JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur dated 20.03.1993 by which she has rejected the objections of the judgment-debtor-petitioner filed under Section 47, C.P.C. and held that the decree-holder is entitled to get the possession of the disputed-property in execution of the decree. The facts of the case giving rise to this revision petition may be summarised thus. 2. The plaintiff-non-petitioner filed suit No. 11/74 (350/74) (in short the ejectment-suit) against the defendant-petitioner Jagdhish Lal for the recovery of arrears of rent of the demised premises and ejectment and suit No. 66/74 (in short the possession suit) for the recovery of mesne profits and possession of adjoining property. In the possession suit, the defendant averred in his written-statement that he did not trespass upon the suit property but it was also included in his tenancy (in the demised premises of suit No. 11/74(350/74). On 17.11.1977, compromise was filed by the parties in the suit No. 11/74 (350/74) and an application was moved in suit No. 66/74 that compromise has been effected and the suit may be decided accordingly. The compromise comprised of the properties of both the suit and they were accordingly decided as per the terms of the compromise. Execution application No. 28/80 (115/83) was filed by the decree-holder. On 17.05.1985, die judgment-debtor filed his objections under Section 47, C.P.C. The execution application was subsequently withdrawn by the decree-holder vide order dated 31.05.1985. Thereafter, the present execution application (No. 14/85) was filed by the decree-holder. On 08.11.1985, the judgment-debtor filed his objections under Section 47, read with Order 21 Rule 23 (2), C.P.C.. The decree-holder filed his reply. On 19.04.1986, the judgment-debtor filed additional objections. On 15.05.1987, five points for determination were framed. By order dated 23.11.1987, the judgment-debtor's application dated 21.11.1987 for the amendment of the objection-petition was dismissed. By order dated 16.12.1987, the executing Court held that the decree under execution is not a declaratory decree and it is an executable decree. Thereafter, evidence of the decree-holder was recorded. The judgment-debtor did not produce any evidence despite granting several adjournments to him for this purpose. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, the impugned order was passed. 3. Thereafter, evidence of the decree-holder was recorded. The judgment-debtor did not produce any evidence despite granting several adjournments to him for this purpose. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, the impugned order was passed. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor-petitioner that the compromise decree is not executable as it is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 13, Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. He further contended that it is clearly recited in the compromise dated 17.11.1977 culminating in the decree under execution that the tenancy in respect of the property marked by letters O.P.ERF.G.H.O. in the annexed site plan would commence with effect from January, 1978, accordingly the new tenancy came into existence w.e.f. January 01,1973 and as such the decree is not executable. He also contended that the same day in the suit No. 66/74 a joint application was filed by the parties stating that the suit property was not earlier in the tenancy of the defendant (petitioner), it has now been given in his tenancy, compromise has been filed in suit No. 11/74 and the suit be decided accordingly and suits were accordingly decided the same day. He relied upon Sudhir Kumar v. Baldeo Krishan Thapar, 1969 (3) S.C.C. 611 and Waryam Singh v. Sham Dass, 1985 (1) R.C.J. 131 4. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the decree-holder non-petitioner that in the earlier execution case No. 28/80 (115/83) such an objection against the executability of the decree was not raised, it cannot now be raised, the issue regarding the executability of the decree was decided on December 16, 1987, this order was not challenged, it became final and it will thus operate as res judicata as the provisions of Section 11, C.P.C. are applicable in different stages of the same proceedings. He also contended that documents and pleadings are not interpreted in the manner as statutes are interpreted. He further contended that decrees are interpreted in the manner which shortens the litigation in between the parties and not in a hypertechnical or pedantic manner, the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor would unnecessarily lengthen the litigation and no jurisdictional error has been committed by the trial Court. He further contended that decrees are interpreted in the manner which shortens the litigation in between the parties and not in a hypertechnical or pedantic manner, the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor would unnecessarily lengthen the litigation and no jurisdictional error has been committed by the trial Court. He lastly contended that the impugned order, if allowed to stand would not occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the judgment-debtor-petitioner as it is well proved from the