Ram Mandiri and another v. Ranganatha Naidu — 1993 DIGILAW 776 (MAD)

Judgment :- K.A. Swami, CJ. These two writ appeals are preferred against the common judgment dated 21. 1993, passed in W.P.Nos.3642,939 and 14035 of 1992. W.P.No.3642 of 1992 was filed by Sri P.Manogaran, Secretary, Pondicherry Bar Association, whereas W.P.No.9391 of 1992 was filed by the Pondicherry Bar Association and W.P.No. 10435 of 1992 was filed by one R.Vadivelu. The prayers made in W.P.Nos.3642 and 9391 of 1992 are similar inasmuch as they have sought for quashing of the appointment of Sri Edward Kumar, V.A., Special Officer-cum-Subordinate Judge, Judicial Department, Pondicherry, with a only difference that in W.P.No.9391 of 1992, a writ of quo warranto to oust him from the office and whereas in W.P.No.l()435ofl992,apart from challenging the appointment of Sri Edward Kumar, V.A., the appointment of S.R.Pushpavalli, L.Veeranath Rao, G.Patric and G.Rajesurya, is challenged. Learned single Judge has held that the appointment of Sri Edward Kumar is not in accordance with the rules of recruitment and the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, the appointment of Edward Kumar, V.A., has been quashed, whereas the appointments of others have been upheld. While parting with the case, the learned single Judge has also observed that though the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras has been extended to Pondicherry, but nevertheless the administrative control of the High Court over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry has not been given effect to. Therefore, it is high time that the High Court should assume its administrative control over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Both the appeals are filed by the Union of India, District Judge and Secretary to Government. Edward Kumar, V. A., though filed a writ appeal, against the order of the learned single Judge, setting aside his appointment. Subsequently withdrew that appeal and the same was dismissed as withdrawn. Therefore, there is not much to be decided in the appeals. However, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the question as to the administrative control of the High Court over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry is necessary to be decided since in the absence of any authoritative pronouncement, the Union Territory of Pondicherry is of the opinion that the administrative control of the High Court of Madras does not extend over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. In the light of this, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that they would also like to have the decision of the High Court on this matter, so that the legal position may become clear to them. 2. In the light of these submissions we have heard both sides on the question as to whether extending of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras to Pondicherry did not include, or did not vest in the High Court of Madras, the administrative control over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry as contemplated by Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. 3. It is not in dispute that by reason of extending of jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras to Pondicherry by Sec.9 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act,‘l962 (Central Act 49 of 1962) the jurisdiction exercisable by High Court under Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution is exercisable by the High Court of Madras over the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The doubt is entertained only as to the availability of power to the High Court of Madras under Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution over the judicial wing of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution deals with the administrative control of the High Court over the subordinate courts. Art.233 of the Constitution which deals with the appointment of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges, is as follows: "233. Appointment of District Judges: (1) Appointments of persons to be and the posting and promotion of district judges in any State shaH be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Appointment of District Judges: (1) Appointments of persons to be and the posting and promotion of district judges in any State shaH be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment." Art.234 provides that the appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service of the State shail be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. The High Court has been vested with the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including several matters connected thereto under Art.235 which reads thus: "235. Control over subordinate courts: The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which be may under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law." 4. The extent of the power of the High Court, as contained in Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution, has been explained in clear terms by the Supreme Court in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. Dixitulu, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 193, thus: "33. We now turn to Chapter VI. It is captioned: ‘subordinate courts’. It consists of Articles which provide for matters relating inter alia to appointment and control of persons who man posts in the subordinate judiciary. According to the scheme of this Chapter, subordinate judiciary has been classified into District Judges and members of the ‘Judicial Service’. We now turn to Chapter VI. It is captioned: ‘subordinate courts’. It consists of Articles which provide for matters relating inter alia to appointment and control of persons who man posts in the subordinate judiciary. According to the scheme of this Chapter, subordinate judiciary has been classified into District Judges and members of the ‘Judicial Service’. Art.236 defines the expression ‘District Judge’ to include ‘Judge of a City Civil Court, Additional District Judge, Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of Small Causes Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge’. The Article defines ‘judicial service’ to mean ‘a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District Judge. 