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1993 DIGILAW 790 (RAJ)

Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra v. MJs J. K. Synthetics Ltd.

1993-12-01

M.R.CALLA, Y.R.MEENA

body1993
JUDGMENT 1. - This civil special appeal (writ) has been preferred under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 against the order dated 15.9.1993 passed in Writ Petition No. 213/88 connected with Writ Petition No. 5106/1993. 2. Having persued the order dated 15.9.93 which is impugned in this appeal, we called upon Sri Punamiya at the very threshold to first satisfy us as to how the letters patent appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 was maintainable against this order which was not a judgment. 3. Shri Punamiya argued that it is necessary for him to invite the attention of this court to the factual position which led the Union to file this appeal, so as to meet the querry raised by the court and he submitted as under : 4. In a matter relating to the validity of Section -N of the Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment of over three thousand workers, Writ Petition No. 409/1993 filed by J. K. Synthetics and Writ Petition No. 213/1983 filed by Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra were decided by the Full Bench on 19.10.1983 (reported in 1983 RLR 972 ). Writ Petition No. 409/83 i. e. the writ petition filed by the Management was allowed by majority and writ Petition No. 213/1983 i. e. the writ petition filed by the Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra was dismissed by majority. Against this judgment and order dated 19.10.1983, the matter was taken before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave its decision on 17.3.1993 based on the view taken in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and others V. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another ( 1992 (3) SCC 336 ) , whereby the vires of Section -N of the Industrial Disputes Act were upheld by upsetting the judgments of Madras and Rajasthan High Courts. By the order dated 17.3.1993 Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the management's writ petition No. 409/83 and remanded the writ petition No. 213/83 back to this court for disposal in accordance with law. Thereupon, the Registry placed the file of Writ Petition No. 409/83 before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for formation of the Bench and Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed the following order on 10.5.93: "List it before Hon'ble J. V. S. Dave and Hon'ble J. Mohini Kapoor in the last week of July,1993. Sd/-K. C. Agrawal 10.5.93" 5. Thereupon, the Registry placed the file of Writ Petition No. 409/83 before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for formation of the Bench and Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed the following order on 10.5.93: "List it before Hon'ble J. V. S. Dave and Hon'ble J. Mohini Kapoor in the last week of July,1993. Sd/-K. C. Agrawal 10.5.93" 5. On 12.5.1993, the registry fixed the date of 26.7.1993 and in Writ Petition No. 213/83 also it was recorded by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) that the case be listed before the court along with the connected case D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 409/83 on 26.7.1993 for hearing. In Writ Petition No. 409/83 the Division Bench (Hon'ble V. S. Dave and Mohini Kapoor JJ) passed order on 29.7.1993 to put up the matter for hearing on 18.8.1993 alongwith D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 213/83 and Civil Appeal No. 4165/1985 received from the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Thereafter, the Writ Petition No. 213/83 was listed before the aforesaid Division Bench on 18.8.1993 and it was noticed that proceedings were to be drawn only in Writ Petition No. 213/83 as the Writ Petition No. 409/83 had already been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 17.3.1993 and therefore, it was ordered that both the files be kept together alongwith the record of Civil Appeal No. 4165/1985 received from the Supreme Court. The order dated 18.8.1993 passed by the Division Bench shows that on behalf of the Company i. e. J. K. Synthetics Shri Paras Kuhad raised an objection that Writ Petition No. 213/83 should be treated as S. B. Writ Petition and should not be heard by Division Bench and the Division Bench ordered as under "The objection, if any, shall be decided at the time when the case is listed for hearing in the Court on the next date of hearing. However, it may be observed that the case is listed before us in pursuance of the direction given by the Hon'ble Chief Justice by constituting a special Bench." 6. The case was ordered to be listed before the Division Bench for 26.8.1993. However, it may be observed that the case is listed before us in pursuance of the direction given by the Hon'ble Chief Justice by constituting a special Bench." 6. The case was ordered to be listed before the Division Bench for 26.8.1993. On 26.8.1993, it was brought to the notice of the division bench that respondents No. 2,3 and 4 in the Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court which had been ordered to be entertained as a writ petition in this Court, had not been served and therefore, it was directed that notice be issued to respondents No. 2,3 and 4 and having noticed that all respondents were represented except the Staff Association of J. K. Synthetics notice was ordered to be issued for him only by registered post and the matter was directed to be listed on 16.9.1993. 