Judgment :- Abdul Hadi, J. This petition by the mother of one Nirubhan is for issue of a writ of habeas corpus, directing the respondents to produce the body of said Nirubhan, detained in the Special Camp, Vellore and set him at liberty. 2. Originally, when this petition was presented on 111. 1992, there were only four respondents, viz., (1) The District Collector, North Arcot Ambedkar District, (2) The District Collector, Trichy District, (3) The Tahsildar, Government Special Camp, Vellore, and (4) The Tahsildar, Government Special Camp, Thuraiyur. But, subsequently, the petitioner filed H.C.M.P.No. 75 of 1993 on 23. 1993 and got the 5th respondent Government of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, impleaded on the ground that the petitioner came to know only subsequently that the 5th respondent has passed an order dated 22. 1992. under Sec.3(2) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (Central Act 31 of 1946). Just prior to the filing of H.C.M.P.No.75 of 1993 the petitioner also filed H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993 on 22. 1993, praying that this Court may treat this H.C.P. as one filed challenging the abovesaid order passed under Sec.3(2)of the Foreigners Act in reference No.SR.III/4191-7/91, and for releasing the said Nirubhan detained in the abovesaid Special Camp and set him at liberty. In the supporting affidavit filed in support of the said H.C.M.P., inter alia, it is stated that only after the 1st respondent filed counter in the habeas corpus petition, the petitioner came to know that the said Nirubhan was detained by the abovesaid order under Sec. 3(2) of the Foreigners Act. (The said counter is dated 2. 1993). 3. The said H.C.M.P.No. 48 of 1993 is taken along with the main habeas corpus petition. Thus, even according to the petitioner, the challenge is now only on the above referred to order dated 22. 1992 passed by the 5th respondent under the abovesaid Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act, whereby the said Nirubhan, a Srilankan National, has been originally ordered to “reside” in the Special Camp for Srilankan Migrants/refugees identified and located by the Collector of Trichy District, at Thuraiyur and not to leave the boundaries of the Special Camp “except with the permission of the Collector of the District,”subsequently since the said Nirubhan has been transferred from the said camp at Thuraiyur to a similar Special Camp at Vellore, in the abovesaid H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993, while challenging the abovesaid order dated 22. 1992, the said Nirubhan’s release from the said special camp at Vellore, was sought for. 4. In the above background, it may not be quite necessary to set out all the averments in the original affidavit dated 111. 1992 filed in the main habeas corpus petition since it proceeded only on the footing that though a case was registered in Crl.No.199 of 1991 under F.I.R.No.21 of 1991 against the said Nirubhan, on a charge under Sec.126, I.P.C. Sec.12(1) of the Passport Act, Sec.6(c) of Indian Wireless and Telegraphs Act and Sec.25 (1)(b)(a) of the Arms Act and was arrested on 1. 1992, bail order dated 26. 1992 was obtained in Crl.O.P.No.5511 of 1992 on the file of this Court for his release, but he was not actually released. Thus, on the plea that the said Nirubhan was not released despite the abovesaid bail order dated 26. 1992 the original main habeas corpus petition was filed. In the abovesaid counter dated 2. 1993 filed by the 1st respondent, it was specifically averred, inter alia, thus: “.......though the High Court has granted bail in respect of the case in Crime No. 199 of 1991, on the file of the Central Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras, since the said Nirubhan was detained under Sec. 3(2) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and pursuant to that detention, he is now kept in the Special Camp, Vellore and the said order passed by the Government under Sec.3(2) of the Foreigners Act is not revoked or is not set aside so far by the competent authority, and hence the said Nirubhan cannot be released. Further, I submit that if a person is arrested and detained in connection with two cases, if the bail was granted in only one, he cannot be released on bail since the bail order is not granted in the other case, and the non release of the person cannot be termed as Contempt of Court. Likewise, here also in the case of the petitioner’s son, though the High Court was pleased to grant bail in connection with criminal case, the petitioner’s son is kept in detention in pursuance of the orders of the Government passed under Sec.3(2) of the Foreigners Act.” The counter-affidavit by the Secretary to Government, Public (S.C.) Department, representing the 5th respondent filed in H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993 also refers to the abovesaid order dated 22. 1992 and says that the said Nirubhan could not be enlarged on bail in view of the said order. It also refers to an earlier order dated 12. 1991 passed against the said Nirubhan under the provisions of the National Security Act since his detention under the said provisions was warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. In the above circumstances it is only to be seen by us whether the abovesaid impugned order dated 22. 1992 is illegal and not valid. The challenge made to the said order is contained in the affidavit of the petitioner in H.C.M.P.No.48of 1993 and we treat the said affidavit and the counter affidavits therein as affidavits in the main H.C.P. as we are allowing H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993. 