JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:---We have heard the common arguments in this group of 36 writ petitions in which common question of law relating to the interpretation and the validity of section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the New Act") arises for consideration. Shri A.V. Mohta and Shri S.V. Naik, Advocates led arguments on behalf of the petitioners while on behalf of the respondents the argument was led by Shri B.P. Jaiswal, Advocate. For the sake of convenience, we shall deliver our main judgment in the instant Writ Petition No. 1842 of 1993 (Mahesh and others v. State of Maharashtra and others)1, in which Shri Anoop V. Mohta, Advocate has appeared for the petitioners. The other writ petitions shall then stand disposed of in terms of the judgment in the instant writ petition. 2. Briefly the facts are that the petitioners claim that they are owners of public service vehicles for which they used to get special permits under section 63(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short "the Old Act"). The said special permits, according to them, were granted on occasions such as fairs, religious gatherings, marriage parties etc. Further according to them, while such a special permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority of this area viz. the respondent No. 3, they were valid in any other region or State without the counter signature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or the State Transport Authority of the other State as the case may be. 3. It may be seen that when the Old Act was in force, a scheme of nationalisation was approved and brought into force by the State Government with effect from 1-1-1974 as provided in Chapter IV-A of the Old Act. 3. It may be seen that when the Old Act was in force, a scheme of nationalisation was approved and brought into force by the State Government with effect from 1-1-1974 as provided in Chapter IV-A of the Old Act. The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (for short the M.S.R.T.C.) was recognised under the said Scheme as a State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of Clause (b) of section 68-A of the Old Act and it was provided in the said Clause (4) of the said scheme that the said undertaking would operate stage carriage and contract carriage services in the entire State of Maharashtra and on all routes and portions thereof as shown in Appendix A to the said Scheme to the complete exclusion of all other persons except the seven categories of Undertaking or Vehicles enumerated in the said Clause (4) of the Nationalisation Scheme. 3-A. It may be seen that section 68-F of the Old Act provides that where, in pursuance of an approved scheme, any State Transport Undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or a notified route, the State Transport Authority in any case where the said area or route lies in more than one region and the Regional Transport Authority in any other case shall issue such permit to the State Transport Undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Chapter IV of the Old Act. The M.S.R.T.C. was, therefore, operating its vehicles in all the notified areas or routes under the above scheme of nationalisation framed by the State Government under section 68-D of the old Act. 4. It is pertinent to see that but for the above nationalisation scheme any person could apply for a stage carriage permit under section 46 or for a contract carriage permit under section 49 to the Regional Transport Authority in its area and jurisdiction and on satisfaction of the requirements of the provisions made therefore either under the Act or the Rules, he/it could be granted stage carriage permit or contract carriage permit under section 48 or section 51 of the Old Act respectively. However, in view of Clause (4) of the Nationalisation Scheme, the said permits could be granted only to the M.S.R.T.C. or the seven categories of the transporters enumerated therein. However, in view of Clause (4) of the Nationalisation Scheme, the said permits could be granted only to the M.S.R.T.C. or the seven categories of the transporters enumerated therein. To that extent Clause (4) of the Nationalisation Scheme created the monopoly of the M.S.R.T.C. as stage carriage and contract carriage services. 5. However, the owners of the public service vehicles even thereafter used to apply for special permit under section 63(6) of the Old Act for plying their vehicles to carry passengers on special occasions like fairs, religious gatherings, marriage, parties etc. The question had thus arisen whether the owners of such public service vehicles who could not get stage carriage or contract carriage permit, in view of the above referred scheme of nationalisation, could apply for a special permit under section 63(6) of the Old Act. This Court in Writ Petition No. 562 of 1986 with Writ Petition No. 561 of 1986 decided on 23-6-1986, (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport, Appellate Tribunal for Maharashtra)2, 1986 Mh.L.J. 626, took the view that in no event the special permit could be issued to a person other than M.S.R.T.C. and the 7 categories of persons who were excluded from the Nationalisation Scheme under Clause (4) thereof as referred to above. 6. An appeal by the special leave was preferred in the Supreme Court by the aggrieved private transporters against the above judgment of this Court and the Supreme Court held in the said appeal (Achyut Shivram Gokhale v. Regional Transport Officer and others)3, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2047, that there is difference between "contract carriage permit" and "Special permit" and that despite nationalisation special permits under section 63(6) of the Old Act could be issued to the private transporters if they satisfied the requirements of the provisions regarding the same. In this view of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of this Court in the above writ petitions. 