JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner, Ramgopal Kumawat is a Class-IV employee (Daftary-cum-peon) employed at Ajmer Branch of the United Commercial Bank (for short the respondent Bank). He has questioned the legality of the charge-sheet dated, 30th January 1992 (Annex. 1) issued by the respondent Bank for holding an inquiry against him in respect of the allegations of misconduct enumerated in Clause 19.5 (j) and Clause 19.7 (d) of the Bipartite Settlement dated, 19.10.66 as amended. 2. Facts of the case show that the petitioner, Ramgopal was prosecuted under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code alongwith co-accused Har Kishan Vijayvargiya. A charge was ultimately framed against him under section 406 Indian Penal Code. The petitioner and his co-accused were tried by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Ajmer. By judgment dated, 28th May 1991 the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate. In the meantime, the petitioner had been placed under suspension and this suspension had continued even after his acquittal by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate. Petitioner filed writ petition No. 5969/91 before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench and therein he questioned his continued suspension. On 24.2.92, the High Court allowed his writ petition and directed his reinstatement with consequential benefits. On account of non-compliance of the order passed by the Court on 24.2.92 the petitioner filed a contempt petition which has been registered as Contempt petition No. 273/92. It is also borne out from the record that against the order dated, 24.2.92 of the learned Single Bench, the respondent Bank filed Special Appeal No. 386/92. On the stay application filed alongwith the special Appeal an exparte interim order was passed by the Division Bench on 30.7.92 staying the operation of the order passed by the learned Single Bench. This order was subsequently modified and a direction was given to the Bank to make payment of specified amount to the petitioner. 3. After about months of his acquittal the respondent Bank issued charge-sheet dated, 30.1.92 alleging that the action of the petitioner in accepting the cash in an unauthorised manner is an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and amounts to gross negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss and that breach of the rules of business of the Bank or instructions for running any department amount to misconduct. 4. 4. While questioning the charge-sheet the petitioner has stated that he had been subjected to criminal prosecution on the basis of a private complaint filed by one Hira Lal. This Private complainant was sent for inquiry under section 156 Criminal Procedure Code to the Police and from 1981 to 1991 the petitioner was subjected to prosecution which ultimately resulted in his acquittal in all the five cases. He further stated that during more than one decade the respondent Bank had not charge sheeted him for any allegation of misconduct, but after his acquittal by the Court, inquiry on the basis of same set of allegations has been initiated. Petitioner has pleaded that the impugned charge-sheet is highly belated. It has been issued after a lapse of 20 years to 12 years with reference to the years of alleged misconduct. Petitioner has alleged that only after filing of the earlier writ petition by him in the High Court the respondent Bank has thought it proper to charge-sheet him and this action of the respondent Bank is arbitrary and malicious. 5. In their reply, respondents have asserted that in the previous writ petition filed by the petitioner sufficient opportunity had not been given to them to contest the matter and to place full material before the Court. Their further assertion is that in terms of Clause -193 read with Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 the employer has right to continue the suspension and even take disciplinary action notwithstanding the acquittal of an employee. While admitting that the petitioner has been acquitted by the Court, the respondents have pleaded that an inquiry was in contemplation against the petitioner and therefore, his suspension was continued. A notice dated, 1.2.92 was issued by the Bank saying that the Bank intended to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. Respondents have pleaded that the standard of proof required in a criminal cannot be applied in departmental enquiries and acquittal of an employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis for restraining the management/employer from proceeding against the employee by way of departmental enquiry. Further plea of the respondent Bank is that in disciplinary enquiry evidence is required to be evaluated on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and there is every justification for the Bank to proceed against the petitioner