(1) THIS appeal is before us on being filed by appellants 1 to 4 (accused 1 to 4 before the trial court) canvassing the correctness of the judgment dated 30/6/19933 made in Terrorists Criminal Case No. 51 of 1992 on the file of the additional Designated court at Ahmedabad. These appellants took their trial before the above Designated court under S. 143, 147, 148, 302, 307 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code and S. 336, 332, 395, 435 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code, under Section 135(1 of the Bombay Police Act and under Section 3(2(i) and (ii) of the Terrorists and disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). (2) THE allegations on the basis of which these appellants took their trial are that on 2/7/1992 between 4.30 p.m. and 9.30 p.m., these four appellants along with two other absconding accused and 500 other persons belonging to Muslim community formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, all of them carrying stones and knives with the common object of throwing stones and creating terror among the individuals of Hindu community and to cause physical injuries and to commit murder, looting, dacoity as well as to attempt of murder etc. etc. and in pursuance of the above-mentioned common object threw stones on the procession of Rath Yatra taken by the Hindu community. (3) THE trial court after accepting the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 and relying on the various other circumstances appearing in the case found these four appellants guilty of the offences punishable under S. 143, 147, 148 Indian Penal Code, under Section 135(1 of the Bombay Police Act and under Section 3(2(ii) of the Act and convicted them thereunder. However, these appellants were found not guilty and acquitted of all other offences punishable under S. 302, 307 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code, under S. 336, 332, 395 and 435 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code. The sentences imposed on the appellants are three months RI for the offences under Section 143, one year Rl and fine of Rs. 500.00 for the offence under Section 147, two years Rl and a fine of Rs. The sentences imposed on the appellants are three months RI for the offences under Section 143, one year Rl and fine of Rs. 500.00 for the offence under Section 147, two years Rl and a fine of Rs. 500.00 for the offence under Section 148 with the default clauses and three months RI for the offence under Section 135(1 of the Bombay Police Act and 8 years RI for the conviction under Section 3(2(ii) of the Act. The sentences imposed on each of the appellants/accused as above-mentioned are directed to run concurrently. (4) IT is not in dispute that there was an unabated violence while the procession of Rath Yatra taken out by the Hindu community through the locality, mostly dominated by the Muslim community people. Similarly, it is not in dispute that during the course of the occurrence, one person had lost his life due to the injuries sustained by him and some more persons sustained injuries. Despite the fact that the police resorted to lathi-charge and shooting to control the crowd, they could not do so up to 9.30 p.m. (5) A complaint was lodged by the Superintendent of Police on the basis of which a criminal case was registered and investigated. The prosecution has examined number of witnesses of whom PWs 1 and 2 have supported the prosecution version. Some of the witnesses have not supported with the prosecution version and so they have been treated as hostile witnesses. (6) MS Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants challenges the impugned judgment on various grounds, inter alia, contending that the FIR does not contain the name of anyone of the appellants, that PWs 1 and 2 on whose evidence the Designated court has relied upon are none other than the police witnesses and that even the entire prosecution case is accepted, the provisions of TADA will not be attracted. If at all any offence is proved, it would amount only to communal rioting resulting in murder and looting etc. The learned counsel took us very scrupulously through the FIR and the depositions of PWs 1 and 2. In support of her contention that the provisions of TADA will not be attracted, drew our attention to the decision of this court, namely, (1 Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat and (2 Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya. In support of her contention that the provisions of TADA will not be attracted, drew our attention to the decision of this court, namely, (1 Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat and (2 Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya. (7) THE evidence discloses that in that FIR of rioting on the date of occurrence there was very tense situation and the police officials even after the arrival of the heavy police force found it difficult to control the unruly mob. Though none of the appellants was arrested on the date of the occurrence, PWs 1 and 2 against whom no animosity was even suggested have come forward to speak about the presence of these appellants in the crowd armed with knives and indulging in the commission of the offences above-mentioned. (8) WE do not find any material in the cross-examination to disbelieve the testimony of these two witnesses. The learned trial Judge has analysed the evidence in detail and evaluated the evidentiary value in the proper perspective. We find no compelling reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court. (9) THE two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel, in our opinion, cannot be of any assistance to the facts of the present case. It cannot be said that it was only a mere communal riot but it was much more than that. The materials placed before us, in our considered opinion, attract the invocation of the provisions of the TADA and accordingly, the Designated court has rightly come to the conclusion that these appellants have made themselves liable to be punished under Section 3(2(ii) of the TADA. For the above said reasons, we accepting the evidence of the prosecution witnesses uphold the convictions as recorded by the trial court. (10) COMING to the question of sentence, we feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case, a minimum sentence of five years as provided under the penal provisions of the TADA would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, while confirming the convictions, we reduce the sentence of eight years RI imposed under Section 3(2(ii) of the TADA to five years. The rest of the sentences imposed on other penal provisions are confirmed. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. Subject to the modification of the sentence as indicated above, this appeal is dismissed.