34. Art.233 gives the High Court an effective voice in the appointment of District Judges. Clause (1) of Article peremptorily requires that ‘appointments of persons to be and the posting and promotion of District Judges’ shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court’. Clause (2) of the Article provides for direct appointment of District Judges from Advocates or pleaders of not less than seven years standing, who are not already in the service of the State or of the Union. In the matter of such direct appointments, also, the Governor can act only on the recommendation of the High Court. Consultation with the High Court under Art.233 is not an empty formality. An appointment made in direct or indirect disobedience of this constitutional mandate, would be invalid. (See: Chandra Mohan v. State of UP, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1987 and Chandramouleshwar v. Patna High Court, A.I.R. 1970S. C. 370. ‘Service’ which under Clause (1) of Art.233 is the first source of recruitment of District Judges by promotion, means the’judicial services’ as defined in Art.236. 35. The word ‘posting’ as used in Art.233, in the context of’ appointment’ and’ promotion ‘means the first assignment of an appointee or pro-motee to a position in the cadre of District Judges. It cannot be understood in the sense of ‘transfer’. (See: Ranga Mohammed case, A. I. R. 1976 S.C. 903). 36. 35. The word ‘posting’ as used in Art.233, in the context of’ appointment’ and’ promotion ‘means the first assignment of an appointee or pro-motee to a position in the cadre of District Judges. It cannot be understood in the sense of ‘transfer’. (See: Ranga Mohammed case, A. I. R. 1976 S.C. 903). 36. Art.234 enjoins that the rules in accordance with which appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State are to be made, shall be framed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission. The expression ‘judicial service’ in this Article, carries the same connotation as defined in Art.36. 37. Art.235 is the pivot around which the entire scheme of the chapter revolves. Under it, ‘the control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotions of, and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of a State’ is vested in the High Court. 38. The interpretation and scope of Art.235 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court. The position crystallised by these decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Art.235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. It comprehends a wide variety of matters. Among others, it includes: (a)(i) Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges, and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges. In the exercise of this control, the High Court can hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal, subject, however, to the conditions of service, and a right of appeal, if any, granted thereby and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Art.311(2). (ii) In Art.235, the word ‘control’ is accompanied by the word ‘vest’ which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. The control vested in the High Court being exclusive and not dual, an inquiry into the conduct of a member of the judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority. The control vested in the High Court being exclusive and not dual, an inquiry into the conduct of a member of the judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority. State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 447, Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192: 1974 Lab.I.C 1280 and Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Haryana (sub nom Narendra Singh Rao, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 613. (iii) Suspension from service of a member of the judiciary with a view to hold a disciplinary inquiry. (b) Transfers, promotions and confirmation of such promotions, of persons holding posts in the judicial service, inferior to that of District Judge. State of Assam v. S.N.Sen, (1972)2 S.C.J. 558: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1028 and State of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1616. .(c) Transfers of District Judges. State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammed, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 903 and Chandramouleshwar v. Patna High Court, AIR. 1970 S.C. 370. .(d) Recall of District Judges posted on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on administrative posts. (State of Orissa v. sudhasu Sekhar Misra, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 647). .(e) Award of selection grade to the members of the judicial service, including District Judges, being their further promotion after their initial appointment to the cadre (Stare of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia, A.I.R. 1970S.C. 1616. .(f) Confirmation of District Judges, who have been on probation or are officiating, after their initial appointment or promotion by the Governor to the cadre of District Judges under Art.233. (Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 613.) .(g) Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Courts and of Subordinate Courts. (Stare of UP. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi). 