JUDGMENT 1. - This is a Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code against the order dated 4th November, 1991, passed by the Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur in Sessions Case No. 46/1991, by which he has found that the charges under Sections 120B, 148 & 302/149, Indian Penal Code deserve to be framed against the accused-petitioners. 2. The case arises out of an incident dated 23rd September, 1987 which is said to have taken place in village Makrana at a hotel known as Mohan Mishthan Bhandar, Industrial Area, Makrana. With regard to this incident an F.I.R. was lodged on 23rd September, 1987 itself at about 8.45 a.m. by one Asha Ram son of Bhawana Ram Jat, resident of Neemadi. The contents of the FIR are reproduced as under: " fuosnu gS fd vkt esjk HkkbZ vtqZujke 7-30 ,0,e0 ij [kku ls etnwjksa dks lkFk ysdj pk; ihus ds fy, eksgu fe"Bku ij vk;k lkFk es nqxkZjke] cyohj] xksihjke] o eksgu vk;sA vtqZu us eksgu fe"Bku ls veoL;k gksus ls izlkn fy;k o dqN lkeku rqyk jgk Fkk] brus es ,d thi [kqyh ftlds uEcj ugh Fks] mles jktsUnz mQZ jktw iq= HkkxhjFkflag] eksguflag iq= fxj/kkjh flag] lq[knso jke iq= xaxkjke] Hkaoj yky iq= lq[knsojke] ckcwyky iq= lq[knsojke] Hkaojyky iq= eksVwjke] jfo iq= HkkxhjFk flag] mjk flag iq= jkes'oj yky o jkes'oj yky iq= fxj/kkjh flag Fks lHkh ds ikl fiLVy o cUnwds Fkh] thi eksgu fe"Bku ds lkeus :dh] thi es cSBs lHkh us dgk ,d nq'eu ;g jgk ekj yks] HkkxhjFkflag us dgk csVs jktw xksyh ekj esjs HkkbZ vtqZu dks fu'kkuk cukdj Qk;j dj fn;s eSa o esjk Hkkutk nksusk ogka ls Jo.k th dh dfVax dh rjQ HkkxsA esjs ihNs eksguflag HkkxhjFkflag us Qk;j fd;sA eS dfVax es ?kql x;kA ogka ls Fkkus VsfyQksu fd;k ,oa ,l0,p0vks0 lkgc ds i/kkjrs gh ;g fjiksZV dj jgk gwWaA esjs HkkbZ ds cnu ij dbZ xksyh;ka nkxdj gR;k dj nh gSA iwoZ es Hkh bu yksxksa us gekjs dks [kRe djus ds fy, geys fd;s Fks rFkk eSus lqj{kk O;oLFkk dh ekax dh Fkh] bu yksxksa us iwoZ es esjs firk dk dRy fd;k Fkk] fjiksZV djrk gWw dk;Zokgh djkosA fnukad 23-9-87 ,l0Mh0 vk'kkjke iq= Hkxokujke th tkV lk0 uheM+h " 3. The case was registered under Sections 302, 147, 148, and 149, Indian Penal Code at the Police Station, Makrana with reference to FIR No. 193/87. The case was registered under Sections 302, 147, 148, and 149, Indian Penal Code at the Police Station, Makrana with reference to FIR No. 193/87. Originally, the case was registered against 10 accused persons and these 10 persons did not include the names of the accused-petitioners Parma Ram, Sarwan Kumar and Mahendra Singh i.e. accused-petitioners N0.6, 7 and 8 respectively. The author of the FIR Asha Ram was first examined by the police, on 23rd September, 1987 itself and his second statement was recorded on 6th October, 1987 in which he gave out the names of the aforesaid three accused-petitioners, namely-Parma Ram, Sarwan Kumar and Mahendra Singh. 4. Thus, in all 13 persons were accused in this case out of which 8 accused-petitioners have come in this petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code and the five persons namely Rajendra Singh, Bhagirath Singh, Bhanwar Lal Son of Sukhdev Ram and Bhanwar Lal Son of Modu and Ravi against whom there is an allegation that they had got down from the jeep, have not come before this Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Shri Bajwa has submitted that in this case, the FIR was lodged by Asha Ram i.e. the brother of deceased Arjun Ram on 23rd September, 1987 itself in his own hand-writing. Asha Ram himself was a police employee and very well knew the importance of mentioning the names of the accused-persons in the FIR. Asha Ram also knew all the persons from whom he and his brother were apprehending the threat of death. Asha Ram also had the knowledge about the applications dated 14th September, 1987 and 15th September, 1987 which are alleged to have been sent to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Ajmer in which the names of all the persons had been mentioned. Being an ex-ASI and having experience of working as such in the police he could not have omitted the name of any accused person in the FIR which had been filed in writing by him on the date of the incident itself. Being an ex-ASI and having experience of working as such in the police he could not have omitted the name of any accused person in the FIR which had been filed in writing by him on the date of the incident itself. The submission of Shri Bajwa is that in the FIR the names of three accused persons namely Parma Ram, Sarwan Kumar and Mahendra Singh i.e. accused-petitioner No. 6, 7 and 8 respectively had not been mentioned and their names had been included subsequently which goes to show that, in fact, none of these three persons were involved in the offence and these three persons have been unnecessarily roped in merely because they are related or associated with the other accused persons. Reliance has also been placed on the statement of Ram Narain who was Muneem at the Misthan Bhandar at Makarana and was present on the spot. It was submitted that the statements of the other persons Viz. Gopal Das and Ram Bahadur etc. who were the workers at this hotel have not been recorded and the only independent witness who was examined was Muneem Ram Narain; according to whom Asha Ram and his maternal nephew Rameshwar Ram had reached the spot after the incident had already taken place. Therefore, Asha Ram's version as has been given depicting himself to be the eye-witness should not be treated as eye-witness nor his statement as of an eye-witness and the subsequent explanation of Asha Ram that he forgot to mention the names of accused-petitioner Parma Ram, Sarwan Kumar and Mahendra Singh in the FIR on account of death of his father should not be believed. 