un-rebutted evidence of the decree-holder that the judgment-debtor has acquired premises in the New Light Industrial Area, Jodhpur and as per terms of the compromise decree dated 17.11.1977 the judg-ment-debtor is to vacate the disputed premises immediately after acquiring the compromise. He relied upon Ram Niwas & Others v. Malik Mahboob Ali, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1031 S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 193 Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 177 Mohanlal Goenka v. S. Beenoy Krishna Mukerji, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 66 Hiralal Mool Chand v. Raman Lal Raichor Das, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449 Dev Dutt Dheer v. Janki Ballabh, A.I.R. 1986 Raj. 170 Smt. Pushpa v. Ganpat Singh & Ors., A.I.R. 1977 Raj. 216 Ghisa Lai v. Seth Kanhaiya Lal, 1969 R.L.W. 467 5. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the decree-holder that the objections regarding executability of the decree under execution could not be taken in the present execution case as they were not taken in the first execution case. The judgment-debtor had taken all objections against the executability of the decree in his reply dated 17.05.1985 filed in the first execution case No. 115/83. Moreover, the first execution case was withdrawn by the decree-holder vide, order-sheet dated 31.05.1985. Provision of Section 11, C.P.C. arc applicable to the suits or issues which have been heard and finally decided in the earlier proceedings. Admittedly, the first execution application was not heard and decided on merit. It was withdrawn. In Pushpa v. Ganpat Singh (supra), the first execution application was decided after contest. In Ghisalal v. Seth Kctnhaiyalal, (supra) objections w ere not taken in the previous execution case. 6. Admittedly, the first execution application was not heard and decided on merit. It was withdrawn. In Pushpa v. Ganpat Singh (supra), the first execution application was decided after contest. In Ghisalal v. Seth Kctnhaiyalal, (supra) objections w ere not taken in the previous execution case. 6. There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the decree-holder that the order dated December, 16, 1987 deciding issue No. 3 relating to the executability of the decree under execution in favour of the decree-holder cannot be challenged in this revision petition as it was not earlier challenged by filing an appeal or a revision petition. It has been observed in Sukh Rani v. Hari Shanker, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1436 as follows: "It is true that at an earlier stage of the suit, in the proceeding to set aside the award, the High Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek reopening of the partition on the ground of unfairness when there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation. It is true that the plaintiff did not further pursue the matter at that stage by taking it in appeal to the Supreme Court but preferred to proceed to the trial of his suit. It is also true that a decision given at an earlier stage of suit will bind the parties at later stages of the same suit. But it is equally well settled that because a matter has been decided at an earlier stage by an interlocutory order and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher Court is not precluded from considering the matter again at a later stage of the same litigation (Vide Satayadhan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajain Devi; (1960) 3 S.C.R. 590 : A.I.R. 1960 941 7. The main question for consideration in this case is whether the decree under execution merely created new tenancy in respect of the properties of both the suits, it is declaratory in nature and as such it is not executable. It is well settled law that an executing Court while construing a decree can take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leadings upto the decree. It has been observed in Bhawanvaja v. Solanki Hanuj, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1371 as follows: "It is true that an executing court cannot go behind the decree under execution. It is well settled law that an executing Court while construing a decree can take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leadings upto the decree. It has been observed in Bhawanvaja v. Solanki Hanuj, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1371 as follows: "It is true that an executing court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court, often has to ascertain the circumstances under which those words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the execution Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it." Admittedly, suit No. 11/74 (350/74) was for ejectment of the defendant-petitioner from the three-doored shop in his occupation and possession as a tenant. The defendant has not said in his written-statement that he is not in occupation and possession of the shop as a tenant. Suit No. 66/74 was filed for the recovery of possession of the land adjoining to the demised shop (subject-matter of suit No. 11/74). In the written-statement, the defendant averred that the suit land is also included in the demised shop. A compromise was effected in