7. It may then be seen that in the meanwhile the old Act was repealed and the New Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the New Act) was enacted by the Parliament which came into force with effect from 1-7-1989 as per the notification of the Central Government dated 22-5-1989 issued under section 1(3) of the said Act. 7. It may then be seen that in the meanwhile the old Act was repealed and the New Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the New Act) was enacted by the Parliament which came into force with effect from 1-7-1989 as per the notification of the Central Government dated 22-5-1989 issued under section 1(3) of the said Act. It is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act that it consolidates and amends the law relating to Motor Vehicles in the light of the report of a working group constituted in January, 1984 to review all the provisions of the Old Act and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legislation to replace the same. What is material for us to be seen from the New Act is that its section 72 deals with grant of stage carriage permits and section 74 with grant of contract carriage permits. Section 80 deals with the procedure of applying for and of grant of permits. 8. Sub-section (1) of section 87 of the New Act provides for grant of temporary permit to be effective for a limited period which shall not in any case exceed four months. The purposes for which the temporary permit can be granted are: (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit and may attach to any such permit such conditions as it may think fit. 9. Section 88 of the New Act then provides for validation of permits for use outside region in which they are granted. Perusal of sub-section (1) of section 88 of the New Act shows that for the permit to be valid in the other region or any other State, the counter-signature of the original Transport Authority of that other region or of the State Transport Authority of that other State is necessary. Sub-section (8) of section 88 provides for grant of special permit. The said sub-section (8) with which we are principally concerned in this writ petition, we shall refer to it in detail when we proceed to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in this writ petition. 10. Sub-section (8) of section 88 provides for grant of special permit. The said sub-section (8) with which we are principally concerned in this writ petition, we shall refer to it in detail when we proceed to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in this writ petition. 10. Chapter VI of the New Act contains provisions about nationalisation of road transport service in the State. Section 99 therein provides for preparation and publication of the draft proposals of the scheme of nationalisation i.e. the proposals for the road transport services in general or any particular class of such service being run by the State Transport Undertakings to the exclusion, complete or partial, of private transporters. Sub-section (1) of section 106 provides that any person can raise objections to the said proposals regarding the scheme of nationalisation and sub-section (2) thereof provides that after giving an opportunity of being heard to the objectors in relation to their objections and the State Transport Undertaking and thereafter considering the objections, the State Government can approve of or modify the said draft proposals. Sub-section (3) of section 100 then provides for publication of such approved or modified proposals in the Official Gazette as well as in at least one newspaper in regional language. On such publication such proposals become final and the scheme so published is known as the approved scheme and the area or the route to which it relates is known as notified area or a notified route. Section 103 of the New Act then provides for issue of a stage carriage permit, goods carriage permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or a route as per the approved scheme to the exclusion of private operators notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V of the New Act. However, in our State in view of the savings contained in Clauses (a) and (f) of sub-section (2) of section 217 of the New Act, the above nationalisation scheme framed under the Old Act has continued to remain in force even after the New Act came into force. 11. However, in our State in view of the savings contained in Clauses (a) and (f) of sub-section (2) of section 217 of the New Act, the above nationalisation scheme framed under the Old Act has continued to remain in force even after the New Act came into force. 11. It may then be seen that in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court, cited supra, the Transport Commissioner, Maharashtra State, Bombay issued a circular dated 30-5-1989 in which he pointed out that it was settled in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court that special permits issued under section 63(6) and the contract carriage permits issued under section 51 are two distinct categories of permits. However, according to him, the amendments made to the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 did not provide for separate tax upon the vehicles of the different categories and therefore, the G.R. dated 1-4-1989 was issued regarding levy of tax upon the Motor Vehicles. However, as per para 3 of the said circular dated 30-5-1989 followed by the circular dated 30-6-1989, it was reiterated that the special permits could be issued to those vehicles which are covered under some kind of substantive permits. In particular, it was made clear in the circular dated 30-6-1989 issued by the Transport Commissioner that only those vehicles having permits as stage carriage or contract carriage service would be eligible for special permit as provided under section 88(8) of the New Act, because of which it was not possible for the private operators like the petitioners to make applications for special permits under section 88(8) of the New Act. 12. Feeling aggrieved, the private operators like the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petitions claiming the relief that part of section 88(8) of the New Act, which requires their transport vehicles to be covered by permits under sections 72, 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act for getting a special permit under section 88(8) thereof is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and should therefore be struck down. They have further claimed the relief that their cases should be considered for grant of temporary permits under section 87(1) of the New Act. They have further claimed the relief that their cases should be considered for grant of temporary permits under section 87(1) of the New Act. It is pertinent to see that by way of interim orders passed in these writ petitions, we had directed the respondents pending decisions in the instant writ petitions to grant special permits to the petitioners without insisting that their vehicles must be covered by permits under sections 72, 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act. 13. Two contentions are urged before us on behalf of the petitioners. The first contention