JUDGMENT - Saldanha M.F., J.:—An issue of considerable interest and importance has been canvassed in this proceeding which I am summarizing below :— In a case where the accused is arrested on a charge of having committed a non-bailable offence and a charge-sheet is filed within the period prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but it is pointed out that apart from such physical compliance that the learned Magistrate has not taken any cognizance of the proceedings and had merely adjourned the same thereafter, (a) whether the accused would be entitled to bail on this ground, and (b) whether it is essential that cognizance in the legal sense of the term is required to be taken within the period of 90 days and, if this is not done, whether a right accrues in favour of the accused that he be released on bail. 2. The three accused before us, along with certain others, are facing a charge wider section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. They had applied for bail earlier to the Court of Session and the learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the application on 12-8-1992 on the ground that sufficient material existed to connect those accused with the offence. Thereafter they filed Criminal Application No. 2883 of 1992 in this Court and my brother Dudhat, J., by an order dated 20-10-1992 observed that the accused are not entitled to bail on merits. Within less than a month on 26-11-1992, the present application has been filed and the contention adopted is that the grounds pleaded in this application had not been urged before the learned Single Judge earlier. 3. Shri Ponda, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, submitted that in a number of similar proceedings, various single Judges of this Court had observed that mere mechanical filing of the charge-sheet in the Court within the period prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure is not sufficient because it must also be demonstrated that the Court has taken cognizance and, if the latter is not so, that the accused is entitled to bail. Admittedly, in the present case, the charge-sheet was filed on the 89th day, that is to say, within the prescribed time-limit. Admittedly, in the present case, the charge-sheet was filed on the 89th day, that is to say, within the prescribed time-limit. Shri Ponda has relied on a certified copy of the Roznama of the proceedings before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, being Case No. 1428/P of 1992, and he has pointed out to me that even though copies of the charge-sheet were furnished to the accused that the only order passed is : “Adjourned to 9-9-1992". There are similar orders adjourning the proceedings on that date as also on 22-9-1992, 6-10-1992, 19-10-1992, 2-11-1992, 16-11-1992. 4. Shri Ponda has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of (Khimbhadhur Palahiram Thapa v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1989(3) Crimes 543 . Suresh, J., (as he then was) had placed reliance on the decision in the case of (Superintendent and Remembrancer of Law Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee)2, A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 437, as also the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Gopal Das v. State of Assam)3, 1961(2) Cri.L.J. 39, and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh)4, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 207. In fairness, he drew my attention to the decisions in the case of (i) (Rabindra Rai v. The State of Bihar)5, 1984 Cri.L.J. 1412, (ii) (Shambha Nath Singh v. The State of Bihar)6, 1987 Cri.L.J. 810, and (iii) (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Brahman)7, 1983 Cri.L.J. 839, wherein the view that has been canvassed is that the filing of the charge-sheet before the trial Court would be tantamount to the Court having taken cognizance and that remand of the accused under section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further period of custody was permissible, even if by that act the accused remained in custody beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. 5. Shri Ponda thereafter drew my attention to a decision of Daud, J., (as he then was) in the case of (Shri Ranjan Dharmraj Puralkar others v. The State of Maharashtra)8, Criminal Application No. 2431 of 1991. Daud, J., had occasion to consider the decisions in the case of (Raghubir Singh others v. State of Bihar)9, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 149; and in the case of (Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel and another v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau)10, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 71. Daud, J., had occasion to consider the decisions in the case of (Raghubir Singh others v. State of Bihar)9, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 149; and in the case of (Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel and another v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau)10, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 71. To my mind, these decisions are on a slightly different aspect, namely, the question as to whether a right to release on bail has accrued to the accused by virtue of the default or, in other words, non- observance of the time-frame prescribed, and the law is now well-settled that even though such a right does accrue, that it is not a release on merits and, therefore, that the order could be revoked on valid grounds being adduced. Shri Ponda argued that the principle would apply in so far as if a default has been committed the only consequence is that the accused must be released on bail. Both Daud, J. and Suresh, J., have interpreted the term “taking cognizance of an offence” and have held that taking cognizance presupposes judicial application of mind and that this is a necessary pre-requisite. Reading the provisions of section 167(2) with section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Judges concluded that regardless of the charge-sheet having been filed if the period of 90 days is crossed without due cognizance having been taken that the accused is entitled to bail. Shri