JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner who is a member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service has filed this petition with the prayer that adverse remarks made in his Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1982, 1983,1986 and 1987 may be ordered to be expunged and the order dated, 27th January 1990 by which his representations have been rejected, be set aside. 2. Necessary facts of the case are that the petitioner joined Rajasthan Judicial Service in the year 1980. During last 13 years he has remained posted as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate as well as Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate. In the year 1982, the petitioner remained posted as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Karauli, District Sawai Madhopur. Shri Govind Ram Bansal and Amar Nath Purohit were District Judges at Sawai Madhopur during that period. In the year 1983, the petitioner was posted as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Madal, District Bhilwara. Shri Amar Nath Purohit was District Judge, Bhilwara during the relevant year. In the years 1985 to June 1988 the petitioner remained posted as Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jhalawar and during this period Shri Arvind Kumar Misra, Shri Amar Singh Godhara and Shri Navrang Rai Jatav were District Judges, Jhalawar for different periods. For the year 1982, the petitioner was conveyed adverse remarks in his confidential report vide letter dated, 14.9.1989 of the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court. For the year 1983 he was conveyed with adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Report by communication dated, 14.9.1989 (Annex. 2) of the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court. For the years 1986 and 1987 also the petitioner has been conveyed with adverse remarks vide communications dated, 14.9.1989 (Annexs. 3 and 4). On receipt of these communications the petitioner submitted applications Annexures-5, 6, 7 and 8 and requested that he may be supplied with the grounds on which adverse remarks were made in his Annual Confidential Reports. According to him, these grounds were not supplied to him. He therefore, made representations (Annexs. 9 to 12), dated 28.9.1989. These representations have been rejected by order dated, 27th January 1990 (Annex. 13). The petitioner has challenged the adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Reports on the ground that remarks were communicated to him after a lapse of number of years and this abnormal delay in the communication of the adverse remarks has by itself made them insignificant. These representations have been rejected by order dated, 27th January 1990 (Annex. 13). The petitioner has challenged the adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Reports on the ground that remarks were communicated to him after a lapse of number of years and this abnormal delay in the communication of the adverse remarks has by itself made them insignificant. Asserting that on account of delay in communication of adverse remarks the petitioner has suffered serious prejudice, he has pleaded that adverse remarks should be quashed only on the ground of delayed communication. Another plea raised by the petitioner is that adverse opinions recorded in his Confidential Reports are without any basis and that the remarks are arbitrary and cryptic. He has challenged rejection of his representation on the ground of arbitrariness. He has pleaded that he had not been furnished with the material which constituted the basis of adverse remarks. Petitioner has stated that during January 1986 to June 1986 Shri A.K. Mishra was his District Judge. Between June 1987 and December 1987, Shri Navrang Rai was his District Judge. Neither of them made adverse remarks in his confidential reports. Shri Amar Singh Godhara was his third District Judge and he has made adverse remarks due to personal annoyance which was on account of a mandatory injunction passed by the petitioner against the then Collector, Jhalawar who happened to be the close of Shri Amar Singh Godhara. He has further claimed that there were no complaints against him from the members of the Bar during the years 1982 to 1983. His relations with the Bar were very cordial. On the basis of these submissions the petitioner has made the prayers as aforesaid. 3. In reply, the respondent has stated that the petitioner had remained posted as Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate Jhalawar between 30.5.1985 to 7.6.1988. Shri Arvind Kumar Mishra was District Judge, Jhalawar between 14.12.1984 to 8.5.1986. Shri Amar Singh Godhara was District Judge, Jhalawar from 11.6.1986 to 14.8.1987 and Shri Navrang Rai was District Judge, Jhalawar between 18.8.1987 to 25.6.1988. Respondent has pleaded that representations of the petitioner against the adverse remarks were duly considered and the same were rejected. Respondent has stated that the Government instructions regarding Annual Confidential Reports/Annual Performance Appraisal Reports are not applicable to the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service. Respondent has pleaded that representations of the petitioner against the adverse remarks were duly considered and the same were rejected. Respondent has stated that the Government instructions regarding Annual Confidential Reports/Annual Performance Appraisal Reports are not applicable to the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service. It has also been stated by the respondent that a decision to communicate the un-communicated adverse remarks was taken by the High Court in the year 1989 and in pursuance, of that decision large number of Judicial Officers were communicated with adverse entries. Representations submitted by the petitioner were considered by a Committee of three Hon'ble Judges of the High Court and on recommendation of the Committee, Hon'ble Chief Justice has rejected his representations. Respondent has pleaded that adverse remarks have been made by the reporting Officers who were in position to watch the performance of the petitioner and therefore, it cannot be said that the adverse remarks have been made without any basis. 4. In pursuance of the directions given by the Court, Shri R.M. Lodha, learned Counsel for the respondent has produced the file containing confidential reports of the petitioner, file containing rep-resentations of the petitioner and the report of the Committee constituted by Hon'ble Chief Justice on 13.9.1989 for consideration of the representations made by various officers against the adverse remarks. Argument of Shri Paras Kuhad, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that adverse remarks for all the years have been communicated to the petitioner after lapse of number of years and this delay by itself is sufficient for quashing the adverse remarks. Shri Kuhad submitted that the making of entries in the Annual Confidential Reports and communication thereof are intended to provide an opportunity to the Officer concerned to improve upon his performance and remove the deficiencies pointed out by way of adverse remarks. This approach is totally frustrated on account of abnormal delay in the communication of adverse remarks, argued Shri Kuhad. Another submission of Shri Kuhad is that the representations submitted by the petitioner against the adverse remarks have been rejected without assigning any reason. He argued that rejection has been conveyed to the petitioner by Annexure-13, dated 27.1.1990 in a cyclostyle proforma and that is a proof of non-application of mind by the competent Authority. Shri Kuhad then argued that there is no basis for the adverse remarks made in the confidential reports of the petitioner. He argued that rejection has been conveyed to the petitioner