Judgment : The 2nd respondent in this writ petition borrowed a sum of Rs.3,750 from the petitioner in 1955 and executed a registered mortgage deed in favour of the petitioner. The 2nd respondent did not repay the amount. Therefore, the petitioner filed the suit O.S.No. 136 of 1972 on the file of the District Munsif, Velangaiman for the sale of the hypotheca and realisation of the mortgage money. On 12. 1972, a preliminary decree was passed and a final decree was passed on 112. 1973. Thereafter the petitioner filed E.P.No.326 of 1974 to bring the mortgaged property for sale. Thereafter the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act (13 of 1980) hereinafter referred to as Act came into force. Taking advantage of the said enactment, the 2nd respondent filed an application before the concerned Special Tahsildar for a certificate of discharge of the mortgage debt on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits of Act 13 of 1980. The Special Tahsildar (Debt Relief), enquired into the same and passed an order dated 23. 1983, holding that the 2nd respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the said Act. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent filed an appeal before to the appellate authority, the 1st respondent herein. The 1st respondent, by his order dated 111. 1985, allowed the appeal filed by the 2nd respondent, holding that the 2nd respondent is entitled to the benefits of the Act and directed the Special Tahsildar to issue the certificate of discharge to the 2nd respondent. Aggrieved by the said order of the 1st respondent, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 111. 1985. 2. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the petitioner had obtained a decree from the civil court in O.S.No.136 of 1972 on the basis of the mortgage deed, it is not open to either the Special Tahsildar or the 1st respondent, the Appellate Authority, to go behind the said decree and nullify the same by granting a certificate of discharge of the decree debt. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, neither Sec.4, nor Sec.5, nor Sec.6 of the Act contains a non obstante clause enabling the debtors to have a certificate of discharge even in cases where the debt has merged in a decree. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, neither Sec.4, nor Sec.5, nor Sec.6 of the Act contains a non obstante clause enabling the debtors to have a certificate of discharge even in cases where the debt has merged in a decree. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions in R.K.R.Radhakrishnan Chettiar and Sons v. Tahsildar (Debt Relief) Kumbakonam, 1982 T.L.N. J. 66, Perumal v. Chinna Kuppanna Gounder, (1981)2 M.L.J. l.A.I.R. 1981 Mad. 271: (1981)94 L.W. 317: 1981T.L.N.J.236 and K.V.S.R.Sttbramanian Chet-tiar v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, 95 L. W. 466. There is merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 3.. There is no dispute in the present case, that a preliminary decree was passed on 12. 1972 the basis of the mortgage deed and final decree was passed on 112. 1973. Admittedly the said decree was put in execution before the civil court in E.P.No.326 of 1974 when Act 13of 1980 came into force. Notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage debt crystallised into a decree of the civil Court, the 1st respondent has invoked the provisions of the Act and directed the issue of certificate of discharge in favour of the 2nd respondent. By directing the issue of such certificate, he has nullified the decree passed by the civil court in O.S.No.136 of 1972. Act 13 of 1980 does not bypass the decrees already passed by the civil courts. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is no non obstante clause in either of the Secs.4,5 and 6 of the Act and in the absence of a non obstante clause, only in a case where the debt is not merged in the decree, the Authorities under Act 13 of 1980 can exercise their power under Secs.5 and 6. Act 13 of 1980 does not contemplate that the Authorities constituted under the said Act, can sit in judgment over the decrees passed by the civil courts. Act 13 of 1980 does not contemplate that the Authorities constituted under the said Act, can sit in judgment over the decrees passed by the civil courts. In K.V.S.R.Subramanian Chettiar v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, 95 L. W. 466, a Division Bench of this Court, while holding that in a suit or proceeding initiated by a creditor in a civil court only the court has to decide the question as to whether the defendant in the suit or proceeding, is a debtor as defined in the Act, as a jurisdictional issue, observes thus: "It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in cases where a creditor has filed a suit for the enforcement of a mortgage executed by a debtor, the debtor has to approach the civil court for adjudication of his claim for entitlement under the provisions of the Act and that he cannot approach the authorities constituted under the Act for such a decision. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Secs.5 and 6 of the Act can apply only to cases where a creditor has not approached the civil court by filing a suit to enforce his claim as against the debtor, as otherwise the authorities constituted under the Act will be usurping the functions of the civil court, which is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act. Sec.4 does not specifically say that even in respect of matters pending before a civil court, the Tahsildar can entertain an application under Scc.6 of the Act. It is no doubt true that Scc.4(1)(b) of the Act says that no civil court shall entertain any suit or other proceedings against the debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt and Sec.4(1)(c) says that all suits and other proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act against any debtor for the recovery of any such debt shall abate. However, the prohibition on the civil court to ascertain a suit and abatement of all existing suits and other proceedings will arise only if the debtor is found entitled to the benefits of the Act. Therefore, the civil court wherein suits or other proceedings are pending against the debtor has to come to a conclusion as to whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the act or not. Therefore, the civil court wherein suits or other proceedings are pending against the debtor has to come to a conclusion as to whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the act or not. Secs.5 and 6 of the Act do not use a non-obstante clause giving the Tahsildar a power to override the decision of the civil court as regards the question whether a parly before the civil court is a person entitled to the benefits of the Act, and the Tahsildar, acting under Secs.5 and 6 of the Act cannot be expected to render a decision on the question as to whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the Act and call upon the civil court to abide by that decision. As pointed out by Ratnam, J., in Perumal v. Chinna Kuppanna Gounder, (1981)2 M.L.J. 1.A.I.R. 1981 Mad. 271: (1981)94 LAV. 317: 1981 T.L.N.J. 236, the Tahsiidar acting under Sec.5 or Sec.6 cannot assume the functions of a civil court, which has to necessarily determine as a jurisdictional issue as to whether the party before it is a debtor entitled to the benefits of the Act, or for deciding the question of maintainability of the suit or for deciding the question of abatement referred to above. Admittedly, there is no express provision taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question as to whether a particular person is entitled to the benefits of the Act or not. In a suit or proceeding initiated by a creditor in a civil court, the court has to decide the question as to whether the defendant in that suit or proceeding is a "debtor" as defined in the Act, as a jurisdictional issue and such jurisdictional issue has to be decided only by a court itself before pronouncing its decision on the question of maintainability of the suit or proceeding or on the question of abatement. In this view of the matter, we have to hold in this present case that as creditor has already filed two suits for recovery of the mortgage amount and those suits are pending, the third respondent herein, who is the defendant in those suits, has to seek an adjudication before the civil court on the question as to whether he is entitled to the benefits of the Act and if the court comes to the conclusion that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act, then the court has to dispose of the suits in accordance with Sec.4 of the Act". The ratio of the above decision directly applies to the facts of the present case. In view of the above settled position of law, it has to be held that when the preliminary and final decree have already been passed by civil court, and the matter was pending in execution stage, the 1st respondent by the impugned order, cannot direct the issue of a certificate of discharge, as it would have the effect of nullifying the decree granted by the competent civil court. Therefore, the order challenged in the writ petition is illegal and it is liable to be quashed. 4. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order challenged in the writ petition is quashed. There is no order as to costs.