urged before us is that if any public service vehicles as defined in the New Act satisfies the requirements of sections 72, 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act, such a vehicle should be considered for grant of special permit. The other contention urged before us is that the words "in relation to a vehicle covered by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of section 88", used in sub-section (8) of section 88 of the New Act place unreasonable restriction upon the right of the private operators to ply their public service vehicle and hence are violative of the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Further, they are also arbitrary and discriminatory and are thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. Although it was initially vehemently urged before us that the petitioners have claimed temporary permits as provided under section 87(1) of the New Act, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has ultimately corrected himself and has submitted that the petitioners have claimed and intend to claim special permit as provided under section 88(8) and the only purpose of referring to section 87(1) is to highlight the purpose as shown therein for which a special permit could also be claimed and granted. It is not necessary for us to consider the relief claimed by the petitioners for directing the respondents to consider their cases for grant of temporary permits for occasions covered by Clauses (a) to (e) of section 87(1) of the New Act. 15. It is thus necessary to consider only the above two questions raised by the petitioners in this writ petition. 15. It is thus necessary to consider only the above two questions raised by the petitioners in this writ petition. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court cited supra, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (G. Satyam and another v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority)4, A.I.R. 1987 A.P. 247, and upon the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Mithilesh Garg etc. v. Union of India and others etc.)5, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 443. 16. In controverting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the State has relied upon the unreported judgments of the Andhra Pradesh, which according to him, in terms clinch the issue of interpretation and validity of section 88(8) of the New Act against the petitioners. The said unreported judgments are Writ Petition No. 9395 of 1989 (K. Galib Saheb v. The Government of India and two others)6, decided on 1-4-1991 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court which has considered the question of validity of section 88(8) of the New Act and Writ Petition No. 15990 of 1989, (L.J. Rakesh Babu v. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor and two others)7, decided by the aforesaid A.P. High Court on 1-4-1991 which has considered the question of interpretation of section 88(8) of the New Act only since the validity of the said section is upheld by it in the case cited supra. Although the learned Counsel for the State has also relied upon an unreported judgment of the Madras High Court rendered on 4-2-1991 in Writ Petition No. 12108/89 and other connected writ petitions, the said decision is not relevant in the instant case because what is considered therein is the question of validity of certain rules framed under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and not the question of interpretation and/or validity of section 88(8) of the New Act. 17. 17. To appreciate the rival submissions, section 88(8) of the New Act is reproduced below for ready reference: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act by the Central Government, the Regional Transport Authority of any one region or, as the case may be, the State Transport Authority, may for the convenience of the public, grant a special permit in relation to a vehicle covered by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of this section for carrying a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract, express or implied for the use of the vehicles as a whole without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract, and in every case where such special permit is granted, the Regional Transport Authority shall assign to the vehicle for display thereon, a special distinguishing mark in the form and manner specified by the Central Government and such special permit shall be valid in any other region or State without the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or of the State Transport Authority of the other State, as the case may be." 18. It construing section 88(8) of the New Act it has to be borne in mind that the object of section 88 of the New Act is validation of permits for use outside the region or the State, as the case may be, in which the permits are granted. A permit granted by the Regional transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region, as provided in sub-section (1) thereof, unless the said permit is countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region. Similarly a permit granted to any one State is not valid in any other State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of that State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned. Similarly a permit granted to any one State is not valid in any other State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of that State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned. Perusal of the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4), read with sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 88 would show that there can be an agreement arrived at between the States as regards the question of validation of permits issued by the authorities in one State to be operative in another State i.e. the question of grant of countersignature on permits. Sub-section (7) of section 88 carves out an exception in so far as it provides that a Regional Transport Authority of one region may issue a temporary permit under section 87 to be valid in another region or State with the concurrence, given generally or for the particular occasion by the Regional Transport Authority of that other Region or by the State Transport Authority of other State, as the case may be. 19. Then comes the exception in question provided by sub-section (8) of section 88. However, before we deal with the same we may point out that sub-section (9) of section 88 carves out an exception in respect of the tourist vehicles for the purpose of promoting tourism. It enables the State