by Annexure-13, dated 27.1.1990 in a cyclostyle proforma and that is a proof of non-application of mind by the competent Authority. Shri Kuhad then argued that there is no basis for the adverse remarks made in the confidential reports of the petitioner. According to him, adverse remarks have been made without there being any material against the petitioner. His integrity certificate has been with held by the then District Judge without any tangible complaint against the petitioner. Shri Kuhad argued that before with holding of the integrity certificate and before making any adverse entry in his confidential reports, it was the duty of the Reporting Officer to have communicated to the petitioner the deficiency and draw backs in his work, performance and integrity and an opportunity should have been given to him to make improvement. That has not been done. Therefore, action of the Reporting Officer in making adverse remarks is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Shri R.M. Lodha, learned Counsel for the respondent has strenuously argued that this Court has no jurisdiction to examine the legality, validity and propriety of the adverse remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports because, they are based on the subjective satisfaction. Shri Lodha pointed out that no Rules or Administrative orders have been issued for preparation of the adverse remarks and no time limit has been fixed for communication of the adverse remarks and for taking a decision on representations made against the adverse remarks and therefore, mere delay of few years in the communication of the adverse remarks cannot be a valid ground for quashing the same. Shri Lodha submitted that adverse remarks made in the confidential reports of the Judicial Officers have to be treated differently than ordinary Civil Servants and those principles which are applied for making an adjudication of the service disputes of the Civil Servants cannot and must not be applied to the service disputes of the Judicial Officers. Shri Lodha pointed out that adverse remarks for the year 1982 are founded on the report of the Inspecting Judge, which was duly communicated to the petitioner and his explanation was found to be unsatisfactory. Shri Lodha pointed out that adverse remarks for the year 1982 are founded on the report of the Inspecting Judge, which was duly communicated to the petitioner and his explanation was found to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, mere delay of six years or so in communication of the adverse remarks for the year 1982 cannot afford justification for invalidation of the adverse entries, argued Shri Lodha. He then submitted that integrity of a Judicial Officer has to be adjudged by the immediate Reporting Officer who has knowledge regarding the Judicial Officers' conduct and character who is immediately subordinate to him. Assessment made by the Reporting Officer cannot be made subject matter of judicial scrutiny, argued Shri Lodha. Shri Lodha further argued that the principles of natural justice are not attracted in the making of remarks in the confidential reports or in deciding the representation submitted by the aggrieved Officer. Reasons are not required to be recorded and communicated to the concerned Officer, argued Shri P>Lodha. 5. Before I proceed further, two legal questions deserve to be determined. First question arises out of the submission of Shri Lodha, learned Counsel for the respondent that the yard-stick to be applied for adjudication of the service disputes involving Judicial Officers should be different than the one applied in the cases of ordinary Civil Servants. Shri Lodha is right in submitting that the members of the Judicial Service cannot be equated with ordinary civil servants. They are part of one of the constitutional organs of the State and their control vests with the High Court as provided in Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Decisions in respect of Judicial Officers are ordinarily required to be taken by Full Court. All Judges meeting in the Full Court discuss the matter before a decision is reached and therefore, it can be said that such decisions should normally be free from arbitrariness. There are inherent checks in the scheme of control which is exercised by the High Court over subordinate judiciary. Their working is also quite different than persons holding other civil posts. However, it is not possible to accept the wide and sweeping argument of Shri Lodha. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the members of the Judicial Service are as much citizens of this country and they enjoy constitutional protections as are available to other citizens. Their working is also quite different than persons holding other civil posts. However, it is not possible to accept the wide and sweeping argument of Shri Lodha. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the members of the Judicial Service are as much citizens of this country and they enjoy constitutional protections as are available to other citizens. They are entitled to enjoy equality in the matter of employment and conditions of service in the same measure as other Civil Servants. They also enjoy the protection provided by Article 311 of the Constitution of India simpliciter, but these Rules are framed by the Government in consultation with the High Court. The protection which is available to the Judicial Officers under these rules is more or less similar to the one provided to other civil servants. Judicial Officers are entitled to constitutional protection against arbitrary and mala fide action. Therefore, no distinction can possibly be made between the members of the Judicial Service vis-a-vis other civil services for deciding the case filed by the Judicial Officers in the Court. A Court of law would be failing in the constitutional duty if arbitrary action taken against the Judicial Officers is upheld by applying the specious plea that the Judicial Service is different than other civil services. It will be a total negation of the Constitutional scheme and the rule of law if different yard-sticks were to be applied for adjudication of disputes involving a particular kind of litigation, may it be in realtion to a Judicial Officer. Similar view has been expressed by J.S. Verma J. (as he then was) in S.N. Jog v. State of M.P., 1981(2) SLR 352, wherein it has been observed : "There can be not doubt that principles applicable for deciding the cases of a subordinate Judge are the same as in the case of other Government servants and no distinction be- tween them can be made in this ground. Accordingly, we have applied the same principle in deciding the points urged on behalf of the petitioner as is the suggestion of the petitioner's counsel." 6. In my humble but considered opinion these observations reflect the correct principles of law. Therefore, this part of the argument of Shri Lodha is rejected. 7. Accordingly, we have applied the same principle in deciding the points urged on behalf of the petitioner as is the suggestion of the petitioner's counsel." 6. In my humble but considered opinion these observations reflect the correct principles of law. Therefore, this part of the argument of Shri Lodha is rejected. 