39. Since in both these appeals, orders of the premature retirement of the respondents, viz. of Shri Dikshitulu made by the Chief Justice, and of Shri Krishnamurthy by the Governor in consonance with the decision of the High Court arc in question, it will be appropriate to amplify the point a little. It is well settled that compulsory retirement simpliciter, in accordance with the terms and conditions of service, does not amount to dismissal or removal or reduction in rank under Art.31 or under the Service Rules because, the Government servant does not lose the terminal benefits already earned by him. It is well settled that compulsory retirement simpliciter, in accordance with the terms and conditions of service, does not amount to dismissal or removal or reduction in rank under Art.31 or under the Service Rules because, the Government servant does not lose the terminal benefits already earned by him. (See: Tara Singh v. State of’ Rajasthan .A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1487 and State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1841.) .40. In the last mentioned case the Government servant, was officiating in the cadre of District Judges. The High Court recommended that he should be reverted to his substantive post of senior Subordinate Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate and, as such, allowed to continue in service till the age of 58 years. Contrary to the recommendation of the High Court, the Slate Government passed an order under Rule 5.32(c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, compulso-rily retiring him from service at the age of 55 years. Holding that the order of compulsory retirement was invalid, this Court stressed that the power of deciding whether a judicial officer should be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years upto the age of 58 years, vests in the High Court and to hold otherwise ‘will seriously affect the independence of the judiciary and take away the control vested in the High Court’. The formal order of retirement, however, is passed by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the High Court, that being ‘the broad basis of Art.235’. It was explained that ‘in such eases it is the contemplation in the Constitution, that the Governor as the head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High Court’. It was concluded that, ‘the vesting of complete control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State’. In other words, while in form, the High Court’s decision to compulsorily retire a subotdinate judicial office in the exercise of its administrative or disciplinary jurisdiction under Art.235 is advisory, in substance and effect, it is well-nigh peremptory. .41. In other words, while in form, the High Court’s decision to compulsorily retire a subotdinate judicial office in the exercise of its administrative or disciplinary jurisdiction under Art.235 is advisory, in substance and effect, it is well-nigh peremptory. .41. Recently, in State of’ Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, this Court succinctly summed up the whole position as follows: .‘The ideal which inspired the provision that the control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto shall vest in the High Courts is thai those wings of the judiciary should be independent of the executive.....It is in order to effectuate that high purpose that Art.235 as construed by the court in various decisions requires that all matters relating to the subordinate judicial including compulsory retirement and disaplinary proceedings, but excluding the imposition of punishments falling within the scope of Art.311 and the first appointments and promotions, should he dealt with and decided upon by the High Courts in the exercise of the control vested in them. 42. In sum, the entire scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI. epitomised in Arts.229 and 235, has been assiduously designed by the Founding fathers to ensure independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciaty. [Italics supplied] In joginder Nath and others v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 511, while dealing with Art.234 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that the word ‘State’ in Art.234 would include a Union Territory also. 5. Art.230 of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to enact law extending the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any Union Territory. Act No.49 of 1962 known as the Pondicherry (Administration Act, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was passed by Parliament. This Act came into force on the 16th August, 1962. Among other things, the Act has extended the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras to Pondicherry. As per Sec.2(d) of the Act, the expression ‘High Court’ means the High Court at Madras. Sec.9o(The Act specifically extends the jurisdiction of the High Court to Pondicherry. The heading of the said section is ‘extension of the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to Pondicherry“. It states” as from the 6th day of November, 1962, the jurisdiction of the High Court shall extend to Pondicherry". Sec.9o(The Act specifically extends the jurisdiction of the High Court to Pondicherry. The heading of the said section is ‘extension of the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to Pondicherry“. It states” as from the 6th day of November, 1962, the jurisdiction of the High Court shall extend to Pondicherry". Sec.10 of the Act reads thus: "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Sec 9, the High Court shall have, in respect of Pondicherry, all such jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable in respect of the former French Establishments by the cour de cassation, the cour superieur d’ arbitrage and the conseil d’etat of France: Provided that while determining appeals from decisions of courts and tribunals in Pondicherry, the High Court shall, as far as may be, follow the same procedure and have the same power to pass any judgment, decree or order thereon, as it follows and has while determining appeals from decisions of Courts in the State of Madras." The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that though Sec.9 of the Act extends the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras to Pondicherry, but the said section has to be read along with Sec.10. Therefore, the High Court can only exercise such jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable by the courts specified in Sec. 10 of the Act. On the contrary, it is the contention of the respondents that by Sec.9 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras is extended to Union Territory of Pondicherry; that this provision is enacted under Art.230 of the Constitution of India, which provides that Parliament may by law extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court from any Union Territory, as such, the extension of jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras means the jurisdiction it enjoyed. Therefore, it could exercise the jurisdiction it enjoys under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution. 