HARI NATH TILHARI, J. This petition application 482 of the Cr. P. C. has been moved by the applicant, who claims himself to be the owner in possession of the land described in paragraph 1 of the petition by boundaries and which has been alleged to bear municiple No. 486/56/2 having a Kothari and Tin-shed over it, for quashing of the proceedings of Case No. 43/92 (Mushtaq Hussain v. Mohd. Usman Hussain & Ors.) pending in the Court of 1st Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow, opposite party No. 2 as well as for setting aside or quashing the order dated January 14, 1992, Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition and order dated 13-4- 1992, Annexure No. 8 and has further prayed that the restoration of the possession of the property in dispute in favour of the applicant, be also directed to be made. 2. According to applicants case as alleged in the petition applicant claimed himself to be the owner of the property in dispute described in paragraph 1 of the application under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. as land measuring 3800 Sq. Ft. surrounded by boundary walls and having Kothari and Tin-shed over it and bearing the municiple No. 4s6/56/2. The applicant has given the boundaries of the land in dispute as under: East - Land of Mohad. Azmat Azim in occupation of Jamil and Masroof West - Road North - Road South - Lane 3. The applicant has asserted that the applicants father Ikram Hussain was in possession of the land in dispute since the year 1948 and since after the death of his father Ikram Hussain, which did place in May, 1990, the applicant claims himself to be in continuous possession thereof. The applicant claimed his title by way of adverse posses sion over the property in dispute. 4. According to applicants case Smt. Hamida Khatoon had instituted a suit, namely, Regular Suit No. 203 of 1985 against the father of the applicant for arrears of rent and damages in which Qaji Ikram Hussain, the applicants father filed a written statement on 25-8-86 claiming himself to be in actual possession of the land as the owner thereof since 1984 and claiming himself to be using the same as the land for stocking and selling fire-wood. According to applicants case, the father of the applicant claimed his possession and user of the land in dispute and had denied, in that case, the allegations of Smt. Hamida Khatoon regarding her father possession over property in dispute and that suit was dismissed by the IXth additional munsif-Magistrate, Lucknow on 11-7-1988. 5. According to applicant, on 31-12-91, Smt. Hamida Khatoon and Smt. Aniuman Bano opposite parties alongwith their associates Mohd. Islam Husain, Idil Rizvi and some others came to place of property to dispossess the applicant forcibly but due to timely intervention of the neighbour, they could not achieve their goal. In view of the above, on January 1,1992, Regular Suit No. 2/1992 Mohd. Mushtaq Hussain v. Smt. Hamida Khatoon & Ors. , was filed by the applicant in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow alongwith application for interim injunction. 6. In the suit, while filing the plaint, an application for temporary injunction was also moved by the petitioner which was granted by the Munsif-South in favour of the applicant and an interim injunction order was issued restraining the opposite parties from dispos sessing the applicant from the land in dispute. According to applicant, opposite parties 3 and 4 i. e. Mohd. Alam Hussain and Anjuman Bano, according to applicants case, could not dispossess the applicant illegally so adopted tactic of harassing the applicant on one pretext on other and opposite parties 3 and 4 (Mohd. Islam Hussain and Anjuman Bano) with the help of the police Hasanganj submitted report dated 14-12-1991 before 1st Additional City Magistrate (I), Lucknow, opposite party No. 2 and opposite partey No. 2 i. e. 1st Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow on 14-1-1992 passed the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to the effect that there exists a dispute about the possession regarding house No. 486/56/2 situate in Mohalla Thatheri Bazar, near Daliganj Railway Station, Police Station, Hasanganj, Lucknow and there is likelihood of the breach of peace being caused there by i. e. on account of the dispute and, therefore, he directed by that order that both the paties should appear on 31-1-1992 before the Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow concerned and put their written statement of their respective claims regarding or in respectof their respective actual possession over the property in dispute. The order dated 14-1-1992 has been annexed as Annexure No. 6/7 to the application. The order dated 14-1-1992 has been annexed as Annexure No. 6/7 to the application. According to the petitioners case, no notices were issued to the applicant before passing of the order under Section 145 (1) of the Cr. PC. by the Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow, opposite party No. 2. 7. According to applicants case is that after passing of the order dated 14-1-1992, opposite party No. 2 issued notices and on 13-1-1992, applicant filed his objections. " irty No 2 had stated that; in Regular Suit No. 2 of r and that order of interim injunction has already been passed by the learned Munsif in applicants favour. The applicant alleged that he filed a photostat copy of the Certified copy of the injunction order dated 1-1-1992 passed by learned Munsif South, Lucknow in Regular Suit No. 2/92. The 1st Additional City Magistrate Lucknow, according to applicant fixed February 18, 1992 as the date of the disposal of the objection but on 18-2-1992 as well as on subsequent dates fixed by the learned Munsif, namely, 18-2-1992, 7-3-1993 and 20-3-1992, the applicants objections against the interim application for injunction could not be disposed of by the learned Munsif Court on account of continued lawyers boycott by strike. 