JUDGMENT T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. Petitioner was an applicant for appointment as High School Assistant (Social Studies) in Government service. She belongs to the Dheevara community. The Kerala Public Service Commission (the Commission, for short) published rank list which came into force on 12-2-1990. is the list of candidates selected from the Dheevara community for appointment in their quota, the petitioner was shown as having rank No. 1, and the fifth respondent was shown as having rank No. 2. Petitioner was accordingly advised for appointment in a vacancy reserved for Dheevaras by the advice memo Ext. P1 dated 12-7-1990, Pursuant thereto, petitioner was appointed as a teacher in the Government High School at Meeachaatha by the proceedings Ext. P2 dated 25-7-1990 of the Director of Public Instruction. While working as such, the District Officer of the Commission at Kozhikode issued a memo Ext. P4 dated 8-1-1991 to the petitioner which read as follows: "Your name has been included as Rank No. 1 (one) in the supplementary ranked list of Dheevara Community prepared for the post of High School Assistant (Social Studies) in the Education Department, Kozhikode District which came into force w.e.f. 12-2-1990. On the basis, you have been advised for recruitment as H. S. A (Social Studies) on 12-7-1990, vide letter first cited. But due to the revision in the ranked list vide erratum notification published on 22-11-1990, your rank in the supplementary ranked list of Dheevara community has been revised and you have racked as 2nd in the supplementary list of Dheevara, Due to this revision you are not eligible to be advised for recruitment as High School Assistant (Social Studies). Consequently the advice of your name for recruitment on 12-7-1990 was wrong. In this circumstance, the Commission have ordered to cancel your advice for recruitment as High School Assistant (Social Studies) made on 12-7-1990 vide letter second cited, by invoking R.3(c) of the K. S. & S. S. Rules," The petitioner was thus called upon to submit her objections, if any, to the proposed cancellation of her advice within fifteen days. The Commission had in the meanwhile published an erratum notification Ext. P5 dated 22-11-1990 to the rank list showing the fifth respondent as the first in the Dheevara list, and the petitioner as the second therein. On receipt of the memo Ext. The Commission had in the meanwhile published an erratum notification Ext. P5 dated 22-11-1990 to the rank list showing the fifth respondent as the first in the Dheevara list, and the petitioner as the second therein. On receipt of the memo Ext. P4, petitioner challenged it by filing this original petition, and obtained an interim order on 21-1-1991 staying all further action, including the cancellation of her advice, pursuant to the memo Ext. P4 and the notification Ext. P5 Respondents 1 and 2, namely the Public Service Commission and District Officer entered appearance and filed counter affidavit setting forth is detail the circumstance in which the memo Ext. P4 and the notification Ext. P5 were issued. Inter alia, K was stated is Para.5 that the fifth respondent had obtained higher marks than the petitioner and that the higher rank assigned to the petitioner In the rank list was by mistake. The Interim order was thereafter modified as follows on 27-6-1991; "The petitioner shall file an explanation to Ext. P4 notice on or before 5-7-1991. It is made clear that filing of the explanation by the petitioner will be without prejudice to any of the contention of the petitioner in the O. P. including the contention regarding validity of Ext. P4 show cause notice. The P. S. C. is directed to pass final orders considering all the points raised in the explanation under R.3(c) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rule on or before 12-7-1991. The decision to be taken by the P. S C shall not be implemented until further orders from this court in this Original Petition". The petitioner accordingly filed her objections Ext. P5(a) and the Commission passed the order Ext. P6 on 11-7-1991 rejecting her contentions holding the advice of her name was liable to be cancelled under R.3(c) of Part 11 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (the Rules). But, the implementation of this order was kept in abeyance in deference to the modified Interim order of this court passed on 27-6-1991. Petitioner has amended the Original Petition challenging Ext. P6 as well. 2. The reason for the cancellation of the petitioner's advice was that she was entitled only to rank No. 2 in the Dheevara list and not No. I assigned to her. Petitioner has amended the Original Petition challenging Ext. P6 as well. 2. The reason for the cancellation of the petitioner's advice was that she was entitled only to rank No. 2 in the Dheevara list and not No. I assigned to her. On a correct tabulation of the marks of the candidates, it was found that the petitioner had obtained only 47 marks as against 49 marks obtained by the fifth respondent. The latter was therefore entitled to the first rank and the petitioner, to the second. When this mistake was discovered, the Commission took action to rectify the mistake, which eventually culminated in the order Ext. P6. 