VINOD LUNIA v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN — 1993 DIGILAW 842 (RAJ)

Judgment SINGHAL, J. ( 1 ) SINCE common questions are involved in these three habeas corpus petitions they are being disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) A search was carried on 30th March. 1992 by the Central Excise and Custom Department of the field in Khasra No. 176-177/ 1/1 and 177/1/2 in village Deedbara. Tehsil Kishangarh. District Ajmer. Meva Ram was found at spot. He informed the search party that he was employed at Lunia Riding Farm. Pushkar Road. Ajmer and he was keeping the watch in respect of the said field on the instructions of Vinod Lunia. A small portion of field was found to be covered by the branches of Babul tree near the boundary field. The search party removed earth from that place and recovered 40 silver bars each having 5 to 6 length mark PLA 9999. Similarly, at a distance of about 20 yards from the well, a place which was covered by grass, 25 silver bars were recovered and thus total 65 bars having weight of 2333. 741 Kg. Valued at Rs. 1,91, 36, 6761 - were recovered, out of which 28 bars were in the jute packing and rest were not covered by any packing. The documents in respect of these bars were not produced and therefore in accordance with the provisions of Custom Act. 1962 the said bars were seized. The statement of Meva Ram was recorded on 30. 3. 1992. He has stated that on 28/ 29th March, 1992 at about 12. 00 in the night Taj Mohammed and Vinod Lunia have brought him on the field which is in the name of Hasan Mohammed father of Taj Mohammed and that the said field has been purchased by Vinod Lunia. After half an hour of reaching on the field a mini truck came having 2 - 3 persons who unloaded the silver bars and burned the silver bars in the field in presence of Taj Mohammed and Vinod Lunia. Taj Mohammed instructed him to keep a watch on the burned goods. All the persons went within an hour. He was brought from Lunia Riding Farm to the field of Hasan Mohammed in a jeep which was driven by Vinod Lunia. He could not say as to whether Taj Mohammed was working as a partner or from where the silver bars were brought by Mohammed and Vi nod Lunia. All the persons went within an hour. He was brought from Lunia Riding Farm to the field of Hasan Mohammed in a jeep which was driven by Vinod Lunia. He could not say as to whether Taj Mohammed was working as a partner or from where the silver bars were brought by Mohammed and Vi nod Lunia. On 31st March, 1992 registration certificate relating to truck No. RJ01g013 (Eicher Canter) and photo albums were recovered from Lunia Riding Farm Village Leela Sebdi, Pushka Road, Ajmer. The statements of Amar Chand Lunia recorded on 30. 3. 1992 and Sunil Lunia on 22. 4. 1992 and that of Hasan Mohammed on 12. 9. 1992. The statement of Babu Lal an employee of Lunia Riding Farm was also recorded on 31. 3. 1992 in which he has stated that Meva Ram has gone in the night of 28129th March, 1992 with Vinod Lunia in jeep and Taj Mohammed was also with him. Taj Mohammed has left the Eicher Canter at Lunia Riding Farm on 30. 3. 1992 and has gone in the morning of 31. 3. 1992 at 6. 00 a. m. towards Pushkar and has not come back. The said truck was found on 31. 3. 1992 abandoned at village Tilora near Health and Family Centre. The said truck was having the concealed cavities in the chasis. On 31. 3. 1992 the search party went to the residential premises of Vinod Lunia. The said house was found locked and therefore it was sealed. Meva Ram was ordered to be released on ball by the High Court on 28th May, 1992 and on the same date he sent a letter retracting his earlier statement by stating that Vinod Lunia has no concern with the silver. ( 3 ) IN a petition filed by Taj Mohammed before the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur for anticipatory bail it was stated that he was carrying on the goods used in the studd farm by his truck and that the said farm and restaurant are at Pushkar Road, Ajmer and are owned by Vinod Lunia and the land of the field was not purchased by Vinod Lunia from him or his family members. Meva Ram was kept for watching the silver bars left by Usuf Bhai and that he had gone to Bombay on 25th March, 1992 for the treatment of his wife and was not at Ajmer and that Vinod Lunia has no concern with the silver. On 13th September, 1992 under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 Taj Mohammed has stated that the seized silver was concealed by him in the field of his father with the help of Meva Ram and he is the owner of truck No. RJO1go13. Notices were issued to Vinod Lunia on 3. 4. 1992, 16. 4. 1992, 12. 4. 1992, 2. 6. 1992, 22. 6. 1992 and 27. 6. 1992 and lastly on 24. 9. 1992 by the Superintendent, Central Excise Jaipur at his Ajmer/bombay addresses for submitting his explanation. ( 4 ) THE orders of detention under section 3 (1) (a) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short, the Act) were issued in case of each of the petitioners on 8. 1. 1993 by the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Rajasthan, Home Department, Jaipur. These orders were served on each of the petitioners immediately after their issue except in the case of petitioner Vinod Lunia which was served with the order on August 4, 1993. Reason for this delay has been given by the non-petitioner as non-availability of the petitioner despite best efforts made by the non - petitioners. ( 5 ) THESE orders of detention have been challenged on various grounds. First contention of Shri Maksood Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the material collected by the Investigating Agency and the proposals sent by the sponsoring authority have simply been adopted by the detaining authority without even looking to the material. Re has submitted that the grounds of detention have not been formulated by the detaining authority and, therefore, the orders of detention are liable to be quashed only on the ground that the same have been passed without application of mind by - the detaining authority. Replaced reliance on the Supreme Court in Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal. Replaced reliance on the Supreme Court in Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal. In particular he placed reliance on the following portion of the decision of the Apex Court: But that does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial review ability. The Courts have by judicial decisions carved out an area, limited though it be, within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred on the executive, the court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority: if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfactions is arrived at by the authority as equired under the statute. The simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Baneri, A. I. R. 1943 FC 75 at p. 92 is a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose: such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of improper purpose, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The existence of improper purpose, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and, therefore, if, in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952scr 135 (A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 