Judgment :- MISHRA, J. 1. Three appeals OSA. Nos. 48 and 191 of 1988 and 16 of 1989 and CMP. No. 14742 of 1991 were disposed of by a common judgment by a Bench of this Court dated 13.11.1991 (since reported in 1992-2-L.W. 345) holding that the award in question cannot be made a rule of the Court unless registered as required under S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as according to the Court the award purportedly divided amongst the parties to the reference to the arbitrators immovable properties which did not constitute the properties of the partnership which they intended to divide. The Court accordingly found the judgment of the trial Court not sustainable, but recorded clearly that there were several arguments advanced on behalf of the parties as to the validity or otherwise of the award including the alleged legal misconduct of the arbitrators and the arbitrators going beyond the arbitration agreement and thus allegedly acting without jurisdiction, which points the Courts felt, were not necessary to decide. It seems that the said judgment was subjected to an appeal with special leave in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has, however, recorded that the conclusion of the Division Bench of this Court, that the allotments are exclusive to the partners and they got independent rights of their own under the award in the properties allotted under the schedule and hence, it is not a case purely of an assignment of the shares in the partnership, but it confers exclusive rights to the allottees and that the award also partitions certain immovable properties owned by the disputants, is based on an erroneous reading of the award(since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 612). The Supreme Court has recorded in its reading the award, that on settlement of accounts the residue is required to be divided among the partners in proportion in which they were entitled to share the profits, the properties have been allocated to the partners as falling to their shares on the distribution of the residue and a mere statement that certain properties were to exclusively belong to one partner or the other as the case may be, cannot change the character of the document or the nature of the assignment because that would, in any case, be the effect on the distribution of the residue . The Supreme Court has, however, remitted the matter to the Division Bench for answering the other contentions which arose in the appeal before it, but which were not decided in view of the decision on the question of registration of the award and also observed. “We also make it clear that the award which is pending for registration may be registered by the Sub-Registrar “We also make it clear that the award which is pending for registration may be registered by the Sub-Registrar notwithstanding the objection raised by one of the partners, S.V. Sivalinga Nadar through his lawyer, if that is the only reason for withholding registration.” Notwithstanding, however, the above finding in respect of the character of the award as held by the Supreme Court, there has been some arguments before us to show that the Supreme Court was not informed of such properties and the divisions which admittedly did not belong to the partnership, but nonetheless were included in the award and as far the observations of the Supreme Court also, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, it cannot be concluded only on the basis of the above reading of the award without being fully informed that there is no division between the members of the joint family of the said immovable properties which are not assigned on the adjustment of the residue after partitioning of the shares in the partnership. We have, however, felt no need to go into this question and allowed time to the parties to complete the pending registration. We are informed that the award has since been registered. 2. The factual matrix in sum, six brothers S.V. Sivalinga Nadar, S.V. Harikrishnan, S.V. Chandrapandian, S.V. Kasilingam, S.V. Ramachandran and S.V. Natesan who were carrying on business in partnership together with other partners, under several partnership names and holding shares and managing a public limited company, namely, Madras Vanaspati Limited, Villupuram agreed to refer their disputes to three Arbitrators, namely Sri. B.B. Naidu, Sri. K.R. Ramamani and Sri. R. Seetharaman. 3. In the reference dated 8.10.1981, they stated as follows: “We are carrying on business in partnership together with other partners under several partnership names. We are also holding shares and managing the public limited company, namely, the Madras Vansapati Ltd., at Villupuram. B.B. Naidu, Sri. K.R. Ramamani and Sri. R. Seetharaman. 3. In the reference dated 8.10.1981, they stated as follows: “We are carrying on business in partnership together with other partners under several partnership names. We are also holding shares and managing the public limited company, namely, the Madras Vansapati Ltd., at Villupuram. Disputes have arisen among us with respect to the several business concerns, immovable and movable properties standing in our names as well as other relatives.” “We are hereby referring all our disputes, the details of which would be given by us shortly to you, namely, Sri. B.D. Naidu, Sri. K.R. Ramamani and Sri. Seetharaman.” “We agree to abide by our award as to our disputes.” 4. The arbitrators proceeded with the arbitration enquiry, received statements and finally delivered the award on 31.1.1983. This, however, was found containing several grave errors. The Arbitrators withdrew the award and continued further proceedings. The arbitration proceeding, however, was not free of objections and litigations were brought to the Court, even during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. Yet eventually, the arbitrators delivered the award on 9.7.1984. 5. S.V. Chandrapandian and three others filed a petition under S. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act for a direction to the Arbitrators to file the award in Court and also filed Application No. 3505 of 1984 for passing a decree in terms of the award. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar filed separate petition, O.P. No. 234 of 1984 for a direction to the arbitrators to file the award. He also filed O.P. No. 247 of 1984 to set aside the arbitration award dated 9.7.1984. Several other petitions were also filed in the proceedings on the Original Side. 6. However, by a judgment dated 17.11.1988, O.P. No. 230 of 1984 and Application No. 3505 of 1984 have been allowed and a decree has been passed in terms of the award dated 9.7.1984. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, condensed his arguments, although he has not given up before us the challenge as to the validity of the award as a whole, to certain items of the award about which alone we shall speak in some details in our judgment, a bit later. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, condensed his arguments, although he has not given up before us the challenge as to the validity of the award as a whole, to certain items of the award about which alone we shall speak in some details in our judgment, a bit later. We may, however, dispose of the contentions as to the validity of the award on the grounds of legality or otherwise of the determinations of the items of dispute between the parties by the arbitrators on grounds. (1) The arbitrators have assigned no valid reason for the various items of award; (2) No proper and adequate opportunity was afforded by the arbitrators to the appellants to meet the various allegations of fact so much so that the arbitrators or the contesting respondents gave no information as to the basis of their respective claims; and (3) There are such errors of law that would fetch the reversal of the award by the Court. 8. That the abvoe arguments, however, have no legs to stand is demonstrated by the fact that although there is item wise pronouncement as to the division of the assets between the parties in the award, it is not a speaking award and therefore, it is not permissible to refer to the terms of the contract or any extrinsic material except that which is reflected by the award. All that is available in the instant case is the document of consensus ad idem between the parties that they intended to get their disputes resolved by arbitration with respect to the several business concerns movable and immovable properties standing in their names as well as other relatives. All that is available in the instant case is the document of consensus ad idem between the parties that they intended to get their disputes resolved by arbitration with respect to the several business concerns movable and immovable properties standing in their names as well as other relatives. In a decision by us in the case of Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Limited v. V.P. Chokhani and another (1993-2-L.W. 300), we have dealt with the scope of enquiry into the validity or otherwise of an award and found that the grounds to modify or correct an award are: (1) Where it appears that part of the award has contained a matter not referred to arbitration and such part can be separated from the other part and does not affect the decision on the matter referred; or (2) Where the award is imperfect in form, or contains an obvious error which can be amended without affecting such decision; or (3) Where the award contains a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission; The award is remitted to the arbitrator for reconsideration upon such terms as the Court thinks fit in cases — (1) Where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration, and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; or (2) Where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it; or (3) Where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of executions; and the award is set aside on grounds — (1) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (2) that the award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under S. 35 of the Act; and (3) that the award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid; The above quoted judgment has gone into some details of the grounds of misconduct etc. in case of non-speaking award and has said as follows: “In nutshell thus, there is no difference in the approach adopted by the Bench of this Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Limited v. Sathiabai & Company (1992-1- L.W. 136) and the Kerala Full Bench in the case of State of Kerala v. V.P. Jolly (supra). So far as the rule applied to the error of law apparent on the face of award is concerned, a non-speaking award will not permit any reference to the conditions of the contract unless it is so found incorporated in the award. For the purpose, however to test whether the arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction or travelled beyond his jurisdiction, the Courts shall see the arbitration clause or the agreement and if the arbitration clause or agreement will connect any of the conditions of the contract with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or indicate limitations upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, it will not be wrong if such terms and conditions of the contract are examined even in the case of a non-speaking award. The Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with this aspect of the law in the case of Associated Engineering Company v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 232) and said (1) the arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract when his whole function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled outside the bounds of the contract, he has acted without jurisdiction. But if he has remained inside the parameters of the contract and has construed the provisions of the contract, his award cannot be interfered with unless he has given reasons for the award disclosing an error apparent on the face of it. (2) An arbitrator who acts in manifest disregard of the contract acts without jurisdiction. His authority is derived from a specialised branch of the law of agency. He commits misconduct if by his award, he decides matters excluded by the agreement. A deliberate department from contract amounts to not only manifest disregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to