8. The applicant has further stated that on 13-4-1992 when the applicant approached the Court or Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow he found that the Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow had already passed an order under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. PC. and in the order sheet 4-4-1992 had been mentioned as a date for hearing in that matter. The applicant stated in the application that 4-4-1992 had never been fixed as the date for hearing and according to his case, this was a open violation of provisions of law and the proceedings under Section 145 (1) Criminal Procedure Code had been engineered to dispossesses the applicant. The applicant has further stated that order under Section 14o (1) of the Cr. PC. was also passed in a scatchy and fraudulent manner. The applicant has stated that the order under Section 146 (1) did not indicate if there was a case of emergency and as to what was the case and what were the circumstances that lead to Magistrate to consider that a case of emergency or it was emergent matter requiring action under Section 146 of the Code. The applicant has stated that the order under Section 146 (1) did not indicate if there was a case of emergency and as to what was the case and what were the circumstances that lead to Magistrate to consider that a case of emergency or it was emergent matter requiring action under Section 146 of the Code. 9, Having felt aggrieved from the proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. PC. and the order 14-1-1992 and order dated 13-4-1992 under Section 146 of the Cr. PC, the applicant has approached this Court by filing this petition under Section 482 of the Cr. PC. for quashing of the entire proceedings of Case No. 43 of 1992, Mohd. Mushtaq Hussain v. Mohd. Islam Hussain, pending in the Court of 1st Additional City Magistrate, Lucknow and has further prayed that by exercising powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. this Court may be pleased to quash and set aside the orders dated 14-1-1992 (passed under Section 145 (1) of the Cr. P. C.) and dated 13-4-1992 (purporting to have been under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. P. C.) contained in Annexure Nos. 6 and 8 to the writ petition. The petitioner has further prayed for restoration of possession over the property in dispute as has been mentioned earlier. 10. On behalf of the opposite parties 3 and 4, a counter-affidavit has been filed on 11-2-1993 alongwith the Photostat copies on certain documents as Annexure to the counter-affidavit. A supplementary counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4. 11. The applicant has filed rejoinder affidavit with appears to have been sworn in 24th February 1993 and a Supplementary rejoinder affidavit had also been filed on behalf of the petitioner which bears the date 22-4-1993 and in reply thereto on 11-10-1993 an additional counter-affidavit to Supplementary rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the opposite party No. 4 and an additional rejoinder affidavit iias also been filed on behalf of petitioner bearing the date 8-11-1993. 12. In the Counter affidavit, it has been asserted that the applicant was never in possession over the property in dispute and instead opposite party No. 4 claimed the opposite parties to be u possession of the disputed property since 1991 continuously. 12. In the Counter affidavit, it has been asserted that the applicant was never in possession over the property in dispute and instead opposite party No. 4 claimed the opposite parties to be u possession of the disputed property since 1991 continuously. It was also asserted in the counter-affidavit that one Smt. Hamida Khatoon had transferred the property in favour of Smt. Anjuman Bano by registered sale- deed dated 4-9-1991 and put her in possession of the property on the date of the execution of the sale- deed and since that date, the opposite party clamined herself to be in continuous peaceful posses sion of the property in dispute. Opposite party Smt. Anjuman Bano claimed herself to be in possession in actual of the property in dispute on the date of preliminary order dated 14-1-1992, as well as on the date, the order of attachment was passed, namely, i. e. 13-4-1992 and made a reference to the Commissioners report filed in the Civil Suit. The opposite parties further took the plea that order under Section 145 (1) of the Cr. P. C. dated 14-1-1992 and order dated 13-4-1992 i. e. order of attachment under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. P. C, are in the nature of interlocutory orders and so this Court may not exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. It has also been asserted that order dated 1-1-1992 has not yet been confirmed. 13. I have heard Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, Advocate assisted by Sri P. S. Mehra, on behalf of the applicant and Sri S. B. Mathur on behalf of the opposite parties. 