by way of a disciplinary action. Further plea of the respondent Bank is that in disciplinary enquiry evidence is required to be evaluated on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and there is every justification for the Bank to proceed against the petitioner by way of a disciplinary action. Further case of the respondents is that the petitioner did not inform the Bank about the criminal proceedings and his arrest, even though it was his duty to have done so. The Bank had waited for the criminal proceedings to be over and only after his acquittal, the charges have been framed. According to the respondents charge-sheet has been issued within less than 8 months of the acquittal of the petitioner by the Court and therefore, it cannot be said that the charge-sheet has been issued after long delay and, in any case, delay cannot be a ground for quashing the charge-sheet. 6. Before proceeding further in the case, I consider it appropriate to take note of some of the findings recorded by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 1 Ajmer in criminal case No. 2250/82, State v. Ramgopal . That case had been registered against the petitioner on the basis of a private complaint filed by one Hiralal. In his complaint Hira Lal had alleged that he had opened Recurring Account No. 1099 on 215.71 in Purani Mandi Branch of the respondent Bank. This account was opened through the petitioner. A Pass Book was issued by the Bank and in the said Pass Book entries had been made of the amount deposited by the complainant from time to time. He further alleged that Ramgopal is his relation and there was a rumour in the market that deposit made by the customers in the Bank is withdrawn by forgery. He further alleged that on 2.5.77 he had inspected his account and then he found that 50 instalments of र 20/- each had been entered in the Pass Book but the same had. not been entered in the Bank account and in this manner, he had been cheated by the accused Ramgopal in connivance of Harikishan Vijayvargiya who had initialed entries in the Pass Book. Ramgopal had misappropriated his money. Prosecution had produced as many as 8 witnesses including complainant Hira Lal. Petitioner (accused) denied the charge. not been entered in the Bank account and in this manner, he had been cheated by the accused Ramgopal in connivance of Harikishan Vijayvargiya who had initialed entries in the Pass Book. Ramgopal had misappropriated his money. Prosecution had produced as many as 8 witnesses including complainant Hira Lal. Petitioner (accused) denied the charge. After considering the evidence produced before the Court the learned Munsiff observed : blfy;s dsoyek= xokg ghjkyk ds dgus ls ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd izn'kZ ih- 10 yxk;r 22 fMiksftV fLyi vfHk;qDr jkexksiky }kjk fy[kh xbZ gksaA xokg ghjkyky us ;g dFku fd;k gS fd Qjojh] 1977 rd [kkrk ls[;k 1099 dh ikl cqd vfHk;qDr jkexksiky ds dCys esa jgh vkSj 20-00 #i;s izfrekg ds fglkc ls tek djkus gsrq jkf'k jkexksiky dks izLrqr dh fdUrq bl lEcU/k esa ,lh vksbZ lk{; ugha gS ftlds le{k eqLrxhl ghjkyky }kjk vfHk;qDr jkexksiky dks ikl cqd nh x;h gks rFkk 20-00 #i;s izfrekg ds fglkc ls iSls tek djkus gsrq fn;s x;s gksaA xokg ghjkyky dk ;g dFku fo'oluh; izrhr ugha gksrk f dog cSad esa 20-00 #i;s tek djkus tkrk Fkk vkSj cSad esa #i;s jkexksiky dks tek djkus gsrq fn;k djrk Fkk D;ksafd tks O;fDr cSad ds vkfQl rd igaqp ldrk gS rks ;g LokHkkfod gS fd iSls Hkh mlds }kjk gh tek djk;s tkrsA bl izdj.k esa ghjkyky us dFku fd;k fd vfHk;qDr jkexksiky dk ;w+ dks+ cSad vtesj ls LFkkukarj.k vU; txg vLokHkkfod ,oa vfo'oluh; yxrk gSA ghjkyky us Li"V ls ugha crk;k gS fd fdl rkjh[k dks fdl O;fdr ds le{k vfHk;qDr jkexksiky dks iSls fn;s FksA xokg tsBey us 1976 esa 20-00 #i;s dh nks fd'usa jkexksiky dks Lo;a }knk fn;k tkuk crk;k gS fd fdUrq mDr xokg us ;g ugha crk;k fd fdl eghus esa jkf'k jkexksiky dks tek djkus gsrq nh FkhA 1976 esa jkexksiky fdl dk;kZy; esa fu;qDr Fkk ;g Hkh ugha crk;kA lEiw.kZ lk{; dk voyksdu djus ls Li"V gS fd vfHk;qDr ds fo#) 20-00 izfrekg ds fglkc ls tks jkf'k fu;r fd;s tkus dk vkjksi vkHk;kstu i{k }kjk yxk;k x;k gS mDr rF; dks lkfcr djus ds fy;s eqLrxhl ds vr~fjDr fdlh Hkh Lora= lk{kh dks U;k;ky; esa is' ugha fd;k x;k ga fylds dkj.k eSa ;g rF; iq.kZr;k lkfcr ugha ikrh fd vfHk;qDr dks 20-00 #i;s izfrekg ds fglkc ls ebZ 1973 ls ysdj viSzy 1974 rd #i;s tek djkus gsrq iznr fd;s x;s gksa vkSj mDr jkf'k vkfHk;qDr jkexksiky }kjk cSad ds [kkrk la[;k 1099 esa tku cw>dj tek ugha djokbZ xbZ gksA cSad esa pijklh ds in ij dk;Zjr jgk gks vkSj mlds dCts esa 1099 ds [kkrk dh ikl cqd jgh gks vkSj mlus fdlh izdkj dh jkf'k mDr [kkrs esa tek djk;h gksA ;fn okLro esa vfHk;qDr ds dCts esa dqN ekg ds fy;s iklcqd jgh gksrh rks vo'; cSad ds fdlh vf/kdkjh }kjk bl vk'k; dh lk{; nh tkrh fd vfH;qDr us iklcqd la[;k 1099 vius dCys es j[kk Fkk vkSj fLyi Hkjdj 20-00 #i;s ezfrekg ds fglkc ls jkf'k tek djkbZ FkhA vr% mijksDr foospu ls