3. Petitioner challenges Ext. P6 on various grounds. Petitioner also challenges R.3(c) as violative of Art.14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. I shall deal with the contentions of the petitioner seriatim. 4. The first submission of the petitioner, which was very seriously pressed by her counsel, was that R.3(c) envisages two acts, both of which have to be completed within a period of one year from the data of advice, the two gets being, cancellation of the advice and the consequent termination of the candidate's service; but this is only partly satisfied in this case, as there has been no termination of the petitioner's service within the prescribed period and therefore all the proceedings taken against her have become purposeless. I shall extract R.3(c): "Notwithstanding anything contained in those rules, the Commission shall have the power to cancel the advice for appointment of any candidate to any service if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under some mistake. On such cancellation the appointing authority shall terminate the service of the candidate : Provided that the cancellation of advice for appointment by the Commission and the subsequent termination of service of the candidate by the appointing authority shall be made within a period of one year from the date of such advice. Provided further that, a cancellation of advice under this sub-rule shall be made only giving the candidate concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The petitioner's contention is that only one of the two acts contemplated by the first proviso, namely cancellation of the advice was completed within the prescribed period, but not the second, namely termination of her service. The petitioner's contention is that only one of the two acts contemplated by the first proviso, namely cancellation of the advice was completed within the prescribed period, but not the second, namely termination of her service. Since the period of one year has expired long ago, there is no further right in any authority to pass an order terminating the petitioner's service at this distance of time, and therefore Ext. P6 and the proceedings leading thereto do not serve any purpose, and need not be sustained. 5. There can be not doubt, having regard to the wording of the first proviso that both the cancellation of the advice and the termination of the service should take place within the period of one year from the date of the advice. It was so held by a Division Bench of this court in Para.2 of Its judgement in Appukuttan Pillay v. Kerala Public Service Commission, 1984 KLT 880 , But the question is whether this rule can be applied in all its force to the facts of this case, where the petitioner herself was responsible for the termination of the service not taking place within the one year period. The advice was on 12-7-1990 Petitioner was also appointed soon thereafter on 25-7-1990. The notice Ext. P4 was issued on 8-1-1991 Petitioner filed this writ petition in this court and obtained an interim order staying ail further action pursuant to Ext. P4 on 21-1-1991. The Commission could not therefore pursue the action initiated as per Ext. P4, so long as the order of stay passed by tills court was in force, That order was modified only on 27-6-1991 with direction to the Commission to pass its order on or before 11-7-1991. But this court specifically prohibited the implementation of the Commission's order without further orders from this Court The first of the acts contemplated by the first proviso to R.3(c), namely cancellation of the advice was thus performed by the Commission within time on 11-7-1991 But the other act namely termination of the service stood interdicted during the entire period of time from 21-1-1991 till date by the continued operation of the orders passed on 21-1-1991 and 27-6-1991. This period is liable to be excluded in the computation of the period of one year, under the general principles of the law of limitation, namely, that time will not run against a person who is under disability, when he is prevented from doing an act by the order of a competent count. 6. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta, AIR 1980 SC 656 . That was a case where in the course of the assessment proceedings under the Income Tax Act for the year 1972-73, a notice under S.142(1) was issued requiring the assessee to produce certain account backs and documents. This was challenged by a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta which was dismissed, by a learned Single Judge; bat the appeal there from was allowed by the Division Bench on 8/12.5.1978 and the notice quashed. Meanwhile, the assessment for, the year had been completed on 31-3-1977, but that was also quashed by the Division Bench, But, while disposing of the writ appeal, the Division Bench directed the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment. This direction was challenged by the assessee in appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the assessment had become barred by limitation and that the Division Bench could not give a direction which will deprive the assessee of this accrued right. The Supreme Court negatived