Judgment : The revision petitioner who is the first accused in the case has been convicted for offences under Secs.18(c) read with Rule 65(2) and Sec.18(c) read with Rule 65(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act in C.C.No.4447 of 1988 on the file of the Tenth Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, and sentenced under Sec.27(d) of the Act on each count to imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. It is not in dispute that the first accused is the owner of the drug store and licensee which P.W.1 Drug Inspector inspected on 8. 1987. According to P.W.1 for the period from 4. 1987 to 8. 1987 Schedule ‘H’ drugs have been sold without the personal supervision of a qualified person, and Prescription Register has not been maintained regarding the said sales. On these grounds A1 and also her husband A-2 who was selling drugs in the shop when P.W.1 inspected, were both prosecuted and convicted and sentenced as stated above. 3. As against this the accused appealed and the appellate court found that no case has been proved against A-2 and therefore it acquitted him. It maintained the conviction and sentence passed against A-1. As against his A-1 has filed this criminal revision case. 4. It is now contended for the revision petitioner A-1 that Ex.P-15 sanction order in the case is defective because there is no application of mind by the sanctioning authority. It is submitted that as to why there was no entry in the prescription register the accused gave an explanation to P.W.1. But that explanation has not been placed before the sanctioning authority and therefore there cannot be application of mind by the sanctioning authority by perusal of necessary records and hence the sanction order is defective. 5. Ex.P-15 sanction order reads that the sanctioning authority has perused the proposal as well as connected records. It must be stated here that no plea of defect in the sanction order has been taken in the trial court. In these circumstances it cannot be believed that the explanation given by the accused has not been placed before the sanctioning authority even if it is required to be placed. It must be stated here that no plea of defect in the sanction order has been taken in the trial court. In these circumstances it cannot be believed that the explanation given by the accused has not been placed before the sanctioning authority even if it is required to be placed. In this connection the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner cited a ruling of this Court in State v. Nachimuthu Gounder, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 402. In that case the sanction order relates to an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. A reading of the judgment shows that in that case merely a form has been filled up and it is observed therein that there is nothing to show that records have been perused. But in our case there is no such form and the sanction order Ex.P-15 is fully type-written, and as stated above, it clearly reads that the proposal and relevant records were perused. 6. The learned Government Advocate brings to my notice Sec.465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as per which “In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings”. Admittedly no contention with regard to any defect in the sanction order has been raised in the trial court. It is stated that in the appellate court this point has been raised in the grounds of appeal. But I do not think that having failed to take the plea in the trial Court the plea taken in the appellate court can be considered. Thus the argument that the sanction order is defective cannot be countenanced. 7. It is next contended that as regards the first charge i.e., Schedule H drugs were sold without the personal supervision of a qualified person as required under Rule 65(2), there is no evidence to show that it was done so. P.W.1 has clearly stated in her evidence that when she inspected the store on 8. 1987 there was no pharmacist and there was a resignation letter by a pharmacist dated 4. 1987 and from 4. 1987 to 8. 1987 there were sales as evidenced by some receipts. P.W.1 has clearly stated in her evidence that when she inspected the store on 8. 1987 there was no pharmacist and there was a resignation letter by a pharmacist dated 4. 1987 and from 4. 1987 to 8. 1987 there were sales as evidenced by some receipts. In the cross examination of P.W. 1 it has not been suggested to her at all either that there were no sales as deposed by her or that there was a pharmacist. Therefore there is absolutely no reason whatsoever as to why the evidence of P.W.1 should not be believed. Therefore, I find no merit in this contention raised. 8. As regards the other offence that there was no particulars entered in the Prescription register, this is not disputed before me. Thus, I find no merit in the criminal revision case. Accordingly it is dismissed.