7. The other point which requires determination arises out of an argument of Shri Kuhad that the principles of natural justice are applicable to the decision of the representation made by an aggrieved Officer/employee against the adverse remarks communicated to him in his Annual Confidential Report. Shri Kuhad submitted that every administrative action of the State is liable to be tested on the touch stone of reasonableness and fairness and therefore, recording of reasons and communication thereof is inherent in the duty imposed on the competent Authority to decide the representation made against the adverse remarks communicated to an officer/employee. To my mind, extension of the principles of natural justice sought to be made of Shri Kuhad in the cases of rejection of representation made against adverse remarks cannot be accepted. This issue stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri, 1991(3) S.C.C. 38 . In that case, the Apex Court has specifically negatived the contention that the communication containing rejection of representation made against the adverse remarks in the Confidential Reports should contain reasons. However, the Court further held that the reasons contained in the Officer notings can be produced before the Court as and when a challenge is made to adverse remarks and the Court can look into the reasons which led to the rejection of the representation made by the aggrieved employee. These observations of the Supreme Court are sufficiently indicative of the fact that the Courts have jurisdiction to make a judicial review of the adverse remarks made in the ACRs of employees who obviously include Judicial Officers. It is also logical to hold that the decision of representation made by an employee against the adverse remarks is also subject to scrutiny by the Court. In what circumstances the Court shall interfere depends on the facts of each case. 8. Coming to the mertis of the case, I would first examine the argument of Shri Kuhad that belated communication of the adverse remarks is by itself sufficient to quash the adverse remarks. In what circumstances the Court shall interfere depends on the facts of each case. 8. Coming to the mertis of the case, I would first examine the argument of Shri Kuhad that belated communication of the adverse remarks is by itself sufficient to quash the adverse remarks. Counter argument of Shri Lodha is that mere delay cannot be a ground for striking down the adverse remarks. Before proceeding further I would like to restate that according to the respondents Neither Statutory Rules have been framed nor administrative guidelines have been issued for drawal of the ACRs, communication of the adverse remarks and decision of representation made against the adverse re- marks. In fact Counsel for the respondent argued that in the absence of any period of limitation having been prescribed by the Statutory Rules or administrative instructions it is not permissible for the Court to declare that adverse entries are bad only on the ground of abnormal delay in the communication thereof. This argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent clearly over-looks one of the basic principles which has been evolved by the Courts for judging administrative actions. The two basic requirements which must be satisfied by every state action are that such action must be reasonable and it must be in public interest. A further elucidation of this proposition is that is State action is arbitrary or it suffers from malice in fact or malice in law, it is liable to be declared contrary to Article 14. Article-14 has been treated as a touch stone on which every State action can be adjudged by the Courts. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1427, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case in relation to promotion and one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the aggrieved party was that the State action in assigning the seniority was arbitrary and unreasonable, speaking for the Court Ramaswamy J. observed, "In this context it is important to emphasise that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the Rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by Rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon Executive Authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. In a system governed by Rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon Executive Authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The Rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and Rules and, in general such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any Rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the Rule of law (Dicey- "Law of the Constitution"- Tenth Edn., Intoduction ex). "Law has reached its finest moments," stated Douglas J. in United States v. Wunderlioh, 1951 342 US 98, "when it has freed, man from the unlimited discretion of some ruled....Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". It is in this sense that the Rule of law may be said to be the sworn ememy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfied stated it in classic terms in the case of John Walkes 17704 Burr 2528 at p. 2539 "means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by Rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fancilful." 9. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 555, the Supreme Court further extended the scope of equality Clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 and declared that the equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, one belongs to the Rule of Law in a Rebulic while the other to the whims and caprice of an absoulte monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to the political logic and constitutional law and is therefore, violative of Article 14 and if it affects any matter relating to public employment it is also violative of Article-16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. In a series of decisions which followed Royappa's judgement, the same principle has been reiterated. In a recent decision in Srilekha Vidhyarthi v. State of U.P. AIR 1991 S.C, 537, a lucid exposition of law has been made in the context of equality clauses. In a series of decisions which followed Royappa's judgement, the same principle has been reiterated. In a recent decision in Srilekha Vidhyarthi v. State of U.P. AIR 1991 S.C, 537, a lucid exposition of law has been made in the context of equality clauses. The Court has held as under : "Even assuming that is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and un-realistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14." "In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsels in the Districts and the other rights, contractual or Statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for this reasons that we base our decision on the ground that independent of any Statutory right, available to the appointees and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down." "It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic to the Rule of Law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. Arbitrariness is the very negation of rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind." "The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable may itself attract the view of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices Of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the law are above you. This is what men in power must remember, always. 