JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, impugning the validity of the assessment order and the notice of demand served on him, requiring to pay Special Road Tax by the respondent-District Transport Officer, Tonk. 2. The Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1951') was enacted to provide for the imposition of, tax on motor vehicles throughout Rajasthan. Special Road Tax is levied Under Section 4-B, in addition to the tax and surcharge on all transport vehicles at the rates fixed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette not exceeding the maximum rates specified in Schedule 'A'. At the out-set, it may be stated that the vires of Section 4-B and the rates of Special Road Tax fixed by the State Government by notification have not been challenged in the present writ petition. 3. The assessment order, as well as, the demand notice have been challenged mainly on three grounds. The first challenge is that the District Transport Officer (for short, 'DTO') passed the impugned assessment order, without giving the petitioner any notice and a reasonable opportunity of being heard. According to the learned Counsel, determination of tax by the DTO is a quasi-judicial act and the Statute itself has incorporated the principles of natural justice by providing an opportunity of being heard to the owner of the vehicle, if the Taxation Officer is satisfied that the tax was not correctly paid or the owner did not furnish the requisite return. The second ground of attract is that the DTO wrongly calculated the tax without taking into consideration that the petitioner was plying only one return trip daily on the route, while determining the tax on the basis of the scope of 3 : 3. The third ground of challenge is that the vehicle was not plied during he period July 15, 1991 to October 15, 91' and the petitioner was entitled to get exemption of the tax for the aforesaid period under Rule 4(2) of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1951 (for short, 'the Rules, 1951). The third ground of challenge is that the vehicle was not plied during he period July 15, 1991 to October 15, 91' and the petitioner was entitled to get exemption of the tax for the aforesaid period under Rule 4(2) of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1951 (for short, 'the Rules, 1951). It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of assessment passed by the DTO was appealable, but, according to him, the alternative remedy of appeal is onerous and subject to restriction of payment of tax, as such, the said remedy is not a efficacious remedy. 4. Before dealing with the above submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the primary question arises for decision is whether the petitioner had an efficacious remedy by way of an appeal or other proceedings? Another related question is that if the alternative remedy is efficacious, then in the facts and circumstances of the case, any relief should be granted to the petitioner, in the present writ petition. 5. Section 14(1) of the Act confers a right of appeal to an aggrieved person to the Appellate Authority appointed by the State Government in this behalf to challenge the assessment order passed by the respondent - DTO. Then, the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 14 provides revisional jurisdiction, which may be exercised by the Commissioner to examine the record of any proceeding under the Act and revise any such order. The Act, therefore, provides an elaborate and self-contained machinery of various authorities competent to decide all questions relating to determination of the tax. Against the decision of the Taxing Officer, there is an appeal to the Appellate Authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. 6. An aggrieved party can challenge an arbitrary or unjust assessment by preferring an appeal under Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, subject to payment of the admitted amount of tax due from him as enjoined by the proviso to sub-Section (2). As regards the disputed amount of tax or penalty, the aggrieved person has the remedy of applying for stay of the recovery to the Transport Commissioner/Additional Transport Commissioner under the proviso. As regards the disputed amount of tax or penalty, the aggrieved person has the remedy of applying for stay of the recovery to the Transport Commissioner/Additional Transport Commissioner under the proviso. The relevant provisos run as under: "Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless It Is accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of tax or such other amount as is admitted by the appellant to be due from him or of such instalment thereof might have become payable land further that the appellate authority shall not stay recovery of tax: Provided also that if the owner of the motor vehicle has preferred an appeal or revision under this section, the Commissioner may on an application in writing from the owner of such vehicle, stay the recovery of the disputed amount of tax or penalty or any part thereof during the pendency of the appeal or revision if the owner furnishes sufficient security to his satisfaction in such from and in such manner as may be prescribed. 7. The contention of the learned Counsel that the right of appeal is subject to payment of tax, and as such, it is an onerous remedy, has no substance. It is no doubt true that the appeal is entertained on satisfactory proof of payment of tax or such other amount as is admitted by the assessee, but for this payment, the assessee cannot have any grievance, as he is bound to pay the undisputed amount of tax. Thus condition, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be onerous or unreasonable. For the disputed amount of tax and penalty, the assessee can apply for a stay to the Commissioner. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is unsustainable that the remedy by way of an appeal or revision is not efficacious. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1983 SC 603 , the provisions of Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, providing similar provision of appeal and revision, were considered by their Lordships. In Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, the right of appeal under sub-Section (1) of Section 23 is subject to payment of admitted amount of tax and, for the disputed amount of tax the assessee has remedy to apply for a stay of the recovery to the Commissioner of Sales Tax. In Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, the right of appeal under sub-Section (1) of Section 23 is subject to payment of admitted amount of tax and, for the disputed amount of tax the assessee has remedy to apply for a stay of the recovery to the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Their Lordships held that the Act provided for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment. 8. However, the matter does not end here. In spite of the fact that an alternative remedy is available, it cannot be said that the High Court will never entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Tax Officer An alternative remedy does not create a bar from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in a given case. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is extensive, but, normally, the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of the Taxing Officers, when the Statute, under which the tax is sought to be levied, provides remedy by way of an appeal or other proceedings to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. In what case, the High Court may or should entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, even the petitioner might have an alternative remedy? In State of U.P. V. Mohammad Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86 , it was held as under: If an Inferior Court or tribunal of first Instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court's sense of fair play the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or If recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. In Than singh v. Superintendent AIR 1964 SC 1419 of Taxes it was observed as under: The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution if couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by the statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore, act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be by passed, and will not leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. (Emphasis supplied)In Bhopal Sugar Industries v. Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal AIR 1967 SC 549 , the question of alternative remedy was again considered by their Lordships in a sales tax matter and it was observed as under: "The Legislature has set up and elaborate and self-contained machinery for investigating whether a transaction is liable to be taxed because it is the nature of a retail sale within the meaning of the Act. The taxing Officer is invested with authority to determine the nature of the transaction and its liability to tax, and against his decision there is an appeal to the appellate authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is extensive, but normally the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of taxing authorities, when the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way, of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. That is not to say that the High Court will never entertain a petition against the order of the taxing Officer. The High Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide whether a statute under which a tax is sought to be levied Is within the legislative competence of the Legislature enacting it of whether the statute defies constitutional restrictions or infringes any fundamental rights, or whether the taxing authority has arrogated to himself power which he does not possess, or has committed a serious error of procedure which has affected the validity of his conclusion or even where the taxing authority threatens to recover tax on an interpretation of the statute which is erroneous. The High Court may also in appropriate cases determine the eligibility to tax of transactions the nature of which is admitted, but the High Court normally does not proceed to ascertain the nature of a transaction which is alleged to be taxable. The High Court leaves it to the tax payer to obtain an adjudication from the taxing authorities in the first instance. (Emphasis supplied).In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 549 , their Lordships considered the previous judgment in State of U.P v. Mohd. Noor (supra) and the judgment was distinguished by observing that there was no suggestion that the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make an assessment or that he acted in breach of rules of natural justice. In the case, the petitioner was served with a notice of the proceedings under the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the impugned orders clearly showed that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to place his case. In the case, the petitioner was served with a notice of the proceedings under the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the impugned orders clearly showed that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to place his case. In the back-ground of these facts, it was held AS under: "Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the prescribed authority under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under Sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Act. 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing (sic) the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by willies, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CBNS 336 at p. 356 in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases In which a liability may be established founded upon statute.... But there is a third class, fiz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it...the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords In Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co., 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P.C. 105 . It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine. 9. The above decisions show that the High Court shall not normally entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if the Statute provided a remedy by way of appeal, revision or other proceedings. Similarly, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal against a decision of Court or Tribunal to correct error of facts by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, an alternative remedy itself is not a bar from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court may entertain a petition if (i)the Authority or the Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or patently in excess exercise of jurisdiction; (ii) the rules of natural justice provided in the Statute or otherwise are violated, while making the order; or (iii) the Authority manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner, committing serious error of procedure, which has affected the validity of the conclusion;& (iv) the Statute under which tax is sought to be levied is found without legislative competence or infringes any fundamental right of the aggrieved party. 10. In the aforesaid back-ground of legal position, I may now examine the matter. Section 8-A of the Act states that the ownership of the vehicle shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, while determining the amount of tax if the Taxation Officer is satisfied that the tax was not correctly paid or incorrect returns were furnished by the owner. It runs as under: "8-A. Determination of tax in certain cases.-(1) An owner of stage carriage may be required to maintain such accounts as may be prescribed and to submit the same to the Taxation Officer as and when required. It runs as under: "8-A. Determination of tax in certain cases.-(1) An owner of stage carriage may be required to maintain such accounts as may be prescribed and to submit the same to the Taxation Officer as and when required. (2) If the Taxation Officer is satisfied that tax has not been correctly paid or the owner has not furnished return or has given inaccurate particular in the return, he shall after giving the owner a reasonable opportunity of being hear, proceed to determine the amount of tax due and recover the same. 11. In the petition, the order of the Taxation Officer has been specifically challenged on the ground that the assessment order, determining the tax and penalty was passed without any notice and providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The respondent did not appear, in spite of the notice and no return has been filed, denying the above specific averments made in the petition. From the impugned assessment order also, it does not appear that any notice was given to the petitioner or he was given an opportunity of being heard, while determining the amount of tax or penalty. The impugned order has been, thus, passed in violation of the rules of natural justice, as provided in the Act and, as such, it is a void order and I have no hesitation in holding that the petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is maintainable. If the petitioner had been given a notice by the Taxation Officer, he could have raised other objections, which relate to the facts to be investigated and determined by the Taxation Officer. 12. Consequently, this petition deserves to be allowed and it is, hereby, allowed. The impugned assessment order, as well as, the demand raised in pursuance to the assessment order are, hereby, set aside. The respondent - DTO shall pass the assessment order afresh, after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the petitioner shall be entitled to produce any document or evidence in support of his defence. 13. Before parting with, I would like to express my concern about the manner, in which the assessment orders are passed by the District Transport Officers. It has come to my knowledge, while dealing such cases, that orders of assessment are passed by the Taxation Officers in a cursory manner, without dealing with the objections/ submissions raised before them. 13. Before parting with, I would like to express my concern about the manner, in which the assessment orders are passed by the District Transport Officers. It has come to my knowledge, while dealing such cases, that orders of assessment are passed by the Taxation Officers in a cursory manner, without dealing with the objections/ submissions raised before them. Such orders normally, do not indicate as to whether any notice was given to the assessee and whether the assessee or his any representative was given an opportunity of hearing or not. The Taxation Officers should remember that passing of assessment orders is a quasi-judicial function and they are expected to follow the principles of natural justice. The assessment order should contain necessary facts and various objections/submissions made by the assessee. Then, such objections should be decided by speaking order. If the assessment orders are passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and without determining the objections raised before the Taxation Officer it gives rise to further litigation. The Transport Commissioner is, therefore, directed to issue proper guidelines to all the Taxation Officers, in the light of the observations made in the writ petition. 14. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Transport Commissioner. 15. The writ petition is allowed, as indicated above.Petition Allowed. *******