Judgment : These two civil revision petitions filed by the respective tenants under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), relating to two different portions of the same building. They are against the same landlord, and are taken up together since they involve same question of law, though at the appellate stage two separate appellate orders were passed, both dated 12. 1993. Both the tenants have failed in both the courts below, since concurrently eviction order has been passed against each of them under Sec.l0(3)(a) (i) of the Act. Actually, on the whole, the same landlord filed 7 R.C.O.Ps. including the present R.C.O.P.Nos.244 of 1981 and 241 of 1981 for evicting 7 different tenants occupying the different portions of the abovesaid same building under Sec. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, on the footing that he bona fide required the entire building, that is, all the 7 portions thereof, for his own residential occupation. But, with reference to five R.C.O.Ps., other than the present ones, the landlord obtained exparte eviction orders through court and also got possession of the respective portions thereof in 1983 itself, while the present R.C.O.Ps. were pending. The present R.C.O.Ps. were disposed of only on 28. 1987 by the Rent Controller and the said order dated 28. 1987 in each of the two cases has also been confirmed by the respective appellate orders dated 17-2-1993 in R.C.A.Nos.78 of 1987 and 77 of 1987 respectively. 2. The only submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in each of the civil revision petitions is that the landlord having taken possession of the abovesaid five portions from the other five tenants, the present R.C.O.Ps. are not maintainable, except under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act, and not under Sec.l0(3)(a)(i) thereof and that the R.C.O.Ps. have to be dismissed even under Sec.l0(3)(c) of the Act since the relative hardship spoken to therein has been neither pleaded nor proved. 3. Initially he has argued that the subsequent event of the landlord taking possession of the abovesaid five portions must be taken into account in the present case and the court should have held that the present two petitions should be dismissed, since the abovesaid Sec.l0(3)(c) requirement is not satisfied. In this connection he relies on the decision in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409. In this connection he relies on the decision in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409. However at a later stage of his argument he did not very much press the abovesaid contention or rely on such decision. The learned counsel for the respondent/has submitted that the said decision will not apply to the present case. 3-A. In the said Supreme Court case, the landlord of a large building had leased out, in separate portions, the building to several tenants and the eviction petition that was considered by the Supreme Court in the said case related to only one such portion Occupied by a tenant, whose eviction was sought for under Sec.l0(3)(a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act. There too, no doubt the landlord came into possession during the pendency of the abovesaid eviction petition therein, of some other portion in the said large building and hence it was held that the said subsequent event of landlord taking possession of the abovesaid another portion must be taken note of. So holding, the Supreme Court dismissed the said eviction petition. But, there is a vital difference between the said case and the present one. From the judgment in the said Supreme Court case, it cannot be said that the landlord therein filed several rent control petitions for evicting all the tenants occupying the different portions of the said large building and got eviction orders against some of them and occupied those portions, while the other rent control petitions were pending. 3-B. In the present case, as already mentioned, ‘even initially the claim of the landlord was quite clear. He wanted the entire building, consisting of the above referred to all the portions thereof for his own residential occupation. That is why filed seven rent control petitions against all seven tenants. When such is the case, when 1 , secures possession through court in the abovesaid five portions out of the seven if he does not occupy those five portions after he gets possession in each of the five cases, not only it could be said that his requirement itself for his own occupation was really not bona fide, but he would also face the statutory . consequence provided under Sec.l0(5)(a) of the Act, which says where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building in pursuance of any order under Sec. 10(3) does not himself occupy it within one month from the date of obtaining possession, the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing restoration of possession to him. 4. So, it is clear that Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409 will have no application to the present case. That apart, in the said decision itself, regarding how far subsequent events have to be taken note of in deciding a list, the following significant observation has been made: "It is basic to our procedural jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances." [emphasis supplied] Thus I find while reconciling the above stated two basic principles, if the court has to decide that the subsequent event has to be taken note of to mould the relief, it must see "no specific provision or fairplay is violated" and there is "absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances". Applying the said Rule, it is clear that in the present case, in view of the abovesaid subsequent event of landlord taking possession of the abovesaid five portions cannot be taken note of in the present case. The contention that the landlord in the present case should not have taken possession of the abovesaid five portions at all till the present two R.C.O.Ps. are finally disposed of will he very unfair to the landlord. The contention that the landlord in the present case should not have taken possession of the abovesaid five portions at all till the present two R.C.O.Ps. are finally disposed of will he very unfair to the landlord. The decision in K.Ganesan v. K.Padmavathi Ammal, 100 L.W. 381, relied on by the court below also squarely supports the case of the landlord. 5. Then, the learned counsel for the petitioners slightly modified his argument saying that since the landlord has taken possession of the abovesaid five portions and has even partitioned the said portions by altering the positions of walls therein, the landlord cannot be still held to have the bona fide requirement for occupying the portions coming under the present R.C.O.Ps. 6. First of all there is a fallacy in this argument also. Only if the abovesaid subsequent event can be taken note of, it could be considered whether in the light of the abovesaid subsequent event, the requirement is bona fide or not. But, once it has been held that the said subsequent event cannot be taken note of in the present case, the other question docs not at all arise. That apart, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord rightly points out that the landlord, a peon in a bank, took loan from the said bank for buying the said entire building of seven portions for his own occupation and that there is also no cross-examination on such evidence given by the landlord as P.W.I in each of the present two cases. He also rightly points out that both to Ex.A-2 petition- notice in R.C.O.P.No.244 of 1981 and Ex.A-1 petition notice in R.C.O.P.No.241 of 1981, there was no reply at all by the respective tenants. In those notices also the landlord has expressed his requirement for all the seven portions of the building. In fact the said notice is a common notice addressed to all the abovesaid tenants. 7. That apart, the said learned counsel also points out that in Ex.A-1, a rough sketch of the entire building of seven portions is also attached and no exception has been taken to the said sketch by the tenants when they gave evidence. In fact the said notice is a common notice addressed to all the abovesaid tenants. 7. That apart, the said learned counsel also points out that in Ex.A-1, a rough sketch of the entire building of seven portions is also attached and no exception has been taken to the said sketch by the tenants when they gave evidence. The said sketch shows that out of the entire building, the portions occupied by four of the abovesaid five tenants, viz., Noorudeen, Govindaraj, Mani and Valliammai are small portions in the north western corner of the entire building and the portion occupied by the other tenant, viz.,Kesavan, out of the abovesaid five persons, is in the south eastern corner and in between the abovesaid four portions and the abovesaid Kesavan’s portion, is the portion occupied by the tenant Karuppayi in C.R.P.No.1399 of 1993. Further, as per the said sketch, the portion of Ponnusami the tenant in C.R.P.No.1405 of 1993 is further east of the abovesaid Kesavan’s portion. Thus, the manner in which the portions of the abovesaid five persons are situate, would ciearlyshow that simply because the landlord had occupied those five portions, his requirement for the entirety of the building for his own use would not become any the less bona fide. Further, admittedly on the date of the two present petitions, the landlord was only living in a rented building. 8. In the result, there is no merit in these civil revision petitions and hence they are dismissed. No costs.