10. These being the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court, it is not possible to accept the submission of Shri Lodha, learned counsel for the respondent, that in the absence of Statutory or the Administrative orders laying down the time schedule within which the Annual Confidential Reports should be drawn, adverse entries should be communicated and representation should be decided, the Court cannot strike down the adverse entries even if they are communicated after undue delay. Even though it is true that no Statutory Rules or administrative instructions exist by which a time limit has been set for communication of the adverse remarks and decision of the representation submitted by the employee/officer against such adverse remarks, I have no doubt in my mind that communication of adverse remarks will have to be made within a reasonable time. If communication is made after a long delay it will be open to the Court to presume that the adverse remarks are arbitrary and meaningless and the Court will be justifed in quashing the same on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. The Court also will be then entitled to conclude that the action of the employer suffers from lack of fairness and is therefore, contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Another question which remains to the examined is as to what is the reasonable time within which the adverse remarks should be communicated and the res-presentation should be decided in those cases where the Rules or Administrative instructions have not been framed fixing a time schedule for the aforesaid purposes. Generally speaking, Annual Confidential Report of an employee/Officer is drawn for his work, performance, conduct, behaviour etc. not exceeding a period of 12 months. That is the ordinary and well understood meaning of the Annual Confidential Report. There may, however be cases where remarks are made for the work, performance etc. even of a shorter duration. This may be due to the fact that the employee has worked under more than one superior Officer or that the superior Officer may have retired before he had an opportunity to make his assessment for full 12 months. It has also to be remembered that Annual Confidential Reports/Annual Performance Appraisal Reports must reflect the true pen picture of the performance of the employee during the year reported upon. Authority to make entries and Annual Confidential Reports can be used for making or for marring careers of employees. Therefore, the remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports must demonstrate objective evaluation of performance and should not represent a casual, whimsical or capricious reflection of the personal feeling of the reporting or Reviewing Authority. Importance and significance of the remarks made in the ACRs/APARs can be gauged from the fact that remarks made in the APARs/ACRs play vital role in the matters relating to confirmation, promotion, crossing of efficiency bar, deputation, grant of pensionary benefits etc. It need not be over emphasised that the employee having adverse remarks in his confidential reports faces supersession when promotion is made on seniority-cum-merit and is denied promotion based on merit. At times, he can be denied even confirmation on a particular post. It need not be over emphasised that the employee having adverse remarks in his confidential reports faces supersession when promotion is made on seniority-cum-merit and is denied promotion based on merit. At times, he can be denied even confirmation on a particular post. Apart from being of great importance to the employee for his service career, proper maintaining of ACRs, communication of entries within reasonable time and quick decision on representation of employee is of equal importance for efficient public services. A proper system of performance appraisal adds to the efficiency of service and maintains the morale of the service. If adverse remarks are made in the confidential reports, communication thereof to the employee is of equal importance. Communication of adverse remarks is intended to give to the employee/officer concerned a chance to bring about an improvement in his performance, conduct or character in respect of which adverse remarks have been made. It is really an advice to the Officer concerned to improve his service cancer. The very object with which the adverse remarks are made will, therefore, be lost if the same are communicated after lapse of number of years. If a Judicial Officer earns adverse comments regarding his knowledge of law, he makes an endeavour to devote more time for study and proper application of law. This is possible only when adverse remarks are communicated to him immediately after they are made. If an officer is slow in disposing the cases, he can bring about improvement in this area in immediate future only when he is told of the deficiency. Similarly, if he lacks in control over the staff or his relations with the Bar are not good, it is possible for the Officer to bring about improvement in these areas only when he is made aware of them and made aware in immediate future. If there is any doubt about his integrity, he can correct himself only when he is told of these doubts. These corrective measures can be taken by the employee only in the years which succeed the year in which the adverse remarks are made. If the remarks are not conveyed to him for years together, he does not even know as to what are the deficiencies, short-comings etc. and what improvement is expected of him. These corrective measures can be taken by the employee only in the years which succeed the year in which the adverse remarks are made. If the remarks are not conveyed to him for years together, he does not even know as to what are the deficiencies, short-comings etc. and what improvement is expected of him. It is, therefore, reasonable to say that even if no Statutory period of limitation has been prescribed and even if no administrative guidelines have been laid down fixing a time frame for communication of the adverse remarks, they have to be communicated to the employee at the earliest and in any case, before the expiry of the next year counted from the year of which P>adverse remarks are made. That should be the normal time limit. If communication is made after this period, there should be some plausible and reasonable explanation for the delay. The same principle will be true for decision of the representation, if any, made by the Officer concerned. If decision on the representation is unduly belated the employee/Officer remains in dark about final outcome of his representation and this too effects his efficiency. The aforesaid propositions find sufficient strength from the observations made by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa AIR 1987 Supreme Court 120. 12. Although, that was a case in which Rules had been framed indicating the time limit for communication of adverse remarks, the Supreme Court declared that the Rules were only directory. 13. Nevertheless the adverse remarks were quashed on the ground of undue delay in communication thereof. The rationale of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in that case is to be found in these observations : "The whole object of making and communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performances, conduct or character, as the case may be. The adverse remarks should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The whole object of making an adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay." 14. The whole object of making an adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay." 14. In the light of the above discussion, it is held that delay in communication of the adverse remarks, unless properly explained, will be a ground for striking down the adverse entries. In the case in hand, adverse remarks for the year 1982 were made in the confidential report of the petitioner by the Reporting Officer in the year 1982 itself and even the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge has, in his inspection note dated, 18.2.1982 recorded that his performance on 5th January 1982 was unsatisfactory. Explanation submitted by the petitioner was considered to be unsatisfactory by the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge and he ordered that the remarks "unsatisfactory performance" should be entered in the service dossier of the Officer. However, the remarks made by the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge were never conveyed to the petitioner. What has been conveyed to the petitioner are the remarks made by the Reporting Officer. This communication has been made after more than six years of the making of the adverse remarks. No explanation has been offered by the respondent for this long delay in communication of the adverse remark except that the communication , of the adverse remarks has been undertaken in view of the observations made by a committee of the five Hon'ble Judges of the Court which had considered the matters relating to grant of selection scale, senior scale etc. Therefore, it is clear that even in the year 1989, remarks may not have been communicated to the petitioner and other Judicial Officers but for the observations made by the Hon'ble Committee. In my opinion, the explanation given by the respondent for delay in communication is wholly unsatisfactory and is unacceptable. For the year 1983 two confidential reports have been filled. One is between 1.1.1983 to 30.4.1983 and the other is between 30.4.1983 to 31.12.1983. The first confidential report contains adverse remarks and the other one does not contain any adverse remarks. The first Reporting Officer has not given the date on which he made the remarks but the second Reporting Officer has given the date as 13.2.1984. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that first report had been filled earlier than 13.2.1984. The first confidential report contains adverse remarks and the other one does not contain any adverse remarks. The first Reporting Officer has not given the date on which he made the remarks but the second Reporting Officer has given the date as 13.2.1984. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that first report had been filled earlier than 13.2.1984. Even if the date of filling of the first confidential report is taken as 13.2.1984 the communication of the adverse remarks vide letter dated, 14.9.1989 is delayed by more than five years and six months. No explanation worth the name has been offered by the respondent for this delay in communication of the adverse remark. For the year 1986, also, there are two confidential reports. One relates to the period between 1.1.1986 to 8.5.1986, the other does not specify the period. In the first, the date has been given as 21.1.1987 under the signatures of the Reporting Officer. In the second, no date has been given. Communication of the adverse remarks has been made after more than three years and six months of the year reported upon. The period for which adverse entry has been communicated is June 1986 to December 1986. No tangible explanation has been given for this delay of over three years. Even if some time period is excluded by taking a liberal view regarding the period within which the remarks must have been made there can be no manner of doubt that communication has been made after over two years counted from the end of 1987 also. Confidential report of the year 1987 also contains two parts. First part which contains adverse entries pertain to 1.1.1987 to 14.8.1987 and the other relate to the period between 18.8.1987 to 31.12.1987. The second Reporting Officer has given the date of entries as 30.1.1988. Even if that date is taken into consideration, the remarks have been conveyed after one year and 8 months. This communication of course cannot be considered to be unduly belated but so far as the entries of other years are concerned, they have clearly been communicated after lapse of long time and since this delay has remained unexplained, I find sufficient justification for accepting the argument of Shri Kuhad that adverse remarks for the years 1982,1983 and 1986 deserve to be quashed on the ground that they are highly belated. 15. 15. Next question which falls for consideration is as to whether the remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner can be treated as baseless and arbitrary. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to once again advert to the remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports. For the year 1982 first confidential report contains remarks in relation to the working of the petitioner as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Karauli between 1.1.1982 to 27.7.1982. His integrity has not been doubted. In the first part "No" has been written against Col. No. 3 which is in the question form namely "If he is cool minded and does not show temper in Court?" In Col. No. 10 his relation with the Bar has been shown to be 'not normal'. In Col. No. 11 it has been recorded that he is discharging his duties fairly but his behaviour with the members of the Bar has been described as not proper. As noted earlier, the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge made inspection of his Court on 5.2.1982 and on 21.12.1983. He directed that remarks "unsatisfactory performance" be entered in his service dossier. I am amazed to find that these adverse remarks have not even been entered in the confidential dossier of the petitioner of the year 1982. Instead, the remarks made by the Reporting Officers have been conveyed to the petitioner. I have therefore, no hestitation in concluding that so far as the adverse remarks made by the Hon'ble Inspecting Judges are concerned, they do not form part of the Confidential dossier and obviously they cannot be relied upon for upholding and adverse remarks Regarding the quantum of work done by the petitioner. No adversity has been reported for the period between 1.1.1982 to 27.7.1982. This adversity has been shown to be for the period between 13.9.1982 to 31.12.1982. The petitioner submitted these representations against the adverse remarks and pointed out that the matter is 7 years old and that he has not been given particulars and the basis of the remarks made against him. In his representation, he pointed out that when he joined as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Karauli the Court had remained unattended in the absence of Judicial Officer for one year and the charge of the Court was with the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate and he had decided only the cases which were ripe. In his representation, he pointed out that when he joined as Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Karauli the Court had remained unattended in the absence of Judicial Officer for one year and the charge of the Court was with the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate and he had decided only the cases which were ripe. No charge had been framed in the fresh cases and no evidence had been recorded. In Civil Cases no issues were framed and evidence had not been recorded. Therefore, he had to start cases afresh and it took some time to him to bring the matters in trial. He has specifically asserted that his relations with all the members of the Bar were very good and the Reporting Officer had never told him of any short-coming in his behaviour with the Advocates and that no Advocate had made any complaint regarding his conduct and behaviour. He requested that inquiry may be made in the matter. Even though, the petitioner had made an application for furnishing him material on the basis of which the adverse remarks were made, but the same were not given to him. Even the Confidential Reports do not contain any details regarding the slow disposal of cases by the petitioner or inadequacy the disposal of the cases. The number of cases decided by the petitioner has not been indicated. Similarly, it has not been indicated as to whether there was a complaint against the petitioner regarding his relations with the Bar.Before this Court also no material has been placed to substantiate the adverse remarks that his disposal was inadequate or that his relations with the members of the Bar were not good. It was open to the respondent to place before the Court figures regarding the disposal of cases of the petitioner and also the complaint if any, made by the members of the Bar regarding his behaviour or conduct. That has not been done. Thus, it is difficult to accept a position that even though a particular Judicial Officer's behaviour with the Bar may not be good and yet there will be no complaint against him from the members of the Bar. Even if there were some real oral complaints some noting would have been recorded by the Reporting Officer. Total absence of such material justifies the conclusion that the remarks are wholly baseless and arbitrary. 