5-A. One attack is found in the following averments in the supporting affidavit to the said H.C.M.P.: "I have met my son both at Thuraiyur Camp as well as at Vellore Camp for several times on several occasions and I have made anxious enquiries about his continued detention to gather information as per the advice of the counsel and on all those occasions my son Nirubhan invariably told me that no orders of any sort was served upon him..... had such order been really served on my son I would not have wasted time harping on the bail order but would have canvassed the release of my son based on the detention orders." However, since the Public Prosecutor maintained that the abovesaid order was served on the said Nirubhan, this Court at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner passed an order on 28. 1993, enabling the learned counsel for the petitioner to proceed to the Government Special Camp at Vellore on 28. 1993 for getting an affidavit from the abovesaid Nirubhan regarding the service said to have been effected on him, of the abovesaid order. Accordingly the affidavit dated 28. 1993 sworn to by the said Nirubhan was also filed in this case subsequently. The said affidavit in Tamil dated 28. 1993 of Nirubhan inter alia, reads as follows: However, the abovesaid order, both in English and Tamil, containing the signature of the said Nirubhan, was produced before us for scrutiny. Accordingly the affidavit dated 28. 1993 sworn to by the said Nirubhan was also filed in this case subsequently. The said affidavit in Tamil dated 28. 1993 of Nirubhan inter alia, reads as follows: However, the abovesaid order, both in English and Tamil, containing the signature of the said Nirubhan, was produced before us for scrutiny. After going through the same we are satisfied that the said Nirubhan had been served with the said order, since there is no other material to disbelieve the version given by the respondents excepting the self serving averment of Nirubhan himself made now. Further, in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 5th respondent, the Secretary to Government has also averred that the abovesaid order had been served on the petitioner’s son and his acknowledgement had been obtained," and that the said order had been served both in English and in vernacular language. It is also argued by the petitioner’s counsel that the respondents have interpolated in the order after the last hearing in this Court. According to him when the papers were produced before the Bench previously the endorsement at the bottom was not there. We do not accept this contention. The Bench which heard this earlier has not made any record to that effect. We find that there is no interpolation in the order in any manner. Therefore, we proceed to discuss only the other points urged in the abovesaid affidavit in support of H.C.M.P.No. 48 of 1993 and the other legal submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. One other point urged in the above said affidavit, in support of H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993 can be gathered from the following averment in paragraph 6 thereof: "My feeling is the present detention order under 3(2) of the Foreigners Act might have been made to avoid the bail granted to my son and it could have been anti-dated as if it was passed earlier to the bail order.....it may be seen that at no point of time both before the court when the bail order was passed as well as in the correspondence the respondent could state that there is a detention order." Here it must be noted that the allegation is only that the abovesaid order "could have been antedated". In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 5th respondent in H.C.M.P.No. 48 of 1993, also, it is stated that "the apprehension of the petitioner that the order might have been antedated is also not justifiable." Further, simply because at the time when the bail order was granted on 26. 1992, the above said impugned order dated 22. 1992 was not made known, it cannot be said that it could have been antedated. So we reject this contention of the petitioner also. 7. One other point faintly touched by the learned counsel for the petitioner,actually after the orders were reserved in this case and when the learned counsel sought to file "list of authorities" can be disposed of briefly, before we take up the main submissions of the said learned counsel. In the said "list of authorities" it is mentioned that in view of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957, the relevant provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 shall not apply to the citizens of Ceylon. But, it is also slated therein that even earlier when this case was argued before the other Bench some time ago it was mentioned that the said order had been withdrawn with reference to the citizens of Ceylon. However, it is mentioned therein that the relevant date of withdrawal is very much crucial and if the withdrawal is later to the impugned order, it will have a telling effect on the order. 8. But, we are not entertaining this submission since the abovesaid allegations were not made actually in any affidavit filed in support of the case of the petitioner in this proceeding. No doubt in the affidavit in support of H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993 there is a vague allegation stating thus: "However I submit that my son being a Srilankan national belongs to a friendly Commonwealth country and bound to enjoy the benefits of Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957". But, the affidavit does not say what are those alleged benefits. That apart, the said learned counsel also did not argue this aspect before orders were reserved/presumably on the footing that the said Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 had been withdrawn prior to the impugned order dated 22. 