the contention, observing in Para.7: "Ordinarily, where the High Court exercises such jurisdiction it merely quashes the offending order and the consequential legal effect is that but for the offending order the remaining part of the proceeding stands automatically revived before the inferior court or tribunal with the need for fresh consideration and disposal by a fresh order. Ordinarily, the High Court doe not substitute its own order for the order quashed by it. It is, of course, a different case where the adjudication by the High Court establishes a complete want of jurisdiction in the inferior court or tribunal to entertain or to take the proceeding at all. In that evens on the quashing of the proceeding by the High Court there is no revival at all. It is, of course, a different case where the adjudication by the High Court establishes a complete want of jurisdiction in the inferior court or tribunal to entertain or to take the proceeding at all. In that evens on the quashing of the proceeding by the High Court there is no revival at all. But although in the former kind of case the High Court after quashing the offending order, does not substitute its own order it has power nonetheless to pass such further orders as the justice of the case requires. When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice between the parities. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a patty invoking the jurisdiction of the court by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted so confer an advantage on the party responsible for it," In other words, a person approaching the court and obtaining an order restraining further proceedings cannot take advantage of his own action to contend subsequently that further proceedings had become barred by the lapse of time. Else the position will be that the action of the court will prejudice the opposite party. As any rate, this court while dealing with the matter under Art.226 can issue appropriate directions to do justice between the parties, as recognised in the above decision. It is the maxim of the law that the act of a court shall not prejudice any party. Precisely is was this approach that was made earlier by the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection v. Pooran Mall and Sons (1974) 96 ITR 390 , and by the Calcutta High Court in Cachar Plywood Co Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (1978) 114 ITR 379 . Petitioner cannot therefore take advantage of the stay obtained from the court to defeat f ho rights of the fifth respondent, when the commission had taken its action well in time, within about four mouths after the date of the advice. Even otherwise, the position is that when proceedings are stayed by virtue of an order of court, time does not run against the opposite party so as to prejudice him in the farther proceedings. Even otherwise, the position is that when proceedings are stayed by virtue of an order of court, time does not run against the opposite party so as to prejudice him in the farther proceedings. 7. Counsel for thy petitioner however persisted with a desperate further submission that the order of termination could have been passed by the appointing authority pursuant to the order Ext. P6. According to him there was nothing in the interim order of this court dated 27-6-1991 which precluded the appointing authority from passing an order terminating the petitioner's service, though the actual termination could take effect only with further orders from this court. I am unable to agree with this reading of the order dated 27-6-1991 by counsel for petitioner. The order is categoric that the decision to be taken by the Service Commission shall not be implemented until further orders from this court in this original petition The decision of the Service Commission is Ext. P6, Any further action pursuant to Ext. P6 can only by the appointing authority, and any termination of the petitioner's service pursuant to Ext. P6 will only be in implementation of that order, at, but for it, the appointing authority will have no occasion to pass an order terminating the petitioner's service. When therefore the interim order placed an embargo on the implementation of Ext. P6, it means nothing can be done on the basis of that order. Even the mere passing of an order without its being implemented will be hit. The appointing authority cannot pass any order based on Ext. P6. as that will be an implementation of the same. The termination of the service of the petitioner within the period of one year or even the passing an order to that effect, pursuant to Ext. P6, was therefore out of question. The petitioner's contention is therefore bereft of any substance. 