16. Even if there were some real oral complaints some noting would have been recorded by the Reporting Officer. Total absence of such material justifies the conclusion that the remarks are wholly baseless and arbitrary. 16. For the year 1983 also, there are two reports. One pertains to the period between 1.1.1983 to 30.4.1983 and the other pertains to the period between 30.4.1983 to 31.12.1983. A look at these reports show that they are self contradictory. In the first part the word 'no' has been written against Col. No. 3 and the words "not cordial" have been written against Col. No.10. In the second part which represents the working of the petitioner for 8 months, he has been described as a cool mined officer and his relations with the Bar has been shown too cordial. It is also significant to notice that not only in the year 1983 but also in the year 1984 and part of the year 1985, the petitioner had remained posted at Madal. Neither in the year 1984 nor in the. year 1985 any adversity with reference to Cols. No. 3 and 10 has been recorded by the Reporting Officers. Moreover, as in the year 1982 for the remarks of four months of 1983 also, no material either exists in the record or has been produced before the Court by the respondent to justify the adverse remarks. 17. For the year 1986, there are two reports. First report relates to the period of working of the petitioner between 1.1.1986 to 8.5.1986 and the other relates to the remaining period. In the first part, the remarks in colum No. 8 "control over office is not effective". Administrative capacity and tact reasonably good". In the second part his integrity certificate has been with-held between June 1986 to December 1986. The integrity certificate contains a very interesting note. It has been recorded by the Reporting Officer that nothing has come to his notice positively which casts any reflection on the integrity of the officer. He then proceeds to make the following in recording : "His general reputation for honesty is doubted in some quarters but nothing so rumoured could be substantiated to opine or conclude either way. Hence, the certificate is with-held." 18. Interestingly, in Col. No. 2, he has been described as generally fair and impartial in dealing with the public and the Bar. Hence, the certificate is with-held." 18. Interestingly, in Col. No. 2, he has been described as generally fair and impartial in dealing with the public and the Bar. The very language employed in the certificate shows that no tangible evident was available to the Reporting Officer for withholding the certificate and the Reporting Officer was not himself sure whether to certify, not to certify the integrity of the petitioner. However, in the end he recorded that the certificate is withheld. In my opinion, no man of ordinary prudence can possibly say that merely on the basis of unsubstantiated rumours, integrity of the Officer should be treat doubtful. The manner in which Reporting Officer has with-held integrity certificate of the petitioner clearly casts a serious reflection on his impartiality and fairness. 19. Likewise, for the year 1987 against Column No. the following remark has been recorded : "No complaint of substantiated nature". However in the Column of integrity certificate the Reporting Officer crossed the certificate. For the remaining part of the year his integrity has been certified as good. Surprisingly when the Reporting Officer did not have any complaint which could be substantiated against the petitioner, he could not have possibly come to the conclusion that the petitioner's integrity was doubtful. It is important to mention at this stage that for the years 1986-87, the petitioner has submitted a detailed representation in which he gave out the reasons of the annoyance of the Reporting Officer. He mentioned that a suit had been filed by Shri Mool Chand and Shri Brij Mohan Gupta, Advocates, against the closure of the door of the 'Gadh' premises which caused inconvenience to the large number of people. Petitioner stated that he was instructed by the learned District Judge that the petitioner should not make any order against the Collector's action because it was a question of prestige of the Administration. He also told the petitioner that administration can harass him and that if he was to make an order, his record may be spoiled. According to him, the Reporting Officer had again called him at his residence and asked not to pass the interim order. According to the petitioner, he passed interim order after hearing the parties. He enclosed copies of the application of the transfer file. He also enclosed copies of various documents pertaining to the said case. According to him, the Reporting Officer had again called him at his residence and asked not to pass the interim order. According to the petitioner, he passed interim order after hearing the parties. He enclosed copies of the application of the transfer file. He also enclosed copies of various documents pertaining to the said case. In view of all these facts, it is not possible to uphold the adverse remark relating to integrity to the petitioner particularly when there was neither any complaint against the petitioner which could be substantiated and the Reporting Officer himself was not certain as to whether the integrity of the petitioner was doubtful. 20. On the basis of the above analysis, I have no hesitation in recording a conclusion that adverse remarks made against the petitioner are wholly baseless, the same are arbitrary apart from being unreasonable. They do not reflect a true picture of the work, conduct and behaviour of the petitioner. Rather they represent personal whims and caprices of the Reporting Officers. Therefore, the adverse remarks made in the various ACRs of the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 21. Last submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner relates to arbitrary rejection of representation submitted by the petitioner. Shri Kuhad submitted that the representations of the petitioner have been rejected arbitrarily and without even calling upon Reporting Officers to give their comments on the representations. Shri Lodha, learned Counsel for the respondents, has taken great pains to submit before the Court that when the representations filed by the petitioner have been examined by the committee of the Hon'ble Judges and they have opined that there is no justification to expunge the adverse remarks and the Hon'ble Chief Justice has accepted the recommendations made by the, Committee, the Court cannot interfere with the decision taken by the respondent for rejecting the representation of the petitioner. As I have already observed in the earlier part of the judgement that in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in E.G. Nambudiri's case (supra), cannons of natural justice are not attracted in process of decision making on the representation submitted by the aggrieved employee. However, some of the observations made by the Supreme Court are quite important. As I have already observed in the earlier part of the judgement that in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in E.G. Nambudiri's case (supra), cannons of natural justice are not attracted in process of decision making on the representation submitted by the aggrieved employee. However, some of the observations made by the Supreme Court are quite important. These are : "Entries made in the character roll and confidential record of a Government servant are confidential and those do not by themselves affect any right of the Government servant, but those entries assume importance and play vital role in the matter relating to confirmation, crossing of efficiency bar, promotion and retention in service. Once an adverse report is recorded, the principles of natural justice require the Reporting Authority to communicate the same to the Government servant to enable him to improve his work and conduct and also to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior Authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. The superior Authority competent to decide the representation is required to consider the explanation offered by the Government servant before taking a decision in the matter. Any adverse report which is not communicated to the Government servant or if he is denied the opportunity of making representation to the superior Authority, cannot be considered against him. Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, 1979(2) SCC 368 . In the circumstances, it is necessary that the Authority must consider the explanation offered by the Government servant and to decide the same in a fair and just manner." "The question then arises whether in considering and deciding the representation against adverse report, the Authorities are duty bound to record reasons or, to communicate the same to the person concerned. Ordinarily, the Courts and Tribunals adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons. Where an Administrative authority is required to act judicially, he is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every Administrative Authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where an Administrative authority is required to act judicially, he is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every Administrative Authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a Statute requires an Authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the Authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of any Statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the Administrative Authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the Authority concerned to place reasons before the Court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the Authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records." "There is no dispute that there is no Rule or Administrative order for recording reasons in rejecting a representation. In the absence of any Statutory Rule or Statutory Instructions requiring the competent Authority to record reasons in rejecting the representation made by a Government servant against the adverse entries the competent Authority is not under any obligation to record reasons. But the competent Authority has no licence to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner. He is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the Officer awarding the adverse entries and the Officer countersigning the same. If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reasons." 22. If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reasons." 22. Similarly, in Mangal Chand Taylor v. State of Rajasthan, 1991(1) R.L.R. 143 , a learned Single Judge examined this question at sufficient length and observed : "In my opinion, in such matters when the only plea advanced in support of the remarks is that the remarks were recorded on the basis of the assessment of the Reporting Officer, the Committee ought to have first called upon the comments of the Reporting Officer and, had the committee taken that trouble to call for the comments of the Reporting Officer, the Reporting Officer would have been in a better position to inform the Committee with regard to the material on the basis of which he had formed the opinion so as to give these remarks and he could have said something in support of the remarks to justify the same." 23. In O.P. Jain v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, 1990(2) RLR 257, a learned Single Judge of this Court examined the merits of the remarks made in the Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner for the year 1986 as well as rejection of the representation made by the petitioner. In para-13 of the judgement, the Court held that adverse remarks made by the Chief Justice on the basis of the notes prepared by a Committee of the Judges cannot be sustained unless the Committee had come to the conclusion that the complaints made against the Officer reported upon were well founded. The earned Single Judge further held that the notes cannot be made use of unless an officer is afforded an opportunity to rebut the assertions made by the Advocates. 24. Requirement of calling upon the Reporting Officer to give his comments on the representation made by the employee/Officer reported upon is of vital importance. At times, the remarks themselves do not reflect the basis on which they have been made. They also do not reflect as to what material constituted basis for making of adverse remarks or for formation of opinion adverse to the employee. Even when the employee asks for the material in support of the adverse entries, the communicating Authority cannot possibly meet with the requirement of the reporting officer. They also do not reflect as to what material constituted basis for making of adverse remarks or for formation of opinion adverse to the employee. Even when the employee asks for the material in support of the adverse entries, the communicating Authority cannot possibly meet with the requirement of the reporting officer. However, when the employee submits his representation at least then the Reporting Officer can justify the adverse remarks by pointing out to the material which he had considered and also to point out to the communicating authority the basis on which he formed an opinion adverse to the employee. In a given case, the Reporting Officer may himself agree with the submission of the employee and fairly state that he had made adverse entries under some erroneous impression. In the absence of comments from the Reporting Officer, the representation made by the employee goes uncontested. In that event it becomes well-neigh impossible for the competent Authority to decide as to whether the representation contains correct assertions or not. Therefore it is necessary for the Authority which decided the representation to first call for the comments of the Reporting Officer on the representation and then take a decision to accept or to reject the representation submitted by the employee. 25. In so far as this case is concerned, the impugned communication rejecting the representation of the petitioner does not contain any reason. However, that is not fatal to the adverse remarks, nor decision of the competent Authority can be nullified only on ground that it does not contain reasons. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in E.G. Numbudiri's case and as per the direction of the Court, the respondent has placed report of the Committee which had considered the representation of the petitioner and the decision taken by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. A look at the report of the Committee shows that it considered representations of large number of Officers. First part of report contains consideration of the representations of 54 Officers. In the case of Shri Vinod Kumar Agrawal, the Committee recommended partial acceptance. In the case of other two Officers, namely, S/Shri Prayag Chand Verma and Nathu Lal Devra, the Committee took decision to recommend the expunging of remarks as a whole. First part of report contains consideration of the representations of 54 Officers. In the case of Shri Vinod Kumar Agrawal, the Committee recommended partial acceptance. In the case of other two Officers, namely, S/Shri Prayag Chand Verma and Nathu Lal Devra, the Committee took decision to recommend the expunging of remarks as a whole. In respect of other Officers including the petitioner, the Committee expressed the opinion that it does not find any justification for expunging the remarks. The Committee recommended rejection of the representations of the petitioner by observing : "After having considered his representation and record, there is no justification for expunging the remarks. As such his representations deserve to be rejected." 