Transport Authority to grant permits in respect of tourist vehicles valid for the whole of India, or in such continuous States not being less than three in number including the State in which the permit is issued as may be specified in section 88. This is the scheme of substantive provisions of section 88 of the New Act. 20. Turning now to sub-section (8) of section 88 of the New Act, its perusal shows that it deals with the question of grant of Special Permit to a vehicle for the convenience of the public. The non obstante clause shows that such a special permit is not controlled by sub-section (1) of section 88 of the Act. 20. Turning now to sub-section (8) of section 88 of the New Act, its perusal shows that it deals with the question of grant of Special Permit to a vehicle for the convenience of the public. The non obstante clause shows that such a special permit is not controlled by sub-section (1) of section 88 of the Act. In other words, the special permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region or as the case may be, the State Transport Authority thereunder is valid in any other region or any other State as the case may be without the countersignature by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region or without the countersignature of that State Transport Authority in other State as the case may be. Its perusal also shows that such a permit is issued for carrying a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract, express or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract. Such a vehicle is assigned a special distinguishing mark which it has to display. The said sub-section (8) of section 88 however, shows that special permit can be granted only in relation to a vehicle covered by permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of the said section. The dispute raised in this writ petition is about the construction of the above requirement of sub-section (8) in question of section 88 of the New Act. 21. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged before us that according to the proper interpretation of sub-section (8) of section 88 of the New Act what is requires for grant of special permit is that the private vehicle should be able to comply with the requirements of section 72, or section 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act, which relate respectively to grant of stage carriage permits, contract carriage permit or all India permit for tourist vehicles. The bare reading of sub-section (8) of section 88 would show that its language is clear and there is no warrant for such interpretation. The crucial words used therein are "covered by a permit issued under section 72....." The said words are very clear and admit of no exception. The bare reading of sub-section (8) of section 88 would show that its language is clear and there is no warrant for such interpretation. The crucial words used therein are "covered by a permit issued under section 72....." The said words are very clear and admit of no exception. It is clear from the above words used in sub-section (8) of section 88 that the requirements for grant of special permit as provided therein is that the vehicle must possess the permit issued under sections 72, 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act. 22. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and admits of no exceptions, the words used therein must be given their own meaning. See judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of: i) (Doypack Systems Private Ltd. v. Union of India)8, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 782, Paras 57 and 58, ii) (M/s. Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax)9, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1806 Para 6, iii) (Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others)10, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 152. As shown above when the words used in section 88(8) of the New Act are "covered by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage), or section 74 or sub-section (9) of this section." .....the said words clearly show that the vehicle, for getting a special permit, must possess a permit issued under either of the three provisions referred to therein. 23. Even the legislative intent behind enactment of section 88(8) of the New Act clearly shows that for grant of special permit a vehicle must be covered by basic permit under section 72 or section 74 or sub-section (9) of the said section 88. It may be seen that there was a working group constituted in January, 1984 to review all the provisions of the Old Act and to submit draft proposal for a comprehensive legislation to replace the same. Perusal of the recommendations of the said working group which considered the question of amendment of the old section 63(6) of the Old Act corresponding to section 88(8) of the New Act, clearly shows that it has in terms rejected the argument that for grant of special permit a vehicle need not have a basic permit. Perusal of the recommendations of the said working group which considered the question of amendment of the old section 63(6) of the Old Act corresponding to section 88(8) of the New Act, clearly shows that it has in terms rejected the argument that for grant of special permit a vehicle need not have a basic permit. It has also pointed out the difficulties if the vehicles do not have any basic permit. 24. The recommendations of the aforesaid working group which considered the question of amendment of Old section 63(6) are reproduced below to show what the legislative intent behind section 88(8) of the New Act is: "Under the existing provision a special permit can be given to any public service vehicle. According to section 2(25) a public service vehicle is defined as a vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage. It is interpreted by some States that, to be eligible for a special permit under this sub-clause, the vehicle need not be the one used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward having a basic permit to operate as a Contract Carriage, State Carriage or Motor Cab, but it is enough if the vehicle is adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward. There is a basic difference between the 2 classes of vehicles. The former is used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward which means it should have a basic permit and the latter is only adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward which means that any vehicle with arrangements for seating of passengers would qualify for this special permit and it need not