8. Petitioner has another subsidiary contention that even if her advice is set aside it is not likely to benefit the fifth respondent because no appointment could be given to him at this distance of time. This argument only requires to be stated and rejected for the reason that the list is still alive and it expires only on 11-2-1993. Ext. Petitioner has another subsidiary contention that even if her advice is set aside it is not likely to benefit the fifth respondent because no appointment could be given to him at this distance of time. This argument only requires to be stated and rejected for the reason that the list is still alive and it expires only on 11-2-1993. Ext. P6 will certainly therefore confer a benefit on the fifth respondent, he being the first rank holder, by enabling the Commission to make advice to the vacancy on or before 11-2-1993. Even otherwise. I am of the view that when the mistake was that of the Commission in tendering a wrong advice by mistakenly ranking the candidates, and implementation of their order was stayed by this court, the entire time during which the stay was is operation, from 21-1-1991 till date Ss liable to be excluded in computing the three year period of validity of the list, so far as the fifth respondent is concerned. This is required in the interests of justice and the court's power to issue necessary directions to secure the ends of justice has been recognised in the decisions cited supra. This is apart from the fact that the rank list is still operative and enures till and inclusive of 11-2-1993 on its own force. This contention of the petitioner does not therefore bear scrutiny. 9. One of the main points urged, and vehemently pressed by counsel for the petitioner was that the second proviso to R.3(c) as also the rules of fair play and justice, if not the principles of natural justice themselves have bees violated in the proceedings in question. According to him, the notice Ext. P4 had been issued after a final decision had been taken to cancel the advice. Therefore the opportunity to file objections was only a futite ritualistic compliance with the second proviso to R.3(c) as the Commission had already fore closed its mind by reaching an anterior decision, as seen from Ext. E4, A post decisional hearing is no substitute for an effective and reasonable opportunity of being heard before the decision is taken. It is not compliance with the rules of fairness and justice or the rules of natural justice. If is therefore stated that Ext. P6 is liable to be quashed. In any event. 10. E4, A post decisional hearing is no substitute for an effective and reasonable opportunity of being heard before the decision is taken. It is not compliance with the rules of fairness and justice or the rules of natural justice. If is therefore stated that Ext. P6 is liable to be quashed. In any event. 10. The second proviso to R.3(c) was inserted by b Government order dated 10-9-1978 along with an amendment to the first proviso by which the period prescribed for cancellation of the advice was reduced from two years to one year. This letter was consequent! on a judgment of this court in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Jayadev 1977 KLT 85 in which It was observed delineating the scope of R.3(c): "We no doubt see that in given circumstances considerable hardship can be caused to persons by the exercise of this rather wide power conferred on the Public Service Commission to change an advice which they had formally and we expect, after due care and attention deemed fit to convey to the authority who has to make the appointment. This is particularly so when we find that this power can be exercised within a long period of two years which is the period of probation for fresh appointment by direct recruitment and which period is allowed by the proviso to sub-r.(c) of R.3",............ "It is most essential that such calamitous results should not follow by the exercise of power and it goes without saying that the period during which the power can be exercised must be limited to a far shorter duration from the fairly long period of two years"................... "We do not understand the rule as laying down an obligation on the part of the Public Service Commission compelling them to cancel every advice when there has been some mistake committed by them, without any regard whatever to the time that had elapsed between the advice and the discovery of the mistake and without any regard whatever to the consequences of the cancellation of the advice." 11. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decisions in Trehan v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 568 and Shephark v. Union of India. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decisions in Trehan v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 568 and Shephark v. Union of India. 1987 (2) KLT 707 (SC) to contend that a post decisional hearing does not subserve the rules of natural justice In the first of these cases it was observed that once a decision has been taken, there will be a tendency to uphold it, so that a hearing after the decision has been taken will not be say compliance with the rules of natural justice. In the latter case, It was held that acting fairly was a facet of natural justice, that fair play is part of public policy and a guarantee for justice to citizens, Counsel also referred to the fact that no appeal is provided against an order under R.3(c), which again was a factor to be taken into account in deciding the validity of the action in question. In fact, even a post decisional hearing by way of appeal will not cure the defect of absence of a pre decisional hearing (vide Thampi v. Collector of Central Excise, 1989 (2) KLT 65 , following Institute of Chartered Accountants v. R. L. Ratna ( 1986 (4) SCC 537 ). Counsel went on to submit, based on certain passages in the judgment in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress. AIR 1991 SC 10). that the conferment of power on a high dignitary or highly ranked officer is not always an assurance that the power will be exercised objectively, reasonably of fairly. Counsel further referred to the decision in Vimalarajan v. Public Service Commission, 1987 (2) KLT 185 to point out that R.3(c) visualises an effective opportunity and not a mere empty formality (vide also Premakumar v. General Manager Tele Communications, 1982 KLT 643 ). In this connection he referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Management of M/s. Nally Bharat Engineering Go. Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1990 (2) SCC 48 and Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaul Paintal 1990 (2) SCC 746 to point out that the rule of fair play apply even if the rules of natural juries are not applicable or are excluded and that the shift now is to a broader notion of fairness and fair procedure in administrative action. The duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. The duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. Even though strict adherence to natural justice may not be required, fairness in action is called for. That fairness is lacking it; this case in view of the pre hearing decision arrived at by the Commission. He also draws a distinction between forfeiture of an existing right and the refusal of a privilege. In the latter case, where there is only a right of fair consideration, and no accrued right is violated, the rules of natural justice may not be applied very strictly while in the case of a forfeiture of right, the rules of natural justice and fair play apply is all their strictness (vide Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, 1984 (3) SCC 258 , Para.32), 12. The basic postulate on which the petitioner presses her ease on the basis of these decisions is that the Commission had already arrived at Its decision to cancel the advice, and that the rank list requires modification by placing the fifth respondent as rank No. 1, before it issued the notice Ext. P4. In this view, there was no scope for any further consideration of the matter by the Commission after the issue of the notice to show cause, and therefore there is a clear violation of the rules of fair play, and fairness in action, if not of the rules of natural justice themselves. 13. I have perused Ext. P4. I cannot however find my way to read it as evidencing a decision, already arrived at by the Commission. According to me, it contains only a tentative conclusion of the Commission subject to modification on cause being shown. Unless such a tentative conclusion had been arrived at, there would have been no basis for issuing a show cause notice at all. The Commission had already noted the mistake committed by its office in ranking the petitioner with 47 marks as No. 1, and the fifth respondent with (higher) 49 marks as No. 2. Necessarily this mistake which had occurred due to lapses in the Commission's office had to be corrected. The Commission could not, without reaching such a conclusion, have issued the notice Ext. P4. It must also be noted that the correction of a mistake committed by it, with a view to avoid injustice is part of the Commission's duties. Necessarily this mistake which had occurred due to lapses in the Commission's office had to be corrected. The Commission could not, without reaching such a conclusion, have issued the notice Ext. P4. It must also be noted that the correction of a mistake committed by it, with a view to avoid injustice is part of the Commission's duties. The reasonable opportunity envisaged by R.3(c) is against cancellation of the advice and not against rectification of the mistakes committed by the Commission while the Commission may rectify a mistake committed by it, as of right, cancellation of the advice does not follow as a matter of course, as the Commission may still decide not to cancel the advice if the circumstances of e given case justify such a course. That is why a reasonable opportunity to show cause is afforded against the cancellation of the advice. The inexactitude in the terminology adopted by the Commission in Ext. P4 cannot therefore lead to any contrary conclusion, particularly as the Commission itself has left the entire issue of cancellation open till after cause is shown pursuant to Ext. P4. This is evident from the subsequent proceedings Ext. P6 also. If this be the way in which Ext. P4 is to be read, the question of violation of the rules of natural justice on of fair play does not arise. Petitioner had had opportunity to put forward her case and to be heard before the action of cancellation of advice was made, I am not impressed with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner, that the Commission had foreclosed its mind before the issue of Ext. P4 that any further hearing was an empty formality on a closed matter. On the other hand Ext. P4 contains only a tentative conclusion which is liable to change on cause being shown. The Commission has as a matter of fact dealt with the matter exclusively in Ext. P6 dealing with each and every one of the points raised by the petitioner in her objections Ext. P5(a) and come to the conclusion that the rank list required modification, and that the advice was liable to be cancelled. This contention of the petitioner has therefore to be overruled. 