Ponda further drew my attention to the fact that Daud, J., has followed this view in Criminal Application No. 1419 of 1992, (Shri Pradesh @ Pintva Dinanath Pisat and another v. The State of Maharashra)11 and in Criminal Application No. 1496 of 1992, (Ravindra Shankar Kondurkar v. The State of Maharashtra)12, Shah, J., has also taken the same view in Criminal Application No. 303 of 1992, (Vijay Baban Babar v. The State of Maharashtra)13. In substance, Shri Ponda contended that the facts of the present case indicate non-application of judicial mind prior to the expiry of 90 days in custody and that, therefore, the accused must be released on bail. 6. In substance, Shri Ponda contended that the facts of the present case indicate non-application of judicial mind prior to the expiry of 90 days in custody and that, therefore, the accused must be released on bail. 6. Shri Lambay, the learned A.P.P., has, in the first instance, pointed out that the power of the Court to release an accused on bail is circumscribed to the period between the date on which the default takes place and the date on which the charge-sheet is filed in those of the cases where the same has not been done within the prescribed period of 90 days. He relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Abdul Wahid v. State of Maharashtra)14, 1991 Mh.L.J. 1219, wherein the Division Bench upheld the contention, after a detailed consideration of the law on the point, that the power to release on bail, when it flows from a situation whereby default has taken place, must be exercised only before the charge-sheet is filed. Once that stage has passed, any application for bail will have to be purely on merits. Drawing a parallel from this case, Shri Lambay submitted that the grievance canvassed by the applicants could only entitle them to an order in default at a point of time prior to the filing of the charge-sheet. Secondly, he submitted that if such a ground existed, it ought to have been canvassed at the earliest point of time and that after two courts have rejected the application on merits, it would be highly improper even to consider the same in a subsequent application. 7. With regard to the last aspect, I need to take a serious view of the fact that applications for bail haphazardly drafted and presented in a light-hearted fashion, most of the time without even annexing the relevant documents or records as is the case in the application before me, cannot be followed by subsequent applications wherein either as one after thought or in order to try one's luck with another Court that some new grounds are squeezed out. This does not mean that if there is a change of circumstances or if, for some very valid reasons, it is pointed out that a default has occurred on an earlier occasion that a Court would shut out a deserving litigant, but in the absence of any justification, this Court will have to draw a line to the number of times such applications will be considered. In the instant case, to my mind, those grounds, if at all they were to be urged, should have been pointed out at an earlier stage, that is to say, before the charge-sheet was filed. 8. Shri Lambay has also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of U P. v. Lakshmi Brahman)15, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439. The Supreme Court had held that between the stage of the filing of the charge-sheet and the committal of the accused to the Court of Session, the Magistrate is required to hold an enquiry and during this interval, the remand of the accused to custody is permissible under section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. With due respect to the views expressed in some of the earlier bail applications which, however, do not create any precedent because every criminal case is decided on facts and the point of law involved is also in relation to the facts of that case. It needs to be stated that the interconnection between section 167 and section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to my mind, is erroneous. The reason for this is because when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force, the legislature felt that even in the case of serious offences, the Investigating Authorities must be bound down to a reasonable time-frame in order to put an end to the obnoxious practice of indefinitely retaining an accused person in custody in cases relating to non-bailable offences. It was, therefore, laid down that if, for whatever reason, the charge-sheet is not filed within the prescribed period of 90 days, that the Court shall have no choice except to release the accused on bail. The provisions of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cease to be applicable once the charge-sheet has been filed within the prescribed period because there is then no question of the accused being released on bail by default. The provisions of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cease to be applicable once the charge-sheet has been filed within the prescribed period because there is then no question of the accused being released on bail by default. As laid down by the Division Bench in Abdul Wahid's case referred to supra, bail can, therefore, be asked for only on merits under section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. The right to claim bail by default is an unusual and a special provision and it has been specifically incorporated in section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a definite purpose and only as an antidote against abnormal delays by the Investigating Authorities. It is necessary to note that this doctrine or principle cannot be transposed into any other situation, and least of all to section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is not in the faintest manner connected with this section. 