1992. 9. But, the affidavit does not say what are those alleged benefits. That apart, the said learned counsel also did not argue this aspect before orders were reserved/presumably on the footing that the said Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 had been withdrawn prior to the impugned order dated 22. 1992. 9. One other point urged in the affidavit in support of H.C.M.P.No.48 of 1993 is that "before passing the detention order Natural Justice should have been observed indicating what were the reasons which prompted the Government in passing the detention order." Dealing with this point based on natural justice, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to substantiate by making the following submissions which alone are his main submissions in this case: According to him, the impugned order must be construed to have been passed under Sec.3(2)(g) of the Foreigners Act, whereby the said Nirubhan has been arrested and detained" in the abovesaid special camp and that too, without following any of the safeguards provided under Art.22 of the Constitution of India, safeguards afforded to persons against whom preventive detention orders are passed under any of the enactments like Tamil Nadu Act 14 of. 1982, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, etc. In other words, grounds of detention are not made known to the said Nirubhan, copies of necessary documents relied on by the detention order are not furnished to him there is no reference to Advisory Board, duration of the detention also has not been specified in the order, etc. Further, according to the said learned counsel, the impugned order does not mention under which specific clause in Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act, the abovesaid Nirubhan has been detained in the abovesaid Special Camp. The impugned order simply quotes Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act, but the said section contains two relevant sub sections, viz., (1) and (2) and the Sub-sec.(2) contains several clauses from (a) to (g). In the impugned order, there is no reference to any specific clause in Sec.3. The impugned order simply quotes Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act, but the said section contains two relevant sub sections, viz., (1) and (2) and the Sub-sec.(2) contains several clauses from (a) to (g). In the impugned order, there is no reference to any specific clause in Sec.3. Further according to him, even if it is argued that the impugned order was passed under Sec. 3(2)(e)(i) by which the order may provide that the foreigner shall comply with such conditions as may be prescribed or specified, requiring him to reside in a particular place,the learned counsel argues that detaining him in the abovesaid special camp will not be a case of making him "reside in a particular place". In this connection he also relies on the Law Lexicon, where the meaning of the word "reside" is given. The learned counsel also attacked the validity of the abovesaid Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act. He also submits that since the abovesaid Act is a pre-constitutional act, the doctrine of eclipse would apply. In this connection he relics on the decision in Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019: (1963) 2 S.C.A. 163. While, attacking the said Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act, he also relies on the decisions in Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27: 1950 S.C.J. 174: 1950 S.C.R. 88: (1950) 2 M.L.J. 42: 1950 M.W.N. 495: 51 Crl.L.J. 1383, Shalini Soni v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431: 1980 Crl.L.J. 1487: (1980)4 S.C.C. 544 : 1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 38: (1981)1 S.C.R. 962 , Francis Coralle v. Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746: 1981 Crl.L.J. 305: (1981)1 S.C.C. 608 : 1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 212: (1981)2 S.C.J. 18: 1981 M.L.J. (Crl.) 331: (1981)2 S.C.R. 516 , Mehrunnissa v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1861: 1981 Crl.L.J. 1283(1): (1981)2 S.C.C. 709 : 1981 .S.C.C. (Crl.) 392, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597: (1978)1 .S.C.C. 248: (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 : (1978)2 S.C.J. 312 and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180. 10. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor initially brought to our notice that the said Nirubhan himself filed W.P.No. 7069 of 1991 against the above referred to initial detention under the National Security Act by the above referred to order dated 12. 10. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor initially brought to our notice that the said Nirubhan himself filed W.P.No. 7069 of 1991 against the above referred to initial detention under the National Security Act by the above referred to order dated 12. 1991 and that the said writ petition was dismissed by a Bench of this Court by order dt 110. 1991. From the said Judgment it is found that the abovesaid detention order dated 12. 1991 was passed against certain persons, including the said Nirubhan on the ground that they were L.T.T.E. militants and they were found to be in possession in Madras of one walkie-talkie handset in working condition, three 9 M.M. pistol cartridges, wireless antenna with wire, cyanide cap-sulcs,etc., and they were not having valid passport or visa for entry or stay in India. