Judgment B. N. Agarwal, J. 1. These two appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment as both arise out of same judgment passed in a first appeal, which was preferred against the judgment and decree passed in one suit. 2. The short facts leading to filing of these appeals are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition claiming 5 annas 4 pies share in the suit property and their case, in short, is that one Chaitnatb, who was common ancestor of the parties, had three sons, namely, Raghu, Shatrughan and buka. Plaintiffs are the great grandsons of Shatrughan being the son of baidyanath and they represent l/3rd share of Shatrughan in the joint family property. Defendant Nos.1 to 5 are heirs of Buka. Raghu had two sons, namely, Bishambhar and Jagu. Each of the aforesaid three sons of Chaitnath had l/3rd shares in the joint family property. It is said that Jagu who was one of the sons of Raghu had sold his 2 annas 8 pies share in the joint family property to Brindawan, who belonged to the branch of Buka and thereby Bukas branch had 8 annas share in the joint family property. Bishambhar, another son of Raghu, had sold his 2 annas 8 pies share to u. C. Roy, the ancestor of defendant Nos 6 to 10, who in his turn settled the same with Ghasi Ram, son of Bisbambhar. Since the parties felt inconvenience in joint enjoyment of the property and request of partition was turned down, the same necessitated filing of the present suit. 3. In the suit defendant Nos.6 to 9 have filed one written statement and defendant No 10 has filed another written statement, but their defence is common These defendants have supported the claim of the plaintiffs and they have made a prayer that their 2 annas 8 pies share in the suit property be carved out. 4. Defendants 1 to 3 have filed separate written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiffs. These defendants have accepted 2 annas 8 pies share of defendants 6 to 10, but they have contested the claim of the plaintiffs. According to them, before the cadestral survey the three sons of chaitnath had separated and there was a partition by metes and bound. These defendants have accepted 2 annas 8 pies share of defendants 6 to 10, but they have contested the claim of the plaintiffs. According to them, before the cadestral survey the three sons of chaitnath had separated and there was a partition by metes and bound. It is said that thereafter one branch had no connection with the lands allotted in the share of other branch It is said that after partition, the parties have been separately dealing with the properties either amongst themselves or with strangers. Hence the suit for partition was liable to be dismissed. 5. The parties in support of their respective cases led evidence in the trial court and the trial court after taking into consideration oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the parties came to the conclusion that the contesting defendants failed to prove their case of previous partition and decreed the suit for partition holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to 5 annas 4 pies share in the property described in item No.1 of the schedule appended to the plaint. So far decree for partition in relation to properties described in other schedules is concerned, the same was refused as the trial court came to the conclusion that those properties were not acquired out of joint family funds. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the contesting defendants preferred a first appeal before this Court being first Appeal No.89 of 1979 (R) in which on behalf of the plaintiffs a cross objection was filed against that portion of the trial courts decree by which their claim for partition in relation to some of the properties had been rejected. A learned single Judge of this Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court after recording finding that there was a previous partition in the family of the parties, as such, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any decree for partition and consequently, the cross objection filed by the plaintiffs was rejected. Hence l. P. A. No.85 of 1987 (R) has been filed at the instance of the plaintiffs whereas L. P. A, No.88 of 1987 (R) has been filed by defendants No.6 to 10. 7. Hence l. P. A. No.85 of 1987 (R) has been filed at the instance of the plaintiffs whereas L. P. A, No.88 of 1987 (R) has been filed by defendants No.6 to 10. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in L. P. A. No.85 of 1987 (R), in support of this appeal contended that this Beach should reappraise the entire evidence like first appellate court and come, to its independent conclusion upon reappraisal thereof. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Smt Asha devi V/s. Dukhi Sao and another, AIR 1974 SC 2048 In that case a learned single Judge of this Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and when the matter was taken before the Letters Patent Beach in appeal, the case was referred to a Full Bench which dismissed the aforesaid appeal on the ground that the appeal was concluded by finding of fact and the power of Letters Patent Bench was limited only to a question of law under Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme court set aside judgment of the Full Bench of this Court and the matter was remanded. The apex court relied upon its earlier decision by a Bench of five judges in an unreported judgment in which it was laid down as follows :- "a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a learned Single judge in a first appeal to the High Court is not equivalent a second appeal under Sec.100 of the Code of Civil procedure, and therefore it cannot be held that a Letters Patent appeal of this kind can only lie on a question of law and not otherwise The matter would have been different if the Letters patent appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court In these circumstances it will be open to the High Court to review even findings of fact in a Letters Patent appeal from a first