JUDGMENT : P.C. Mishra, J. - The plaintiff in O. S. No. 426 of 1986-III is the appellant in this appeal. The, appeal is directed against dismissal of the suit as not maintainable because of the arbitration agreement entered into between the parties. 2. The plaintiff, the Food Corporation of India, filed the aforesaid suit for realisation of Rs. 58,845.49 P. from the defendant together with pendente lite and future interest and cost of the suit on the ground that the defendant, who was entrusted with the work of construction of some quarters, lavatory block etc., could not complete the construction and as a result, the plaintiff sustained loss to the extent of the claim in the suit. The defendant filed his written statement denying the plaint allegation and challenging the maintainability of the suit on the ground of existence of arbitration agreement. The trial Court framed the issue relating to maintainability of the suit and decided the same against the plaintiff before taking up the other issues by the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal. 3. The only question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the existence of an arbitration agreement embracing the claim made in the suit would be a bar for maintainability of the suit. Admittedly the work in question was entrusted to the defendant and an agreement was entered into between the parties. Clause 25 of the said agreement provides that all disputes relating to execution of the work shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the person appointed by the Managing Director of the Food Corporation of India. There is no dispute between the parties that the language of the said arbitration clause is abundantly clear that all questions and disputes relating to the specification, designs, drawings, inductions, quality of workmanship or materials used in the work or as to any other question. Claim etc. shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the person appointed by the Managing Director of the Food Corporation of India or if there be no Managing Director, the Administrative Bend of the said Corporation. The question that was raised in the trial Court was that because of the said clause, the suit claim comes within the purview of arbitration and the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to file a suit for recovery of damages without taking recourse to the procedure envisaged in the arbitration clause. The question that was raised in the trial Court was that because of the said clause, the suit claim comes within the purview of arbitration and the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to file a suit for recovery of damages without taking recourse to the procedure envisaged in the arbitration clause. The learned trial Court referred to decisions reported in Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta Vs. Collector Jabalpur and Others, and Kumarbar-bar Behera Vs. Executive Engineer, P.H. Maintenance Division No. II, Bhubaneswar and Another, which are not strictly relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand. Those decisions are to the effect that arbitration agreement is not required to be in any particular form and if the parties have agreed that disputes arise between them in respect of the subject matter of contract, such disputes shall be referred to arbitration and it is an arbitration agreement within the meaning of the expression given in the Act. At the hearing, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision reported in The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra and Another, in which their Lordships have expressed the view that when a suit is filed in respect of matters within the scope of arbitration agreement, the Court can exercise its discretion with regard to stay of the suit u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act, but the said discretion is to be exercised only when an application under that section is otherwise competent. If the defendant has done something in aid of the progress of the suit or has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudication on merits of the controversy in the suit, such discretion u/s 34 of the Act is not available to be exercised. Relying on the said decision their Lordships of Madras High Court in the decision reported in R. Kamalam Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, have held that where the defendant has not filed an application for stay of the suit u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Civil Court is entitled to proceed with the matters at issue in the suit, notwithstanding existence of arbitration clause in the contract. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, have held that where the defendant has not filed an application for stay of the suit u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Civil Court is entitled to proceed with the matters at issue in the suit, notwithstanding existence of arbitration clause in the contract. The correctness of the aforesaid view is beyond question for the reason that if the existence of an arbitration agreement would be taken as a bar for maintainability of a suit, Section 34 of the Arbitration Act would be redundant and cannot be pressed into operation in any case whatsoever. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a decision reported in AlR 1984 A. P. 110 (N. V. Chowdary v. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Visakhapatnam) wherein the scope of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act has been explained. Section 32 of the Act provides that no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Act. Relying a decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 379 (Jawaharlal v. Union of India) their Lordships held that the bar to the suit created by Section 32 inevitably raises the question as to what remedy it is open to a party to adopt in order to obtain an appropriate declaration about the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The suit before their Lordships involved the question relating to the validity, existence and effect of the arbitration agreement which is not the case in the present suit. The existence, effect and validity of the arbitration agreement is not at all an issue in the present suit for which it cannot be said to be barred u/s 32 of the Arbitration Act. 4. In the result, we set aside the judgment passed in the suit and remand the same to be disposed of afresh on merits. Since the suit is of the year 1986, the learned trial Court shall take steps for expeditious disposal of the same. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. G.B. Pattnaik, J. 5. I agree.