vfHk;qDr jkexksiky dks /kkjk 406 Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds n.Muh; vijk/k dk drbZ nks"kh ugha ikrh gaw ,oa vfHk;qDr mDr vkjksi ls nks"keqDr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vfHk;qDr jkexksiky dks /kkjk 406 Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds vijk/k ls ckbtr cjh fd;kA In the conclusion the learned Munsiff passed the following order:- HINDI MATTER B 7. The charge-sheet which has been issued to the petitioner on 30.1.1992 reads thus : "It is alleged against you as under : 1. That on 25.6.1979, you were arrested by the Police and placed under their custody for an alleged criminal offence on the strength of an FIR No. 70/78 lodged against you by Shri Hegira Lal Kumawat, under sections 420, 406, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code registered by the Police Station Sadar Kotwali, Ajmer. In terms of Bank's HO SCL No. 63/71 dated 8.12.71, you were under an obligation to intimate to the Bank promptly, in writing, with regard to the criminal case registered with the police against you, your arrest on 25.6.79 and the investigation /enquiry and/or any trial or proceedings started there against. In contravention to this rule, you never intimated to the Bank about any of the aforesaid incidents and the facts came to the notice of the Bank only when the copies of the charge-sheets No. 36, 36A, 36B, 36C and 36D, all dated 30.6.79 were obtained. Your not informing the Bank regarding above incidents has been regarded as an act of suppression of material information. 2. That though you were not working in the Cash Department of the Purani Mandi Ajmer Branch, still you accepted cash on various dates viz. 21.5.71, 28.6.71, 31.7.71; 26.8.71, 20.9.71, 30.11.71, 23.12.71, 3.12.72, 28.3.72, and 20.2.73 from Shri Heera Lal Kumawat (Bank's customer) intended to be deposited by him in his R.D.A./c No 1099, maintained at Purani Mandi Ajmer Branch. Your this act of accepting cash is unauthorised and clearly in contravention to the Bank's rule in this behalf which categorically states that no employee of the Bank other than cash department staff is authorised to accept cash from the customers. 3. The above allegations constitute misconducts in your part as under : (i) Doing the act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and gross negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss- a gross misconduct as per clause 19.5 (j) of Bipartite Settlement dated, 19.10.1966, as amended. (ii) Breach of the rule of business of the Bank or instruction for running any department- a minor misconduct as per clause 19.7. (d) of Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.66 as amended. 4. Your are hereby charged with such of the above mentioned misconducts. 5. (ii) Breach of the rule of business of the Bank or instruction for running any department- a minor misconduct as per clause 19.7. (d) of Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.66 as amended. 4. Your are hereby charged with such of the above mentioned misconducts. 5. You are required to submit your explanation/ written statement of defence, if any, within a period of 7 days from the date of receipt of this letter, failing which further action as deemed appropriate will be taken against you as per provisions of the Bipartite Settlement dated, 19.10.66, as amended, without further reference to you. 6. Please acknowledge receipt." 8. A look at the charge-sheet quoted hereinabove, shows that allegation levelled against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry is that he had received cash on various dates from Heera Lal for being deposited in his R.D. account No. 1099 maintained at Purani Mandi, Ajmer Branch and that acceptance of this cash by the petitioner, even though he was not working in the Cash Department, amounts to major misconduct under Clause 19.5 (j) of the Bi-partite Settlement. Another allegation levelled against the petitioner is that he had committed breach of Bank's Head Office SCL 63/71 dated. 8.12.71, because, he had not informed the authorities of the Bank that he was arrested by the Police on 26.5.79 in connection with the FIR No. 70/78 lodged by Heera Lal Kumawat and that he had not intimated the Bank about the incident. It is, therefore, clear that in so far as the charge regarding receipt of money by the petitioner from Heera Lal Kumawat on various dates between 21.5.71 to 20.2.73 is concerned, it is that very allegation which constituted the basis of his prosecution in the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Ajmer. The facts which constituted the basis of the charges framed against the petitioner by the court of competent jurisdiction were the same which now constitute basis of one of the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet. Of course, another charge levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated, 30.1.92 namely, that he had committed violation of the Circular No. 63/71 dated. 