appeal heard by a learned single Judge, though generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below. But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. " From a bare perusal of the aforesaid passage, it cannot be said that in each and every Letter Patent appeal against decision of a learned single judge of a High Court in a first appeal, the Division Bench is obliged under law to reappraise the evidence and coma to its independent conclusion. In my view, what their Lordships mean to say is that a Letters Patent Bench is not debarred from reappraisal of evidence if in its opinion, it was an appropriate case for reappraisal. The Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb the finding of fact and the same can be disturbed only if appropriate case is made out for interference with the same, for example, the finding is perverse. Whether appropriate case for interference is made out or not will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the bald contention raised on behalf of the appellants that in each and every Letters Patent appeal the Division Bench is obliged to reappraise the evidence and come to its independent conclusion. ; 8 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants next contended that by the documents (Exts. A/2, A/3, A/4 and A/22 the members of the joint family of the parties have made transfers inter se but in the documents there is no recital of previous partition. Merely because there is no recital in the document in relation to previous partition the same cannot affect the case bf previous partition. It has been categorically laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Bahadur Nath tiwari V/s. Kedar Nath Tiwari and others, AIR 1977 Pat 59 tnat mutual transactions between two members of the family furnish a very strong evidence of partition. Nothing could be shown on behalf of the plaintiffs as to under what circumstance members of the family were transfering family property in favour of each other. In absence of any explanation, from inter se transactions between the members of the family only irresistible inference that can be drawn is that there was a previous partition. Therefore. Nothing could be shown on behalf of the plaintiffs as to under what circumstance members of the family were transfering family property in favour of each other. In absence of any explanation, from inter se transactions between the members of the family only irresistible inference that can be drawn is that there was a previous partition. Therefore. I do not find any substance in this contention as well. 9. Learned counsel further contended that the learned single Judge has misconstrued the statements of plaintiffs ancestor in a previous title suit which has been marked as Ext.6. According to learned counsel, it was stated in the plaint of that suit that there was severence of status but there was no partition by metes and bounds. The learned singlq Judge has thoroughly considered the aforesaid statement. I have also looked into paragraph 6 of the plaint of that title suit and in my view, according to recitals, a partition had already been effected. Therefore, I do not find any error in the judgtaent of the learned single Judge on this count, 10. Learned counsel also contended that accoiding to Ext.11, which is deposition of plaintiffs ancestor Brindawan in a title suit filed previously, there was no partition in the family. So far this case is concerned, the same related to a tank only which vested in the State of Bihar. Tne learned single Judge has taken this document iato consideration and in view of unimpeachable documentary evidence to prove previous partition has rightly not attached any importance to it. 11. Learned counsel lastly contended that according to the trial court, the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants in support of their case of previous partition was insufficient and meagre and the learned ingle Judge has simply said that consideration of oral evidence of defendants by the trial court was perfunctory. Learned single Judge did not discuss the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants on the question of previous partition as in his opinion, there was overwhelming documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants to prove previous partition. Learned single Judge did not discuss the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants on the question of previous partition as in his opinion, there was overwhelming documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants to prove previous partition. In my view, the finding on previous partition recorded by the learned single Judge is based upon unimpeachable documentary evidence and it cannot be said that the same is perverse ; as such, it iff not possible to interfere with the same and consequently, T do not find any merit in Letters patent Appeal No.85 of 1987 (R) filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. 12. So far Letters Patent Appeal No.88 of 1987 (R) filed on behalf of defendants 6 to 10 is concerned, in my view, the same also must fail. According to the case of the plaintiffs as well as the contesting defendants, ancestors of defendant Nos.6 to 10 had purchased 2 annas 8 pies share from Bishambhar, who was one of the members of joint family. A decree for carving out their separate share could have been passed. But 1 find that the trial court had decreed the suit for partition filed by the plaintiffs and directed for carving out their 5 annas 4 pies share whereas no direction was given for carving out 2 annas 8 pies share of defendant nos.6 to 10. These defendants neither preferred any first appeal nor cross objection against the decree passed by trial court, therefore, decree passed by the trial court in relation to their claim attained finality and the same cannot be challenged before Letters Patent Bench by preferring appeal against the decision of learned single Judge. 13. In the result, both the appeals are devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.