Judgment S. C. AGRAWAL, JJ. ( 1 ). Heard learned counsel. Special leave granted. ( 2 ). This appeal arises out of a suit for partition filed by the appellants herein in the court of Sub-Judge, Purnea, in the year 1969. Gulabchand Sah, respondent 1 herein, was defendant 2 in the said suit, and after his death his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 1 (a) to (J)MOHAN Lal Sah, respondent 2 herein, was defendant 3 in that suit. On 25/04/1969, a compromise petition was filed on behalf of respondent 1 and appellant 1, but no orders were passed on it because the suit was being contested by the other defendants. No interest was, however, taken by respondent 1 in the said proceedings after filing the said compromise petition. An injunction was granted by the trial court in the suit whereby the defendants were restrained from making any construction on some of the plots. The said injunction was vacated by the appellate court insofar as respondent 2 was concerned and the appellants went in revision against the said order to the High Court. The said revision was dismissed by the High Court on 24/04/1973 on an agreement between the parties that respondent 2 will not make any further construction. After receipt of the record of the suit from the High Court, the trial court on 26/02/1977 directed that requisites be filed for issuance of registered letter and by order dated 2/03/1977 it was further directed that lawyers appearing for parties be informed. On 25/03/1977, when the suit was taken up for hearing, neither respondents 1 and 2 nor their advocates were present and an ex parte preliminary decree was passed. On 20/07/1981, two separate applications were filed by respondent 1 and respondent 2 for setting aside the said ex parte preliminary decree. The said applications were contested by the appellants and after recording evidence of the parties, the trial court, by separate orders dated 18/04/1983, dismissed both the applications. Appeals filed against these orders were dismissed by a common judgment dated 23/05/1985 by the District Judge, Purnea. Separate revision petitions were filed by respondent 2 and respondent 1 against the said order of the District Judge. Civil Revision No. 965 of 1985, filed by respondent 2 was dismissed by order of the High court (B. P. Jha, A. C. J.) dated 10/08/1987. Separate revision petitions were filed by respondent 2 and respondent 1 against the said order of the District Judge. Civil Revision No. 965 of 1985, filed by respondent 2 was dismissed by order of the High court (B. P. Jha, A. C. J.) dated 10/08/1987. Civil Revision No. 851 of 1985. filed by respondent 1 was, however, allowed by a division bench of the High court by order dated 4/05/1992. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the High court dated 4/05/1992, the appellants have filed this appeal. ( 3 ). Shri Ranjit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has urged that the trial court as well as the appellate court have found that respondent 1 was not prevented by sufficient cause from appearing before the court when the case was called for hearing on 25/03/1977 and further that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was hopelessly barred by limitation and that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the said order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 1 15 Civil Procedure Code. In this context, the learned counsel has pointed out that in similar circumstances, the High court, by its earlier order dated 10/08/1987, had dismissed the revision petition filed by respondent 2, Shri Harilal Agarwal, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 1 (a) to (j), has, however, submitted that there is a distinction between the case of respondent 2 and that of respondent 1 in the matter of setting aside the ex parte decree inasmuch as while in the case of respondent 2 notice had been given to Shri K. K. Niyogi, advocate appearing for respondent 2 in the trial court, no such notice was given to Shri Anil Ranjan Mitra, advocate appearing for respondent 1 in the trial court, and since no notice was given to counsel for respondent I, the High court was justified in setting aside the ex parte decree. ( 4 ). Under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a period of 30 days is prescribed for an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte. The starting point for computing the said period of limitation is the date of decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. Under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a period of 30 days is prescribed for an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte. The starting point for computing the said period of limitation is the date of decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. In the present case, respondent 1 has invoked the latter pail of Article 123 and has claimed that the period of limitation should he computed from the dale of knowledge of the decree for the reason that the notice about the date of hearing after the receipt of the record from the High court had not been served on him or his counsel. The case of respondent 1 is that he came to know of the ex parte preliminary decree for the first time on 20/07/1981 and that he submitted the application for setting aside the ex parte decree on the same day and, therefore, there was no delay in the filing of the said application. This fact has been disputed by the appellants. Before the trial court, they adduced evidence of Narain Sah. op w 2 