have a basic permit. If this argument is accepted we would be creating yet another class of vehicles for the purpose of special permits alone. As these vehicles do not have any basic permit and as such can move out from one region to another region at their will, it would be very difficult to trace them in case of any serious violation of M.V. Act or Taxation Act. From the point of view of tighter control over violation of the Act, it would not be advisable to give room for creation of such special classes of vehicles. From the point of view of tighter control over violation of the Act, it would not be advisable to give room for creation of such special classes of vehicles. Further in the proposed Act, Provision has been made for grant of State wide Contract Carriage permits and Motor Cab permits. Therefore, the contract carriages, stage carriages and Motor Cabs having basic permits are more than sufficient to cater to the special needs of the public by obtaining the special permit under this section. It is, therefore, felt that this issue of special permits should be restricted only to vehicles having a basic permit. This sub-section has been amended suitably." The above recommendations clearly bring out the legislative intent behind section 88(8) of the New Act that for grant of special permit the vehicle must have a basic permit. 25. As regards the question whether the aforesaid recommendations of the working group constituted for the purpose of review of the provisions of the Old Act can be used as an external aid to find out the legislative intent behind enactment of section 88(8) of the New Act, it may be seen that it is now well settled that the reports of commissions or Inquiry Committees preceding the introduction of a bill can be referred to either as evidence of historical facts or surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil sought to be remedied. See (A. Thengal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkattachelam Pott)11, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246, (Express Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India)12, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578. In (B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of A.P.)13, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 210, the following observations of the Supreme Court in this regard at page 215 of the report are illuminating : "Where internal aids are not forthcoming we can always have recourse to external aids to discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well settled principle of modern statutory construction. Thus Enacting History is relevant. "The enacting history of an Act is the surrounding corpus of public knowledge relative to its introduction into Parliament as a Bill, and subsequent progress through, and ultimate passing by Parliament. In particular it is the extrinsic material assumed to be within contemplation of Parliament when it passed the Act."" 26. Thus Enacting History is relevant. "The enacting history of an Act is the surrounding corpus of public knowledge relative to its introduction into Parliament as a Bill, and subsequent progress through, and ultimate passing by Parliament. In particular it is the extrinsic material assumed to be within contemplation of Parliament when it passed the Act."" 26. It may then be seen that the well known rule of purposive construction or the mischief rule laid down long back in (Re. Hydon's)14, case 76 E.R. 637, is relied upon in the case of (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar)15, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661, in interpreting Article 286 of the Constitution of India which, according to it, was enacted to cure the mischief of multiple taxation which prevailed in the provisions prior to the Constitution and to preserve the free flow of inter State trade and commerce. However, the observations of the Earl of Halsbury in (Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents)16, 1898 A.C. 571 at page 576, relied upon in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co's case are more useful for our purpose in the instant case. The said observations are as follows: "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the latter Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion." 27. It is held by the Supreme Court in the case of (State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills)17, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 772, at page 783, that the change of language in a latter statute in pari materia is suggestive to show that change of interpretation is intended. Further, it is also held in the case of (State of U.P. v. Radhye Shyam)18, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 682, at pages 689, 690, that the argument that the change of law was not intended would be negatived if the adherence to the law as it was before the amendment would make the words added by the Amending Act otiose. Further, it is also held in the case of (State of U.P. v. Radhye Shyam)18, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 682, at pages 689, 690, that the argument that the change of law was not intended would be negatived if the adherence to the law as it was before the amendment would make the words added by the Amending Act otiose. It was thus held by the Supreme Court in the case cited supra that after amendment of section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, a notification under section 6 of the said Act cannot be issued simultaneously with the notification under section 4 of the said Act even in the cases of emergency to which section 17 of the said Act applies because it would then make the words "after the publication of the notification under section 4(1)" added by way of amendment in section 17(4) redundant. 28. The real difficulty of the petitioners it appears, however, is that they cannot get a stage carriage or a contract carriage permit because of the scheme of nationalisation framed under section 68-D of the Old Act on 29-11-1973 by which the stage carriage and contract carriage services in the entire State of Maharashtra are nationalized with the result that it is only the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and the 7 expected categories of transporters carved out in Clause (4) of the Scheme of nationalisation who are holders of contract carriage permits who are entitled to claim special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act. 29. In the instant case, if we compare section 63(6) of the Old Act with the corresponding section 88(8) of the New Act both relating to special permit we find that while enacting section 88(8) in the New Act, the words "covered by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of this section" are added in the pari materia corresponding provision of section 63(6) of the Old Act. The said words added in enacting section 88(8) of the New Act cannot be read as redundant and if the said words are given their meaning it would mean that the vehicle must be covered by a basic permit as shown therein for getting a special permit thereunder which also is the legislative intent in enacting the said provisions as shown above. 30. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied therefore upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Achyut Shivram Gokhale v. Regional Transport Officer and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2047, in support of his submission that a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act can be granted even for routes or areas in respect of which there is an approved scheme of nationalisation. 31. It is however, necessary to see that, in the judgment cited supra, the Supreme Court was considering the question of interpretation of section 63(6) of the Old Act. As pointed out hereinabove, in section 63(6) of the Old Act there were no words used therein to restrict the right to get a special permit thereunder to a person who holds permit for stage carriage, contract carriage or all India permit for Tourist vehicles under sections 48, 51 or 63(7) respectively of the Old Act corresponding to sections 72, 74 and 88(9) of the New Act respectively, which restriction is placed upon the right of the owner of a public transport vehicle to get a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act by use of the appropriate language as shown hereinabove. In the absence of the words containing the said restriction, the Supreme Court has held in the case cited supra that since there is difference between a contract carriage permit and a special permit, a special permit under section 63(6) of the Old Act cannot be denied to the owner of a public transport vehicle on the ground that in view of the approved scheme of nationalisation under section 68-D of the Old Act, it is only the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and the 7 excepted categories of vehicles mentioned in Clause 4 of the Scheme of Nationalisation who are entitled to get a special permit. 31-A. However, the above ratio is clearly inapplicable while interpreting section 88(8) of the New Act in view of the clear restriction placed thereunder that for getting a special permit thereunder a vehicle must be covered by a basic permit as provided therein. In fact, the legislative intention was otherwise and therefore, by use of clear language in section 88(8) of the New Act, Parliament has departed from the above view taken by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra while making provision for special permit under the said section 88(8) of the New Act. We cannot, therefore, accept the construction sought to be placed on behalf of the petitioners upon section 88(8) of the New Act. 32. The next question which needs consideration is whether the restriction placed upon the right of the owner of a public transport vehicle to get a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act by use therein of the words "covered by a permit issued under section 72 (including a reserve stage carriage) or under section 74 or under sub-section (9) of this section", is violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In appreciating the above challenge to the restriction placed for grant of special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act it is necessary to see that the rationable for the above restriction is considered to the working group in its recommendations reproduced above while suggesting amendment to section 63(6) of the Old Act. Perusal of its recommendations would show that if a vehicle is allowed to ply on a special permit without having a basic permit and is thus allowed to move out from one region to another at its will, it would be very difficult to trace it in case of any serious violation of M.V. Act or the Taxation Act. Therefore, to tighten control over violation of the Act, it was of the view that it would not be advisable to give room for creation of such special classes of vehicles. Further, in the proposed Act if the New Act provision was made for grant of Statewide contract carriage permit and Motor Cabs permits and therefore, the said contract carriages, stage carriages and Motor Cabs having basic permits were more than sufficient to cater to the special needs of the public by obtaining the special permit under the said section. Further, in the proposed Act if the New Act provision was made for grant of Statewide contract carriage permit and Motor Cabs permits and therefore, the said contract carriages, stage carriages and Motor Cabs having basic permits were more than sufficient to cater to the special needs of the public by obtaining the special permit under the said section. It was thus of the view that the issuance of special permit should be restricted only to vehicles having a basic permit. 33. It is to be borne in mind that in considering the reasonableness of the statutory provisions in view of the protection of the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, the material disclosing the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of the law is relevant and can be referred to. Even affidavit evidence regarding such circumstances is admissible. See Mithilesh Garg's case cited supra. The above reasons given by the working group for making appropriate changes in section 63(6) of the Old Act and which led to the passing of section 88(8) of the New Act are thus relevant and give the rationable for passing the restrictions upon the owner of a public transport vehicle that for getting a special permit thereunder, his vehicle must be covered by a basic permit. 