7. At this juncture, while the matter was to come up before the division bench on 16.9.93 and when the division bench had already passed a judicial order, on 18.8.1993 with regard to the objection of the company (J. K. Synthetics) that the matter should not be heard by division bench, that this objection shall be decided at the time when the case is listed for hearing, the matter appears to have been listed before Chief justice on 15.9.1993 and the order sheet dated 15.9.93 is as under- "15.9.93 Hon'ble Mr. K. C. Agrawal, C. J. Arguments heard. Order reserved. B. O. Reader"8. It further appears that in Writ Petition No. 213/83 on 15th September, 1993, itself the Chief Justice passed the order that the writ petition No. 213/83 and 5106/83 are congnizable by a Single Bench and as such the same be listed before a Single Judge and that this order be brought to the notice of the Division Bench before which these cases are listed. This order dated 15.9.93 passed by the Chief Justice shows that it was passed on the application filed by Shri U. N. Bhandari i. e. counsel for the Staff Association of J. K. Synthetics and another application filed by Mr. This order dated 15.9.93 passed by the Chief Justice shows that it was passed on the application filed by Shri U. N. Bhandari i. e. counsel for the Staff Association of J. K. Synthetics and another application filed by Mr. B. L. Sharma as both these applications have been disposed of by this order dated 15.9.93.The matter then came up before the division bench on 16.9.93 as scheduled and in view of the order dated 15.9.93 passed by the Chief Justice the division bench ordered that the cases are to be listed before the Single judge having the roster of such writ petitions and that let the matter be listed before concerned bench on Monday i. e. 19.9.93. Thereafter, on 17.9.93 the Chief Justice again passed the order as under: "17.9.93 May be listed before Mr. Justice V. K. Singhal in next week. Sd/-K. C. Agrawal."The matters were accordingly listed before Hon'ble V. K. Singhal J. on 20.9.93 and the following order was passed: "20.9.93, Hon'ble V. K. Singhal J. Mr. Mohan Poonia, for the petitioner Mr. Paras Kuhad, for the respondents. It has been pointed out by Mr. Mohan Poonia appearing on behalf of the petitioner that earlier the matter was to be heard by a Division Bench and thereafter by the order of the Chief Justice it was directed that the writ petition No. 5106/93 is to be heard by a single Judge and nomination was made in favour of the undersigned. It is submitted that the said order is being challenged before the Division Bench and therefore it would not be proper to hear both the above writ petitions today. The arguments of Mr. Kuhad have also been heard in the matter. The matter is adjourned for 5th October, 1993 on which date if no orders are produced of the Division Bench then the arguments will be heard on merit and further adjournments will not be given. Sd/-V. K. Singhal J."9. On 20.9.93, itself the present Civil Special Appeal against the order dated 15.9.93 passed by the Chief justice with regard to the listing of the matters before Single Bench instead of division bench, was preferred.Mr. Sd/-V. K. Singhal J."9. On 20.9.93, itself the present Civil Special Appeal against the order dated 15.9.93 passed by the Chief justice with regard to the listing of the matters before Single Bench instead of division bench, was preferred.Mr. Punamiya raised the following contentions : (i) that the Chief justice had already exercised his posers u/rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules on 10.5.1993 when he formed the Division Bench to hear this matter and he could not have exercised the powers u/rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules again and again and hence the order dated 15.9.93 could not have been passed and it amounts to a judgment on the question of exercise of powers u/rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules by the Chief Justice; (ii) that even after the passing of the impugned order dated 15.9.93 when the matter came up before the division bench on 16.9.1993, the division bench having noticed the order passed by chief justice had ordered on 16.9.93 that the matter be listed before the Single Judge having the roster of such writ petitions and that let the case be listed before concerned bench on 19.9.93, yet the Chief Justice passed an order on 17.9.93 that it may be listed before Mr. Justice V. K. Singhal in next week whereas the regular roster was not with Hon'ble V. K. Singhal J. and hence order dated 15.9.93 read with the order dated 17.9.93 passed by the Chief Justice was beyond the scope of rule 55, nay, it was in contravention of the D. B. 's Judicial orders dated 18.8.93 and 16.9.93 and hence, the inteference under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is warranted; (iii) that the facts and circumstances attendant and preceding to the passing of the impugned order dated 15.9.93 make it clear that this order is a decision in so far as the appellant's right to be heard by a higher court i. e. Division Bench is concerned and hence it is a judgment denying this right. Mr. Mr. Punamiya has placed reliance on ; (iv) that while the Division Bench was already seized of the matter and had passed a judicial order to consider the objection with regard to the question as to whether this matter ought to be heard by Single Bench, the Chief Justice could not pass the impugned order, merely because any party/parties had applied for the change over from Division Bench to Single Bench on 14.9.93, while the matter was to come up before the Division Bench on 16.9.93 as ordered by Division Bench itself by a judicial order; (v) Besides this it was submitted that the appellant cannot be rendered remedyless with regard to an order which is on the face of it erroneous, factually incorrect and contrary to record inasmuch as: (i) Supreme Court had allowed the appeal arising out of Writ Petition No. 409/83 but the Chief Justice has recorded that it was dismissed. (ii) Writ Petition No. 409/83 had been allowed by Rajasthan High Court in favour of the management and yet the Chief justice has recorded that the management had preferred the appeal against judgment given in Writ petition No. 409/83 whereas the appeal had been preferred by the Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra i. e. the present appellant and same had been allowed by the Supreme Court. (iii) In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and ors. Versus Meenaksi Mills i. e. 1992 (3) SCC 336 the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of Section -N of the Industrial Disputes Act and yet the Chief justice has recorded in the impugned order dated 15.9.93 that the Supreme Court had found this provision to be invalid. 