JUDGMENT - Dr. B.P. SARAF, J.:---The petitioner is the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation ("Corporation"). By this writ petition, it has challenged the order of the Industrial Court, of Maharashtra Bombay, on a complaint of unfair labour practice under Item 4(a), (c), (d) of Schedule II and Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU PULP Act). By the said order, the Industrial Court allowed the complaint of the Trade union and set aside the order of the petitioner Corporation reverting the employee concerned, during the period of probation, from the post of Senior Clerk to Junior Clerk on the ground that there was no express provision in the Service Rules or Regulations for keeping a promotee on probation and, as such, the very condition of putting the concerned employee at the time of promotion on probation was beyond the powers of the Corporation. 2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are as follows : One Mrs. Latika B. Wankhede, who was working as a Junior Clerk in the office of the petitioner-Corporation since 1978, was promoted alongwith many others to the post of Senior Clerk by order dated 10-9-1985. The promotion was on probation. It was mentioned in the order of the promotion that "the promotees will be on probation for a period of one year in the first instance and their confirmation as Senior Clerk will depend upon the satisfactory completion of probation period". After the expiry of one year, by an order dated 6-1-1987, the period of probation of the petitioner was extended for a period of one year from the date of her joining, that is, 10-9-1986 on the ground of unsatisfactory service. In the said order, her shortcomings were pointed out and she was directed to make necessary improvement. She was also informed that her confirmation would depend upon her work during the extended period of probation. After the expiry of probation, by order dated 12-11-1987, she was reverted to her substantive post of Junior Clerk on the ground that her services during the initial probationary period and the extended probationary period were not found to be satisfactory. She was also informed that her confirmation would depend upon her work during the extended period of probation. After the expiry of probation, by order dated 12-11-1987, she was reverted to her substantive post of Junior Clerk on the ground that her services during the initial probationary period and the extended probationary period were not found to be satisfactory. This order of reversion from the promotional post to the substantive post during the period of probation was challenged by the union representing the petitioner by way of complaint under the MRTU PULP Act before the Industrial Court. Both the parties filed joint purshis stating that they did not desire to adduce any oral evidence in the complaint and the only issue to be decided by the Court being a pure question of law relating to interpretation of the provision of the law on the subject of appointment on probation, it should be decided on the basis of documents on record. In other words, the controversy before the Industrial Court was restricted by the parties to the power of employer to make promotions on probation. The case of the complainant union was that there was no provision in the service rules empowering the Corporation to promote an employee on probation. In the absence of such a provision, the promotion has to be deemed to be regular promotion meaning thereby 'not on probation' and, as such, there can be no question of reversion simplicitor on the ground of unsatisfactory service. Reversion can only be done by initiating proper proceedings. The Labour Court gave a number of opportunities to the Corporation to produce the relevant rules or regulations to show that it had the power to make promotion on probation. The Corporation failed to produce any such rules or regulations before the Industrial Court. Situated thus, the Industrial Court held that there being no provision for promoting an existing employee on probation, the appointment on probation itself was beyond the powers of the Corporation and, therefore, the reversion of an employee on the ground of unsatisfactory services during the period of probation amounted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act. In view of this finding, the Industrial Court allowed the complaint and set aside the order of the Corporation dated 12-11-1987 reverting Mrs. In view of this finding, the Industrial Court allowed the complaint and set aside the order of the Corporation dated 12-11-1987 reverting Mrs. Latika B. Wankhede from the post of Senior Clerk to the Junior Clerk. It is this order of the Industrial Court which has been challenged by the Corporation by this writ petition. 3. When this writ petition was taken up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the Corporation contended that it was the inherent power of an employer to make promotions "on probation". No rules could be produced which provided for promoting employees to higher post on probation. However, in course of the day, a set of rules called "The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (Recruitment, Promotion, Seniority Recategorisation) Procedure" were produced. These rules are in existence ever since 1959. Rule 44 thereof clearly provides that employee promoted to higher grade shall be treated as on probation. It reads : "An employee promoted to a higher grade shall be treated as on probation for one year and his case shall be put up to the Competent Appointing Authority again, on completion of the officiating probationary period, for confirmation : Provided that the Competent Appointing Authority may, if deemed necessary, order the extension of the probationary period for reasons to be recorded." It is clear from the above rule that a mandatory provision has been made to the effect that every employee promoted to a higher grade "shall be" treated as on probation for one year and on completion of such period, his case shall be put up to the Competent Authority for confirmation. The proviso further makes it clear that the Competent Authority has power to extend the probationary period, if deemed necessary. The only requirement is to record the reasons for doing so. This rule, evidently, was not before the Industrial Court. As a result, it came to a finding that the Corporation had no power and jurisdiction to promote an employee to higher grade on probationary basis and it was as a result of such a finding that the order of reversion was set aside. Now on the face of this rule, the reasoning of the Industrial Court does not stand and so also the order of setting aside reversion. 4. Now on the face of this rule, the reasoning of the Industrial Court does not stand and so also the order of setting aside reversion. 4. Though on the face of Rule 44, the learned Counsel for the respondent could not dispute the authority of the Corporation to put an employee who is promoted to a higher grade on probation, he tried to contend that it had no power of reversion under the said rule. The only power in the event of unsatisfactory service during the period of probation was to extend the period of probation. In other words, the contention of the learned Counsel is that in the absence of specific power to revert an employee who has been promoted, no reversion can be done even during probationary period without initiating proper proceedings against the employee concerned. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-op. Sugar Factories Federation)1, 1986 Supp. S.C.C. 95 : (M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank)2, (1987) Supp. S.C.C. 643; (Municipal Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Misra)3, 1991(78) F.J.R. 495, in support of the above contention. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh)4, 1968(34) F.J.R. 408. 5. I have carefully considered the above decisions. All these decisions are in cases where under the Service Rules maximum period of probation was fixed, which is not the position in the present case. In Om Parkash Maurya v. U.P. Co-op. Sugar Factories Federation (supra) the Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that the position will be different in cases where the maximum period of probation had been provided by the rules and the probationer had been allowed to continue in service beyond that period, and in cases where no restriction was there in the rules on the appointing authorities power of extending the period of probation. Referring to Rule 5 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 which provided that every employee shall be appointed on probation for such period as the appointing authority may specify and the period of probation may be extended by the appointing authority from time to time, it was observed : "It is true that Rule 5 of the Federation Service Rules does not place any restriction on the appointing authority's power to extend the probationary period, it may extend the probationary period for an unlimited period and in the absence of confirmation order the employee shall continue to be on probation for indefinite period. It is well settled that where appointment on promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after expiry of the probationary period without any specific order of confirmation he would be deemed to continue on probation provided the rules do not provide contrary to it. If Rule 5 applies to the appellant he could not acquire the status of a confirmed employee in the post of Commercial Officer and he could legally be reverted to his substantive post." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the above decision does not in any way help the respondent. 6. The next decision of the Supreme Court in M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, also was a case where the maximum period of probation was fixed. The period of probation was one year in the first instance. The employer could only extend it for a further period of 6 months. There was a clear limitation on the power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the services of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged. It was in view of such a provision in the service rules that it was held by the Supreme Court that if the probationer was not discharged at or before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. This decision also, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. This decision also, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. In Municipal Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Misra (supra), the Supreme Court again considered the scope of the power of the employer to extend the period of probation. Considering its earlier decisions on the point in Om Parkash Maurya (supra) and (State of Punjab v. C. Bhargav)5, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2735 it was observed that the exercise of the power to extend the probation is hedged with the existence of the rule in that regard followed by a positive act of either confirmation of the probation or discharge from service or reversion to the substantive post within a reasonable time after the expiry of the period of probation. It was made clear that confirmation of probation would always be subject to satisfactory completion of the period of probation. Mere expiry of the initial period of probation does not automatically have the effect of deemed confirmation. Thus, this decision also does not in any way help the respondent. 8. The last decision on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent is the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, 1968(34) F.J.R. 408. The ratio of this decision is that where the first appointment or promotion is made for a specified period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. Where, however, the rules of service forbid extention of period of probation beyond a certain period, and an employee appointed and employed on probation is allowed to continue in that post after the completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation will be deemed to be confirmed in that post on that day by implication and it will not be open to the employer thereafter to terminate his services on the ground that the work or conduct during the probationary period was unsatisfactory. The employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation will be deemed to be confirmed in that post on that day by implication and it will not be open to the employer thereafter to terminate his services on the ground that the work or conduct during the probationary period was unsatisfactory. Apparently, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 9. From a perusal of the above decisions, it is clear that there is a marked difference in the matter of the status of a probationer who has overstayed his period of probation between cases where under the service rule the maximum period of probation has been specified and cases where no such maximum period has been prescribed. In case of employees falling in the latter category, it is well settled that on his continuation beyond his probation, the employer has always the power to revert back the employee to his substantive post see Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-op. Sugar Factories Federation, (1986) Supp. S.C.C. 95. 10. In the light of the foregoing discussions, I am of the clear opinion that the Industrial Court was not correct in setting aside the order of reversion of the petitioner to her substantive post. If fact, as already indicated, the very foundation of the order of the Industrial Court, was the nonexistence of any rule allowing the petitioner-Corporation to promote an employee to a higher grade "on probation". In view of Rule 44 of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (Recruitment, Promotion, Seniority Recategorisation) Procedure, which has been already set out above, this foundation itself has now crumbled. In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The same is, therefore, set aside. The order of reversion of the respondent from the post of Senior Clerk to the post of Junior Clerk stands affirmed. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. Under the facts and circumstances, I make no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****