14. P6 dealing with each and every one of the points raised by the petitioner in her objections Ext. P5(a) and come to the conclusion that the rank list required modification, and that the advice was liable to be cancelled. This contention of the petitioner has therefore to be overruled. 14. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the high dignitary theory has been exploded by the Delhi Transport Corporation Case, which according to counsel for the Commission, has not made any dent in this theory affirmed as late as in 1989 by a unanimous Constitution Beach in Express Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat 1989 (3) SCC 677 . 15. Petitioner has a further subsidiary point on this aspect, that she had not been apprised at any time about the precise nature of the mistake committed by the Commission and therefore the had no opportunity to show cause against it, I do not find any substance in this contention. Petitioner was well aware of the circumstance which led to the notice Ext. P4 from Ext. P4 itself. Further she was well aware of It from Para.5 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 in this writ petition, after which alone the interim order dated 21-1-1991 was modified and the petitioner was directed to file her objections to Ext. P4. Therefore she knew the nature of the mistaken in the rank list before she filed the objections Ext. P5(a). The rules of natural justice are intended to put a party on notice of the case made out against her. They are not weapons of offence to fell actions otherwise valid, for alleged technical non compliance with them. Even assuming that Ext. P4 fell short of the necessary requirements by not mentioning the exact nature of the mistake is the rant list, petitioner cannot be allowed to make use of this technicality to challenge Ext. P6 as she had been made well aware of the nature of the mistake by the counter affidavit in this writ petition. This is apart from the fact, as mentioned by me in the preceding discussion, that R.3(c) envisages a reasonable opportunity to show cause only against cancellation of the advice and not against correction of an obvious mistake. 16. P6 as she had been made well aware of the nature of the mistake by the counter affidavit in this writ petition. This is apart from the fact, as mentioned by me in the preceding discussion, that R.3(c) envisages a reasonable opportunity to show cause only against cancellation of the advice and not against correction of an obvious mistake. 16. Even assuming that there is any substance is this contention of the petitioner the question still arises whether this court should interfere when there is only one conclusion possible on the facts disclosed, that the fifth respondent had obtained more marks then the petitioner and was entitled to be ranked No. 1. Petitioner cannot contend, nor has the chosen to establish, feat the Commission's conclusion that the petitioner had only 47 marks while the fifth respondent had 49 marks was in any manner erroneous. When only one conclusion is possible on the facts disclosed, the court will not lean in favour of a defeated applicant to ensure technical observance of the rules of natural justice, (vide S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1990 (4) SCC 379 at page 392, Para.17 and District Collector v. Bhaskara Kurup, ILR 1987 (2) Ker. 296, Para.6). The petitioner could not have stated anything more that what she had already stated is Ext. P 5(a), on this point, the relative marks obtained by the patties being a matter of record with the Commission. This contention therefore only deserves to be overruled. 17. Petitioner's further case is that the action in this case has been taken by the District Officer and not by the Secretary to the Commission and therefore the proceedings are bad without jurisdiction. I do not find any substance in this contention. The answer to this appears in the discussion under points I and IV in the order Ext. P6. It is true that Ext. P4 is signed by the District Officer, but it is a communication issued by him on instructions from the Commission with direction to forward all the papers to the Commission for further action. The ultimate order Ext. P6 which governs the matter has been Issued by the Secretary to the Commission after an elaborate discussion of the various points raised by the petitioner. The Commission stands by the action Exts. P4 and P6. It is not as if the notice Ext. The ultimate order Ext. P6 which governs the matter has been Issued by the Secretary to the Commission after an elaborate discussion of the various points raised by the petitioner. The Commission stands by the action Exts. P4 and P6. It is not as if the notice Ext. P4 had been sent unauthorisedly by the District Officer. On the other hand, it was a communication issued at the instance of the Commission itself. 