14. Sri S. B. Mathur, learned Counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the application under Section 482 Cr. PC. and urged that, orders impugned namely, order dated 14-1-1992 (Order under Section 145 (1) Cr. PC.) and (Order dated 13-4-1992 Annexure No. 8 to the under Section 482 Cr. P. C. are orders in the nature of interlocutory-order and, as such revision under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. is barred against the order of interlocutory in nature. There is mandate of law that the power of revision shall not be exercised in relation to interlocutory orders passed either an appeal or in trial or other proceedings. P. C. are orders in the nature of interlocutory-order and, as such revision under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. is barred against the order of interlocutory in nature. There is mandate of law that the power of revision shall not be exercised in relation to interlocutory orders passed either an appeal or in trial or other proceedings. Shri Mathur has further submitted that as the law specially puts a restriction and bar against the exercise of reyisional jurisdiction in the matter arising out of interlocutory orders and ordains that revisional powers are not in exercise in relation to interlocutory order. The Court should not exercise its jurisdiction or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. as it will be against all cannons of law and justice to allow to a person to circumvent special provision law creating bar by asking the Court to exercise inherent jurisdiction in case where there law ordains that no in ference should be made with the order. He submitted that inherent power of the Court are not meant to be used and exercised to perpetuate the violation of the mandate or man datory provisions of the Code itself particularly the mandate of the provision like one contained to Section 397 (2) of the Cr. P. C. He contended that a perusal of the rejoinder affidavit, particularly paragraph 17 thereof indicates that the main thrust and attack of the petitioner-applicant is against the orders dated 14-1-1992 and 13-4-1992 that the said orders be quashed. 15. This preliminary objection was met out and was strenuously attempted to met out by and on behalf of the revisionist, by Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Counsel for the applicant by asserting that there is no doubt that the applicant has challenged the order dated 14-1-92 and 13-4-92 passed under Section 145 (1) and Section 146 (1) respectively, of the Criminal Procedure Code but the main thrust and real attack and challenge of the petitioner is to the maintainability of the entire Case No. 43/92 which is in regard to the same property in respect of which Regular Suit No. 2 of 1992 is pending in the Civil Court and in which an ex-pane temporary injunction order has been granted in favour of the plaintiff-applicant and against the defendant i. e. present opposite parties No. 3 and 4 to this Criminal Misc. Case. 16. Shri Mohd. Case. 16. Shri Mohd. Arif Khan Submitted that the said suit i. e. Suit No. 2/1992 is a suit for injunction based on title and possession and that suit had come into existence prior to the Court of Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. and prior to the date of passing of the preliminary order. Sri Khan contended that Suit No. 2 or 1992 being a suit in which the decree for permanent injunction has been claimed and in that suit there is a dispute regarding the title and right of the parties regarding the property in dispute as well as their possession and when this suit has been pending on date the Magistrate passed the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. i. e. on 13-1-92 or on the date on which it passed the order of attachment under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. P. C. the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed or to continue to proceeding under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. nor had any jurisdiction to pass any order under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. P. C. He submitted that really institution of the Section 145 proceedings or initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. during the pendency of the Regular Suti No. 2 of 1992 relating to this property in dispute was bad in law as it is well settled that when the title suit is pending recourse cannot or could not be made under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. instead if there was any apprehension of breach of peace, the Magistrate should take action under Section 107/116 Cr. P. C. The correctness of this contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist, was disputed on behalf of the opposite-parties. 17. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties Shri S. B. Mathur replied by submitting that unit it is clear form the order of the Civil Court as to who is in possession and entitled in possession may be by an interlocutory order passed during the continuance of proceed ings of Civil Court is cannot be said that action taken under Section 145 (1) of the Cr. PC. was not maintainable and as proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. PC. was not maintainable and as proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. were main tainable in view of the fact that interim order of injunction contained in Annexure No. 5 was vague and did not indicate as to who was actually in possession of the property on the date of the suit and as no alternative arrangement was provided thereunder to the arrange ment made by the Criminal Court under Sections 145 and 146 of the Cr. PC, the proceedings could not be dropped. 18. Learned Counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions placed reliance on some authorities which may be discussed while examining their respective contentions. 19. I have applied my mind to the respective contentions of learned Counsel for the parties, namely, to the contentions of the learned Counsel Shri Mohd. Arif Khan and to that of Shri S. B. Mathur. As regards, the preliminary objetions to the effect that present application under Section 482 of Cr. P. C should be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the order impugned are of interlocutory in nature let us examine the relevant provisions. 