16) and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service did in Simmos Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service, (1946) 2 All ER 201 the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self created rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad where it is based on the application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value Machiner v. King, A. I. R. 1950 FC 129. The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it would not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 72. If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters. If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters. The authority must call its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider. On the basis of the above observation of the Supreme Court he argued that since there is absence of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at on the basis of consideration of the material collected by the sponsoring authority, the order of detention is vitiated. ( 6 ) THE main submission on the basis of the above proposition of law of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that after the proposals were sent by the sponsoring authority, it was the duty of the detaining authority to have formulated the ground itself. He argued that even if the grounds are not formulated by the detaining authority then it should be considered that he has acted on the dictate of the sponsoring authority and it is a case of non-application of mind. ( 7 ) THE principles which emerges from the above decision for the purpose of subjective satisfaction arc that there can be several grounds on the basis of which it could be said that there was no subjective satisfaction and by way of illustration they were enumerated (1) where the authority has not applied its mind; (2) here the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose; (3) the authority has acted on the dictate of other person; (4) where the satisfaction is based on the application of a wrong test or misconstruction of statute; (5) the satisfaction must be on the materials which are of rationally probative value and should not be extraneous to the scope/purpose of the statute so that the authority must call its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider; (6) where there is non-compliance of statutory requirements and (7) where the subjective satisfaction is not such that a reasonable person could arrived at. We have given out thoughtful consideration to this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The order of detention passed in each of these cases run on the same lines. We have given out thoughtful consideration to this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The order of detention passed in each of these cases run on the same lines. (Matter in other language) ( 8 ) SECTION 3 of the Act contemplates that if the detaining authority is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of the foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from: (i ). smuggling goods or; (ii ). abetting in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or; (iii ). engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or; (iv ). dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or; (v ). harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. A safeguard has been provided that when any order of detention is made by the State Government the report in respect thereof has to be sent to the Central Government within 10 days. It has further been provided that the detenu has to be provided with the grounds on which the detention order has been made as soon as may be after the detention but not ordinarily latter then 5 days and in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing not latter than 15 days from the date of detention. The requisite condition is that the subjective satisfaction should be of the detaining authority. If while sending the report and proposals the sponsoring authority has placed the documents before the detaining authority on perusal of which the detaining authority feels that the proposals as submitted to it are in accordance with law, then it is not necessary that the language used in the grounds should be different one or should be formulated by the detaining authority itself without adopting it from the proposals sent. ( 9 ) IN the case of Vinod Lunia affidavit of Shri Arun Kumar, Principal Secretary to the Government, Home Department has been filed and even though such affidavit of the detaining authority has not been filed in other two cases, from the perusal of the affidavit filed in Vinod Luniats case and other material which has been placed before us, we are fully satisfied that the detaining authority has not acted on the dictates of the sponsoring authority or has acted with application of mind to the record made available to it. In his affidavit the detaining authority has made an unequivocal statement that it has - considered the material placed before it and after due application of mind the order of detention has been issued. ( 10 ) ARTICLE 22 (5) of the Constitution of India has been interpreted by the Apex Court in large number of cases. In Shalini Soni v. Union of India, the Apex Court has observed as under: The Articles has two facets: (1) communication of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; (2) opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Communication of the grounds pre - supposes the formulation of the grounds and formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say to pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case and excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism (if one may be permitted to use the work to describe a mechanical reaction without a conscious application of the mind ). It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters, only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters, only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision that (but also) the grounds on which the decision is founded, it is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the decision to detain a person depends on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu. From what we have said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and. not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the second facet of Art. 22 (5) An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but to allow the factual materials which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. Whatever angle from which the question is looked at, it is clear that grounds in Art. 22 (5) do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The groundst must be self - explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which inference is made in the grounds must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds. The groundst must be self - explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which inference is made in the grounds must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds. The above exposition of law by the Supreme Court makes it clear that if the relevant material has been considered by the detaining authority and the grounds are self - explanatory, the order of detention cannot be quashed only on the ground that the detaining authority has itself not formulated the grounds of detention. The decision of Bombay High Court in Smt. Versa Vilas Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, as also the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Anwar Abdulla v. Union of India, do not in any manner help the case of the petitioners. In the first case it was observed that the order has been passed in a mechanical manner on the basis of the notings and recommendations of several junior officers and, therefore, it was a case of non application of mind on the part of the detaining authority which was under an obligation to consider the material independently and then take a decision. In Karnataka case the Court held that there was no satisfaction of the detaining authority and the order was passed without proper application of mind. It was noted that the was put before the Home Commissioner for the first time at the end of the pre lunch office hours on 7. 