18. Counsel inter alia pleaded that R.3(c) as well as Ext. P6 are violative of Art.14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. The argument is based on the allegation that R.3(c) is bereft of any guidelines as to when it should be invoked. This argument does not stand scrutiny for a moment as the rule is explicit and clear as to when it may be invoked, namely when it is subsequently found that the advice tendered by the Commission was made under some mistake. Such a reserve power to correct mistakes committed by itself has to be located in every public authority in the interests of justice and to avoid arbitrariness. It is not uncommon in fact it is a human falling - that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs. Infallibility is not a human virtue, that being a quality attributable only to the Almighty. Such a power to correct apparent mistakes is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision as was held by me earlier In my decision In Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India, ( 1990 (2) KLT 573 , paragraph, 7 relying on the decision in Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction, 1966 KLT 290 and others. The observations of the Supreme Court in a slightly different context in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521 are apposite in this context. "The question then is as to the effect of a void order of confirmation. When an order is void on the ground that the authority which made if had no power to make it cannot give rise to any legal rights, and as suggested by the learned Advocate, General, any person could have challenged the status of the respondents as Thahsildars by instituting proceedings for the issue of a writ of quo warranto under Art.226 of the Constitution. Had such proceedings been taken it would not have been possible for the respondents to justify their status as permanent Tahsildars and the High Court would have issued a writ of quo warranto depriving the respondents of their status as permanent Tahsildars. Now, were the Government itself realises that an order made by an authority under the Government is void is it powerless to do anything in the matter? Is it bound to give effect to a void order and treat as confirmed Tahsildars parsons who have no legal right to be treated as confirmed Tahsildars? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the fact of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31, 1957? In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular states, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law to be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status." Equally if the higher ranking given to the petitioner could have been successfully challenged as patently erroneous, why not the same result be achieved by the Commission itself rectifying what otherwise was an obvious mistake committed by it? Conferment of such a power is found in various statutes and is an essential requisite for achieving the ends of justice. It cannot be termed an arbitrary power as contended by the petitioner. 19. The guidelines as to when R.3(c) has to be invoked are seen therein itself, namely when it is found subsequently that the advice has been given by mistake, It is too much to say that the rule does not contain any guidelines. Apart from that the authority vested with the power to correct the mistake is a Constitutional functionary, namely the Commission constituted under Art.315 of the Constitution. The rules of procedure of the Commission should subserve the ends of justice and not defeat it enabling people to profit by mistakes committed by the officers of the Commission. This is the intent and purpose of R.3(c). The rules of procedure of the Commission should subserve the ends of justice and not defeat it enabling people to profit by mistakes committed by the officers of the Commission. This is the intent and purpose of R.3(c). If a mistake is corrected, and job opportunity is provided for the rightful incumbent I do not find any violation of Art.14 or 16 or any deprivation of the right under Art.21 of the Constitution. The right guaranteed by Art.21 applies equally to the petitioner and the fifth respondent. Neither R.3(c) nor Ext. P6 based thereon can therefore be struck down as violating any of the above provisions. 20. It was lastly submitted that the respondents are estopped from relying on their mistake and cancelling the advice. The argument is that because of the advice under Ext. P1 and the appointment under Ext. P2. the petitioner gave up other avenues of employment available to her. Reference is made to Ext. P3 dated 3-10-1990 of the Deputy Director of Educate, Kozhikode, appointing her as a P. D. Teacher which petitioner says she did not accept because of the earlier appointment under Ext. P2. But it is pointed out in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the third respondent State that the second respondent District Officer of the Public Service Commission at Kozhikode had directed to reissue the posting as P. D. teacher to the petitioner which was compiled with. The petitioner did not however join duty pursuant thereto, relying on the filing of this writ petition and the order of stay passed thereon. It is in this background that the question of estoppel has to be gone into. 21. Reference was made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. 