, the writ petition was decided on 28th April, 1992, holding that the reference was bad as there was no demand in respect of their reinstatement by the workmen, before the matter was taken up by the authorities for referring the dispute to the Labour Court. 4. In the meantime, on 5-7-1989, the petitioner made a representation to the Labour Commissioner (Annexure P1) alleging that the Company had been committing unfair labour practices for which they may be prosecuted. After conciliation failed before the Labour Inspector, Labour Circle, Una, by notification No. 19-12/89-Labour (Annexure P4), the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, authorised the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Inspector, Una Circle, Una, to file a complaint against the management of the Company in respect of Unfair Labour Practices pertaining to Daljeet Singh workman which was, in fact, filed on 1-11-1990. 5. Taking cognizance of the complaint, the Chief Judicial Magistrate issued summons to the Managing Director of the Company on 1-11-1990. But in the Criminal Revision Petition No. 7 of 1991 filed on behalf of the Company, the Addl. Sessions Judge has quashed the summoning order as well as the complaint on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation and also that no valid sanction under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) was granted by the State. 6. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Sh. 6. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, has pointed out that a perusal of the representation dated 5-7-1989 filed by the petitioner, on the basis of which the complaint dated 31-10-1990 was instituted by the Labour Inspector, shows that besides the incident dated 23-4-1986 offering the appointment of General Supervisor to the petitioner and terminating 30 workmen members of the Union, including the petitioner, for their trade union activities, theunfair practice alleged against the company was that during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court and the writ petition in the High Court, the Management of the Company and its agents had been coercing the petitioner to accept monetary rewards or get the dispute decided exparte in their favour. According to Mr. Kuldip Singh, since the complaint could not be filed in the Court without the authority of the State as required under Section 34 of the Act, for computing the period of limitation, the time spent in granting authorisation is not required to be taken into account. Therefore, calculating the limitation from the date of authorisation, that is, 8-10-1990, the complaint which was filed on 1-11-1990 is within time. For making this submission he has relied upon Sub-Section (1) of Section 470, Cr. P.C. 7. On the other hand, Shri A. K. Goel, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has urged that so far the alleged malpractice of conditional offer of appointment to the petitioner on 23-4-1986 and termination of 30 workmen because of their trade union activities is concerned, this is prima facie time barred as the petitioner had complained after more than three years on 5-7-1989. In respect of the alleged unfair labour practices of coercing the petitioner to accept monetary rewards or get the dispute decided in their favour during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court and the writ petition in the High Court, according to Mr. Goel, these averments are too vague, without specifying the period when these unfair practices were committed to constitute an offence of unfair labour practice of which cognizance could be taken. 8. This Court has given its best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. Goel, these averments are too vague, without specifying the period when these unfair practices were committed to constitute an offence of unfair labour practice of which cognizance could be taken. 8. This Court has given its best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The words "unfair labour practice" has been defined in Section 2(ra) as the practice specified in the Fifth Schedule of the Act. Clause I of Part I of the Fifth Schedule relates to Unfair Labour Practices of Employers and Trade Unions of Employers and its relevant extract is :- "1. To interfere with, restrain from, or coerce, workman in the exercise of their right to organize, form, join or assist a trade union or to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, that is to say - (a) threatening workmen with discharge or dismissal, if they join a trade union; (b) threatening a lock out or closure, if a trade union is organized; (c) granting wage increase to workmen at crucial periods of trade union organization with a view to undermining the efforts of the trade union at organization.........." 9. Further, under Section 25T of the Act, the employer or workmen or a trade union, whether registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926 or not, is further prohibited from committing any unfair labour practice. The penalty for committing unfair labour practices has been provided under Section 25U which is imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/- or with both. The cognizance of the offence of unfair labour practice can be taken by a Court a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class but only on the complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government as provided under Section 34(1) of the Act. In view of the quantum of penalty, provided for the offence of unfair labour practice, the limitation under Section 468, Cr. P.C. is one year, but how to compute the period of limitation is given in Section 470, Cr. P.C. Sub-Section (3) of Section 470, Cr. P.C. which is relevant is as under :- "470. Exclusion of time in certain cases. P.C. is one year, but how to compute the period of limitation is given in Section 470, Cr. P.C. Sub-Section (3) of Section 470, Cr. P.C. which is relevant is as under :- "470. Exclusion of time in certain cases. - (1) xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. EXPLANATION :- In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the government or other authority shall both be excluded......." 