Judgment :- CHETTUR SANKARAN NAIR, J. This appeal by the State of Kerala is directed against the judgment of the Court of Session, Trichur Division acquitting respondent-accused of the charge under S. 302, IPC. Respondent stood trial for offences under sections 324 and 302, IPC, for causing the death of one Subramanian and for causing injuries to P.W. 1, in the course of the same transaction, at or about 6-30 p.m. on 13-2-1987. The court below accepted the evidence, but found that only the offence under S. 304, Part I, IPC was made out. 2. Accused Mullan was engaged in quarrying operations. He was also living in adultery with one Janaky, with whose daughter Mini, the deceased was in love. Deceased sought the hand of Mini, in marriage. Accused resented the attentions paid to Mini by the deceased. It is alleged that the accused questioned deceased regarding his intentions, and that the deceased retorted back stating : "if you can keep the mother of Mini, I can as well marry her daughter". Upon this, the accused flew into a rage and threatened the deceased that he would not let him live. Suiting his deeds to his words, he whipped out a dagger and inflicted a number of injuries on the deceased. 3. P.Ws. 1 to 3 who were at the scene removed the injured to Kunnamkulam Hospital, and then on to the Medical College Hospital, Trichur. En route he dies. P.W. 1 then made Ext. P1 report to the police and P.W. 14 recorded Ext. P1(a) first information report. Ext. P5 is the inquest report and Ext. P3 is the scene mahazar. P.W. 11 performed autopsy on the dead body and issued Ext. P6 certificate. He noticed thirteen injuries, and found that injuries 2 and 3 were fatal. Those injuries are : "Incised penetrating wound, 4.3 x 1.4 x 7.5 cms. on the left side of front of chest between 4 & 5 O'clock position 5 cm. away from nipple, oblique, entering the left chest cavity through 5 cm. long clean cut involving the lower border of 5th rib and 5th intercostal space and had cut pericardium and left ventricle of heart 2.5 cm. x 1 cm., at 2.5 cm. above apex entered left ventricular cavity and left lung cleanly cut for 4.1 cm. at 2 cm. away from nipple, oblique, entering the left chest cavity through 5 cm. long clean cut involving the lower border of 5th rib and 5th intercostal space and had cut pericardium and left ventricle of heart 2.5 cm. x 1 cm., at 2.5 cm. above apex entered left ventricular cavity and left lung cleanly cut for 4.1 cm. at 2 cm. below top front and outer border of lower lobe of left lung; left chest cavity contained 500 ml of blood with clots directed inwards and upwards. Incised penetrating wound, 3.1 x 1.4 x 6.6 cm. oblique in the upper most portion of right armpit, it has cut axillary artery and vein and brachial plexus and was directed inwards and slightly upwards". These injuries according to P.W. 11, and apparently too, would cause death. P.Ws. 1 to 3 clearly say that they saw the accused inflicting the stab injuries. Acting on their evidence, as also the medical evidence, the court below found that the occurrence took place as alleged. 4. Notwithstanding this, the court below held that the act fell only under S. 304 Part I, IPC. The reason for this conclusion is : "If Subramanian (deceased) had stated that the accused was keeping Mini's mother it was "somewhat provocative", though it may not amount to grave and sudden provocation ............... it is possible that Subramanian could have stated something more provocative ............ Though the plea of acting in self defence cannot be accepted, 'the plea' that he was acting under grave and sudden provocation must be accepted". This finding is challenged by the State. The Additional State Prosecutor submits that there was no justification in invoking Exception I to S. 300, IPC, after finding the act and accepting the medical evidence. Exception I is to the effect that, "Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation .................." To invoke Exception I, there must be grave provocation and such provocation must also be sudden. 5. The court below misdirected itself on fact and law, in coming to the conclusion that Exception I would apply, for reasons more than one. The statutory ingredient of "grave and sudden provocation" was substituted with a "somewhat provocative" act, by the Court of Session. 