20. Section 145 (1) of the Cr. P. C provides that when the Magistrate i. e. Executive Magistrate is satisfied from the report of the Police Officer or upon other informations that there is exist a dispute concerning land or water or boundaries thereof within the local limits of its jurisdiction and that dispute is likely to cause breach of peace then the Magistrate shall make an order in writing calling upon the parties concerned to the dispute to attend the Court either in person or through pleader on a date i. e. specified date and time and to place or put their written statements of their respective claims relating to the factum of actual possession. No doubt, such an order is in writing stating the ground i. e. being so satisfied about the existence of dispute likely to cause breach of peace. But such an order passed under Section 145 (1) Cr. PC. by itself does not determine the rights of either of the parties. It is an order which is passed by the Magistrate on being satisfied about the dispute and its nature and thereby only calls upon the parties to come and to place their dispute. But such an order passed under Section 145 (1) Cr. PC. by itself does not determine the rights of either of the parties. It is an order which is passed by the Magistrate on being satisfied about the dispute and its nature and thereby only calls upon the parties to come and to place their dispute. By this order which is passed under Section 145 (1) itself he does not decide anything. Such an order is only an order passed in course of proceedings and for the purposes of taking recourse. Such an order is as step in aid of the process to do certain thing, namely, i. e. calling of party in order to decide actual factum of possession of the party on the relevant date referred to in Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. or to decide the question which of the party has been dispossessed within a period of two months next before the date of passing of this order so this is nothing but an order as step in aid of proceedings and it is an order of interlocutory in nature. It is something that take place in between, prima fade, satisfaction of the Magistrate regarding the dispute on the basis of report or other information and the decision of the question of possession under sub- sec tion 4. Such an order does not in anyway either determine any right nor iota of any interest of the party. Under it is respective parties are called to put their case so it is beyond doubt that an order under Section 145 (1) by itself is not an order of final nature instead it is a preliminary order in its nature. 21. When I hold that an order under Section 145 (1) of the Cr. P. C. is not an order deciding any right of the parties nor it is an effecting the rights of the parties in any manner it only calls upon the parties to put their case and so is an interlocutory in nature. I find support for my view from the decision of this Court in the case of Ashfaq Hussain v. Ehtram Hussain & Ors. , 1991 Cr. LJ page 747. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Jai Prakash Singh & Am v. Radhey Shyam Singh & Ors. , ACC 1987 (24) page 464. I find support for my view from the decision of this Court in the case of Ashfaq Hussain v. Ehtram Hussain & Ors. , 1991 Cr. LJ page 747. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Jai Prakash Singh & Am v. Radhey Shyam Singh & Ors. , ACC 1987 (24) page 464. In the case of Jai Prakash Singh (supra) it has been laid down as under: "in view of the above principles determining final orders and interlocutory orders, if an order is made before the judgment and it gives no final decision on the matter in dispute, but is merely on the matter of procedure and does not finally dispose of the matter in dispute and permits the action to go on it is an interlocutory order. In the instant case passing a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Code or an order of attachment under Section 145 (1) of the Code and directing the parties to appear on a particular date and lead evidence to prove their respective cases, is an order made as a matter of procedure and allows the action to go on and nothing has been decided, hence it is certainly not a final order but only an interlocutory order and the revision would not be maintainable in view of Section 397 (2) of the Code. " 22. In the present case, the order under Section 146 that has been passed i. e. Annexure No. 8 to this Section 482 petition. A perusal thereof indicates that the said order had been passed as, after having been passed the order dated 14-1-92, the Magistrate concerned on the basis of the police report or the report of Sub-Inspector felt satisfied that there is a case of great emergency and so it is necessary to attach the subject matter of dispute. As measure corollary to the process of decision of matter under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. regarding the possession. It is not a case in which the order of attachment had been passed by the Magistrate taking the view that either of the parties was in possession or taking the view that he was not in a position to decide or in other words, he was unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession on the date relevant under Section 145 Cr. P. C. so in such a case of attachment under Section 146 in course of proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. is nothing but an attachment of interlocutory nature pending the disposal of proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. itself and in such a case, It can be said and has been contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties that the order of attachment had been passed under Sub-Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. is an inter locutory order. I am supported in my view, from what has been laid dawn in the case of Smt. Premalata & Anr. v. Ram Lubhaya & Ors. , 1978 page 1822, dealing with this question of an attachment of under Section 146, this Honble Court has been pleased to observe that: "in other words, the emergecny attachment is just a protective measure to prevent breaking of heads till such time as the Magistrate gives his final decision under Section 145 (4) of the Cr. P. C. Such an order passed under the first clause of Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. will be an interlocutory order. " Similar view has been expresed by this Court in the case of Ashfaq Hussain v. Ehtram Hussain & Ors. , 1991 Cr. LJ 747. 