10. From the explanation to Sub-Section (3) of Section 470, Cr. P.C., it is clear that the period from 5-7-1989, when representation was filed by the petitioner, to 8-10-1992, when authorisation was issued, is to be excluded for determining the limitation, with the result the complaint in respect of unfair labour practices of coercing the petitioner to accept monetary rewards or get the dispute decided ex-parte in their favour is within time. The allegations in this regard are made in para 3 of the complaint which is :- "3. That the management of Village Papers Pvt. Ltd. is unduly dragging on the matter with a view to gain time and thereby frustrate the efforts of the workmen concerned to get justice from the Honble Court. They have now approached the H.P. High Court, Shimla on a trivial point of framing the issue according to their dictates. In the meanwhile the Management and its agents are adopting unfair means like coercing the applicants to accept monetary rewards or get the dispute decided ex-parte in their favour." 11. They have now approached the H.P. High Court, Shimla on a trivial point of framing the issue according to their dictates. In the meanwhile the Management and its agents are adopting unfair means like coercing the applicants to accept monetary rewards or get the dispute decided ex-parte in their favour." 11. It is correct that the complaint dated 5-7-1989 was filed by the petitioner in his individual capacity and the authority dated 3-10-1990 was also given in respect of unfair labour practice pertaining to him but from the tone and tenor of the complaint, especially the allegations made in para 3, it is clear that these pertain to all the thirty workmen-members of the Union including the petitioner, who were terminated and in respect of their termination the reference was pending before the Labour Court and also writ petitions in this Court. It is also correct that specific incidents constituting the alleged unfair labour practices have not been stated in the complaint but in the opinion of this Court, this is a matter of evidence and cannot be judged at the initial stage, when only summoning order has been passed. 12. In respect of the other point of defective sanction, this Court is of the view that the Addl. Sessions Judge has misdirected himself in holding that the requirement of Section 34(1) of the Act in respect of grant of authorisation is pari materia to the requirement of grant of sanction. Section 34(1) of the Act is as under :- "34. Cognizance of offences. (1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of the abatement of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government......." 13. This provision talks of only authorisation and not of sanction as provided under Section 197, Cr. P.C. and Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The purpose of it seems to be to provide for the delegation of it seems to prosecute on behalf of the appropriate Government but it has not been pointed out to whom the authorisation is to be awarded. Without going into the difference between sanction and authorisation, it is incumbent upon the appropriate Government to satisfy itself by applying its mind to all the relevant facts, before it grants the authority. Without going into the difference between sanction and authorisation, it is incumbent upon the appropriate Government to satisfy itself by applying its mind to all the relevant facts, before it grants the authority. Though it is not necessary to set out the facts of the case which might establish on the face it that the appropriate Government has applied its mind, yet, it for the prosecution to prove on record that, in fact, the authority was given after the Government duly satisfied itself on the material placed before it. Therefore, at this initial stage when only respondent No. 1 has been summoned on behalf of the company, the complaint cannot be quashed on the ground that from the authorisation it does not appear that the Government has applied its mind before granting it. 14. Mr. Goel, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has also raised an objection that the present petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is not maintainable as the quashing of summoning order and the complaint amount to acquittal that the has conceded that this Court has powers to interfere with and set aside the impugned judgment under Section 397 read with Section 401, Cr. P.C. if it is not satisfied about its propriety or legality or correctness. 15. In view of the above discussion, the finding of the Additional Sessions Judge on both the points of limitation and defective sanction are declared wrong and the judgment dated 18th July, 1992 is set aside. In the result, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, will proceed with the Criminal Case No. 16 of 1990 and decide it in accordance with law expeditiously. 16. The parties are directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, on 28th May, 1993. The records be sent to him immediately. Petition allowed.