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that only because of the said foreign national Nirubhan’s militant activities in India, he was made to reside in the abovesaid special camp after his detention period under the National Security Act got expired, pursuant to the abovesaid impugned order dated 22. 1992. under the abovesaid Foreigners Act. According to him, the abovesaid impugned order would only fall under Sec. 3(2)(c)(i) of the said Act and not under Sec. 3 (2)(g) which speaks of “arrest and detention.” He specifically points out that the impugned order also provides that with the permission of the District Collector, the said Nirubhan could also leave the boundaries of the Special Camp. Further he also submits that the claim of the petitioner that the said Nirubhan could be released and deported to Ceylon cannot be accepted since such militant, belonging to the abovesaid L.T.T.E organisation would again come back to India and be a menace to this country also. He also points out that the abovesaid Scc.3 of the Foreigners Act had been already held to be constitutionally valid. He also points out that for an order under the Foreigners Act against a foreign national, there is no necessity for satisfying the requirements of Art.22 of the Constitution of India. In this connection he specifically refers to two recent Judgments of this Court, viz. (1) Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu W.P.Nos. 15044 of 1991, etc., dated 24. He also points out that for an order under the Foreigners Act against a foreign national, there is no necessity for satisfying the requirements of Art.22 of the Constitution of India. In this connection he specifically refers to two recent Judgments of this Court, viz. (1) Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu W.P.Nos. 15044 of 1991, etc., dated 24. 1992 and (2) Ananda Bhavanani alias Swamy Geethanando v. Union of India, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 393, in which several earlier Supreme Court decisions like Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335, G.B.Singh v. Government of India, (1973)2 S.C.C. 588: 1973 Crl.L.J. 1801: 1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 971: .A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2667, Govind v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1975 S.C.1378, Louis Be Raedt v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1886, Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (1955)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 188: 1955 S.C.J. 324: 56 Crl.L.J. 876: 1955 M.W.N. 478: 1955 M.W.N. (Crl.) 126: (1955)1 S.C.R. 1284 : A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367 were relied on. He particularly points out that the abovesaid Division Bench Judgment dated 24. 1992, against which S.L.P.No. 1577-78/92 was also dismissed by Supreme Court on 26. 1992 would squarely apply to the present case since the facts therein are similar to the facts in the present case. The learned Public Prosecutor also explains the meaning of the term “reside” used in Sec. 10(3)(2)(e)(i). He also submits that the doctrine of eclipse will not apply since there is no scope for application of Art.22 of the Constitution of India in the case of orders under the Foreigners Act. 11. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner faintly sought to distinguish the abovesaid recent Division Bench judgment dated 23. 1992 and partially attached some portions of the reasoning of the said judgment, as not correct. 12. We have considered the rival submissions. After going through the above referred to two recent Division Bench Judgments of this Court, including the latest one dated 24. 1992, and the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, we have no reason to differ from the recent Division Bench judgment in W.P.No.15044 of 1991 (batch) 24. 1992 , whose facts are similar to the present one. It is also clear to us that the impugned order falls only under Sec. 3(2)(e)(i) of the Foreigners Act and not under Sec. 3(2)(g) thereof. 1992 , whose facts are similar to the present one. It is also clear to us that the impugned order falls only under Sec. 3(2)(e)(i) of the Foreigners Act and not under Sec. 3(2)(g) thereof. In other words, as also found by the said recent Division Bench judgment, the present case is not one of “arrest and detcntion”as found in Sec. 3(2)(g) of the Act. But, it is only a case where the abovesaid Nirubhan, by the impugned order, has been required to reside in the abovesaid special camp and directed not to leave the boundaries of the said camp without the permission of the District Collector. In the abovesaid recent Division Bench Judgment, it has also been pointed out, after a lengthy discussion, that Art.22 of the Constitution of India would not apply to the case before it. 13. In the abovesaid recent Division Bench judgment dated 24. 