23. Thus considered the order, dated 14-1-1992 under Section 145 (1) and dated 13-4-1992 in the present case passed under Section 146 Cr. P. C are interlocutory orders and that no revision would have been, ententainable against those orders, in view of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it ordains that revisional powers shall not be exercised in respect of interlocutory order. That being the position another ques tion arises whether in such cases inherent power should be exercised. 24. Learned Counsel for the applicant Shri Mohd. Arif Khan submitted that there is no bar in the matter of exercise of inherent powers in such a case to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In view of the use of expression nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Honble High Court and Shri Khan laid great emphasis of the use of this Non-obstenate Clause. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides saving of inherent powers of High Court it reads as under: "482. In view of the use of expression nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Honble High Court and Shri Khan laid great emphasis of the use of this Non-obstenate Clause. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides saving of inherent powers of High Court it reads as under: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Coun.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " 25. It is well settled principles of law that ordinarily powers are inherent in the Court for being exercised in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court as well as to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 Cr. P. C. with on marked difference is analogous to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: "section 151 of C. P. C.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or other wise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. " 26. Section 151 of the C. P. C. inherent powers of the Court, required to be exercised for making orders that may be necessary for ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, have been saved and preserved in respect of all Court, i. e. inherent powers of every Court, High Court and the Sub- ordinate Courts to pass necessary orders in the ends of justice to prevent abuse of process of Court have been secured and every Court is entitled to exercise inherent power to pass such order as are necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent to abuse the process of the Court under Section 151 of the C. P. C. But under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. it has been declared that High Courts inherent powers have been saved and preserved. P. C. it has been declared that High Courts inherent powers have been saved and preserved. In all manner to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or which may be necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. The expression any Court by itself is indicative of the fact that the High Court has got only inherent powers to be exercised by it to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or any Court i. e. any sub-ordinate to it. 27. It is well settled principle of law that where there is a express provision in respect of certain matter either in the negative or in the positive then there is no inherent powers in the Court or the High Court to override it. In other words when the law ordains that certain powers shall not be exercised in certain specified cases or conditions and refrains the Court Appellate or Revisional or to say the restrains the High Court or Sessions Court from exercising it supervisory or revisional powers then resort cannot be had to inherent power nor the inherent powers be exercised to circumvent that bar. 28. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr. , AIR 1981 SC 736 :1981 Cr. LJ 296, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the contention raised before them in that case observed as under: "the appellant points out that he invoked the inherent power of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code and that notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 the High Court had power to grant relief. Now it is well settled that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. Sankatha Singh v. State of U. P. , AIR 1962 SC 1208 . It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is "otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. " Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. " Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provisions contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. " Similar view has been expressed by the Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhani Pal v. Ram Shree, 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 (1) SCC 435 . 