5. The court below misdirected itself on fact and law, in coming to the conclusion that Exception I would apply, for reasons more than one. The statutory ingredient of "grave and sudden provocation" was substituted with a "somewhat provocative" act, by the Court of Session. It was plainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Session to whittle down a statutory provision, of well recognised import. Again, the finding of the court below that, "it is possible that subramanian could have stated something more provocative", is nothing but a far fetched and wild guess, without any factual basis, stated or discernible. It is not for the court to indulge in guesses, dehors, factual foundation. The Court of Session made yet another misstatement when it stated that. "............. The "plea" that he was acting under grave and sudden provocation must be accepted". The accused made no such plea, while questioned under S. 313 of the Code or otherwise. The court below acted thus without evidence and outside evidence in finding Exception I to S. 300, IPC. 6. Grave and sudden provocation is such provocation, that would deprive a reasonable person "of the power of self control". It must, also be sudden. Unless the twin requirements are met, Exception I to S. 300, IPC cannot be invoked. The law in this country is well settled ever since the Supreme Court handed down the celebrated decision in K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 521). The law in England as enunciated in Palmar's case 1913 (2) KB 29 and R. v. Johnson 1989 (2) All WR 839 Court of Appeal, has been the same. What could be provocation to a person of super sensitivity, is not provocation in the contemplation of S. 300, IPC. What would be grave and sudden provocation, would depend on the facts of each case. Variety of circumstances like the social status of the accused, the prevailing those of the community and so on would be relevant in determining this question. 7. Judged by standards of reasonable persons, placed in a like situation, the act of respondent cannot attract Exception I to S. 300, IPC. The finding entered by the Court of Session, amounts to clear misdirection in law, and it is based on incorrect assumptions. 8. 7. Judged by standards of reasonable persons, placed in a like situation, the act of respondent cannot attract Exception I to S. 300, IPC. The finding entered by the Court of Session, amounts to clear misdirection in law, and it is based on incorrect assumptions. 8. Learned counsel argued further that normal moral standards prevailing in the society, cannot be the basis to ascertain whether grave and sudden provocation existed. The Appellant who was living as the husband of Janaky, lost his mental balance on the deceased trying to wean away Janaky's daughter, says counsel. Appellant cannot assume such moral indignation, or protective attitudes. He who lived in adultery, which the Indian Penal Code makes punishable, cannot adopt a virtuous stance and seek justification for his criminal act of killing one who wanted to marry Janaky's daughter. The posture adopted by the Appellant, of moral indignation, approximates to the analogy of the devil quoting the scriptures. 9. The offence falls clearly under S. 300, IPC as the accused committed an act which he knew or must be credited to have known to be so imminently dangerous, as to cause death in the ordinary course of things. The nature of the weapon used and the nature of injuries inflicted, can leave no doubt about the knowledge of the Appellant. The order of acquittal is unsustainable. 10. One more argument was advanced by counsel for respondent. The first information report reached the court only on 16-2-1987, the fourth day after the occurrence. This suggests embellishments according to counsel. The first information was recorded on the night of 13th. 14th was a second Saturday and 15th a Sunday and on Monday morning the report reached the Magistrate. There is no delay and facile assumptions of machinations cannot be drawn against the investigating agency without any basis. 11. We set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused-respondent of the offence under S. 302, IPC and sentence him to imprisonment for life. 12. Counsel for respondent submits that the respondent has served the sentence imposed on him by the court below and that he is a physical wreck now. If that is so, it is for him to move the Constitutional Authority under Art. 161 of the Constitution and it is entirely for that Authority to act. 12. Counsel for respondent submits that the respondent has served the sentence imposed on him by the court below and that he is a physical wreck now. If that is so, it is for him to move the Constitutional Authority under Art. 161 of the Constitution and it is entirely for that Authority to act. The period of detention suffered by the respondent will be set off against the term of imprisonment that respondent may suffer. Appeal is allowed.