1992 also, the prayer in the Writ petitions was for the issue of writ of habeas corpus for the production of the respective Srilankan Nationals who have been ordered to reside in similar special camps for Srilankan refugees by the concerned District Collectors and the challenge in those writ petitions was for quashing the said orders passed by the State Government under Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. No doubt it appears that in the said Division Bench cases the impugned orders were passed specifically under Sec. 3(2)(e) of the Foreigner. Act. As already stated, in the present case, only Sec. 3 has been generally mentioned in the impugned order and not any particular clause therein. But, if really the impugned order could fall under any one of the clauses in Sec. 3, the impugned order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that it refers generally to Sec. 3, and not any particular clause therein. But, if really the impugned order could fall under any one of the clauses in Sec. 3, the impugned order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that it refers generally to Sec. 3, and not any particular clause therein. While considering the detentions therein, the said Division Bench points out that the Foreigners Act is intended to deal with three different aspects regarding the foreigners, viz., (1) their entry into India, (2) their presence in India and (3) their departure therefrom, that the object of the Act is limited to powers over entry, presence and departure of foreigners into and from India, that every Government must possess this power over foreigners whose presence may be, or may in the course of time, become dangerous to the security of India or become undesirable for other reasons and that since such reasons may be many and may arise on account of political or other considerations, too numerous to define, the legislature could not have visualised all the eventualities and the whole matter of the foreigners’ presence in India was left to executive discretion. 14. Dealing with Sec. 3(2)(e), the said Division Bench observes as follows: “There is nothing to indicate, that the word ‘place’ is either as big or as small as a town, village, market place or otherwise. The word place has been used to denote certainty rather than “size”......It is therefore, abundantly clear that the word “place” contemplated under Sec. 3(2)(e), is different from the word “locality”, the latter being broader in concept..... Mr.B.Kumar was able to realise the possible difference between a place and locality and hence, conceded that the special refugee camp can be termed as a”particular place“. If that be so, under Sec. 3(2)(e) of the Act, the State Government does have the power to require foreign nationals, riot only to reside in a particular place, as a special refugee camp, but also have power to impose restrictions, on their movements. Power to pass orders under Sec. 3(2)(e) of the Act, indisputably has been delegated by the Central Government to the Stale Government. We are unable to agree, that the foreigners involved in these writ petitions have been arrested and detained or confined. Only certain limited restrictions have been made in their movements and place of residence. A special refugee camp cannot be termed as an Internment Camp. We are unable to agree, that the foreigners involved in these writ petitions have been arrested and detained or confined. Only certain limited restrictions have been made in their movements and place of residence. A special refugee camp cannot be termed as an Internment Camp. If that be so, the argument that the impugned orders must be deemed to have been made under Sec. 3(2)(g) of the Act cannot survive. Similarly, the protection sought under Art. 22(4) of the Constitution also cannot exist, since the said article deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.” But, the learned counsel for the petitioner made emphasis on the term “reside” used in Sec. 3(2)(c)(i) in the clause “requiring him to reside in a particular place”and points out the meanings given in the Law Lexicon for the term “residence”. But the Supreme Court has pointed out in Jeewanti Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 517 , thus: “The word “resides” is a flexible one and has many shades of meaning, but it must take its colour and content from the context in which it appears and cannot be read in isolation.” The Supreme Court, in the said case was considering the meaning of the term “resides” as found in Sec. 19(ii)of the Hindu Marriage Act, which says, “every petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction, (i) the marriage was solemnised, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii).....“in that context, while deciding as to which court had jurisdiction to try the petition under the said Act, it also observed thus: “In order to give jurisdiction on the ground of”residence“, something more than a temporary stay is required.... the word”resides“is by no means free from all ambiguity and is capable of a variety of meanings according to the circumstances to which it is made applicable and the context in which it is found...... the word”resides“is by no means free from all ambiguity and is capable of a variety of meanings according to the circumstances to which it is made applicable and the context in which it is found...... In Webster’s Dictionary,”to reside“has been defined as meaning”to dwell permanently or for any length of time......If a person has no established home and is compelled to live in hotels, boarding houses or houses of others, his actual and physical habitation is the place where he actually or personally resides." Therefore, in the light of the above observations of the Supreme Court, there is no difficulty in holding that the stay of the abovesaid Nirubhan in the abovesaid special camp would come within the term "reside" in a particular place" found in the abovesaid Sec. 3(2)(e)(i) of the Act. 15. Further, just as the abovesaid recent Division Bench judgment held, we also hold that Art. 22 of the Constitution of India would not apply to the impugned order. In