29. A perusal of this decision clearly indicates that inherent powers of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code and once revision of interlocutory orders is prohibited, there can be, no doubt, that an application claiming barely the relief for setting aside of, or, for interfering with interlocutory orders under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. as the Court of a supervisory jurisdiction would not have been maintainable and would have been liable to be dismissed and this Court would no doubt have refused to interfere with those orders, as in such a situation inherent powers could not be utilised so as to circumvent the bar of Section 397 (2) of the Code. Here in the present case, the main reliefs sought is the quashing of entire proceeding of Case No. 43/1992, Mohammad Mushtaq v. Mohd. Islam Hussain & Ors. and ancillary thereto the orders have also been challenged. The life of interlocutory orders is conterminous, in this case, with the final order in the case under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. i. e. in other words, the life of interlocutory order contained in Annexures-6 and 8 is conterminous with the life of the main case and if the main proceeding of the case are liable to be quashed in order to prevent the abuse the process of the Court then alongwith that the orders contained in Annexures-6 and 8 have also to die with the quashing of the proceeding of the entire case and the question of setting aside that order contained in Annexures-6 and 8 is not the main relief sought. It is a ancillary to the main relief i. e. the question quashing of the Case No. 43/92 and its proceedings and, as such, this Court cannot refuse to consider the question of exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. for the purpose of quashing the whole proceedings of Misc. Case No. 43 of 1992, if the initiation or con tinuance of those proceedings is something that results in nothing but duplicity of proceeding one in Civil Court and the other in Criminal Court and it further results in the abuse of the process of the Court. In this context, the case has got to be examined. 30. As regards, the present case, it is necessary to recapitulate the facts of the case, in brief, with respect to the very property in dispute which is involved in 145 Cr. P. C. proceedings vide Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The suit was filed by Mohd. Mushtaq Hussain the present petitioner against Smt. Anjuman Bano, who is opposite party No. 4 in the present petition. Mohd. Mushtaq Hussain and Mohd. Islam Hussain, they are sons of Late Hazi Ikram Hussain and are real brothers. Mushtacj Hussain has filed this suit claiming decree for permanent injunction against the opposite parties i. e. Smt. Anjuman Bano and Smt. Hameeda Khatoon. Smt. Hameeda Khatoon is the defendant No. 1 in the suit. The plaintiff has claimed to be the owner in possession of the property in dispute and has claimed title under Sections 7 and 9 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. In alternative, the plaintiff has further claimed title on the basis of adverse possession vide Paragraph 2 of the plaint. The plaintiff has alleged the cause of action to have accrued to him when on 14-12-1991, the defendant and their men as well as Mohd. Imran Hussain father of the defendant No. 2 had tried to take forcible possession of the property in suit. The plaintiff, in that suit, has claimed himself to be the exclusive owner of the property in dispute and as according to plaint case, the defendant tried and threatened to interfere as alleged the plaintiffs peaceful possession, so the need for filing the suit for injunction did arise. No party to the proceeding under Section 482 Cr. The plaintiff, in that suit, has claimed himself to be the exclusive owner of the property in dispute and as according to plaint case, the defendant tried and threatened to interfere as alleged the plaintiffs peaceful possession, so the need for filing the suit for injunction did arise. No party to the proceeding under Section 482 Cr. P. C. has filed the copy of the writen statement filed in Suit No. 2/1992 but a copy of the objection/counter-affidavit to the application for the temporary injunction moved under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Suit No. 2 of 1992 has been filed as Annexure-CA 4 i. e. Annexure- 4 to additional counter-affidavit. A perusal of the Paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit filed in Regular Suit No. 2/92 in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow i. e. present Annexure-ACA 4 as under: "the contents of Paragraph 3 are wrong and are denied. It is emphatically denied that plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit property as alleged or otherwise. It is further denied that the land has been settled with the plaintiff. The defendant has been advised to state that the alleged provisions of Z. A. & L. R. Act have no application. In the second part of the Paragraph 3 defendant Hameeda Khatoon has tried to set up her exclusive title. The claim of plaintiff to have acquired title by adverse possession has been disputed. " 31. A perusal of this counter-affidavit i. e. Annexure-ACA-1 shows that in that suit there is a dispute regarding the title and the title of ownership as claimed by the plaintiff i. e. present applicant in the plaint has got to be considered and decided. In other words, the suit involves a dispute relating to question of title of the present applicant Mushtaq Hussain whether he is the owner in possession of the property and whether he had acquired rights and title under Section 7/9 of U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act or not. The second question relating to title to be examined should be decided is whether the plaintiff of that suit i. e. Mushtaq Hussain i. e. present applicant is this application Section 482 of the Cr. The second question relating to title to be examined should be decided is whether the plaintiff of that suit i. e. Mushtaq Hussain i. e. present applicant is this application Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. case has perfected his title over the property in dispute which is same as involved in Section 145 proceedings initiated subsequent to the institution of the suit and the passing of order of temporary injunction against the opposite parties. It is well settled principle of law in that suit for possession or injunction, the plaintiff