10. (iii) In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and ors. Versus Meenaksi Mills i. e. 1992 (3) SCC 336 the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of Section -N of the Industrial Disputes Act and yet the Chief justice has recorded in the impugned order dated 15.9.93 that the Supreme Court had found this provision to be invalid. 10. Shri Bajrang Lai Sharma and Shri Paras Kuhad appearing for respondents have submitted as under : (i) that even if the Chief justice had earlier passed an order on 10.5.1993 to list the matter before Division Bench he could have yet passed the order to list the case before Single Bench on the application which had been filed on 14.9.93; (ii) that the appropriate orders could be passed by the learned Chief Justice u/Rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules when the applications were filed on 14.9.93 and the order passed on 10.5.1992 to place the matter before Division Bench could not come in the way of the Chief justice so as to pass the order again u/Rule 55 so as to list the matter before Single Bench instead of Division Bench; (iii) It was also submitted by Shri Bajrang Lal Sharma that u/Rule 55 itself the chief Justice has powers to assign a particular case to a particular Judge; (iv) that the narration made by shri Punamiya is of no consequence and notwithstanding all that has been submitted by Shri Punamiya, the impugned order dated 15.9.93 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said or taken to be a judgment by any stretch of imagination and therefore, there is no question of appeal being maintainable under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. Reliance was placed on the following cases: (a) S. N. Mukherjee V. Union of India (1990 (5) SLR (8) SC) . (b) Gulam Abbas V. State of Rajasthan & others ( 1983 RLR 12 ) , Para 11, 12,13,14) (c) State V. H. O. Sugar Mills ( AIR 1974 Raj. 110 ) . (d) Asrumati Devi V. Rupendra Deb ( AIR 1953 Raj. 198 ) . (e) State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur V. Vijay Singh Mehta (1986 RLR 293) . (b) Gulam Abbas V. State of Rajasthan & others ( 1983 RLR 12 ) , Para 11, 12,13,14) (c) State V. H. O. Sugar Mills ( AIR 1974 Raj. 110 ) . (d) Asrumati Devi V. Rupendra Deb ( AIR 1953 Raj. 198 ) . (e) State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur V. Vijay Singh Mehta (1986 RLR 293) . (v) that the order dated 15.9.93 is only an administrative order passed by the learned Single Judge as Chief Justice and so also there was no question of entertaining the appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. 11. So far as the argument based on Rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 and the marking of the case to a particular Judge by name is concerned, the relevant rule is Rule 54 and it may be observed that according to the scheme of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, it is the sole prerogative of the Chief justice to constitute the Benches under Rule 54 of the Rules and the Judges have to sit alone or in such division courts as may be constituted, from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. All the matters which shall ordinarily be admitted, heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone, have also been enumerated under Rule 55 of the Rules with the proviso (a) that the Chief Justice may, from time to time, direct that any case or class of cases which may be heard by a judge sitting alone, shall be heard by a bench of two or more Judges. Rule 54 and proviso (a) under rule 55 occurring under Chapter-V of the Rules of 1952 are reproduced as under : "54. Constitution of Benches.-Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts, as may be constituted from time to time and do such work, as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction." "Rule 55 Proviso (a)-the Chief Justice may from time to time direct that any case or class of cases which may be heard by a Judge sitting alone shall be heard by a Bench of two or more judges." 12. It is, therefore clear that the Judges have to sit alone or in such division courts as may be constituted, from time to time, by order of the Chief justice and they may do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions but it is not discernible from the aforesaid provisions that the Chief justice may mark any particular case to a particular Judge by name at any time or as and when he likes, lest the roster as ordered by Chief Justice will lose its importance and sanctity. Of course, at the time of forming the roster and issuing orders or directions under Rule 54, the Chief Justice may order that the exceptions of a particular Judge will be laid before such and such Judge but once the order or directions are made under Rule 54, the orders or directions cannot be issued with regard to a particular case otherwise than the arrangements made by way of roster. Chief Justice is the sole repository of the power in the matter of constituting the benches and prepare the roster and