6. Therefore, it could exercise the jurisdiction it enjoys under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution. 6. Sec. 10(1) of the Act provides that the jurisdiction exercisable by the cour de cassation, the cour superieur d’ arbitrage, and the conseil d’ etat of France’in respect of the former French Establishments under the law in force immediately before the appointed day shall be exercisable by the High Court of Madras in respect of Pondicherry. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.10 of the Act only deals with the pending appeals and other proceedings and also all original proceedings. According to this provision, all those proceedings shall stand transferred to the High Court of Madras and shall be disposed of by the High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it by the Act as if such appeals and proceedings had been filed before it. This section does not in any way limit the scope, ambit and extent of Sec.9 of the Act. Sec.10 of the Act provides as to exercise of jurisdiction in judicial matters by the High Court and also as to how the pending appeals, all other proceedings and original proceedings shall be dealt with. Sec.ll of the Act enabled the advocates who were entitled to practise before the tribunal, Superiord’ Appeal of Pondicheny to practise in the High Court of Madras in relation to cases coming before the High Court from Pondicherry, Sec.12 of the Act enabled the High Court to make rules from time to time. Other provisions of the Act do not touch upon the issue in question. Therefore, it is not necessary to refer to them. Thus, there is nothing contained in the Act which can be said to indicate that the jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution is not available to it by reason of extension of its jurisdiction under Sec.9 of the Act over the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Hence, it is not possible to accept the contention. 7.The provisions relating to Union Territories are contained in Part VIII of the Constitution. Art.241, which falls under Part VIII of the Constitution, relates to "High Courts for Union Territories". Hence, it is not possible to accept the contention. 7.The provisions relating to Union Territories are contained in Part VIII of the Constitution. Art.241, which falls under Part VIII of the Constitution, relates to "High Courts for Union Territories". However, it may be pointed out that under this Article the Parliament may by law constitute a High Court for a Union Territory or declare any court in any such Territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution. Therefore, it is clear from Art.241 of the Constitution that it provides for constitution of a High Court for the Union Territory or declaring any one of the Courts existing in the Union Territory to be a High Court. Art.241 does not provide for extension of the jurisdiction of any High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of it from, the Union Territory. It provides for constitution of a High Court for a Union Territory, or to declare any i court existing in such territory to be High Court. This is specifically dealt with by Art.230 of the Constitution. As already pointed out, there is no other provision in the Constitution, dealing with either establishment of a High Court for a Union Territory or extension of the jurisdiction of any High Court to a Union Territory. Therefore, Sec.9 of the Act is relatable to Art.230 of the Constitution. That being so, the question that will arise for consideration is as to when once the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras is extended to the Union Territory of Pondicherry, whether it can be considered only the extension of the judicial jurisdiction of the High Court or, and also of the jurisdiction the High Court of Madras enjoys under the Constitution in relation to the State for which it is established. It may be pointed out that the judiciary is not a department of the Government. It is independent of the executive. It is as much an organ of the Constitution as the Legislature and the Executive. The Constitution ensures separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. It may be pointed out that the judiciary is not a department of the Government. It is independent of the executive. It is as much an organ of the Constitution as the Legislature and the Executive. The Constitution ensures separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dixitulu’s case, referred to above, the entire scheme of Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution epitomised in Arts.229 and 235, has been assiduously designed by the Founding Fathers to ensure independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciary. It must be presumed that the Parliament was fully conscious of this position. The judiciary being one of the organs of the Constitution, independent of the other two, the High Court exercises jurisdiction not only on the judicial side as is provided under the Constitution and the laws, but it also exercises the administrative control over the judicial wing of the State which includes subordinate judiciary. Therefore, when the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras was extended under the Act, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, all that jurisdiction, administrative and judicial enjoyed by the High Court of Madras under the Constitution, as contemplated in Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution must be held to have been extended over the subordinate judiciary of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. In this connection, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that Art.230 does not specifically provide that whenever a jurisdiction of a High Court is extended to a Union Territory, the jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution shall also be available to it. It is also contended that whenever a High Court is constituted for the Union Territory, as per Art.241 of the Constitution, the provisions of Chapter V of Part VI have been made applicable and if the Constitution makers intended that the High Court shall also exercise the power as contemplated in Chapters V and VI of Part VI over the subordinate judiciary, a provision similar to the one contained in Art.241 (2) of the Constitution, would have also been provided in Art.230 of the Constitution. 