between the parties in respect of the properties of both the suits and a joint compromise was filed in respect of both the suits in the suit No. 11/74 (350/74) and an application was moved in suit No. 66/74 stating that compromise had been effected and the suit be decided accordingly. Both the suits were decided as per terms of the compromise. A perusal of the compromise dated 17.11.1977 shows that its para No. 1 relates to the demised shop (subject-matter of suit No. 11/74) and para No. 2 relates to the adjacent land (subject-matter of suit No. 66/74). In para No. 1 of the compromise, it is stated that the defendant admits the plaintiffs reasonable and bona fide necessity and greater hardship. In para No. 1 of the compromise, it is stated that the defendant admits the plaintiffs reasonable and bona fide necessity and greater hardship. It has been observed in Hiralal Mool Chand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhod Das (supra) as follows: "An admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, expressly or impliedly, will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the Court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admissions made in judicial proceedings are absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate decree cannot be called a nullity to enable the executing Court to go behind it." This para No. 5 leaves no manner of doubt that no new tenancy was created but concession was granted to the defendant for a limited period i.e., till the defendant or a member of his family gets a plot and building is constructed on it for carrying on business. A further concession was granted to the defendant by supplementary agreement dated 30.12.1979. If the intention would have been to create new tenancy it would not have been mentioned in it repeatedly that the compromise decree dated 17.11.1977 would remain unaffected. Reference of A.I.R. 1982S.C. 813 maybe made here. In Sudhir Kumar v. Baldeo Krishna Thapar (supra) there was a renewal clause even in the new agreement and as such direction in the compromise decree to vacate the suit premises at the end of the term fixed in the compromise was held to be an ineffective direction. Similar Interpretation was put in Devdutta Dheer v. Janaki Vallabh & Others (supra), Warayam Singh v. Sham Das (supra) new tenancy came into existence as per the statement of the plaintiff-decree-holder.9. Great stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor that it is not provided in para No. 5 that the decree-holder would be able to get possession through the Court as is provided in para No. 1 and, on 'he contrary, it is provided in it that the plaintiff would be able to take necessary legal action for recovery of the possession of the demised premises if possession is not delivered to him. Moving application for the execution of decree is also a legal action. Moving application for the execution of decree is also a legal action. It is not mentioned in this para that a suit for recovery of possession may be filed. Passing of the decrees on the basis of the compromise itself indicates that implementation of the compromise would be through the execution of the decree and not through a suit. Courts are always in favour of construing a compromise in a manner which tends to shorten the litigation and always resist any attempt on the part of a party to construe the decree in such a way as to multiply or lengthen litigation. Latest trend of jurisprudence is "Substantial Justice" is contradiction to "Technical Justice". Thus the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur has rightly held the decree as executable. VERNUACULAR MATTER OMITTED 10. Issue No. 1: The decree-holder examined five witnesses and the judgment-debtor did not produce any witness despite giving him several adjournments. He did not even come in the witness box. The executing Court decided this issue in favour of the decree-holder.11. There is yet another aspect of the matter. According to the findings of the Issue No. 1, the judgment-debtor petitioner would not suffer a irreparable injury if the order under challenge is allowed to stand. It would not occasion a failure of justice to him as he himself agreed to vacate the suit properties after getting a plot and constructing a building thereon. Even suit for eviction would be liable to be decreed on the basis of his admission contained in the said compromise. Proviso on sub-section (1) of Section 115, C.P.C. runs as under: "Provided that the High Court shall not, under this Section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." It has been observed in Ajil Prasad v. Hindustan Acronauticals Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 76 as follows: "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing, is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code: See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dhoni v. Maruti Hari Jadhav (1966) 1 S.C.R. 102 : A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 153 and D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup Singh, 1970 (2) S.C.R. 368 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2324)." 12. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.Revision dismissed. *******