ORDER JANARTHANAM, J. - Walchandnagar Industries Ltd., Madras 2 (petitioner) is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act with their registered office at Construction House, Walchand Hirachand Marg, Bombay 400 038. The petitioner, it is said, inter alia, is engaged in the manufacture of industrial machinery required for sugar plants, cement plants, apart from manufacture of boilers, heat exchangers and other general engineering products, at their factory situate at Walchandnagar 413 114, Pune district. The petitioner, it is said, was assessed to a total and taxable turnover at Rs. 1,96,78,251 and Rs. 38,33,081 respectively for the assessment year 1989-90 by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Anna Salai - II Assessment Circle, Madras 2 (respondent). While so, on November 16, 1992, the Enforcement Wing of the Commercial Taxes Department, it is said, inspected the places of business of the dealers of the petitioner. During the course of such inspection, an enquiry was directed towards availability of certain debit notes from the customers and statements, in fact, have been recorded as to availability of such debit notes at the head office of the petitioner and production of the same in due course. On November 30, 1992, the petitioner submitted some of the debit notes received from the customers. Books of accounts were also said to have been examined for the assessment year 1989-90. On March 5, 1993, the petitioner, it is said, has submitted a detailed letter indicating the nature of its contract with its customers, pointing out that the sales were inter-State from Maharashtra and other States. Debit note particulars, it appears, had also been recovered from the customers of the petitioner. On June 9, 1993, the petitioner was served with a notice by the respondent, vaguely alleging that with the materials received at the site, it assembled and fabricated them into machinery and sold the goods to local sugar mills, thereby proposing huge taxes and penalty and requiring it to file objections, if any, granting fifteen days' time. On June 16, 1993, the petitioner sought for extension of time by three weeks and accordingly, time was extended up to July 16, 1993. However, on June 23, 1993, the petitioner filed an application for furnishing requisite certified copies of the documents mentioned in the notice, besides seeking extension of time by a fortnight for filing its detailed objections after the receipt of the same. However, on June 23, 1993, the petitioner filed an application for furnishing requisite certified copies of the documents mentioned in the notice, besides seeking extension of time by a fortnight for filing its detailed objections after the receipt of the same. On July 15, 1993, a reminder was sent by it with no effect. While so, on August 2, 1993, the Commercial Tax Officer sent summons calling upon the petitioner, once again, to produce the books of accounts for the assessment year 1989-90 on August 13, 1993. The petitioner accordingly did so. But, to its dismay, it was not able to find the Commercial Tax Officer in his office on that day. On August 16, 1993, a confirmation letter was sent to the Commercial Tax Officer that if any fresh summons was issued, it would again make available the documents. At that stage, the petitioner, it is said, sincerely believed that further investigation and enquiry against the show cause notice was transferred from the respondent to the higher official, namely, the Commercial Tax Officer. The petitioner was stated to have gone to the respondent's office periodically and was assured that nothing in haste would be done and that the Commercial Tax Officer would look into the files before any further course of action was taken. While so, the petitioner, to its shock and surprise, was said to have been served with the impugned order in TNGST/071845/89-90 dated September 29, 1993 purporting to revise the assessment under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1959 - for short "the Act") imposing a huge tax demand to the tune of Rs. 3.42 crores, surcharge and additional surcharge of Rs. 51.3 lakhs, additional sales tax of Rs. 68.44 lakhs and penalty of Rs. 6.93 crores. The impugned order reveals that the reasons for inspection of the debit notes had been rejected, since it has been earlier claimed that they were available at the head office and that the petitioner was apparently not co-operating with the department in furnishing those copies. 51.3 lakhs, additional sales tax of Rs. 68.44 lakhs and penalty of Rs. 6.93 crores. The impugned order reveals that the reasons for inspection of the debit notes had been rejected, since it has been earlier claimed that they were available at the head office and that the petitioner was apparently not co-operating with the department in furnishing those copies. The petitioner, aggrieved with the impugned order, resorted to the present action for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the same, contending that the impugned order is bad for violation of the rules of natural justice, in the sense of mulcting huge liability to tax, surcharge and penalty without making available adequacy of opportunity to the petitioner to file its objections to the tax liability proposed, by furnishing copies of documents prayed for by it, on which reliance had been placed for passing the impugned order. The petitioner has also filed W.M.P. No. 29730 of 1993 praying for stay of all further proceedings, pending disposal of the writ petition. When the writ petition, along with W.M.P., came up for admission, this Court directed Mr. T. Ayyasamy, learned Government Advocate (Taxes) to take notice and accordingly, he did so. Mr. The petitioner has also filed W.M.P. No. 29730 of 1993 praying for stay of all further proceedings, pending disposal of the writ petition. When the writ petition, along with W.M.P., came up for admission, this Court directed Mr. T. Ayyasamy, learned Government Advocate (Taxes) to take notice and accordingly, he did so. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in reiteration and further elaboration of the stand taken in the affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition, would submit that the sequence of events that had happened prior to the passing of the impugned order would demonstrate, in an unclinching fashion, that the petitioner was led to believe that it would be provided with adequacy of opportunity for filing its objections, after furnishing the copies of documents it had prayed for, before ever the impugned order was passed; that therefore, the order impugned, which had been passed throwing to winds, all canons of rules of natural justice of audi alteram partem cannot at all be said to be not bad in the eye of law; that if the petitioner was asked to avail of the alternative remedy of filing an appeal, it might not be in a position to convince the appellate authority to exercise the power of setting aside or modifying or annulling the assessment so made, as a consequence of the handicap it had suffered, in not placing all relevant materials before the assessing authority - the respondent and if at all, in such a circumstance, it might be having the benefit of making a prayer for a remit order to be made by the appellate authority, which, in turn, is a time-consuming process; that if the petitioner was directed to file all necessary and requisite documents, in projection of its case before the appellate authority, then it would tantamount to issuance of a mandate or direction to the appellate authority to exercise its discretion in a particular way mandated by this Court, which is not also permissible in the eye of law, inasmuch as under section 39-B of the Act, the exercise of discretion for admission of additional documents can be resorted to in certain contingencies mentioned therein and not otherwise, and therefore, the best course, he would say in the circumstance of the case, is to set aside the impugned order, as being void for non-observance of the rules of natural justice of audi alteram partem and issuance of a direction to the respondent to furnish copies of the debit notes as available with him to the petitioner to enable it to file its objections to the show cause notice dated June 9, 1993. Learned Government Advocate (Taxes) would, however, repel those submissions. Rival submissions of either learned counsel may now fall for consideration, in the arena of discussion. The debit notes, referred to in the show cause notice dated June 9, 1993 is an igniting factor to the fire resulting in the issuance of the impugned order. The department appears to have proceeded on the assumption that the debit notes supplied by the customers to the petitioner would be available with it. This sort of presumption gains further strength and momentum by the factum of recording of statements from a personnel of the petitioner on the date of inspection, namely, November 16, 1992. There is nothing wrong on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to have given such a statement. This is quite obvious. Perhaps such a personnel would have been under the impression by giving such a statement that debit notes, being the customer's documents, would normally be available in the head office. This Himalayan blunder, said to have been committed by him, perhaps came to be revealed only when those documents were found to be not traceable in the head office. It transpires from the assertions made in the affidavit and supplemental affidavit, sworn to by the branch manager of the petitioner, that certain debit notes from the customers had neither been received; nor accepted or either returned or rejected by the petitioner and that such of those debit notes objected to by the petitioner have not been communicated to it again and such debit notes could be available only with the customers. When the copy of the debit notes as sheet-anchor for the department resulting in the impugned order passed, it cannot be expected that the petitioner would have been in a position to put forth their points of view, in an effective manner, in rather a bid to avoid incidence of tax effect in a colossus way. That perhaps was the reason for the petitioner, revelling in making representations to the authorities concerned for furnishing copies of those documents. The sequence of events, as narrated in the summation of facts, eloquently speak for themselves, without any further elucidation. That perhaps was the reason for the petitioner, revelling in making representations to the authorities concerned for furnishing copies of those documents. The sequence of events, as narrated in the summation of facts, eloquently speak for themselves, without any further elucidation. At no point of time, anterior to the passing of the impugned order, there was any indication by the department that the documents sought for by the petitioner, would not at all be furnished and they were required to, somehow or other, file their objections to the show cause notice. Had there been any inkling in that regard, the petitioner would have somehow or other filed their objections, in projection of their case, in the best of fashion possible, having regard to the relevant materials available with them. The absence of any sort of an intimation by the department that the documents sought for would not at all be furnished led to the belief of a legitimate expectation in the mind of the petitioner that the copies of such documents would be granted so as to enable it to file its objections, before ever the impugned order was passed. But alas; such an expectation had been thrashed to pieces by the passing of the impugned order. In such a process, it goes without saying that the petitioner was deprived of its valuable opportunity of projecting its points of view, supported by materials possessed of by it at the relevant point of time. It is nothing but sheer non-observance of the rules of natural justice of audi alteram partem in passing of the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the impugned order