JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition, under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been filed by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board against the judgment of the Addl. District & Sessions Judge No. 2, Jaipur-city dated 3.5.1991. 2. Suit No. 238/90 had been filed by the plaintiff-respondents - S.S. Rathore and R.D. Modi. They were employed in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (hereinafter to be referred as `the Board'). Against them departmental enquiry was initiated. Since they were involved in the corrupt practices, an F.I.R. was lodged by the Board to the Anti-corruption Department, which was registered as No. 58/83 under section 120(B) read with Section 5(1)(D) & 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Rules. 3. Along with the suit, the plaintiff-respondents filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the departmental enquiry till the decision of their criminal case pending in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Department, Udaipur. The application was contested by the Board. 4. After hearing the parties, the Addl. Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur-city rejected the application vide order dated 18.5.1990. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff-respondents. The appeal was allowed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge and departmental enquiry was directed to be held up till the decision of the criminal case pending in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Department, Udaipur. 5. Against the judgment of the Add. District & Sessions Judge dated 3.5.1991, the present revision has been filed by the Raj. State Electy. Board. 6. The question involved in this revision was about the scope of interference by the High Court in the revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. In Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, 76 Ind. App. 67 , the Privy Council examined the scope of S. 115 and observed that they could see no justification for the view that the section was intended to authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate Courts so as to prevent grave injustice in non appealable cases and that it would be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate Courts could be measured. It was said:- "Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however, profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate Court on question of fact or law." 8. Later in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhary, 76 Ind. App. 131 , their Lordships had again adverted to this matter and reiterated what they had said in their earlier decision. They pointed-out - "There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High Courts on S. 115 to many of which their Lordships have been referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a subordinate Court does not by itself involve that the subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under sub.s. (c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under sub.-s. (a) or sub.-s. (b) and sub.-s. (c) can be ignored." 9. Reference may also be made to the observations of Bose J. in his order of reference in Narayan Sonaji v. Sheshrao Vithoba (AIR 1948 Nag. 258) wherein it was said that the words "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. 258) wherein it was said that the words "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to either law or fact alter the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 11. The case of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board was that the two proceedings departmental enquiry and criminal case were altogether different from each other and the departmental enquiry was not liable to be stayed. The Board denied that any prejudice was likely to be caused to the plaintiff-respondents. The contention raised on behalf of the Board was that it could simultaneously conduct both the enquiries. There is no bar to the two proceedings simultaneously going on : 12. In Kusheshwar v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. ( AIR 1988 SC 2118 ) , the Supreme Court observed:- "While there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken against the delinquent employee against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should be or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted pending criminal trial. It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, strait-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation." 13. The Supreme Court held that as the disciplinary proceedings and criminal action were based on the same facts, the disciplinary proceedings could be stayed. 14. In the instant case, after perusal of the charges and papers, it appears that the departmental enquiry was more or less on the basis of the same charges as they were in the criminal case. 15. 14. In the instant case, after perusal of the charges and papers, it appears that the departmental enquiry was more or less on the basis of the same charges as they were in the criminal case. 15. It was said by the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra) that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, strait-jacket formula for permitting one proceeding to go on and staying the other. 16. In the instant case, as the appellate court has passed the order and given reasons for doing so, it would not be in the ends of justice to interfere with the same. 17. Consequently, the question of staying one of the two proceedings being discretionary also, I find no force in this revision petition. It is dismissed. *******