8.12.71 did not and could not have constituted the basis for his prosecution in a court of law. 9. Now, I will first examine the argument of Shri Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the charge-sheet is highly belated. 8.12.71 did not and could not have constituted the basis for his prosecution in a court of law. 9. Now, I will first examine the argument of Shri Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the charge-sheet is highly belated. Shri Saxena submitted that the charge-sheet has been issued against the petitioner on 30.1.92 in respect of the incident of 1971 and thus, it is delayed by 21 years. His alternative submission is that even from the date of registration of the case against the petitioner the charge is belated by over 12 years and six months. He pointed out that after the registration of the case investigation was made by the Police, which included recording of statements of employees of the Bank and collection of the record of the Ban (Exhibits P.7 to P.94A). Despite full knowledge of the allegations against the petitioner respondents did not consider it proper to charge-sheet him for over 12 years and six months.According to the learned counsel, this delay is by itself fatal to the charge-sheet dated, 30.1.92. Shri Saxena further argued that even if the petitioner had not informed the authorities of the Bank in June 1979 about his arrest by the Police, they did have full knowledge of the factum of his arrest and they in fact suspended him on account of his alleged involvement in the criminal case. The criminal case instituted against the petitioner did not relate to his act of violating Circular No. 63/71 dated, 8.12.71 and therefore, there was no impediment against the Bank in charge-sheeting the petitioner for this alleged misconduct under clause 19.7 (d) of the Bi-partite Settlement. Shri Saxena lastly argued that once the petitioner has been honourably acquitted by the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No.1 in respect of a charge framed under section 406 Indian Penal Code, there could be no justification for holding a departmental enquiry on the same set of allegations. Shri Saxena has argued that the petitioner has already suffered the prosecution for over ten years and now after a period of 14 years, computed from the date of his arrest, there is no justification for holding departmental enquiry. Shri C.K. Garg, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent Bank, argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet merely because of delay in framing of the charge. Shri C.K. Garg, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent Bank, argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet merely because of delay in framing of the charge. Shri Garg argued that the Bank was fully justified in awaiting result of the trial of the petitioner and after the criminal case has been decided by the Court, the respondent Bank has taken a decision to initiate inquiry against the petitioner. By making reference to Papra 19.3 of the Bi-partite Settlement, Shri Garg argued that even after acquittal by the court of competent jurisdiction, the Management of the Bank has every right to proceed against the petitioner. He argued that a person who is said to have cheated a customer of the Bank, must not be given any indulgence by the court under Article 226. Shri Garg submitted that the acquittal of the petitioner by the court of Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Ajmer does not operate as a restraint against the Management from holding an inquiry against the petitioner. Shri Garg argued that the degree of proof required in a criminal case has no relevance whatsoever in a departmental enquiry and even though a person might not be punished by a court in respect of an allegation which constitutes an offence, the departmental authority has a right to proceed against him on the basis of the same allegation and punish him on the basis of evidence. 10. On the question, as to whether a departmental enquiry can be quashed on the ground of delay in initiation of inquiry or in the conduct of inquiry, recent trend of decisions is that delay itself may in a given case prove fatal to the holding of inquiry. In State of M.P.V. Bani Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1308 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering a case in which the inquiry was initiated after almost 12 years computed from the date of alleged delinquency. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, had allowed an appeal filed by the respondent and had quashed the inquiry proceedings on the ground that there was abnormal delay in the initiation of inquiry. While upholding the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. While upholding the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities,'if any, and they came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge-memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage." 11. A learned Single Judge of this Court (N.C. Sharma J. as he then was) considered a similar question in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4605/89 in with a charge-sheet had been served after 19 years. After taking note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2257 , Union of India v. M. R. Patnaik, 1981(2) SCC 159 , Diwan Singh v. State of Haryana, 1976 (3) SCC 638 , the learned Single Judge quashed the inquiry on the ground of unreasonable delay in the conduct of inquiry. 12. A Division Bench of the High Court considered almost a similar case in Hari Prakash Kuchchal v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 WLR 789 and held that initiation of inquiry after a period of 14 years from the date of incident was wholly unwarranted. The Division Bench proceeded to quash the charge-sheets issued against the petitioner Hari Prakash Kuchhal. In S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1662/87, K. M. Dani v. State of Rajasthan , S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1662187 decided on 10.6.92, this Court once again quashed the charge-sheet on the ground of unusual delay in the initiation of the proceedings. In Dr. In S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1662/87, K. M. Dani v. State of Rajasthan , S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1662187 decided on 10.6.92, this Court once again quashed the charge-sheet on the ground of unusual delay in the initiation of the proceedings. In Dr. B. K. Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1992 (1) RLR 210 = 1993 (1) WLC 47 , the Court quashed the charge-sheet on the ground that the inquiry has been initiated in October, 1988 in respect of an incident relating to January 1979. The Court took notice of the fact that there was a delay of over 9 years in the initiation of the inquiry and the Government had issued the charge-sheet after a period of five years of the acquittal of the petitioner by the Court. These decisions clearly show that if there is an unreasonable delay in the initiation of inquiry, the Court will in appropriate cases be justified in quashing the inquiry and in restraining the employer to proceed with the disciplinary action. 13. In the present case, the charge-sheet has been issued on 30.1.92 i.e. after more than 12 years and six months of the date of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the F.I.R. No. 170/78 lodged by Heera Lal Kumawat. It is true that the petitioner had failed to communicate the factum of his arrest as required by Circular Letter No. 63/71 dated, 8th December 1971, but this is also an established fact that the Bank authorities were aware of the incident relating to his arrest. They had come to know of this when copies of the charge-sheets dated, 30.6.79 were obtained. Admittedly, this allegation was not made and could not have been made subject matter of the prosecution of the petitioner. It was open to the authorities of the Bank to proceed against the petitioner departmentally in respect of the allegation of violation of the Circular letter dated, 8.12.71. Admittedly, this allegation was not made and could not have been made subject matter of the prosecution of the petitioner. It was open to the authorities of the Bank to proceed against the petitioner departmentally in respect of the allegation of violation of the Circular letter dated, 8.12.71. Total silence on the part of the authorities of the Bank for over 12 years without any tangible explanation is sufficient for holding that the Bank authorities themselves did not consider the failure of the petitioner to comply with the Circular letter dated, 8.12.71 to be of any significance.They served the charge-sheet on the petitioner containing the allegations, one of which relates to violation of the said Circular, only after his acquittal by the Court. The attempt made by the respondents in the reply to explain the delay by stating that the Bank authorities were awaiting prosecution of the petitioner is too feeble and weak to be accepted as genuine or justified. Clearly, there has been unreasonable delay of over 12 years in the initiation of inquiry against the petitioner in respect of charge No. 1 and on that ground this part of the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. 