therefore it is for him to make such arrangements in the roster that it becomes a document of complete guidance for the registry in the matter of listing cases and may meet all possible and conceivable eventualities, contingencies and exigencies. It may also include the guidance with regard to the absence/exception of the regular benches. Roster has to be such a comprehensive and self contained document u/Rule 54 that the registry may not have to rush up or disturb the Chief Justice time and again as to before which bench a particular case should be listed. If any Judge is not sitting on any particular day or makes an exception and it is to be decided as to before whom the cases are to be listed, the registry should be able to find its answer in the roster itself without bothering the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Language of Rules 54 and 55 nowhere contemplates the power to mark a particular case to a particular bench. Language of Rules 54 and 55 nowhere contemplates the power to mark a particular case to a particular bench. If there is any rule which makes any specific provision for specific purpose-the same has to be adhered to-e. g. in cases where the election petitions are to be assigned for trial or when any bench makes a reference to a larger bench-then to name the judges to constitute such larger bench.13. In the impugned order dated 15.9.93 it has been recorded as under:- "When I passed the order dated 10.5.93 in Writ Petition No. 409/83, the above rule did not strike me and by mistake the writ petition No. 409/83 was directed to be listed for hearing before a Division Bench." That may be so, but what we find is that in this order dated 15.9.93 there is no reference to the orders passed by the Division Bench on 18.8.93 and 16.9.93 and we gather the impression that contents of these orders may have escaped his notice, otherwise he may not have passed the impugned order dated 15.9.93 deciding the question of cognizance by S. B. or D. B. and he may not have passed the order on 17.9.93 that 'May be listed before Mr. Justice V. K. Singhal in next week for twin reasons as under : (i) At page 3 in the D. B'. s order dated 18.8.93 it was clearly mentioned that the objection raised by Shri Paras Kuhad that this writ petition should be treated as S. B. and should not be heard by D. B. shall be decided at the time when the case is listed for hearing. Thus D. B. was already seized of this matter. (ii) In the order dated 16.9.93 passed by the D. B. after the impugned order dated 15.9.93 the D. B. had ordered that these cases are to be listed before the Single Judge having the roster of such writ petitions and that let the case be listed before concerned Bench. 14. Be that as it may, Mr. Kuhad and Mr. B. L. Sharma, appearing for the respondents have submitted that by no stretch of imagination the impugned order dated 15.9.93 can be said to be judgment and therefore, notwithstanding the grievances raised by Shri Punamiya against the order dated 15.9.93, the special appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 cannot be entertained. Kuhad and Mr. B. L. Sharma, appearing for the respondents have submitted that by no stretch of imagination the impugned order dated 15.9.93 can be said to be judgment and therefore, notwithstanding the grievances raised by Shri Punamiya against the order dated 15.9.93, the special appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 cannot be entertained. Section 18 of the Ordinance is reproduced as under: "18. Appeal to the High Court from judges of the Court.-(1) An appeal shall be (lie) to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court; (2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." 15. We have gone through the case law cited before us as also provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance, 1949. The case of Shah Babulal Khimji V. Jayaben ( AIR 1981 SC 1786 ) has been considered in the case of Gulam Abbas (supra) by this Court and it has been held that special appeals against interlocutory orders are not maintainable. Having considered all the submissions and the cases cited before us and having gone through the provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance, we are unable to agree with Shri Punamiya that the impugned order dated 15.9.93 is a judgment. Having considered all the submissions and the cases cited before us and having gone through the provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance, we are unable to agree with Shri Punamiya that the impugned order dated 15.9.93 is a judgment. This order does not determine any of the rights of the parties nor it determines any point of controversy relating to the merits of the case, it only decides the question as to whether the matter should be heard by a division bench or a single bench and by this order dated 15.9.93 the learned Single Judge has held that the matter was cognizable by a Single Bench. Such an order can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a judgment. There is ample authority for taking the view that special appeals in such cases are not maintainable and we hold accordingly.16. We find that an application seeking certain corrections in the order dated 15.9.93 as filed on behalf of J. K. Staff Association on 18.9.93 is yet to be decided and therefore the matter may come up again before the learned Single Judge (Chief Justice).17. It is for the Chief justice to consider the orders passed by the Division Bench on 18.8.1993 and 16.9.1993 vis-a-vis his orders dated 15.9.93 and 17.9.93 and it cannot be the subject matter of challenge in the special appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. This special appeal is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs. Special appeal dismissed with observation. *******