5. In this case, earlier the investigation was conducted by the local police and later on the investigation was transferred to CBI. Shri N.C. Chaudhary appearing on behalf of the complainant has submitted that the local police had not made fair investigation and, therefore, the investigation was later on transferred to the CBI. Thereafter on the basis of the investigation conducted by the CBI an application was filed. Shri N.C. Chaudhary has submitted that the accused-petitioners yield political influence and one of the accused-petitioners namely Rameshwar Lal is an ex-MLA. He has submitted that the complainant party was apprehending the danger to their life from the very beginning. Thereafter on the basis of the investigation conducted by the CBI an application was filed. Shri N.C. Chaudhary has submitted that the accused-petitioners yield political influence and one of the accused-petitioners namely Rameshwar Lal is an ex-MLA. He has submitted that the complainant party was apprehending the danger to their life from the very beginning. There were series of criminal cases going on between the parties and the police protection had also been provided to Asha Ram and the deceased Arjun Ram, but the same was withdrawn on 11th September, 1987. Thereafter Arjun Ram was murdered on 23rd September, 1987. He has made reference to letters sent by Arjun Ram deceased to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Ajmer in which the grievance has been raised against the DIG himself and he has categorically mentioned that there was imminent danger to his life and to the life of his brother Asha Ram. He had named all the 13 accused persons in the letters sent by him to the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 14th September, 1987. Arjun Ram also voiced his grievance against the withdrawal of the police guard on llth September, 1987. Shri Chaudhary has submitted that the accused persons had committed offences after offences against the complainant party and had created a terror against them in the area. The submission of Shri Chaudhary is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused the accused persons and it is not a case of no evidence. Therefore, there is no question of invoking Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code against the order by which the trial Court has considered it proper to frame charges against the petitioners. He has also submitted that all the 13 persons had conspired to commit this offence and, merely because three of the accused persons were not named in the FIR and merely because it is said that other five accused persons could not get down from the jeep cannot absolve them of the criminal liability of conspiracy and participation in the commission of the offence. Shri Bajwa has refuted the allegations that the local police was not fair to the complainant party in the matter of investigation. He has also submitted that the investigation conducted by the local police shows that it has virtually acted in the interest of the complainant party. Shri Bajwa has refuted the allegations that the local police was not fair to the complainant party in the matter of investigation. He has also submitted that the investigation conducted by the local police shows that it has virtually acted in the interest of the complainant party. Although, the statement of Asha Ram had been recorded on 23rd September, 1987, his statements were again recorded on 10th August, 1988, in which the names of the left over accused persons were included who had not been named in the FIR. The statements of nephew of Asha Ram were recorded on 24th September, 1987 and he has submitted that the case of the complainant has been improved and, as such, it is a clear cut case of over implication. He has raised grievance that the CBI did not record the statement of the workers who were present on the spot and who had been named by the Muneem Ram Narain. The statements of Asha Ram were recorded by CBI on 17th January, 1988 and further statement was recorded on 1st November, 1988. Similarly, the statements of Rameshwarlal were also recorded first on 17th January, 1988 and again on 1st November, 1988. The statements of certain other witnesses were also recorded more than once on different dates. 6. Whereas Shri N.C. Chaudhary has taken the objection with reference to the scope of Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, at the very outset in order to meet this objection Shri Bajwa has cited before me Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 366. In this case, the Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. It has been observed in para 5, page 368 that the legislature while dispensing with the procedure for commitment enquiry under the Code of 1988 has conferred a dual responsibility on the trial Judge who has first to examine the case on the basis of the statement of witnesses recorded by the police and the documents filed with a view to find out whether a prima-facie case for trial has been made out and then if such a case is made out to proceed to try the same. The Supreme Court has further observed that the legislature has adopted this course in order to avoid frivolous prosecutions and prevent the accused from being tried of an offence on materials which do not furnish a reasonable probability of conviction, and that it is manifest that the accused has got only one opportunity and that too before the Sessions Judge for showing that no case for trial has been made out. In para 10 of this judgment, the Supreme Court has enumerated the following principles after considering the authorities mentioned therein: 1. That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima-facie case against the accused has been made out; 2. Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. 3. The test to determine a prima-facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and It is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. 4. That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge who under the present code is a senior and experienced officer of the Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 7. On the scope of Section 227, State of Kamatak v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 was also cited by Shri Bajwa. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 7. On the scope of Section 227, State of Kamatak v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 was also cited by Shri Bajwa. In this case, the Supreme Court has observed that it is clear from Section 227 of the New Code that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record its reason is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of the order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court has further observed in this very para 7 that in the exercise of this wholesome power under Section 482 the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. 8. Having observed as above, the Supreme Court considered the facts of the case which they were considering, and observed as under: "This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy Is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct Involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of accused No. 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at-all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justice the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed. 9. In para 10 of this very judgment, while making a reference to Vadilal Panchal v. D.D. Ghandigaonkar, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1113 and Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 545 it has been observed that it is wrong to say that at the stage of firming charges the Court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. It has been further observed in the end of para 10 that these decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said to be reasonably possible. 10. Reference was then made to Sati Kanta v. State of W.B. 1977 Cr. L.J. 1644 , a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, in which the object of Sections 226 and 227 has been discussed in para 25 of this judgment. According to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, Section 227 read with Section 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a precious safe-guard, so to express, a pre-battle protection conferred by Parliament in its wisdom upon accused persons chargesheeted by the Police for trial in a court of Session without collecting and collating materials sufficient to warrant a fulfledged trial. This provision in law is calculated to eliminate further harassment to the accused persons when the evidentiary materials gathered after a prolonged and thorough investigation of the occurrence fall short of minimum legal requirement. Therefore, this provision of law cannot be reduced into a dead letter and accused persons made to undergo the rigour of a futile trial, where such a trial on materials available is palpably not warranted against them. Lastly reliance has been placed on (1991) 2 Suppl. 574 by Shri Bajwa. 11. Therefore, this provision of law cannot be reduced into a dead letter and accused persons made to undergo the rigour of a futile trial, where such a trial on materials available is palpably not warranted against them. Lastly reliance has been placed on (1991) 2 Suppl. 574 by Shri Bajwa. 11. On the basis of these authorities, it has been argued by Shri Bajwa that in an appropriate case, the courts can certainly consider in a petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code as to whether the trial Court while passing the order of framing the charge against the accused persons in a case has acted in accordance with Section 227, Criminal Procedure Code or not and as to whether the order has been passed after due application of mind keeping in view the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court so as to come to the conclusion that the charges are required to be framed, or not? Shri Gupta has cited before me Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 121. Shri Gupta has submitted that at the stage of considering the question of framing of the charges, the court cannot undertake a meticulous consideration of the evidence and materials. While referring to Kunj Behari @ Kunji and Ors. v. State 1989 RCC 150 , the Supreme Court set-aside the order of the High Court by which the charges were quashed. In this case, the Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision reported in Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1548 wherein it has been pointed out that at the stage of framing charges, meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by Court is not required. The Supreme Court also referred to its earlier decision reported in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2018 and has observed that the High Court's conclusion about the inadequacy of the evidence against respondents 1 to 3 besides being a premature assessment of evidence, is also attributable to the wrong premises on which the High Court's reasoning in based. Thus, the charges framed against respondents by the Sessions Judge were restorep by the Supreme Court and the order which had been passed by the High Court for the reasons given in para 5 of this judgment was set-aside, as has been passed under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the charges framed against respondents by the Sessions Judge were restorep by the Supreme Court and the order which had been passed by the High Court for the reasons given in para 5 of this judgment was set-aside, as has been passed under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Shri Chaudhary has also placed reliance on State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (supra). He has made reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 4 of this judgment, in particular. In this case, the Supreme Court has observed in para 4 that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused, it is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases. The presumption of guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. According to the Supreme Court, as mentioned in para 5 of this judgment, the test is whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not, whether there was sufficient ground for conviction and it was observed that where there was prima-facie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate state and issue of a process could not be refused. It has been observed that unless, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory or intrinsically untrustworthy, proces cannot be refused if that evidence makes out a prima-facie case. 12. Shri N.C. Chaudhary has placed reliance on Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja 1990 Cr. L.J. 1869 , para 7 thereof. In para 7 of this judgment, the Supreme Court referred to Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 as quoted in para 18 as under: "The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding, the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion, founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 13. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion, founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 13. The Supreme Court has concluded that at the Section 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. The Supreme Court in this case was considering a case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, a case in which there was a gang rivalry and offences were committed with an intention to eliminate rivals. In the end of para 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that when a law visits a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law. But that does not mean that the judicial officer called upon to decide whether or not a case for framing a charge under the Act is made out should adopt a negative attitude. He should frame a charge if the prosecution shows that the material placed on record and the documents relied on give rise to a strong suspicion of the accused having committed the crime alleged against him. 14. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is reproduced as under: "If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 15. 15. Shri Bajwa has submitted that even if the test as has been laid down in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja (supra), relied upon by Shri Chaudhary which is a case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, in which there is a presumption against the accused, is applied, the ratio is that for limited purposes at the Section 227-228 stage, the court may sift the evidence and the court has to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken on their face value disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or not. He has submitted that in the facts of this case, if an objective evaluation of the material and documents on record is made, by taking the facts on their face value, it cannot be said that all the ingredients constituting the alleged offences against the accused-petitioners are made out. 16. I have considered the entire law. as has been discussed here in above. Having given my anxious consideration to the facts of this and the cases as have been discussed here in above I am of the opinion that at the stage of considering the question of framing of the charges the Court should not undertake a meticulous consideration of the evidence and material, lest it may result into a premature assessment. The various submissions made by Shri Bajwa can't be appreciated unless a meticulous evaluation of the material is made. The absence of names of three accused persons in the FIR lodged by an ex-police employee when their names have been mentioned by other three witnesses examined on 24.9.87 cannot be taken as a ground to give them a clean chit at this initial stage. Even if the argument of Shri Bajwa, is accepted that the evidence should be there even at the stage of the consideration of the question of the framing of the charge the meticulous consideration of evidence and material by the Court is not required and in the facts of this case it can't be said to be a case of no evidence at this stage. No doubt, according to the provisions of Section 227 of the Code if upon the consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith after hearing the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the prosecution, if the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so, but in my opinion the facts and circumstances attendant and preceding to the alleged commission of the offence in this case it is not at-all possible to draw such a conclusion in favour of accused petitioners at this stage. 17. What has to be considered by the Court at the time of the framing of the charge is that the facts emerging from the material and documents on record which looked at their face value disclose the possibility of existence of all the ingredients of the offences or not and it is only for this limited purpose that the Court can sift the evidence. So far as the question of the reasons is concerned it will be sufficient to say that under Section 227 and 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code even a very strong suspicion founded upon the materials before the Magistrate leading him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence may justify the framing of the charge as has been held in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jiiendra Bhimraj Bijja's case reported in 1990 Cr. LJ. 1869 , and thus, recording of the reasons is essential if the order is passed with regard to discharge. Even if the reasons are not given by the Magistrate and the petition is filed under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code before the Court and it is found that at this initial stage it cannot be said that no charge is made out, the order with regard to framing of the charge cannot be struck down on this ground alone and in this case having heard the learned Counsel at length, I am satisfied that it is not a case of no material and as such there is no question of abuse of the process so as to interfere Under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 18. 18. Thus, I find that this is not a case worth interference under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of quashing the charge. This petition Under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code is hereby dismissed. *******