David Patrick Ward v. Union of India, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 154 also, which arose against the preventive detention under National Security Act, the Supreme Court held as follows: "Certainly, if there are good grounds to form the subjective satisfaction under Sec.3 of the Act, it is not for the court to say which is a better course; either to detain the petitioners by an order of preventive detention or to deport them.........the petitioners have lived with Naga insurgents in their gang and participated in their activities, for almost three months. If regard is had to the pretext on which the petitioners had entered India, the non-disclosure by them of the real purpose for which they were visiting India and attempts made by them to evade arrest from the Indian security forces by opening fire against them it would be difficult to think that their deportation from India will not make them return to India by some means or the other to carry on the prejudicial activities which were carried on by them before their detention, along with Naga insurgents and secessionists, against the established State Government and the Central Government." [Emphasis supplied] Further, earlier in Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367: 1955 S.C.J. 324: (1955)1 S.C.R. 1284 : (1955)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 188: 1955 M.W.N. 478: 1955 M.W.N.(Crl.) 126: 56 Crl.L.J. 876, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 was Intra Vires the Constitution. It also appears that SLP against the abovesaid recent Division Bench Judgment has also been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 16. The said Division Bench Judgment dated 24. 1992 relies on the above referred to Ananda Bhavanani alias Swamy Geethanando v. Union of India, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 393, which also deals with an order under the abovesaid Foreigners Act (no doubt a deportation order) and quotes the observation therein thus: "Considering the policy behind and the object of the Act, very many exigencies would arise, which we cannot enumerate and glossarise and which would impel quick and lightning action to betaken under the Act, failing which, the very security of the nation may be jeopardised. The Act is a piece of legislation, having a significance and a play of its own and as pointed out by the Supreme Court, that Act vests the Central Government with absolute and unfettered discretion and a foreigner can be expelled without any formality beyond the making of the order......It cannot be contended that the present action is violative of the well known principles of human rights, we do not think we should be weighed down by these while dealing with a right of a foreigner to be in this country, which right has no foundation in law, and in particular when an order under the Act has come to be made." 17. The said Division Bench judgment dated 24. The said Division Bench judgment dated 24. 1992 applied the same reasoning to orders similar to the present impugned order. The fact that there too the facts are similar to the present case can be gathered from the following observation of the said Division Bench: "In the instant cases, it is not disputed that the inmates of the special refugee camps, are Srilankan Nationals and hence foreigners, who had come down to India, without travel documents and further they have no valid permits to continue to stay in India." The said Judgment also relies on the following observation of the Bombay High Court in Bawalkhan v. B.C. Shah, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 27: 1959 Bom. L.R. 993: (1960) 61 Crl. L.J. 54., "The Legislature intended to give widest possible powers to the Government for obvious reasons. A Foreigner is not entitled to any Guarantees or fundamental rights as a citizen is entitled to under the Constitution. A foreigner can be dangerous to security of India. His presence may be undesirable for any reason of any kind and it appears to have been intended by the Legislature to leave the whole matter of the foreigners’ presence in India to the Executive discretion of the Government. The provisions as contained in Sec. 3 make this object of the Act abundantly clear. The last words in the Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.3 of the Act show the wide character of the powers intended to be conferred on the Government. The power is given to make provision for any matter which is to be or may be prescribed and for such incidental and supplementary matters which may be deemed expedient or necessary by the Government for giving effect to the Act." [Italics supplied] 18. Then, the abovesaid recent Division Bench judgment dated 24. 1992 also points out that since the cases therein are not cases of detention, fixation of time for residing in special refugee camps, cannot be mandate. The relevant further observations of the Division Bench are as follows: "If a foreigner had been received in this country, with open arms, when he came down due to ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, he has to necessarily abide by the laws of this country. The relevant further observations of the Division Bench are as follows: "If a foreigner had been received in this country, with open arms, when he came down due to ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, he has to necessarily abide by the laws of this country. As long as he abided by the laws of this country, his having come down to India without valid travel documents, would not have been taken against him, for the circumstances then