mala fide action. His authority is derived from a specialised branch of the law of agency. He commits misconduct if by his award, he decides matters excluded by the agreement. A deliberate department from contract amounts to not only manifest disregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to mala fide action. A conscious disregard of the law or the provisions of the contract from which he has derived his authority vitiated the award; (3) A dispute as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is not a dispute within the award, but one which has to be decided outside the award. An umpire or arbitrator cannot widen his jurisdiction by deciding a question not referred to him by the parties or by deciding a question otherwise than in accordance with the contract. He cannot say that he does not care what the contract says. He is bound by it. It must bear his decision. He cannot travel outside his bounds. If he exceeded his jurisdiction by doing so, his award would be liable to be set aside; (4) Evidence of matters not appearing on the face of the award would be admissible to decide whether the arbitrator travelled outside the bounds of the contract and thus exceeded his jurisdiction. In order to see what the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is, it is open to the Court to see what dispute was submitted to him. If that is not clear from the award, it is open to the Court to see what dispute was submitted to him. If that is not clear from the award, it is open to the Court to have recourse to outside sources. The Court can look at the affidavits and pleadings of parties; the Court can look at the agreement itself; (5) If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Such error going to his jurisdiction can be established by looking into material outside the award. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. Such error going to his jurisdiction can be established by looking into material outside the award. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The dispute as to jurisdiction is a matter which is outside the award or outside whatever may be said about it in the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award Such jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award.” “It is one thing thus to dispute an award on the ground that it is not in accordance with the pleadings of the parties or that it is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract and another to say that in delivering a non-speaking award, the arbitrator has committed an error of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional errors are noticed in manifest disregard of the contract, and the extent and limitations that are mentioned in the arbitration clause, if it is a part of a compact or a common contract or in the arbitration agreement as it is called, if it is an independent arbitration agreement”. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show any ground that by delivering a non-speaking award, the arbitrator has committed an error of jurisdiction. He has thus not been able to persuade us to take notice of any part of his pleading in the petitions and affidavits before this Court as to any acts of error of law or fact committed by the arbitrators except the grounds stated hereinafter. 10. It is conceded by all parties that only six brothers signed the arbitration agreement. It is said, however, that their sisters ranked in the arbitration and participated in some part, but later withdrew. In so far as any adjudication by the arbitrators as to the dispute between the parties, that is to say, six brothers who joined the arbitration agreement is concerned, they are bound by it and are obliged o act accordingly. It is said, however, that their sisters ranked in the arbitration and participated in some part, but later withdrew. In so far as any adjudication by the arbitrators as to the dispute between the parties, that is to say, six brothers who joined the arbitration agreement is concerned, they are bound by it and are obliged o act accordingly. There are declarations in the award, however, in respect of the two business concerns, namely (1) Shobana Blue Metals and (2) Brahmasakthi Tin Factory. It is conceded that none of the parties is concerned with them or is a partner along with any other persons. Shobana Blue Metals, it is said in the award, has been owned and run as proprietorship by S.V.H. Rajaraman, son of S.V. Harikrishnan, the father being one of the parties to the arbitration. The said Rajaraman is a major. Brahmasakthi Tin Factory is said to belong to the son of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar and they are also said to be majors. There is a statement as to lands and buildings styled as S.V. Sivalinga Nagar and Refinery Complex at Villupuram and it is said that Sivalinga Nadar acquired some lands, buildings and machineries either in his name or in the name of his sons or jointly. In respect of these three items, the award says as follows: “The business of Shobana Blue Metals: This is owned and is being run as a proprietorship by S.V.H. Rajaraman, son of S.V. Harikrishnan who shall continue to own and run the same.” “Brahmasakthi Tin Factory at Villupuram: This is owned by the name of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar, and they shall continue to own and run the same.” “Land and Building styled as S.V. Sivalinga and Sons Refinery Complex at Villupuram: S.V. Sivalinga Nadar has acquired some lands, buildings and machinery at Viliupuram either in his name or in the names of his sons or jointly by both. We understand that these have been acquired by him and/or his sons out of his and/or their drawings and they shall stand allotted to those in whose names they have been acquired.” As in the case of lands and buildings styled as “S.V. Sivalinga Nadar and Sons Refinery Complex” it is said, in respect of lands and buildings bearing Nos. 802, 803 and 804 at Thiruvotriyur High Road, Madras, covering an area of four grounds and 2,119 sq. ft. 802, 803 and 804 at Thiruvotriyur High Road, Madras, covering an area of four grounds and 2,119 sq. ft. or thereabouts that V.R. Jaising son of S.V. Ramachandran