R. L. Gupta, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed under Article 226of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminalprocedure for issue of appropriate writ, order of directions for quashingdetention order No. F. 5/22/92-Home (P-ll) dated 15. 5. 1992 passed by theadministrator of Delhi under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreignexchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for shortcofeposa Act ). On 9. 3. 1992, the petitioner was intercepted outsiderailway Station, Delhi when he was about to board a ricksha by the Customofficers. He was found to be carrying eight gold biscuits in three smallpackets wrapped with adhesive tape and carbon paper in his shoes. Besides " proceedings against him under the Customs Act, the impugned dententionorder was passed on 15. 5. 1992 with a view to preventing him from smugglinggoods and from engaging in concealing, keeping smuggled goods and alsopreventing him from dealing in smuggled goods etc. The petitioner made arepresentation dated 28. 5. 1992 (copy Annexure P-IV in the paper book)to the Administrator of Delhi with the prayer that the detention order berevoked. He was informed vide letter dated 30. 6. 1992 that the representationhad been rejected and further that all the documents duly considered andrelied upon had already been supplied to him. ( 2 ) ALTHOUGH the petitioner has taken up a number of grounds toassail the detention order, during the course of arguments Mr. Bagai, learnedcounsel for the petitioner has restricted his arguments to the grounds takenup in Para-A of the grounds at page 4 of the writ petition. That ground isthat there has been undue delay in considering his representation dated28. 5. 1992 on the part of the second respondent. The Detaining Authoritywas bound under law to consider the representation at the earliest and withutmost haste. This representation was rejected after a month when thepetitioner was served with the memorandum of rejection dated 30. 6. 1992on 2. 7. 1992. Thus, there was undde and un-explained delay in consideringthe representation. In reply to this averment on behalf of second respondent, it is stated that there was no delay in considering the representation. It is further stated that the representation dated 1. 6. 92 (Mr. 6. 1992on 2. 7. 1992. Thus, there was undde and un-explained delay in consideringthe representation. In reply to this averment on behalf of second respondent, it is stated that there was no delay in considering the representation. It is further stated that the representation dated 1. 6. 92 (Mr. Sharma onbehalf of the State admits that the reference of this representation is thesame as that moved by the petitioner) was received in the Home Departmentthrough Deputy Superintendent of Jail on 3. 6. 1992. It was sent to thecustoms Department for comments on the same day. The comments werereceived on 11. 6. 1992. It was examined in the Branch on the same dayand was put up before the Superintendent of the Branch who examinedthe same and put up before the respondent on 15. 6. 1992 (12th, 13th and 14thbeing holidays ). The file was then placed before the Joint Secretary (Home)on the same date who examined the same and sent it to the link officer ofthe Home Secretary. The Home Secretary was on leave. The link officerconsidered the representation and could put up the same before the Detaining Authority on 24. 6. 1992 which was considered and rejected on 25. 6. 1992. ( 3 ) NOW the question is, whether from the aforesaid reply given onbehalf of the second respondent can it be said that there is any undue delayin the consideration of the representation moved by the petitioner ? In thisrespect it has to be noted that there is no explanation as to why thecustoms Department took as many as eight days in forwarding its comments. The aforesaid department received the representation on 3. 6. 1992 andforwarded the comments only on 11. 6. 1992. Thus the affidavit is completelysilent as to why about eight days were taken by the department. Thereafterthere is no explanation in the affidavit as to why after examining the same on15. 6. 1992, it was put up before the second respondent on 24. 6. 1992. It meansthat there was a delay of about nine days in putting up the representationbefore the second respondent for consideration. This period of delay is alsounexplained. It is stated that Home Secretary was on leave. If the link officercould put up the representation before the second respondent on 24. 6. 6. 1992. It meansthat there was a delay of about nine days in putting up the representationbefore the second respondent for consideration. This period of delay is alsounexplained. It is stated that Home Secretary was on leave. If the link officercould put up the representation before the second respondent on 24. 6. 92during the period of leave of the Home Secretary, he could have done iteven earlier without any delay because he must have known the period ofleave of the Home Secretary. In any case the delay of nine days in puttingup the representation for consideration by the second respondent was notcalled for. ( 4 ) A number of authorities have been cited by learned Counsel forthe petitioner in respect of delay in the consideration of representation. Thefirst case is that of Harish Pahwa v. State of U. P. and Others, AIR 1981sc 1126. It was observed in this case, "the representation made by adetenu has to be considered without any delay. The Supreme Court does notlook with equanimity upon delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking and allowing therepresentation to lie without being attended to is not the type of actionwhich the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. It is theduty of the State to proceed to determine representations with the utmostexpedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for considerationas soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait) until a final decision is taken andcommunicated to the detenu". In this case the aforesaid comments weremade when there was delay of about seven days only in the consideration ofthe representation. In the case of Rajender Pd. Khanna v. Union of India andothers, 1998 (3) Crimes 829, a Division Bench of this Court observed, "inpreventive detention cases inordinate, unreasonable and unwarranted delayof about 10 days in considering the representation of detenu amounts toviolation of Article 22 (5) Constitution of India which guarantees to thedetenu a right to have his representation considered with reasonableexpedition". In the case of R. D. Borade v. V. K. Saraf, Commissioner ofpolice and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1861 , there was a gap of 28 days betweenthe receipt and the disposal of representation. In the case of R. D. Borade v. V. K. Saraf, Commissioner ofpolice and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1861 , there was a gap of 28 days betweenthe receipt and the disposal of representation. In para 10 at page 1863 it wasobserved," In attempting to explain the delay from 17-10-88 to 27-10-88 it isstated in the. counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the third respondent that18th. 20th, 22nd and 23/10/1988 were the closed holidays; but noexplanation is given as to why the representation was not attended to anddisposed of on 17, 19th, 21st, 24th to 26th October. In explaining the delayin communicating the decision taken on 27-10-88 it is stated that 29th and30th October were holidays but the affidavit is silent as to why that decisionhad not been communicated to the detenu either on 27th or 28/10/1988. " The explanations were not found satisfactory at all by the Supremecourt and it was further of the view that the respondent had not diligentlycollected the information required by the third respondent. ( 5 ) IN the present case also, it will be seen that there is no explanation at all as to why about eight days were taken in receiving the commentsfrom the Customs department and another 9-10 days then in putting up thefile before the second respondent for consideration. Thus, there is a clearviolation of the guarantee provided by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution andthe detention order, therefore, cannot be sustained. ( 6 ) IN view of what has been stated above, the impugned detentionorder is hereby quashed. Petitioner will be set at liberty if not wanted in anyother case of proceedings.