26. The report further shows that only two of three members of the Committee considered the representations of Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Bhanwar Lal Sharma and Satish Chand Mittal-II and they recommended rejection of the representations of these Officers. In yet another part of the report the Committee considered the representations of 37 more Officers and recommended that the same be accepted. Incidentally, in each of these cases substantial reasons have been given by the Committee for accepting the representations, whereas, such reasons are absent in the earlier parts of the report wherein recommendations have been made for rejecting the representation. A careful perusal of this part of the report brings out contradictions in the various parts of the report. While in the case of the petitioner and some others the Committee has recommended rejection of representations, in almost identical cases it has recommended acceptance of representations. In the case of one Shri Badri Lal Meena remarks were that he needs improvement in behaviour. The Committee took note that there is no mention of any complaint by members of the Bar, public or the staff about the behaviour of the Officer and the inspection note was silent about it. On that basis, the Committee recommended acceptance of his representation. In case of Shri 'K.C. Jain, adverse remarks in regarding his integrity and impartiality were recorded for 1983 and 1985. The Committee recommended acceptance of the representation on the ground that confidential reports of previous or subsequent years do not contain such remarks and that the Hon'ble Chief Justice had certified his integrity for the years 1975, 1985 and 1987. In case of Shri 'K.C. Jain, adverse remarks in regarding his integrity and impartiality were recorded for 1983 and 1985. The Committee recommended acceptance of the representation on the ground that confidential reports of previous or subsequent years do not contain such remarks and that the Hon'ble Chief Justice had certified his integrity for the years 1975, 1985 and 1987. In the case of Shri Chandra Singh integrity certificate was withheld by the Reporting Officer and the Committee recommended that there was no justification for withholding of the integrity certificate. In case of Shri Damodar Mishra adverse remarks have been expunged by taking note of the contention of the Officer concerned that remarks are belated. In case of Madho Singh Udawat, adverse remarks have been expunged because, the remarks were made by the Officer under whom he had worked only for two months. In the case of Shri O.P. Gupta (III), the Committee accepted representation because, the Reporting Officer has not given any particulars in respect of the adverse remarks and he never pointed out any laxity or defect in his working. In case of Suresh Chand Gupta (II), his integrity certificate was withheld. The representation had been accepted only on the ground that the Officer had filed a complaint before the Rajasthan Bar Council against the members of the Bar. The committee opined that his integrity was not doubted in earlier years and his other ACRs contained good remarks. In case of Ratan Lal Agrawal, the integrity certificate was withheld by the District Judge but the representation was accepted only on the ground that the Reporting Officer has not given any reason for with holding his integrity certificate. In case of Yashpal Choudhary also, adverse remarks relating to integrity have been recommended to be expunged only on the ground that the Officer reported upon has stated in his representation that his Reporting Officer was not happy with him. The Committee has given similar reasons for expunging the remarks in other cases as well. On the basis of the above, it can be said that the Committee has adopted different yard-sticks for, judging the representations made by the petitioner and some other persons on the one hang and some other Judicial Officers on the other hand. Not a word has been said regarding the claim of the petitioner that no member of the Bar had complaint against his behaviour. Not a word has been said regarding the claim of the petitioner that no member of the Bar had complaint against his behaviour. The Committee has also not recorded any reason as to why the petitioner assertion made with reference to the case filed against the Government at Jhalawar and the alleged threat given by the then District Judge to the petitioner was not accepted. The details given by the petitioner sufficiently justified a course of action by the Committee in which the Reporting Officer ought to have been called upon to give his comments on the representations made by the petitioner. The Committee has brushed aside the representations made by the petitioner without recording any reason whatsoever. Hon'ble the Chief Justice has accepted the report of the Committee. Therefore, rejection of representation has been communicated to the petitioner. On the basis of the above, I hold that the rejection of the petitioner's representations is unfair and arbitrary and is therefore, not sustainable in the eye of law. 27. Order passed by this Court on 2.4.91 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 465/80, Mata Deen Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. on which reliance has been placed by Shri R.M. Lodha, does not in any manner, help the case of the respondent. A look at the said order shows that in dismissing the Writ petition of Mata Deen Gupta, the learned Single Bench was greatly influenced by the fact that the petitioner has been compulsorily retired a few months back and it will serve no purpose to expunge the entries made in his Annual Confidential Reports. The observations made in the last portion of the order that in the character rolls entries given by a Judge, there could be no interference on the judicial side by this High Court, is itself hedged with another condition that interference can be made if entry is mala fide. Clearly, the judgement of the Supreme Court, in E.G. Nambudiri's case (supra) was not before the learned Single Bench and in the face of the decision of the Supreme Court it cannot be accepted as a correct principle of law that interference cannot be made in the character roll entries given by a Judge. That apart, so far as the present case is concerned, entries have been made not by the Inspecting Judge or by the Chief Justice but only by the Reporting Officer. That apart, so far as the present case is concerned, entries have been made not by the Inspecting Judge or by the Chief Justice but only by the Reporting Officer. Further more, I am clearly of the opinion that if the entries in the character roll were found to be baseless, there will be every justification to hold them to be arbitrary and quash the same. That has precisely been done in the cases of Mangal Chand Taylor and U.P. Jain to which reference has been made herein above. 28. For the reasons abovenoted, the Writ petition is allowed. Order dated, 27.1.1990 (Annexure-13) is quashed. The adverse entries made in the Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner for the years 1982, 1983, 1986 and 1987 are also quahsed. If the petitioner has suffered adversely on account of these adverse remarks, he shall get consequential benefits. Costs made easy.Petition allowed. *******