3. 1991. The file contained 260 full scape closely typed pages and the detaining authority had passed the order in the post lunch session. The Court concluded that it could not have been possible for the detaining authority even to peruse all the pages. ( 11 ) ON the basis of the above discussion we hold that the first argument of Shri Khan does not have any merit. It is, therefore, rejected. ( 12 ) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in passing of the order of detention. It has been submitted that the proposals sent to the Government on 27th May, 1992 and the order of detention was passed on 8. 1. 1993. The copy of the grounds of detention was served on 5th August, 1993. It has been submitted that the proposals sent to the Government on 27th May, 1992 and the order of detention was passed on 8. 1. 1993. The copy of the grounds of detention was served on 5th August, 1993. The fact of seizure of, contraband silver ingots was known to the sponsoring authority in March, 1992 beside the fact that the statement of Meva Ram was also recorded on 301 31st March, 1992 and, therefore, issue of the detention order dated 8. 1. 1993 is with inordinate and inexcusable delay. It is submitted that the object of the Act is to detain a person to prevent him from indulging in the smuggling activities and the passing of the order after such a delay suffers from vice of non - application of mind. The power under section 7 in respect of absconding person were also not exercised in the present matter. The belated exercise of the power by the detaining authority shows the inaction, inertia/indolence on his part. When the proposals were sent on 27th May, 1992 to the detaining authority there should not have been such an inordinate delay. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Apex Court in T A. Abdul Rehman v. State of Kerala, wherein it was observed that the delay throws considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with the view to preventing him for acting in prejudicial manner. The principles were summarised as under: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the Circumstances of each case. ( 13 ) ON the basis of the above principles it has to be seen as to whether there is a reasonable explanation with regard to delay. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Bombay High Court in Smt. Pushpa Trilok Chand Chopra v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , wherein it was observed that it is time that the detaining authority should realise the powers of serious consequences conferred under the Act and in case powers are to be exercised, they must be exercised with utmost urgency. The liberty to the citizen cannot be deprived merely because the detaining authority is busy with several activities connected with govt. work or enough staff is not available. The law of preventive detention is deviation from the general rule that no person should be detained without any enquiry or trial and if the resort has to be made to this power, then the authority concern with exercise of power must act with promptitude and failure to do so is bound to result in vitiating the order. This Court in Rais Khan v. Union of India, has held that the delay of 5 months in passing of the order of detention cannot be said to fatal to the prosecution. In Pradeep Neelkanth Paturkar v. Shri Ramamurti and Ors. , the delay in passing the detention order was of 5 months 8 days from the date of registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposals. In Pradeep Neelkanth Paturkar v. Shri Ramamurti and Ors. , the delay in passing the detention order was of 5 months 8 days from the date of registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposals. It was observed by the Apex Court what disturbs our mind is that the statements from the witnesses A to Z were obtained only after the detune became successful in getting bail in all the prohibition cases registered against him that too in the latter part of March, 1991. These statements were very much referred to in the grounds of detention and relied by the detaining authority along with the registration of the case under the Act. In these circumstances, the order of detention was quashed. In the present case the facts cannot be said to be similar as neither the statements of the witnesses were obtained after the detunes were released on bail nor the order granting the bail had any bearing on the grounds. In Anmaria Pereira v. Union of India, it was held by the Bombay High Court that the delay of over 5 months between the offending act and passing of the order of detention attributable to the difficulties in investigation will not vitiate the detention order since link between the offending act and passing of the order was not snapped. In Kishori Sharan Garg v. State of Rajasthan, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under:as to the question of delay in passing the detention order, we may observe that it is well settled that there is no hard and fast rule that merely because there was a time lag of some months between the offending acts and the date of the order of detention, the casual link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the detaining authority must be regarded as sham or unreal. No mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the notice of the acts relied on, grave or determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reasons for delay in taking preventive action, information of participation available in the course of investigation. It has to be investigated, whether the connection has been broken in the circumstances of the case. It has to be investigated, whether the connection has been broken in the circumstances of the case. There is, therefore, no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of some months or so, between the offending acts and the date of the order of detention. The casual link must be taken to be broken, and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the detaining authority must be regarded as sham or unreal. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the Court for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenue is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it sub serves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate: or drown itt The fact of no activities were noticed on the part of detenue indicating that he continued to keep the smuggled goods and the order of detention having been passed after 7 months of raid was held to. be immaterial in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U. P. This judgment of the Allahabad High Court was upheld by the Apex Court in 1984 (4) S. C. C. 558. 