and Sri Lal Sah, op w 3. Narain Sah, op w 2 has deposed that Sri Lal Sah, appellant 1, had talked to respondents 1 and 2 at the darwaza of respondent 1 at Rajiganj about the ex parte decree in August 1977 in his presence and that respondents 1 and 2 had told appellant 1 that they would settle the whole thing later on. The said witness is a close neighbour of both the parties. Sri Lal Sah. op w 3 has slated that he had himself informed respondents 1 and 2 about the said ex parte decree and there was also a meeting between him and them. The Sub-Judge, Purnea, in his order dated 18/04/1983, has accepted the testimony of both these witnesses. It may be mentioned here that evidence to the same effect had been adduced by the appellants while opposing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree filed by respondent 2 wherein also the said evidence had been accepted by the Sub-Judge by his order dated 18/04/1983. It may be mentioned here that evidence to the same effect had been adduced by the appellants while opposing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree filed by respondent 2 wherein also the said evidence had been accepted by the Sub-Judge by his order dated 18/04/1983. The District Judge, in appeal, did not consider it necessary to refer to the said evidence because he was of the view that the period of limitation had to be computed under the first part of Article 123. namely from the date of decree and not from the date of knowledge. The High court, while dismissing the revision petition of respondent 2, by its order dated 10/08/1987, observed: "it is clear from the finding ofthe trial court that in 1977, the petitioner and the other defendants had knowledge about the ex parte decree. " In the impugned judgment, the division bench of the High court has proceeded on the basis that the delay in filing of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code ought to have been condoned by the trial court, even though there was no application for condonation of delay, since respondent 1 claims that he had no knowledge of the decree till 21/06/1981 and he learnt about the same on 22/06/1981 and the same could be a ground for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. In accepting the claim of respondent 1 that he had no knowledge of the decree till 22/06/1981 the High court has failed to take note of the evidence that was adduced by the appellants before the trial court as well as the observations mentioned above in the earlier order of the High court dated 10/08/1987. The evidence adduced by the appellants which has been accepted by the trial court establishes that respondent 1 had knowledge of the decree in August 1977 itself and it negatives the claim of respondent 1 that he had no knowledge of the decree till 22/06/1981. The evidence adduced by the appellants which has been accepted by the trial court establishes that respondent 1 had knowledge of the decree in August 1977 itself and it negatives the claim of respondent 1 that he had no knowledge of the decree till 22/06/1981. Since this was the only circumstance which persuaded the High court to condone the delay in filing of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code the order of the High court condoning the delay in filing of the said application cannot be upheld and the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code must be held to have been rightly dismissed as barred by limitation by the trial court and the appellate court. Moreover in the instant case after submission of the compromise petition on 25/04/1969, respondent 1 did not take any steps in the suit before the trial court during the period from 1969 to 1974. In this regard, the trial court has observed: "it is the definite testimony of the petitioners son (AW 3 that no pairvi was made from the side of his father in that suit after filing of the said compromise petition. It is also his testimony that after the filing of the said compromise petition he or his father did not find out as to what the position in regard to the progress in T. S. No. 10 of 1969 was. " ( 5 ). The trial court has further found: "these facts clearly show that the petitioner-applicant, after getting full knowledge of the plaint in T. S. No. 10 of 1969 neglected pairvi in that suit for a very long period without any sufficient cause. . . . The record of T. S. No, 10 of 1969 shows that the defendants " left pairvi altogether in the said suit on 3/09/1974. " ( 6 ). Similarly, the District Judge, while referring to respondent I, has held: "this defendant appeared for the first time to file the compromise petition and thereafter, he never appeared in court to inquire about the fate of that compromise petition. " ( 7 ). Keeping in view the aforesaid conduct of respondent I, it is not possible to hold that the ex parte decree, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to respondent 1. " ( 7 ). Keeping in view the aforesaid conduct of respondent I, it is not possible to hold that the ex parte decree, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to respondent 1. The High court was, therefore, not justified in interfering with the orders passed by the courts below in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. ( 8 ). The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order of the Patna High court dated 4/05/1992 in Civil Revision Petition No. 851 of 1985 is set aside and the said civil revision petition filed by respondent 1 is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.