8. 8. When the High Court at Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 (Act No.26 of 1981), was passed by the Parliament extending the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, a specific provision was also made under Sec.5 of that Act, stating that: “The provisions of Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution shall apply to the High Court at Bombay in relation to the exercise of its jurisdiction to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, subject to the following exceptions and modifications, namely: .(a) the references in the said Chapter to ‘State’ except where it occurs in the expression ‘Governor of the State’ shall be construed as references to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu; .(b) in Clause (1) of Art.233 and in Art.234, the references to the Governor of the State, and in Art.237, the reference to the Governor, shall be construed as references to the Administrator of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu; .(c) the provisions ofArt.233-A shall not apply; .(d) in Art.234, the reference to the State Public Service Commission shall be construed as a reference to the Union Public Service Commission.” Therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that as the Act does not contain any provision similar to Sec.5 of the Act No.26 of 1981, it cannot be held that the administrative control of the High Court of Madras also extends over the subordinate judiciary in the Union Territory of Pondicherry under Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. As already pointed out, Sec.9 extends the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras to Pondicherry. Earlier, we have also pointed out about the independence of the Judiciary and the powers exercisable by the High Court under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution over the subordinate judiciary in the State. Therefore, when once the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras was extended to the Union Territory of Pondicherry, it included all the powers exercisable under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution by the High Court of Madras. Therefore, when once the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras was extended to the Union Territory of Pondicherry, it included all the powers exercisable under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution by the High Court of Madras. It was the totality of jurisdiction as was enjoyed by the High Court of Madras under Chapters V and VI of Part VI, that was extended and not a part of the jurisdiction, namely, the judicial power in Sec.9 does not say that only the jurisdiction relating to judicial matters is extended. The expression ‘jurisdiction of the High Court, occurring in Sec.9 of the Act cannot at all be confined to only the judicial matters. Sec.10 of the Act also does not limit the scope and ambit of Sec.9 of the Act. On the contrary, Sec.10 of the Act specifically makes it clear by using the words, "without prejudice to the generality of the provision of Sec.9", that it does not either control or limit the scope and ambit of the provision contained in Sec.9 of the Act. The jurisdiction over the judicial matters arising from the subordinate judiciary without having any administrative control over it, will not have any meaning inasmuch as it will not be able to ensure independence of the subordinate judiciary in the absence of the powers exercisable under Chapters Vand VI of the Constitution. Such administrative control over the subordinate judiciary to ensure independence of the judiciary which is one of the basic features of the Constitution is absolutely necessary, rather such a power is inalienable or inseparable. In this regard, it is relevant to notice another portion of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dixitulu ‘s case, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 193:1979 Lab.I.C. 1672: (1979)2 S.C.C. 24 as to the principle of interpretation of Constitution. "Where two alternative constructions are possible, the court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion, or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment. These canons of construction apply to the interpretation of our Constitution with greater force, because the Constitution is a living, integrated organism having a soul and consciousness of its own. These canons of construction apply to the interpretation of our Constitution with greater force, because the Constitution is a living, integrated organism having a soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of its basic framework can be felt all over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture, nor a mere exercise in grammer. As one of us (Chandrachud, J., as he then was) put it in Kesavatuman Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R 1973 S.C. 1461: (1973)4 S.C.C. 225 : While interpreting words in a solemn document like the Constitution, one must look at them not in a school-masterly fash on, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer, but with the realization that they occur in ‘a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other’ so that the construction must hold a balance between all its parts." Therefore, we have to choose that interpretation, which accords with the scheme of the Constitution and the basic structures of it. If the interpretation placed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is accepted, the subordinate judiciary will be under the administrative control of the Executive and the High Court will only be exercis-ing the judicial powers which will not ensure independence of the judiciary, which includes subordinate judiciary also, is one of the basic structure of the Constitution. Further, there is no provision in the Constitution, or in the Act in question, that in the event of extension of the jurisdiction of an existing High Court to a Union Territory, the powers exercisable by it under Chapters V and VI of Part VI will not be available unless specifically conferred. In this regard, we are also of the view that no specific provision was required to be