prevailing in Sri Lanka, which needed exodus so imminently, had been taken note of by the State Government, which on humanitarian grounds had provided all facilities for the refugees. Once, some of those refugees attempted to violate the law of the land, naturally, the security of the State, which is paramount has led to the passing of the impugned orders against a few of the Sri Lankan nationals, who have been identified as having close links with the L.T.T.E., and belonging to rival ethnic groups as well. It is quite true that the impugned orders do not ex facie show the reasons, which prompted the State Government to pass orders for regulating the continued presence of these foreigners. But, the counter affidavits filed by the State, have clearly given out the reasons therefor, namely, the close links of the inmates of the Special refugee camps concerned in these writ petitions, with the L.T.T.E. and the danger they had posed to the security of the State, apart from they being members, belonging to various militant groups." [Italics supplied] 19. We also adopt the same reasoning and wholly concur with the view expressed in the said recent Division Bench judgment. Further, in the present case apart from the fact that the abovesaid Nirubhan is a Srilankan National belonging to the abovesaid, L.T.T.E. militant group, a case also has been registered against him and certain others under the above referred to enactments, they having been found in possession of the above referred to materials like wireless sets. etc. 20. The said recent Division Bench judgment dated 24. etc. 20. The said recent Division Bench judgment dated 24. 1992 also relies on Louis Be Raedt v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1886 and Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 367: 1955 S.C.J. 324: (1955)1 S.C.R. 1284 : (1955) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 188: 1955 M.W.N. 478: 1955 M.W.N.(Crl.) 126: 56 Crl.L.J. 876, wherein also it was pointed out that the power of the Government in India to expel foreigners was absolute and unlimited and there was no provision in the Constitution of India fettering this discretion, and that there cannot be any hard and fast rule about the manner in which a person concerned has to be given an opportunity to place his case. The said Division Bench further observes thus: ".....the claim of the writ petitioners, that their cases should have been referred either to an Advisory Board or an impartial Authority, does not appear to be sound. If we held, that the discretion has been exercised by the State Government bonafide and further malafides cannot be attributed, that would be the end. It may not be possible to prescribe a particular length of time for stay, of these foreign nationals in the Special refugee camps, for various factors relating to security of State will necessarily govern the further decisions to be taken from time to time, as rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor." We adopt these observations in the present case. 21. The said Division Bench also observes thus: "Once we are able to see that the Sri Lankan Nationals will have opportunity to leave the boundaries of the special camp on sufficient cause with the permission of the District Collector concerned, it cannot be held that any procedural mandate has been violated." The same observation will hold good even in the present case. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the abovesaid Nirubhan sought for any such permission from the District Collector at any time and it was unreasonably refused. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner no doubt attempted to argue that residing in the abovesaid special refugee camp is nothing different from being detained in a prison. In this connection, he began to point out the averments in an affidavit in the abovesaid batch of writ petitions, as set out in the above referred to Division Bench Judgment dated 24. In this connection, he began to point out the averments in an affidavit in the abovesaid batch of writ petitions, as set out in the above referred to Division Bench Judgment dated 24. 1992showing that the special camp involved in the said batch of writ petitions, viz., the special camp at Saidapet was really a sub jail. But, in the present case, there are no such averments at all, with reference to the above referred to Special Camp at Vellore, in any of the affidavits filed by the petitioner. Therefore, there is no merit in the said arguments of the learned counsel. 23. Further, since we hold that Art. 22 of the Constitution of India is not attracted in the present case, there is no scope for any argument regarding the application or non application of the doctrine of eclipse. Hence, Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019: (1963) 2 S.C.A. 163 has no application to the present case. 24. Further, the above said Division Bench reached the abovesaid conclusion, only after taking into account the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in decision like Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27: 1950 S.C.J. 174: 1950 S.C.R. 88: (1950) 2 M.L.J. 42: 1950 M.W.N. 495: 51 Crl.L.J. 1383 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597: (1978)1 S.C.C. 248 : (1978)2 S.C.R. 621 : (1978) 2 S.C.J. 312. The other Supreme Court decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner also will have no application since Art.22 relied on by him, itself will have no application. 25. In the result, there is absolutely no merit in this habeas corpus petition and accordingly it is dismissed.