is not suffering from any vice or infirmity of being void for non-observance of the rules of natural justice, in the sense of not giving any adequacy of opportunity to the petitioner to file its objections by furnishing with certified or xerox copies of the documents, it had asked for, before ever the impugned order was passed. Such an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice cannot at all be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. The affected party by such decision, like the petitioner, may perhaps appeal; but he is not bound to do so, because he is at liberty to treat the act as void. Such an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice cannot at all be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. The affected party by such decision, like the petitioner, may perhaps appeal; but he is not bound to do so, because he is at liberty to treat the act as void. The passing of an order by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, without observance of the rules of natural justice had been construed as void by superior courts of jurisdiction on occasions more than one and therefore it is, such a rule has become an axiomatic proposition of law to be followed by all the courts in the land. The impugned order, as such, deserves to be set aside. Yet another point of view had been focussed for consideration from another angle. If the petitioner simply resorts to file an appeal under section 31 of the Act, it ought to suffer a serious handicap. The reason is so obvious. Before the appellate forum, it is legitimately permissible for the petitioner to urge for invocation of the appellate powers of setting aside, modifying or annulling and such other ancillary powers depending upon the exigency of the situation. In the case on hand, if the petitioner resorted to file an appeal, without resorting to the action of the present nature, there are no materials available on record, as a consequence of the denial of an opportunity to project its point of view, supported by the materials enabling it to canvass, in the exercise of power of setting aside the impugned order on merits and if at all, it can resort to address arguments for a remit order to be passed by the appellate authority on the ground of denial of an opportunity to project its points of view by the assessing authority, which in turn, is a time consuming process, detrimental not only to the interests of the petitioner - assessee but also the revenue. In order to wriggle out such a situation, a loud thinking also emerged across the Bar, as to the issuance of a direction to the petitioner to file an appeal and also to direct the appellate authority to entertain objections that would have normally been filed by the petitioner before the assessing authority, supported by materials and other evidence in their possession, after furnishing copies of the documents, they had prayed for. At first sight such a loud thinking appeared to be credible, on the face of it. But, a little bit of a probe, if made, in the light of the salient provisions, adumbrated under section 39-B of the Act, such a thinking cannot at all be given any credibility of tenability. Sub-section (2) of section 39-B, as is relevant for the present purpose, is couched in the following terms : "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall not, for the first time, receive in evidence on behalf of any dealer, in any appeal, such account, register, record or document as is mentioned in sub-section (1), unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, he considers that such account, register, record or document is genuine and that the failure to produce the same before the assessing authority was for reasons beyond the control of the dealer." From a cursory perusal of the provisions, as extracted above, it is rather crystal clear that certain primordial requisites are to be satisfied before ever the Appellate Assistant Commissioner exercises his power of admission of documents or other records, as evidence at the stage of appeal. One such pre-requisite is that the account, register, record or document adduced by way of evidence must be genuine and the other requisite is that the production of those documents must have been for reasons beyond the control of the dealer. Only after recording those reasons in writing, he can allow such documents, at the appellate stage, to be adduced as additional evidence. To mandate the appellate authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to allow the petitioner to file its objections, which it would have normally filed before the assessing authority, at the appellate stage, besides permitting it to produce all necessary and relevant documents, by way of additional evidence, in support of their case, would tantamount to snatching away of the jurisdiction that had been vested in such authority, which is not permissible, in the eye of law. Looking at from any angle, the best course to be adopted, in the facts and circumstances, is to set aside the impugned order as being void, as a consequences of violation of the rules of natural justice, in the sense of the petitioner not having been given the adequacy of opportunity to file its objections, in an effective manner, after furnishing it with copies of the documents, it had sought for and accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. It is however made clear that copies of whatever documents and statements of accounts, which are available in the custody and possession of the authorities on the basis of which the impugned order had been passed must be made available to the petitioner within a week from today (November 4, 1993), at its cost and the petitioner, in turn, would file its objections within three weeks from the date of furnishing of such copies by the authorities for enabling the authorities to pass assessment order, on consideration of objections so filed. The writ petition is thus disposed of. Consequently, W.M.P. is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.