34. It is pertinent to see that when a special permit is granted under section 88(8) of the New Act for carrying passengers from one route to another or from one State to another, the said permit is valid in the other region or the State without the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or of the State Transport Authority of the other State as the case may be as required under section 88(1) of the New Act although such a countersignature of the aforesaid competent authority of the other region or the other State is required for the validity of any permit for the use of the vehicle outside the State or the region under section 88(1) of the New Act. In these circumstances, the apprehension expressed in the above recommendations of the working group that if the vehicles do not have basic permit, they can move out from one region to another at their will and therefore, it would be very difficult to trace them in case of any serious violation of the M.V. Act or the Taxation Act cannot be said to be unjustified. It is in order to tighten control over the violation of the Act that the requirement of the vehicles being covered by basic permit is insisted upon by the working group in its above recommendations. 35. The working group has then considered the question whether the special needs of the public for the vehicles by the grant or special permits under section 88(8) of the New Act can be satisfied, if the requirement of basic permit is insisted upon. It has observed in this regard that in the New Act, the provision has been made for grant of Statewide contract carriage permit, stage carriage permit and motor cabs permits by adopting a liberal policy because of which the contract carriages, stage carriages and motor cabs having basic permits are more than sufficient to cater to the special needs of the public by obtaining the special permits under the aforesaid section 88(8) of the New Act. In fact the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 443, upon which the reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of their plea of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution of India also shows that by not re-enacting the provisions under section 47 and section 57 of the Old Act, a liberal policy is adopted in the New Act for grant of stage carriage and contract carriage permits to more operators so as to have an efficient transport system. 36. 36. If the contract carriage, stage carriages and motor cabs having basic permits are more than sufficient to cater to the special needs of the public envisaged be section 88(8) of the New Act, there is no reason why the State should not be allowed to insist upon the requirement that the vehicle should have a basic permit for grant of a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act so as to tighten control over the violation of the M.V. Act and the Taxation Act as recommended by the Working Group. For all the above foregoing reasons, it cannot be said that the requirement in section 88(8) of the New Act that the owner of a Public Transport Vehicle must have the basic permit for its vehicle under sections 72, 74 or section 88(9) of the New Act for grant of a special permit thereunder has no rationable or that it is not a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. It cannot therefore, be said that there is any violation of the Article 14 or Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India in insisting upon the vehicles having a basic permit for grant of special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act. 37. It is difficult to see how the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 443 cited supra is of any assistance to the petitioners in regard to the plea of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution perusal of the said judgment would show that the observations therein are made entirely in different context. The petitioners therein were existing stage carriage operators holding permits granted by the concerned Regional Transport Authority under the Old Act. What they objected to was the grant of such stage carriage permits to the new operators on the ground that considerations laid down in section 47 in respect of stage carriage permits and section 57 in respect of contract carriage permits precluded such competition. The Supreme Court observed that the policy under the New Act was of liberalisation of grant of permits particularly when provisions like sections 47 and 57 in the Old Act were not re-enacted in the New Act. The Supreme Court observed that the policy under the New Act was of liberalisation of grant of permits particularly when provisions like sections 47 and 57 in the Old Act were not re-enacted in the New Act. It is in this context that it was held that the liberalisations policy under the New Act by removing the restrictions in the aforesaid sections intended to promote healthy competition by permitting all new operators to apply for stage carriage or contract carriage permits as the case may be, so as to promote efficient transport service in which the convenience and the comfort of the public would be satisfied. 38. It may be seen that in the judgment cited supra, the Supreme Court was not considering the provision like section 88(8) of the New Act. As pointed out hereinbefore, the requirement that for grant of special permit the vehicle must have a basic permit is inserted upon not for avoiding any healthy competition as such for such a special permit but for exercising or tightening control over such a vehicle in respect of violation of M.V. Act or the Taxation Act. Since such a vehicle with a special permit can at its will travel in another region or the State without having the countersignature of the competent authority of that said region or the state and therefore may not be traceable in case of violation of M.V. Act or the Taxation Act. On the other hand, as shown hereinabove, since the policy of grant of stage carriage and contract carriage permits is liberalised, more than one operator having such basic permit can compete for a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act. We cannot thus accept the submission on behalf of the petitioners based upon the judgment of the Supreme Court cited supra. 39. We cannot thus accept the submission on behalf of the petitioners based upon the judgment of the Supreme Court cited supra. 