1985 (4) SCC 369 , Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India. AIR 1986 SC 872 and Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab 1992 (2) SCC 411 , and of this court in Govindan Chengalath v. Cochin Shipyard Ltd. 1983 KLJ 306 . It is true that the horizons of promissory estoppel have been widened over the years comprehending within its ambit, various aspects of State action as well. The doctrine precludes the State and its authorities from going back on representations when they have been acted upon by the citizens. It is true that the horizons of promissory estoppel have been widened over the years comprehending within its ambit, various aspects of State action as well. The doctrine precludes the State and its authorities from going back on representations when they have been acted upon by the citizens. But the question here is whether there was any such representation or promise which could be held holding on the Commission. It must be noted here that any advice made by the Commission is liable to cancellation under R.3(c), if the advice was subsequently found to be mistaken. In fact, Ext. P1 itself states that the petitioner's selection was subject to R.3(c) and 10(b) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules. Petitioner knew therefore that her advice was subject to cancellation if it was found to be mistaken later. Being so, and since the advice by the Commission was subject to this condition, petitioner cannot take advantage of the advice, without the burden of the condition and contend that her advice and appointment should remain despite the mistake committed by the Commission. No question of promissory estoppel arises in this case, when the petitioner had been told and she had understood the possibility of cancellation of the advice when Ext. P1 was issued to her. 22. I have dealt with the various points raised by the petitioner and do not find merit in any of them. What the petitioner seeks is to profit from the mistake committed in the office of the Commission and to treat her as the first rank holder vis a vis the fifth respondent though he was the real first rank holder. The grant of the petitioner's prayer and the quashing of Ext. P6 will perpetuate the injustice of keeping the legitimate incumbent out of appointment and offering it to a person who is not entitled to it petitioner cannot be permitted to profit by such a mistake when the action to rectify the mistake has been taken well in time. This court will not exercise its discretion under Art.226 to perpetuate an injustice, to defeat the just and legitimate claims of the fifth respondent for the appointment, the action taken by the Commission being well within the confines of R.3(c). 23. The next question is what is the order to be passed in this writ petition. This court will not exercise its discretion under Art.226 to perpetuate an injustice, to defeat the just and legitimate claims of the fifth respondent for the appointment, the action taken by the Commission being well within the confines of R.3(c). 23. The next question is what is the order to be passed in this writ petition. No doubt, it entails dismissal, but the question is whether any directions should be gives to render justice to the fifth respondent and to relieve him of any possible injustice arising from the continued operation of the order of stay passed by this court on 21-1-1991 That such directions can be given in the interests of justice has been recognised in Grindlays Bank AIR 1980 SC 656 and other cases referred to earlier. 24. Accordingly I dismiss the writ petition, without however any order as to costs But the first respondent Kerala Public Service Commission is directed to advise the name of the fifth respondent for appointment at High School Assistant (Social Studies) on or before 11th February, 1993. The first respondent is also directed to keep the rank list in question of High School Assistant (Social Studies) open and in force for a period of two years and fourteen days more from 12th February, 1993, (being the period for which further proceedings under R.3(c) stood stayed by this court), in so far as the fifth respondent is concerned. Orders in implementation of Ext. P6 may be passed within a period of five months and 14 days (i. e. excluding the period from 21-1-1991 till this date from the period of one year prescribed by R.3(c). 25. I have mentioned earlier that the petitioner had obtained appointment as P. D. Teacher as evident from Ext. P3. But she did not accept it, or the further offer made to her later in view of her appointment under Ext. P2, and subsequently because of the pendency of this writ petition. Since it was the mistake on the part of the Commission that resulted in the petitioner's refusal of the offer of appointment, it Ss upto the Government and the Commission to consider whether the petitioner may not be advised for some other alternate post or offered some other appointment; so as to undo the hardship that will otherwise be caused so her. That is a matter for the Government and the Commission to consider with all the sympathy that it deserves.