Judgment : This Letters Patent Appeal is preferred against the order dated 2. 1992 passed by a learned single Judge in C.M.P.Nos.256 to 258 of 1993 filed in Second Appeal No. 1623 of 1984. Those C.M.Ps. have been filed for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased third appellant on record, on condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement. The learned single Judge, having not been satisfied with the explanation offered for the delay, has rejected the petition filed for condoning the delay, and has consequently rejected the other two petitions filed for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased third appellant on record. 2. The office has raised an objection that as no Letters Patent Appeal lies against the judgment and decree in the second appeal, as such the letters patent appeal preferred against the order refusing to set aside the abatement is not maintainable, in view of the provisions contained in Scc.100-A read with Sec. 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that as the order refusing to set aside abatement is passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction, because the proceeding under 0.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an original proceeding, a Letters Patent Appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786: (1981)4 S.C.C. 8 . 3. It is necessary to point out that a mere fact that Rule 11 of O.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in the application of O.22 to appeals, the word ‘plaintiff occurring in the order shall be held to include an appellant and the word ‘defendant’ a respondent and the word ‘suit’ an appeal, does not convert that proceeding, which is filed in the second appeal as an original proceeding. It is a collateral proceeding in the second appeal only. It cannot be considered to be an original proceeding. The collateral proceedings in a second appeal or for that matter in any proceeding, cannot assume a different character than that it is a collateral proceeding in the second appeal or any other proceeding, as the case may be. It is a collateral proceeding in the second appeal only. It cannot be considered to be an original proceeding. The collateral proceedings in a second appeal or for that matter in any proceeding, cannot assume a different character than that it is a collateral proceeding in the second appeal or any other proceeding, as the case may be. The contention that the provisions contained in Rule 11 of O.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure make the proceedings filed under 0.22 in a second appeal an original proceeding, cannot be accepted. 4. Apart from this, there are other difficulties in the way of the appellant to maintain the appeal. Sec.100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides thus: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.” Therefore, from the provisions contained in Sec.100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that even if the contention of the appellant is accepted that the proceeding initiated under 0.22 of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing the legal representatives of one of the deceased appellants on record is an original proceeding (about which we have already pointed out that it cannot at all be considered to be an original proceeding), Sec. 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that even in such proceedings, also no appeal lies to a Division Bench, irrespective of the provisions contained in the Letters Patent. This amendment came to be introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 only to prevent such an appeal from being entertained, inasmuch as against the decree passed in the second appeal, no Letters Patent Appeal lies, whereas against the orders passed therein which are appealabale under O.43, an appeal would lie. This amendment came to be introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 only to prevent such an appeal from being entertained, inasmuch as against the decree passed in the second appeal, no Letters Patent Appeal lies, whereas against the orders passed therein which are appealabale under O.43, an appeal would lie. In addition to this, Sec. 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure further provides, “Where an appeal from any order is allowed it shall lie to the court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in the suit in which such order was made or where such order is made by a court (not being a High Court) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, then to the High Court.” Thus, Sec.106 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes the forum of appeal to be preferred against the appealable orders. As no appeal lies against the decree passed in the second appeal to a Division Bench, consequently, no forum is provided for an appeal to be preferred against the decree passed in the second appeal. That being so, no appeal can be preferred against an order passed in the second appeal. Thus, it is clear that Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellant against the order refusing to set aside the abatement passed in a second appeal by the learned single Judge of this Court, is not maintainable, because such an order is not passed in the original jurisdiction of this Court, 5. We may also point out here that in Modan Naik v. Hamsubala Devi, A.l.R. 1983 S.C. 676: (1983)3 S.C.C. 15 : (1983)2 S.C.W.R. 235: 1983 Fac.L.R. 113, it is held that the dismissal of the second appeal on the ground that it has abated, does not amount to a decree, therefore no appeal would lie, whereas the order refusing to set aside the abatement would be appealable, but the appeal would lie to the court from which an appeal would lie from the decree passed in the appeal. Therefore, it is clear that as no appeal is provided against the decree passed in the second appeal, no appeal would also lie against the order refusing to set aside the abatement passed in the second appeal. 6. Therefore, it is clear that as no appeal is provided against the decree passed in the second appeal, no appeal would also lie against the order refusing to set aside the abatement passed in the second appeal. 6. In Firm Chunnilal Laxman Prasad v. M/s.Agarwal and Company, A. I. R. 1987M.P. 172, similar view is taken, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786: (1981)4 S.C.C. 8 . It has been held therein that the effect of the provisions contained in Sec. 104 read with O.43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is that if an order is passed by a sangle Judge of the High Court either appointing a receiver or granting or refusing to grant an injunction under O.39, Rule 1, C.P.C., in some original proceeding, Letters Patent Appeal would lie against that order treating it to be a judgment. It has also been pointed out that if the order passed by the High Court is not an original order, but has been passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Sec. 104 read with O.43, Rule 1, even then a Letters Patent Appeal would lie. Indeed, such an argument is not open on the clear language of the Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.104, which as held by the Supreme Court is applicable to the Letters Patent Appeal. Therefore, it has been held that the L.P.A. is not maintainable. Thus, we are of the view that the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellant against the order refusing to set aside the abatement passed in the second appeal by a learned single Judge of this Court is not maintainable, as no Letters Patent Appeal lies against the decree passed in the second appeal by a learned single Judge. Accordingly, the office objection is upheld and the L.P.A. is rejected.