Judgment :- Bakthavatsalam, J. 1. The prayer in W. P. No. 13749 of 1993 is for the issue of writ of mandamus forbearing the first respondent from proceeding with the Appeal in T. S. E. No. 10 of 1993, filed by the second respondent and pending on the file of the first respondent. 2. The prayer in W. P. No. 13750 of 1993 is for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in I. A. No. 5 of 1993 in T. S. E. No. 10 of 1993 in the file of the first respondent dated 14.6.1993 and to quash the same and to forebear the first from proceeding with the Appeal in T. S. E. No. 10 of 1993. 3. After hearing Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prakash for the second respondent, the short print point which falls for consideration is, whether the order of the first respondent-appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act condoning the delay of 1384 days in filing the appeal can be justified or upheld. 4. Though the question of jurisdiction of the appellate authority has been raised, I am not inclined to enter into that question at this stage since the appellate authority himself has not gone into that question. I am also not inclined to go into the merits of the case since any finding is given on the facts, it will affect the case of both the parties. Suffice to extract the operative portion of the order of the appellate authority in which he has condoned the delay : "As per Ex. P-2 (letter from the head Office of the respondent-Bank at Trichur dated 4.4.1989) it is clear that the petitioner was requested to call on the Head Office at Trichur immediately. The petitioner's contention is that she was at Trichur in response to the above letter on 23.6.1989. The petitioner further says she had sent a letter dated 27.4.1989 to the respondent and the same was acknowledged on 29.11.1989. She had also claimed that she had presented an appeal on 23.6.1988 against the order of dismissal dated 31.5.1988. According to her that the appeal still pending and not disposed of so far."" Non-admission of the appeal is deprival of the appellant of her only chance to put-forth her case. She had also claimed that she had presented an appeal on 23.6.1988 against the order of dismissal dated 31.5.1988. According to her that the appeal still pending and not disposed of so far."" Non-admission of the appeal is deprival of the appellant of her only chance to put-forth her case. Considering the circumstances prevailing, I condone the delay in presenting the appeal. The consideration of the main appeal will be taken up on 28.6.1993." Though Mr. Prakash has vehemently contended that once the appellant authority has thought fit to condone the delay, this Court jurisdiction need not exercise it under Art. 226 of the Constitution and this Court should uphold the order. I am not inclined to accept the said contention on the facts of the case. I have gone through the documents filed before me and also the impugned order of the Appellate Authority. I am of the view that the appellate authority has not exercised its discretion properly which is expected of under the Rules framed under the said Act, especially Rule 9(2) and (3) of the Rules. Rule 9(2) and (3) of the Rules reads as follows : "9(2) In any appeal preferred under the Act, if the appellant fails to appear on the specified date, the appellate authority may dismiss the appellate." "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rules (1) (2) any order passed under either of those sub-rues may be set aide and the appeal reheard on good cause being shown within one month of the date of the said order, notice being served on the opposite party of the date fixed for such rehearing". So far as this case is concerned, we are concerned with Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 extracted above. Even for admission of an appeal by the Appellate Authority under Sec. 41 of the Act, the appellate has to satisfy the authority with sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within a period of thirty days. In those cases, the impugned order extracted above, in my view has got to be set aside. The appellate authority has not discussed the rival contentious properly. The appellate authority has relied on Ex. A-2 which seems to be a letter from which it is clear that the petitioner has gone to Trichur. From the records, I am able to find that she has gone to Trichur to settle here accounts only. The appellate authority has not discussed the rival contentious properly. The appellate authority has relied on Ex. A-2 which seems to be a letter from which it is clear that the petitioner has gone to Trichur. From the records, I am able to find that she has gone to Trichur to settle here accounts only. The only reason given by the appellate authority is that the non-admission of the appeal is deprival of the appellant of her only chance to put forth her case. On this issue, the appellate authority has not considered the petitioner's case that the second respondent has not at all filed an appeal inspite of the affidavit filed by the Chairman of the Bank. So when the order prima facie shows non-application of mind by the appellate authority to arrive at the conclusion that sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay, I am of the view that the impugned order has got to be set aside. It is true that the order condoning the delay is a discretionary order and to sustain that order, there must be some prima facie reason to convince this Court that the order is correct. That is absent here. The order shows that no reason is given to condone the delay. As such, I am of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The first respondent is directed to consider the objections for condonation of delay afresh and pass orders on merits according to law and also decide the question of jurisdiction since the authority has to decide the question of jurisdiction also before entertaining the appeal under Sec. 41 of the Act. The writ petitions are allowed. It is open to the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence. The appellate authority is directed to pass an order within a period of three (3) months from today. There will be no order as to costs.