12. In Rajendra Kumar v. State of Gujarat, the Apex Court has gone even to the extent that even in the absence of explanation for delay, the inference could not be drawn that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was not genuine or that grounds were stale or illusory if there is delay in making the order of detention. In Surendra Pal Grover v. Union of India, reply to the show cause notice was given to the petitioner in adjudication proceedings and statements of witnesses were not taken into consideration by the detaining authority while passing the detention order. In these circumstances it was held that the order is vitiated because of non-consideration of those documents and in addition thereto the delay of eight and half months was also not explained, the detention order was set aside. In these circumstances it was held that the order is vitiated because of non-consideration of those documents and in addition thereto the delay of eight and half months was also not explained, the detention order was set aside. The decision of Bombay High Court in Mahesh Ganga Ram v. Shri L. Hmingliana, wherein there was delay of more than three months for placing the proposal before the screening committee when the investigation was complete and the documents were available and the sponsoring authority was not serious for a period of over three months to place the proposals before the screening committee and after the proposals were received by the detaining authority and draft grounds were prepared the order was passed after two months without any explanation, it was held that the power of detention was exercised in extremely casual manner having no live-link between the date of incident and the order of detention was held vitiated. ( 14 ) ON the basis of the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court in A. I. R. l99osupreme Court 225 (supra) the only thing required to be scrutinised is as to whether there is reasonable ex planation for the delay. The length of time by itself is not sufficient to snap the nexus between the incident and the order of detention. If a very old or stale incident is taken into consideration then it may justifiably be challenged on the ground of delay. The test of proximity is not rigid or mechanical test. In the present matters the proposals were sent by the sponsoring authority on 27th May, 1992 and the meeting of the screening committee was held on 8th July, 1992. The papers were returned by the Deputy Secretary, Home for making a detailed fresh note and they were submitted on 12. 11. 1992. On that very day they were produced before the Special Secretary, Home Department and on 13. 11. 1992 they were placed before the Special Secretary, Home, Law Department and the file was received back by the Deputy Secretary, Home on 17. 11. 1992 who has placed the same before the Minister, Home Affairs who approved the proposal. In the meantime some additional grounds for detention was also received from the Custom Department which was incorporated in the grounds of detention and note-sheet was prepared on 11. 12. 1992. 11. 1992 who has placed the same before the Minister, Home Affairs who approved the proposal. In the meantime some additional grounds for detention was also received from the Custom Department which was incorporated in the grounds of detention and note-sheet was prepared on 11. 12. 1992. which was submitted to the Special Secretary, Home (Law) from where it was returned on 14. 12. 1992 and the file was put up before the Deputy Secretary/special Secretary on 15. 12. 1992 and was sent to the Chief Secretary but since the proclamation had already been issued for disolution of the Assembly and the Presidents rule had been imposed, the file was sent to the Advisor on 21. 12. 1992 and ultimately the order of detention was passed on 8. 1. 1993. ( 15 ) THE record which has been placed before the Court shows that the proposals for detention of the petitioners had been sent by the sponsoring authority on 27. 5. 1992. When the relevant papers were received in the Home Department, the same were placed before the screening committee. The screening committee made recommendation on 8. 7. 1992 for passing of order of detention of the petitioners under section 3 (1) of the Act. It further appears from the record that separate files were prepared for each of the case which were recommended by the screening committee including those of the three petitioners. The files regarding detention of petitioners were opened on 20. 9. 1992 and were placed before the Deputy Secretary, Home. It was then returned for preparing a detailed fresh note. This note was prepared and submitted on 12. 11. 1992. It can therefore be said that a period of over two months was consumed in placing the papers before the Deputy Secretary, Home. It has been stated before us by an additional affidavit that there is acute shortage of staff with the persons who have been dealing in these matters. It has also been stated that in the months of August and September 11 files were opened separately. It has been stated before us by an additional affidavit that there is acute shortage of staff with the persons who have been dealing in these matters. It has also been stated that in the months of August and September 11 files were opened separately. Shri Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners may be justified in arguing that the time consumed by the lower officers in dealing with the matter cannot by itself be sufficient to overlook the delay in consideration of the matter but in our opinion what the Court is required to see in each and every case of detention is as to whether on account of delay the casual relationship between the incident and the passing of the order has been broken. In large number of cases referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners orders of detention have been quashed on the ground of delay but a perusal of those judgments show that in each case the courts felt satisfied that the explanation for delay is wholly unsatisfactory and that the link between the incident and the object of detention has been snapped. ( 16 ) IN Ashok Narain v. Union of India, as also in Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that mere delay in making the order of detention is by itself not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the detaining authority was not satisfied about the necessity of passing a detention order. In Ashok Narains case there was a delay of more than 8 months and the Court observed that passage of time from the date of initial apprehension of the detenu and the making of the order of detention was not occasioned by any laxity on the part of the concerned agencies but it was a result of consideration of the case at various levels of the different department. In Mallick Shaw v. State of West Bengal, it was held that period of delay of 5 months between the date of incident and the date of passing of the order of detention cannot be considered to be unreasonable so as to discredit