purhased them out of his own deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation and advances from his parents, another house and ground No. 252, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13 covering an ar ea of 1-1/4 grounds or thereabouts are also said to have been acquired by V.R. Jaising out of his deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation Limited and advances from his mother, the land and building bearing No. 3, Kappal Polu Chetty Street, Washermenpet, Madras, are said to have been purchased by K. Bhaskaran, son of S.V. Kasilingam out of his drawings and advances made by his parents, land and building bearing No. 25, Rathna Sabapathy Mudali Street, Washermenpet, Madras, are said to have been purchased by V.N. Ravi Varman son of S.V. Natesan from out of his deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation and advances from his parents, the houses bearing Nos. 90-A, 90-B and 90-C West Mada Church Road, Royapuram, Madras and house No. 1-A and shops at Kalmandapam Road East and shops at Arathoon Road, Royapuram are said to have been constructed (only superstructures and not shops) out of the personal funds and borrowing by K. Bhaskaran, son of S.V. Kasilingam, V.R. Jaisingh, son of S.V. Ramachandran, V.N. Ravi Varman, son of S.V. Natesan and C. Thiagarajan, son of S.V. Chandrapandian respectively. In respect of these items, the award reads as follows: “Land and building bearing Nos. 802, 803 and 804. Thiruvotriyur High Road, Madars-19: This covers an area of 4 grounds and 2,119 sq. ft. or thereabouts. In respect of these items, the award reads as follows: “Land and building bearing Nos. 802, 803 and 804. Thiruvotriyur High Road, Madars-19: This covers an area of 4 grounds and 2,119 sq. ft. or thereabouts. This has been purchased by V.R. Jaising, son of S.V. Ramachandan out of his deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation and advances from his parents and shall stand allotted to him.” “House and ground No. 252, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras-13: This covers an area of 1-1/4 ground or thereabouts acquired by V.R. Jaising son of S.V. Ramachandran out of his deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation and advances from his mother and shall stand allotted to him.” “Land and building bearing No. 3, Kappal Polu Chetty Street, Washermenpet, Madras-21: This has been purchased by K. Bhaskaran, son of S.V. Kasilingam out of his drawings and advances from his parents and shall stand allotted to him.” “Land and building bearing No. 25, Rathna Sabapathy Mudali Street, Washermenpet, Madras-21: This has been purchased by V.N. Ravi Varman, son of S.V. Natesan from out of his deposits with Srimagal Finance Corporation and advances from his parents and shall stand allotted to him.” “House Nos. 90-A, 90-B & 90-C. West Mada Church Road, Royapuram, Madras-13 and House No. 1-A and shops at Kalmandapam Road East and shops at Arathoon Road, Royapuram: These superstructures, except the shops, have been constructed out of the personal funds and borrowings by K. Bhaskaran, son of S.V. Sivalingam, V.R. Jaising son of S.V. Ramachandran, V.N. Ravi Varman, son of S.V. Natesan and C. Thiagarajan son of S.V. Chandrapandian respectively and they shall stand allotted to the respective persons. Land occupied by these houses and shops belong to S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Bros, and have been allotted by us to disputants to Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 3 respectively, in the schedules D, E, F & C vide also plan annexed hereto.” 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in so far as items 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23-A aforementioned are concerned, since the properties are found by the arbitrators to belong to persons who are not parties to the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrators have exceeded the limitations of the reference to them and have, in this respect, acted without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondents has on the contrary pointed out that the legal infirmity in respect of items 19 to 23-A aforementioned is attached to the allotment and declarations in items 16 to 18 as Well. Although the learned counsel for the appellant has raised a technical argument that the respondents have not objected to the award in any part and therefore, they should not be heard in respect of declarations in items 16, 17 and 18, we are inclined on the facts of the instant case to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that if items 19 to 23-A fall outside of the arbitration agreement, items 16 to 18 also fall outside of the arbitration agreement. As a consequence of the above, it will not be illegal for any person including the parties to the agreement, to raise any averment as to the proprietory rights of S.V. Rajaram in the business of Shobana Blue Metals or that of the sons of S.V. Sivalinga Nadar in Brahmasakthi Tin Factory or lands and buildings styled as S.V. Sivalinga Nadar and Sons Refinery Complex. Similarly the rights that V.R. Jaisingh may have or may not have in the buildings bearing Nos. 802, 803 and 804 at Thiruvotriyur High Road, Madras, or in house and ground bearing No. 252, Suryanarayana Chetty Street, Madras, or in the superstructures in item No. 23-A aforementioned, can be subjected to/subject to claim of any other person including any of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The same will apply to the declaration in favour of K. Bhaskaran, son of S.V. Kasilingam or V.N. Ravi Varman son of S.V. Natesan. Since these declarations have no legal validity in the absence of any dispute raised by persons who are declared owners of the properties and they are not parties to the arbitration agreement, the declarations in the award are of no consequence and not binding at all. In other words, none of the persons said to be the owners of the properties aforementioned can rely upon the award as a document of title. 13. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant in the first two appeals, as well as, the learned counsel for the appellant in OSA. In other words, none of the persons said to be the owners of the properties aforementioned can rely upon the award as a document of title. 13. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant in the first two appeals, as well as, the learned counsel for the appellant in OSA. No. 16 of 1989 to a statement in paragraph 29 of the award which reads as follows: “The partners constituting these partnership business are the relatives of the disputants and not the disputants themselves. We, however recommend in the interest of place and amity and future well being, that the firms be dissolved with effect from the close of the business on 14th July, 1984 and the accounts settled between the partners. New firms may, however, be reconstituted if deemed expedient on the lines to be decided by the future partners of these firms” What, however, the partners of the two firms, namely Brahmasakthi Agencies and Srimagal Finance Corporation, have done pursuant to the above recommendation in the award is their concern. Our attention has been drawn to allotments of certain properties belonging to Brahmasakthi Agency and Srimagal Finance Corporation to the parties to the arbitration. Learned counsel for the appellants have contended that since the partners constituting the business are the relatives and not disputants themselves, how any property belonging to such a firm can be brought into the basket of one or the other party who intended to divide their joint business. Learned counsel for the appellants in OSA. No. 16 of 1989 has, in particular, submitted that the appellant in the said appeal has been one of the partners in Brahmasakthi Agency, as well as, Srimagal Finance Corporation, and he has not been a party to either of the arbitration proceedings or the proceedings in the Court in this behalf. When he learnt that his interests were already divided by the arbitrators between the parties to the arbitration, he moved the Court and sought to be added as a party objecting to the validity of the award. He has submitted that he has established his locus standi and that he is interested in the subject matter of the award, yet, he has not been added as a party and his objections have not been decided. He has submitted that he has established his locus standi and that he is interested in the subject matter of the award, yet, he has not been added as a party and his objections have not been decided. Learned counsel for the respondents has seriously refuted, however, the very claim of the appellant in OSA No. 16 of 1989 and he urged that he has/had no subsisting interest in Brahmasakthi Agency or Srimagal Finance Corporation. It is indeed a matter which cannot be decided in the reference aforequoted or as the objection to the award. It has to be decided in an appropriate proceeding. Any declaration in this behalf in the award is ineffective. The declaration in the award shall not bind any person having interest in Brahmassakthi Agency and Srimagal Finance Corporation to move in any appropriate proceeding for appropriate and proper adjudication. 14. We would have closed the proceedings as above, but for the award being interim in respect, however, of two matters, namely (1) item No. 11 and (2) item Nos. 14-A and B. It is possible to argue that a declaration of a joint interest of the parties is also an award and in that sense the award in joint rent account or stock-in-trade as aforementioned may conclude the dispute between the parties. But a glance to the reference is enough to make realise that the parties had intended to settle their disputes and they had not asked the arbitrators to leave for future adjustments any of the disputes between them. It is in that sense, necessary that a clear picture of the joint rent account of the parties as closed on 14.7.1984 and balance due by or due to respective parties is obtained and mutually adjusted by a specific allotment in accordance with the legal claims of the parties and similarly a follow up action after obtaining inventory of stock-in-trade as completed by the arbitrators themselves. We are informed that two of the arbitrators are still available and one B.B. Naidu has, however, expired. We are informed that two of the arbitrators are still available and one B.B. Naidu has, however, expired. It will be in the interests of the parties that a further direction is issued to the arbitrators to complete the settlement of the accounts between the disputants in respect of the joint rent account and the stock-in-trade between the disputants, that is to say, the parties to the reference for which purpose they shall still be deemed to be holding arbitration on the same terms and conditions as agreed to between the parties, for which in the vacancy caused due to the death of B.B. Naidu, to nominate a Chartered Accountant of repute who shall be in the place of B.B. Naidu acting as an arbitrator and a further direction that the arbitrators shall take decisions as far as possible by a common consensus and in case no such common consensus is available, by majority. In view of the determinations as above by us the decree of the trial Court is affirmed subject to the modifications as above. The formal rule of the Court shall accordingly be modified. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant in OSA. No. 48 of 1988 has stated that the prayer for injunction has failed because in the earlier judgment of the Bench of this Court, the award was not accepted as an award. He has contended that as a consequence of the declaration by us today, he is entitled to the injunction as prayed for. Since we have not subjected ourselves in any details for the prayer for injunction, we are not making any observation on the merits of the same. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, stated that there could be no objection to the appellant making a fresh application for injunction in the light of the findings recorded by us in our judgment in OSA. No. 48 of 1988 etc. and as a consequence, an order of injunction against any interference in their trade mark. There could be no objection to such a prayer. The prayer is allowed. 16. OSA. No. 48 of 1988 is dismissed as with drawn. There will be no order as to costs in all these appeals.