made in the Act, empowering the High Court to exercise the power under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution over the subordinate judiciary in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. When once the jurisdiction of the High Court was extended, the powers under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution, as a matter of course, became available to it over the subordinate judiciary in the Union Territory of Pondicherry over which jurisdiction of the High Court was extended. When once the jurisdiction of the High Court was extended, the powers under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution, as a matter of course, became available to it over the subordinate judiciary in the Union Territory of Pondicherry over which jurisdiction of the High Court was extended. This is also clear from the wordings in Arts.233 and 234 of the Constitution. Art.233(l) specifically provides that appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such Slate. The words "exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State’ are very material inasmuch as it is the High Court of Madras, which exercises the jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Similarly, Art.234 also uses the same expression. The expression ‘State’ occurring in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution also includes the Union Territory. (See: Joginder Nath’s case, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 511 referred to earlier). As per Art.367 of the Constitution, General Clauses Act is applicable for the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. The General Clauses Act specifically provides that the expression ‘State’ includes Union Territory also. However, it is contended by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants that Arl367 specifically opeas with the words, “unless the context otherwise requires” therefore it is submitted that while interpreting the Constitution on applying the General Clauses Act, the context in which the word ‘State’ occurs in Chapter VI of Part VI cannot be lost sight of. It may be pointed out that the whole Chapter VI of Part VI relates to subordinate courts. Therefore, the word “State” is used in Chapter VI of Part VI in the context of subordinate courts. Therefore, the expression “State” in Part VI of Chapter VI includes Union Territory also. The jurisdiction of the High Court is extended to the Union Territory of Pondicherry. If such extension of jurisdiction is to be meaningful, the extent and the scope of such jurisdiction are to be determined in the light of the distribution of powers and independence of the judiciary ensured under the Constitution. Therefore, necessarily the expression ‘State’ occurring in Chapter VI of Part VI shall have to be read as including Union Territory also. 9. Therefore, necessarily the expression ‘State’ occurring in Chapter VI of Part VI shall have to be read as including Union Territory also. 9. With reference to Sec.10 of the Act, it is contended that the High Court of Madras, on the extension of jurisdiction over the Union Territory of Pondicherry can exercise only such powers as were exercisable by the various courts and authorities in the Union Territory functioning when the Act came into force. It is also brought to our notice that those courts mentioned in Sec.10 of the Act did not exercise any of the powers, now exercisable under Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. Therefore, it is contended that the High Court of Madras cannot exercise those powers over the subordinate judiciary of Pondicherry. We have already pointed out that Sec.10 of the Act cannot override or limit the scope and ambit of Sec.9 of the Act. On the contrary, Sec.10 itself states that the provisions contained therein are without prejudice to the provisions contained in •Sec.9 of the Act. While interpreting Sec.9 read with Art.230 of the Constitution, we have held that the extension of jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras means the extension of the jurisdiction, which the High Court of Madras] enjoyed under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution. That being the position, the control’ over the subordinate judiciary of the Union Territory of Pondicherry is vested in the High Court of Madras and the powers that are available to it under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Consti-tution are exercisable by it over the subordinate judiciary of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. 10. It is also submitted by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that in the event this Court were to hold that the powers under Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution are exercisable by the High Court of Madras over the subordinate Judiciary of the Union Territory of Pondicherry. the Government of Pondicherry will suitably amend the Pondicherry Judicial Service Rules, 1980and also the other connected Acts and the Rules pertaining to the jurisdiction of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary and also the establishment of the Courts. the Government of Pondicherry will suitably amend the Pondicherry Judicial Service Rules, 1980and also the other connected Acts and the Rules pertaining to the jurisdiction of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary and also the establishment of the Courts. In view of the above undertaking given on behalf of the Government of Pondicherry, which we place on record, we do not consider it necessary to issue any mandamus to amend the Pondicherry Judicial Service Rules and the provisions of the other enactments and the Rules, except stating that the undertaking shall be complied with, within a period of six months from today. We also further direct that the High Court of Madras shall also take such steps as are necessary for the purpose of exercising its control over the subordinate judiciary in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, as per the provisions contained in Chapters V and VI of Part VI of the Constitution of India. 11. Subject to the aforesaid directions and undertaking given by the Union Territory of Pondicherry, the writ appeals are disposed of. There will, however, be no order as to costs.