the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In Mallick Shaw v. State of West Bengal, it was held that period of delay of 5 months between the date of incident and the date of passing of the order of detention cannot be considered to be unreasonable so as to discredit the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. ( 17 ) IN these cases even though delay of two months between the date of consideration by the screening committee and the initiation of the process thereafter by the Home Department has not been satisfactorily explained but it cannot altogether be ignored that one of the petitioners namely Vinod Lunia had been absconding. The detaining authority has carefully applied its mind to the material record and after taking note of the various facts it formed an opinion that it was imperative to order of detention of the petitioners under the Act. After perusing the record we are satisfied that the detaining authority has duly applied its mind and the subjective satisfaction arrived at by it cannot be treated as vitiated merely because of lapse of time. In our view the live link was not broken. (3) It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is non- application of mind: (a) because the order passed is on different grounds and is at variance with the grounds of detaining; (b) that there was no material with the detaining authority to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioners are involved in the act of smuggling; (c) the conclusions which have been arrived at in the grounds of detention are contradictory. 3 (a) It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that the detaining authority is satisfied that in order to prevent the smuggling activities under the Act the petitioners are to be detained for violation of provisions of Section 3 (1), (2) and (3 ). In the order of detention it has been mentioned that the petitioners are to be detained for their alleged activities which fall under Section (ii), (iii) and (iv) and thus the order of detention being at variance with the grounds is liable to be quashed for this reason alone. In the order of detention it has been mentioned that the petitioners are to be detained for their alleged activities which fall under Section (ii), (iii) and (iv) and thus the order of detention being at variance with the grounds is liable to be quashed for this reason alone. (Hindi Matter) ( 18 ) RELIANCE has been placed on the decision of Vijay Kumar Dharna v. Union of India wherein it was held by the Apex Court that on account of the variance in the order of detention and grounds of detention the detenu was not able to effectively represent his case before the concerned authorities and he was confused as to whether he should represent against his detention for smuggling of goods and/or abetting the smuggling of goods or for engaging in transporting and concealing smuggled goods and/or in dealing in smuggled goods. Beside this the English version of the detention order was only for abetting the smuggling of the goods and the satisfaction recorded in Gurmikhi version of the grounds of detention was not consistent with the purpose for detention found in the detention order and on account of variance the detention order was quashed. Reliance has also been placed on an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vimal Kumar Kundan Mal v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , wherein it was held that when the order of detention refers to the subjective satisfaction in respect of one ground while the ground of detention reflect satisfaction in respect of other ground, then the detenue is clearly prevented from making effective representation and is unable to understand on what basis the power of detention is exercised. The variance in the order and grounds deprive the detenue of making effective representation and thereby the fundamental guarantee conferred under Article 22 of the Constitution of India is denied. In the order of Islamuddin Badruddin Shekh v. L. Hmingliana, it was held that variance between the grounds of detention and the order of detention prevented the detenu from making effective representation under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Similar view has been taken in Moses Michael Patil v. Shri B. B. S. Sohar and Ors. In the order of Islamuddin Badruddin Shekh v. L. Hmingliana, it was held that variance between the grounds of detention and the order of detention prevented the detenu from making effective representation under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Similar view has been taken in Moses Michael Patil v. Shri B. B. S. Sohar and Ors. , it was held that the total variance in the ground bf detention and the order of detention affected the constitutional right of the detenue to make effective representation and the order of detention is liable to be struck down on this ground. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in the case of Smt. Sangeeta Rajendra Bapna v. State of Maharashtra, where the detention order was passed only on one ground and not on number of grounds. The activity was not falling within clause (iv) of subsection (1) of Section 3 but was falling under clause (iii) of section (1) of Section 3 and it was held relying on the earlier decision of Bombay High Court in Smt. Shashi Kala Krishna Roo Rane v. Union of India. , wherein it was observed that Section 5 (A) relates to the grounds furnished to a detenue in support of order of detention. It does not apply to an order of detention and, therefore, the order of detention is vitiated on that ground. The view which has been taken by the Bombay High Court is although after taking into consideration the provisions of Section S-A of the Act and the decision of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Chaman Lal Manji Bhai Sons, A. I. R. 1981 Supreme Court 1480, the view which has been taken by the learned Judges appears to us contrary to the specific language used in section 5a (a ). The provisions of Section S-A reads as under: 5 - A. Grounds of detention severable.- Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub - section (1) of Sec. 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly (a) Such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason what so ever, it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said subsection (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. ( 19 ) THE provisions of Section 5 - A makes it clear that where there are number of grounds of detention then the order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative because one or some of the grounds are not in existence or relevant. The order of detention has to be passed on the grounds and if the order of detention is declared statutorily not to be invalid or inoperative for the various exigencies mentioned in the section then it cannot be challenged on that ground. In accordance with the provisions of Section 5-A the order of detention has to be considered to have been made separately on each of the grounds and even if anyone of them fails then for that reason the detention order cannot be considered to be bad. It is on the basis of the remaining ground that the validity of the detention order could be examined and if after excluding the invalid nonexisting/irrelevant unconnected/vague ground the order can survive on the basis of the remaining ground then the order cannot be declared invalid. It is on the basis of the remaining ground that the validity of the detention order could be examined and if after excluding the invalid nonexisting/irrelevant unconnected/vague ground the order can survive on the basis of the remaining ground then the order cannot be declared invalid. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not submitted that the various activities mentioned in the order of detention were not in existence so as to render the order of detention invalid or inoperative. In view of the provisions of Sec. 5 - A the decisions relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners arc not applicable. The contention raised therefore, has no force and is rejected. ( 20 ) IT has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no material to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioners were smuggling/abetting or dealing in the smuggled goods. So far as the fact of engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods is concerned, that has not been disputed. ( 21 ) RELIANCE has been placed on an unreported decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Hajari Mal Veer Chand v. State of Maharashtra and others, wherein it was observed that the activity of smuggling of goods, mentioned in clause (iv) of sub - sec. (1) of Section 3 must be attributed restrictive meaning. Meaning of the phrase smuggling of goods used in the said clause is not as wide as the meaning attached to the word smuggling by the definition given in section 2 (e) of the COFEPOSA Act read with Sec. 239 of the Customs Act. Smuggling of goods contemplate by clause (i) of sub - section (1) of Sec. 3 mean to activities of smuggling other than those mentioned in clauses (ii) to (v) and, therefore, indulging in activities purchasing of smuggled gold would neither amount to smuggling nor abatement there of. On the basis of this judgment it has been submitted that the petitioners were not involved in smuggling of goods from, out of country and, therefore, even the allegation of abetting the smuggling of goods cannot be made against the petitioners. The statements of the various persons which have been recorded were also brought to our notice. On the basis of this judgment it has been submitted that the petitioners were not involved in smuggling of goods from, out of country and, therefore, even the allegation of abetting the smuggling of goods cannot be made against the petitioners. The statements of the various persons which have been recorded were also brought to our notice. Under Article 226 of the Constitution it has to be seen as to whether the order of detention has been passed on the material available with the detaining authority on record. The subjective satisfaction has to be of the detaining authority and the court would interfere only when no reasonable person could on the basis of the record available can be satisfied for passing the order of detention. Even the adequacy of reasonableness of the satisfaction is not open to be examined by the High Court then the only thing which is to be seen is whether there is any material on record or not. The statements which have been, given under section 108 and the investigation which has been carried on by the Customs Department constitute sufficient material. The act of bringing the goods from the foreign country to India is not to be established beyond doubt. The power which are to be exercised under the COFEPOSA Act are for prevention of smuggling and the silver bars which were found were having foreign marks on them and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is no material for passing of the order. This contention has no force and is, therefore, rejected. ( 22 ) IT has been submitted that the conclusions drawn are contradictory in the ground itself. To elaborate it more specifically it was stated that it was mentioned in the grounds that the action of prosecution could be taken under the common law but there is a possibility of being released on bail and as such the petitioners are liable to be involved in smuggling in future and as such the order under section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act is being passed. It is submitted that it was only in the case of Meva Ram that he was released on bail and there was no possibility of the other two petitioners for being released on bail in near future as even the application for bail was neither pending nor moved. It is submitted that it was only in the case of Meva Ram that he was released on bail and there was no possibility of the other two petitioners for being released on bail in near future as even the application for bail was neither pending nor moved. ( 23 ) RELIANCE has been placed on the unreported decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Leo Nardo Vilarico v. Shri L. Hmingliana, wherein the ground furnished on the detenue it was recited that the assay report is awaited while in fact on the date of order and the grounds were drawn up the assay report was received. It was held that it was a case of non application of mind. In the case of Smt. Shakina Abbas Bhai v. Union of India and Ors. wherein on 14. 10. 1988 the date on which the detention order was passed neither any prosecution was launched nor the adjudication proceedings were started and the sanction for prosecution was obtained on 30. 11. 1989, it was held that the order of detention is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. In Jogindra Kaul Hanjara v. J. P. Dange and others, the fact of the detenue being not released on bail was taken note of but it was observed that the people facing charges of transporting smuggled goods are normally granted bail was considered a ground for detaining as a preventive measure. This was considered a case of non application/confusion of mind and the order of detention was quashed. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Madras High Court in Muthu Muthu Mohammed v. Govt. of Tamilnadu where the order passed in the bail application in adverse, case relied on by the detaining authority, the copy of the said document was not furnished to the detenue and as such it was held that the order is vitiated as the petitioner was deprived of making effective representation. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, has laid down the principles in respect of detaining a person who is already in jail. The validity of the detention order in each case has to be examined looking to the fact of that case. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, has laid down the principles in respect of detaining a person who is already in jail. The validity of the detention order in each case has to be examined looking to the fact of that case. In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India where it was observed by the detaining authority TIJ am aware that you are under judicial custody and possibility of your release on bail in the near future cannot be ruled out. Also nothing prevents you from moving bail application in the jurisdictional court and getting release on bailtt. It was held by the Apex Court that the detention order can validly be passed even in a case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenue was already in custody. When such awareness is there then it should appear from the grounds that there was enough material necessitating the detention of the person in custody. This aspect depends I upon various considerations and facts and circumstances of each case. If there is a possibility of being released on bail and on being so released he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity then that would be one such compelling necessity to pass the detention order. The order cannot be quashed on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a High Court. ( 24 ) SPECIFIC ground has further been taken that the possibility of bail being granted is without any basis and there was no compelling reasons. The decision in the case of Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat v. Union of India, has been relied. It was held in this case that the order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show (1) that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue is already in detention and (2) there was compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The expression compelling reasons in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenue is likely to be released from the custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in. order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. Reliance has also been placed on the decision in the case of Kamarunnisa v. Union of India, wherein the order of detention was passed while detenues were in judicial custody. The statement made in the grounds that detenues were charged of bailable offence. The use of the expression bailable was considered to have been used in the legal sense that bail is normally granted and this would not be considered to be a case of non -application of mind. The only thing which was required to be seen that there could have been reliable material. The decision in the case of Ajay Pal Singh Sethi v. Union of India , Punjab and Haryana High Court has also been relied where it was held that the order of detention was passed when the petitioners were already in custody and it was just a day earlier to the hearing of the bail application. The bail application was ultimately dismissed. It was observed that when there was no chance of petitioner coming out of jail his detention order cannot be upheld. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Khail Asghar v. Union of India, wherein it was held that a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities on release from jail is enough for detaining authority to justify an order of detention. ( 25 ) THE satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioners if tried under common law could be released on bail cannot be said is without any material. One of the petitioners Meva Ram was released on bail. Petitioner Vinod Lunia remained absconding for a considerable time and under law no one is prevented for moving the application for bail which could or could not have been accepted. One of the petitioners Meva Ram was released on bail. Petitioner Vinod Lunia remained absconding for a considerable time and under law no one is prevented for moving the application for bail which could or could not have been accepted. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioner if tried under the common law is possible to be released on bail cannot be said to be without any basis. No inference is required even on this ground to declare the order of detention as invalid on account of non- application of mind. In Rais Khan v. Union of India (supra) this court has held that where the bail application of the detenue was rejected by the Sessions Judge and there was no possibility of detenue being set at liberty the satisfaction of the detaining authority that there is compelling necessity in view of the likelihood of the detenue being released on bail under the normal law and the likelihood of his indulging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, the order of detention can validity be passed. ( 26 ) THE grounds of detention cannot be said to be not proximate in time to provide rational nexus between the incident and the satisfaction arrived at In Hawabi Syed Arif v. L. Hmingliana, the sweeping remarks the persons who are charged with smuggling are generally granted bailt were found unjustifiable and unwarranted and were strongly condemned. The filing of successive bail application was considered with all the condition that are necessary to satisfy the compelling reasons for passing the order of detentions were satisfied. ( 27 ) THE submission that after the goods have crossed the border the activity at the most could be considered as transporting and not of smuggling has also no substance because these are the various links of a chain and the action which is being taken is to break the chain by preventing the persons engaged in it. The entirety of the circumstances has to be seen. The truck is having a concealed cavity which cannot be but for their designed plan and regular activity. ( 28 ) IN the case of Taj Mohammed it was submitted that the detaining authority was not justified in coming to the conclusion that merely while transporting the goods the detenue abetted in the act of smuggling. The truck is having a concealed cavity which cannot be but for their designed plan and regular activity. ( 28 ) IN the case of Taj Mohammed it was submitted that the detaining authority was not justified in coming to the conclusion that merely while transporting the goods the detenue abetted in the act of smuggling. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Harbhagwan Das Vasuram Bahal37. The facts of that case have no application to the case of the present detenu inasmuch as the canter (vehicle) was having the concealed cavity which was purposely designed and, therefore, an inference could be drawn that the petitioner abetted in the activities of smuggling and he was fully aware that the act committed by him is going to facilitate the smuggling. It has to be considered from the facts of each case as to whether mere transporting amounts to indulging in smuggling of goods or indulging in abetting the smuggling of goods. The act of transportation and concealing has not been denied. The entire facts have to be taken into consideration and on the basis of which it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was without any material. This contention has also no force and is rejected. In the matter of Vinod Lunia additional ground has also been raised that he was taken in custody on 4. 8. 1993 and was brought to Jaipur but the grounds of detention were served on 5. 8. 1993 till next day. In the reply submitted it has been stated that the petitioner was apprehended in Bombay on 4th August, 1993 and was brought to Jaipur same day and served with the detention order. The receipt of the petitioner has also been produced. Since the order of detention was available at Jaipur and was served on the same day it cannot be said that there was undue delay in serving the order of detention. Another objection in the case of Vinod Lunia which has been taken is that representation was submitted on 20. 8. 1993 and was rejected by the State Government on 22. 9. 1993 and by the Central Government on 21. 9. 1993 and the delay in disposing of the representation vitiate the order of detention. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Mahesh Kumar Banti v. Union of India and Ors. 8. 1993 and was rejected by the State Government on 22. 9. 1993 and by the Central Government on 21. 9. 1993 and the delay in disposing of the representation vitiate the order of detention. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Mahesh Kumar Banti v. Union of India and Ors. , Julia Jose Mavely v. Union of India and Ors. ( 29 ) FROM the documents produced it is evident that the representation was received by the detaining authority on 24. 8. 1993 and the comments of the sponsoring authority were as on 25. 8. 1993. The sponsoring authority sent the papers on 27. 8. 1993 by speed post from Jaipur to Ajmer for getting the report which was received on 1. 9. 1993 by the Ajmer office. The Ajmer office sent the comment on 4. 9. 1993 to Jaipur office of the sponsoring authority. The Jaipur office added more remarks on 10. 9. 1993 and the comments were despatched on 14. 9. 1993. The delay in the present case has satisfactorily been explained and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the detention of the petitioner cannot be vitiated on this ground. ( 30 ) IT has also been brought to our notice that Vinod Lunia was detained under COFEPOSA Act, 1974 vide order dt. 16. 3. 1989 and was released on 31. 7. 1989 by the order of the Court He was again found involved in smuggling and the matter is still pending. Since these documents were not placed on record they are not taken into consideration. It has also been submitted that a reply was filed on 21. 12. 1992 by Vinod Luoia to the show cause notice issued against him by the Collector of Custom in which it was stated that the petitioner had no concern with the silver seized on 30. 3. 1992 and the field from where it was seized also does not belong to him. This reply to show cause notice was not placed before the detaining authority and thus the material document which has the potentiality to sway the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority having not been placed and as such non-consideration vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. This reply to show cause notice was not placed before the detaining authority and thus the material document which has the potentiality to sway the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority having not been placed and as such non-consideration vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Ayya Ayub v. State of U. p. , on the proposition that omission to consider the relevant material by the detaining authority vitiated the order of detention on the ground of non-application of mind. ( 31 ) WE have seen the copy of the alleged reply. The said reply was neither signed by the petitioner nor by any person authorised by him. Even the Vakalatnama of the Advocate who had signed the reply has not been sent along with the reply. Beside this it he not been stated that the reply is being sent by Anil Saxena under the instruction or on behalf of Vinod Lunia. After the word sincerely yours the name of Vinod K. Lunia is typed on which Anil Saxena has signed and it is not even signed as Tfor or on behalf of Vinod Lunia. The word through has been written after the typed name which cannot bind the petitioner of any content of the representation and, therefore, the respondents were under no obligation to consider the said communication as are presentation of the petitioner. Besides this the show cause notice dated 14. 9. 1992 was pasted at the residential house of the petitioner on 28. 9. 1992 to submit the reply within 30 days which was not complied with and the proposals were approved by the detaining authority on 21. 12. 1992. No illegality has been committed in not placing the said representation before the detaining authority. It has also been submitted that the application for anticipatory bail was rejected by the District and Sessions Judge and the copy of the application was not placed before the detaining authority. This submission has also no force because all the reasons discussed above and the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioner could be released on bail was found not baseless. There was no material incorporated in the application which was not considered when the fact case possibility of being released was mentioned in the ground itself. This submission has also no force because all the reasons discussed above and the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioner could be released on bail was found not baseless. There was no material incorporated in the application which was not considered when the fact case possibility of being released was mentioned in the ground itself. In the matter of Meva Ram it has been submitted that the use of the word engaged in section 1 (iii) contemplate a continuous activity and one incidence cannot be considered that the petitioner was habitually or consistently involved in the activities. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Shashi Kala v. Union of India, 1987 Cr. L. J. 1787. The contention has also no force. Even a single incident could lead to the conclusion that a person is engaged in the activity. ( 32 ) THE fact that large volume of smuggled goods were recovered in this case coupled with the fact that the career (canter) was having concealed cavity and the fact that Meva Ram was in the employment of petitioner Vinod Lunia, are sufficient to show that the Detaining Authority had applied its mind before passing the order of detention. Even if no other activity on the part of the petitioner had been detected it cannot be said that detaining authority had not applied its mind. Therefore, contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. ( 33 ) ON the basis of the discussion, we have held that the petitioners are not entitled to issue of writ of habeas corpus. All the three petitions are liable to be dismissed and they are hereby dismissed. ( 34 ) BEFORE parting with the case we would like to remind the State Government of its responsibility in relating to preventive detention matters. It is unfortunate that the Government has ignored the observations made by the Apex Court and this Court on more than one occasion that it should make end favor to set its machinery in order for expeditious dealing of the cases relating to detention. We wish to remind the Government that it is in the larger public interest that such like matters are dealt with greatest urgency. People must not be allowed to entertain a feeling that the Government is lax deliberately or otherwise, in such case involving large quantities of smuggled goods. We wish to remind the Government that it is in the larger public interest that such like matters are dealt with greatest urgency. People must not be allowed to entertain a feeling that the Government is lax deliberately or otherwise, in such case involving large quantities of smuggled goods. It will therefore be appropriate for the government to make available proper staff to the concerned cell of the Home Department and it should be the end favor of the government to see that matters which are brought to its notice under the different statues are dealt with expeditiously so that the people regains its confidence in the working of the government in such like matters. Petition dismissed. .