39. However, in the instant cases, it has to be seen that there is an approved scheme of nationalisation of Road Transport Services under section 68-D of the Old Act which continues to be in force in view of the savings Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 217 of the New Act as if the notification relating to the approved scheme of nationalisation under section 68-D of the Old Act, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the New Act, is deemed to have been issued under the corresponding provision (i.e. section 100) of the New Act. In view of the scheme of nationalisation of the road transport services, section 98 of Chapter VI of the New Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Chapter over the provisions of the Chapter V of the New Act and any other law for the time being in force. What is material to be seen is that when there is an approved scheme of nationalisation section 103 provides for issue of stage carriage or contract Transport Undertakings only. Perusal of the notification dated 29-11-1973 issued by the State Government shows that all the routes and the areas in the state are covered by the scheme of nationalisation of transport services in the State. As such, no private operators except those for whom the exceptions are carved out in Clause (4) of the said Notification dated 29-11-1973 are entitled to get such permits, except temporary permits, if there is a contingency envisaged by the proviso to section 104 of the New Act. In these circumstances, since it is the State Transport Undertaking viz., the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, and the 7 excepted categories of owners of transport vehicles referred to in Clause (4) of the aforesaid notification dated 29-11-1973 relating to the nationalisation of transport services can have basic permits, they can alone provide vehicles for special permits under section 88(8) of the New Act. 40. 40. The question thus is whether only because the State Transport Undertaking and the 7 excepted categories of private operators can apply for a special permit under section 88(8) of the New Act, the said section 88(8) of the New Act is violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In appreciating the said question, it is to be see that Article 19(6) of the Constitution, apart from enabling the State to impose, while making any law reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public upon the exercise of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, provides in Clause (ii) of sub-section (6) thereof that nothing in the said Clause (g) of Article 19(1) shall prevent the State from making any law relating to carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, or any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. In view of the above provision in Article 19(6)(ii) of the Constitution, the monopoly created by the State regarding transport service in favour of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes the fundamental rights of a private operator under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on trade or business of transport services. 40-A. In this regard, we can usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ramchandra Palai and others v. State of Orissa and others)19, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 298 in which it is held that Article 19(6) of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 excludes all argument in regard to the alleged ousting of the private owned stage carriage services and the creation of a virtual monopoly in favour of the Joint Stock Company or the State. It is thus held in the said case that the Joint Stock Company formed under the provisions of Orissa Act in question in the said case could carry on its business of transport services, even if it resulted in the complete elimination of the private owned stage carriage services without any violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. What is material to be seen is that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of (Akadasi v. State of Orissa)20, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1047, a law relating to the creation of State Monopoly has to be presumed to be in the interest of general public. 41. It has therefore, to be held that because there is no competition by private operators, it cannot be held that the provision under section 88(8) of the New Act infringes Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It has to be plasumed that when the monopoly is created in favour of the State or a corporation owned by it or controlled by it, it will provide for adequate number or vehicles for catering to the normal and special needs of the Public in the state. It cannot for the said reason be said that section 88(8) of the New Act infringes Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. When the Supreme Court in the case of Akadasi cited supra has observed that creation of State monopoly is presumed in the interest of general public, the restriction envisaged by section 88(8) of the New Act viz. that for grant of special permit, a vehicle must have a basic permit is a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution. For the same reason, it is to be held that it has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by section 88(8) of the New Act. Section 88(8) of the New Act, therefore, cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 42. It is pertinent to see that even in case of partial exclusion of private operators in respect of certain routes or areas, the Supreme Court has held in the case of (Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan and others)21, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 603 that the partial execution does not violative Article 14 of the Constitution. 42. It is pertinent to see that even in case of partial exclusion of private operators in respect of certain routes or areas, the Supreme Court has held in the case of (Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan and others)21, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 603 that the partial execution does not violative Article 14 of the Constitution. The said judgment is followed in the recent judgment in the case of (A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. P.V. Rammamhan Chowdhary)22, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 888, in which it is held that the exercise of discretion by the State Transport Undertaking in its selective application of partial exclusion of private operators in respect of certain routes and areas is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because partial exclusion does not offend its right under Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus on a complete nationalisation of the entire routes and areas in the state, if the State Transport Undertaking alone can get special permits envisaged by section 88(8) of the New Act, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The challenge to section 88(8) of the New Act on the ground of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution must therefore fail and is rejected. 43. In the result, the instant Writ petitions fail and are dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs in these writ petitions. The interim order passed in all these writ petitions shall stand vacated. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. -----