11. The decisions referred to by Shri Ponda have overlooked the nature of the proceeding that is pending before the trial Court which has aptly been described as “enquiry” by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman's case referred to supra. That the enquiry may not be completed in one hearing and that there may be reasons for the Court having to adjourn the matter from time to time has been recognised and it has been held that such a procedure is perfectly valid. In the earlier decisions, the learned Single Judges have drawn a distinction between the proceeding being merely adjourned and a situation whereby it is effectively heard and have held that if there is no judicial application of mind, then it cannot be contended that cognizance has been taken. In my considered view, such a conclusion overlooks one very elementary fact, namely, that the accused is already in custody under prior orders of that very Court and that, therefore, the Court is not taking cognizance of the proceedings “for the first time”. The accused, after their arrest, were produced before the learned Magistrate, who has applied his mind to the remand application and has retained them in custody and refused bail because such a procedure was warranted. The accused, after their arrest, were produced before the learned Magistrate, who has applied his mind to the remand application and has retained them in custody and refused bail because such a procedure was warranted. When the charge-sheet is filed, the accused are entitled to take up the plea that either no case is made out against them or that the prosecution wrongly contends that it is a Sessions triable case and to this limited extent, it would be unfair to deny the accused reasonable time when the charge-sheet is first filed. Furthermore, the pressures on Court's time being what they are, the courts are entitled to consider the charge-sheet that has been placed before it, and, for this purpose, postponement of the proceeding is well in order. An adjournment, in these circumstances, cannot be construed as non-application of judicial mind, but it is done both with reason and good purpose. In such a situation, to my mind it would be improper to hold that there has been non-application of mind on the part of the Court. In any event, to argue that in such circumstances a right to release on bail in default de hors the merits of the case would be tantamount to grafting the provisions of section 167(2) on to section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a procedure is impermissible and the arguments, which pressed on such basis, must necessarily fail. 12. Learned Counsel on behalf of the applicants relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Kishun Singh others v. State of Bihar)16, J.T. 1993(1) S.C. 173. In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the aspect of the taking of cognizance by a Magistrate. The Supreme Court had occasion to observe as follows :— “Even though the expression 'take cognizance' is not defined, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that when the Magistrate takes notice of the accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or police report or information that on being satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence decides to initiate judicial proceedings against the alleged offender he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. It is essential to bear in mind the fact that cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender.” (Emphasis supplied) While deciding this case, the Supreme Court (Ahmedi, J.) had occasion to refer to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Jamuna Singh others v. Bhatlal Sah)17, (1964)5 S.C.R. 37 . 13. What was emphasised by the Supreme Court in this decision was that the cognizance is in regard to the offence and not the offender. Shri Ponda contended that this decision would clearly support him in so far as it is not a question of merely filing the charge-sheet or some document before the Magistrate's Court that matters, but that the Court is required to take stock of the offence that the accused is facing and if this is not done that a mere adjournment of the proceeding would be fatal to the legality of the remand. The learned A.P.P., Shri Lambay, has countered the argument by contending that the principle enunciated in this case as such supports the contention advanced by him. He reiterates that the accused were in custody having been produced at an earlier point of time before the trial Court and that their retention in custody and non-release was, principally, because the Court, on applying its mind to the offence with which they stood charged and the material in support thereof, was of the view that they ought to be retained in custody until they were committed to the Court of Session. He, therefore, submitted that even this decision of the Supreme Court would not appreciably change the position in law. 14. I have earlier held that the provisions of section 167 and section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are independent of each other and that they can neither be merged nor are they interdependent. The entire thrust of the arguments canvassed before me is that the provisions of the former section govern the latter. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion and the fact that the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicants would not entitle them to be released on bail, more so at this point of time, the application stands rejected. The rule to stand discharged. 15. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion and the fact that the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicants would not entitle them to be released on bail, more so at this point of time, the application stands rejected. The rule to stand discharged. 15. Shri Pasbole, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, makes a strong plea for expedition of the trial, principally, on the ground that as many as five persons are in custody. He further points out to me that it is a case essentially of circumstantial evidence and that the accused have a fair chance of success. Having regard to what has been pointed out, this is a valid case for expedition of the trial. The trial shall accordingly be expedited and every effort shall be made to complete it at the very earliest. Liberty to learned Counsel to apply either to the Principal Judge or to the learned Judge before whom the trial is pending. Application rejected. -----