has to prove his own title and in case that suit for injunction, the plaintiff has to prove, alongwith his title, the possession on the material date so the Civil Suit for injunction based on claim of title and possession, as in the present case, involves a question of title to be investigated and tried, apart from question of possession, that being the position of the Civil Suit, the question that crops up is whether proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. were validly initiated or whether his order under Section 146 was legally and validly passed. In my view, when title suit has been pending in the Civil Courts and question of rights and title of the parties had to be investigated and the Civil Court had been seized of the matter and when Civil Court had passed an order of injunction, there was no question of initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. I may mention it that the Suit No. 2/92 had been filed on 1-1-1992 and order of temporary injunction had been passed restraining the defendant of that suit from interfering with the plaintiff legal possession over the property in dispute. When the Civil Court had seized the matter and the injunction order had been passed, as submitted by the learned Council for the applicant, that there could be no likelihood of breach of peace with regard to subject matter of dispute. No doubt, Islam Hussain did not figure as the defendant in the suit, as he has not been impleaded as the defendant in the suit though allegations in Paragraph 6 of the plaint has been made against Islam Hussain. In Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint allegations have been made against Islam Hussain but no relief has been claimed against Islam Hussain. 32. In Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint allegations have been made against Islam Hussain but no relief has been claimed against Islam Hussain. 32. Thus it appears that in view of the injunction order, possession of the property in dispute, prima facie, appears to have continued with the plaintiff i. e. present applicant and on the date of the injunction order was passed. 33. In this view of the above as well as the subsequent development i. e. as now since after order, dated 13-4-1992 on account of attachment order having been passed under Section 146 of the Cr. PC. , at present, the receiver or superdar, the property is attached and being in possession of the police authorities only order of the Magistrate read with order dated 12-2-1993 of this Court. It appears just and proper in the light of law laid down in the case of Dharm Pal v. Ramshree, 1993 SCC (Cr.) 333 : 1993 (1) SCC 435 , to issue the following directions to avoid the multiplicity of the legal proceedings as well as to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court by continuance of similar proceeding i. e. Regular Suit No. 2/1992 and that of Criminal Misc. Case No. 43 of 1992. That all proceedings of Misc. Case No. 43 of 1992 under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. are hereby quashed except the order of attachment which shall automatically cases to be operative and effective, after the following steps are taken: (a) That the plaintiff-appellant in Suit No. 2 of 1992 shall move an application for impleadment of Mohd. Islam Hussain, opposite party No. 3 as well as a defendant; (b) That the Civil Courts when approached by other parties for appointment of the receiver or for suitable orders for appointment of receiver, to hold the possession of the property to be released by the receiver or superdar appointed by the Magistrate under Section 146 (1) of the Cr. P. C. and the Civil Court may either appoint a fresh receiver or continue the receiver or superdar at present working or having possession of the property in dispute unders order of the Court under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. (c) That the order of attachment made by the Magistrate under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. and the Civil Court may either appoint a fresh receiver or continue the receiver or superdar at present working or having possession of the property in dispute unders order of the Court under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. (c) That the order of attachment made by the Magistrate under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. shall cease on the order of the Civil Court appointing receiver and receiver appointed by Civil Court will be handed over possession of property in dispute. It may even appoint a party found by it to be in possession on the date of Suit to Act a receiver under the directions and Control of Court; (rf) Till any such suitable arrangement is not made, the arrangement made by the Magistrate under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. is to continue. As at present, no doubt, except the Court i. e. the Magistrate, Court is in possession or receiver appointed by the Magistrate is in possession on behalf of the rightful owner of the property; (e) In case there is yet any apprehension of breach of peace in any manner, the powers of Magistrate under Section 107/117 of the Cr. P. C. are to exercisable by him if and when required or considered necessary and (f) The order of attachment made under Section 146 of the Cr. P. C. by the Magistrate shall cease and be deemed to have ceased with the appointment of receiver by Civil Courts and the possession will have to be handed over to him by the Superdar or authorities appointed by the Magistrate under attachment order in case the receiver appointed by the Civil Courts is different from the Superdar or receiver of the property working under the arrangement of the Magistrates Court. The Section 482 Cr. P. C. petition is thus allowed and disposed of. The costs of the petition are made easy. Petition allowed. .