14. The second allegation levelled against the petitioner relates to his act of receiving cash from Heera Lal Kumawat for being deposited in his R.D. account No. 1099. It has been alleged that by accepting the cash unauthorisedly, the petitioner has committed a serious misconduct under clause-19.5 (j) of the Bi-partite settlement. A perusal of the complaint filed by Heera Lal shows that he had given money ( र 20/-) on different occasions for being deposited in his account. He alleged that he had given notice to Ramgopal on 17.9.77 alleging breach of trust and cheating and misappropriation of funds. Learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate had considered the following question in her judgment. HINDI MATTER C 15. Evaluation of the evidence made by the learned Munsiff abstract of which has been quoted above, shows that no evidence had been produced in the Court to establish that the complainant Hira Lai had given र 20/- every month for deposit in his R.D. Account. The learned Munsiff has categorically held that the statement of Heera Lai was not worthy of acceptance. It was most unnatural and unreliable. The learned Munsiff has categorically held that the statement of Heera Lai was not worthy of acceptance. It was most unnatural and unreliable. The learned Munsiff further held that no independent witness was produced in the Court to establish the factum that money had been given to the accused for deposit in the R.D. Account of the complainant and he had misappropriated the same. It is therefore, clear that so far as the Court is concerned, it has clearly disbelieved the statement of the complainant and has categorically held that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the petitioner. The Court has been unequivocal in declaring that the charge levelled against the petitioner is baseless. On the basis of these findings the Court completely exonerated/ honourably exonerated the petitioner. Para-19.3. of the Bi-Partite Settlement on which much reliance has been placed by Shri Garg, learned counsel for the respondent Bank as well as Para 19.5 (j) which constitutes basis of charge levelled against the petitioner are quoted below for ready reference: "19.3 (a) When in the opinion of the management an employee has committed an offence, unless he be otherwise prosecuted, the Bank may take steps to prosecute him or get him prosecuted and in such a case he may also be suspended. (b) If he be convicted, he may be dismissed with effect from the date of his conviction or be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in Clause 19.6 below. (c) If he be acquitted it shall be open to the management to proceed against him under the provisions set out below in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharges. However, in the event of the management deciding after enquiry not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination of service with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice. However, in the event of the management deciding after enquiry not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination of service with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice. And he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full pay and allowances minus such subsistence allowance as he has drawn and to all other privileges for the period of suspension provide that if he be acquitted by being given the benefit of doubt he may be paid such portion of such pay and allowances as the management may deem proper, and the period of his absence shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the Management so direct. (d) If he prefers an appeal or revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under provisions set below in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply, the period upto-date for which full pay and allowances has not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice, as directed above." "19.5. By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of he following acts and omissions on the part of art employee : (a) to (i) -- (j) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss;" 16. Para -19.3 quoted hereinabove, no doubt, postulates that the employer can proceed against an employee who is acquitted by a Court of law but this provision cannot be considered to be a Charter for the employer to proceed against the employee in each and every case, where the employee has been acquitted by a Court of law. Acquittal of an employee in a criminal case may be for different reasons. Acquittal of an employee in a criminal case may be for different reasons. In a given case the employee who is accused of an offence may be acquitted for want of proper sanction. In another case, he may be acquitted/ discharged because of non-compliance of some statutory provision. In yet another case, he may be acquitted on account of bar of limitation etc. Such an acquittal cannot be considered as acquittal on merits and in those cases the employer is not precluded from holding a departmental enquiry, may be on the same charges. However, if an employee is exonerated on merits of the charge the situation will be entirely different. 17. In Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G. Modak, AIR 1984 S.C. 626 , a more or less similar question was examined by the Apex Court. That was a case in which the employee had been charge-sheeted under section-304A I.P.C. A disciplinary action was also initiated against him on the same charges. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated. of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered." 18. Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 S.C. 2118 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the question as to whether the proceedings of the departmental enquiry can go on simultaneously with prosecution of the employee in a Court of law. While declining to lay down a general guideline the Supreme Court observed that, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the High Court and stayed the departmental proceedings because of the pendency of the criminal case. 19. While declining to lay down a general guideline the Supreme Court observed that, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the High Court and stayed the departmental proceedings because of the pendency of the criminal case. 19. In Nelosn Molice v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981 . The Supreme Court held that the nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. That was case in which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant on the basis of several charges. The inquiry officer submitted a report holding the appellant guilty of the charges and then the disciplinary authority passed the order of removal. This order was confirmed in the appeal. The Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the order of punishment on the ground that inquiry report had not been served upon the delinquent. The Tribunal left it open for the departmental authorities to take fresh proceedings but also observed that the factum of acquittal of the delinquent in a criminal case should be kept in view while deciding whether the proceedings should be dropped or not. The employer once again ordered removal from service. While laying down that the scope of criminal case is different, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that even the Tribunal had observed that the acts which led to the initiation of the departmental disciplinary proceedings was not exactly the same which were the subject-matter of the criminal case. 20. Different High Court have also dealt with this issue. In Bhagwat Charan v. State of U.P., 1973 (2) SLR. 238 , a learned Single Judge made reference to the decision of the Madras High Court in Jairomo De Silva v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1952 Madras (-) and K. Rangarajan v. State of Madras, 1968 Lab I.C. 63 and also in R.P. Kapoor v Union of India, AIR 1964 S.C. 787 and hold that, if a person has been honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court then the departmental proceedings on the basis of the same charges are not competent. 21. 21. In Govind Ram v. State of U.P., 1981(2)SLR 458 a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court once again held that where the person had been acquitted by the criminal court of the charges of misappropriation of Government funds and there was not even an iota of evidence in the criminal proceedings from which suspicion regarding involvement of the Government could be inferred, it was not permissible to hold a departmental enquiry on the same charges. 22. In Dy. Inspector General Of Police v. V.N. Shankaran, 1982 (3) SLR 44 a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took the same v7ew. 23. Sahib Ram v. Delhi Administration, 1984 (2) SLR 133 Delhi High Court took the view that after an employee had been discharged in the criminal case the departmental enquiry into the same allegations cannot be held. 24. In Ghulam Moinuddin v. State of Jammu Kashmir, 1984 (3) SLR 613 , the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that, even though there was no bar against the holding of departmental enquiry, such enquiry cannot be hld after the employee had been acquitted in the case. The learned Judge held that the acquittal on merits will operate as a bar to the holding of departmental enquiry. In R.J. Diwakar v. Union of India, 1985 (1) SLR 214 , a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to several decisions of different Hight Courts and held that if an employee is acquitted in criminal proceedings, the departmental enquiry on the same set of allegations cannot be held thereafter. The division bench quoted the following observations of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India (supra.) "If the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, the disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow, where the acquittal is other than honourable." 25. In Mohmmod Tofique v. General Manager, APSRTC , K. Ramaswamy J. (as he then was) held, where the acquittal of an employee was on merits of the charges it is not expedient to conduct an inquiry on the same charge". This view has been reiterated though in different words in Srinivas Reddy v. Union Bank of India, 1990(3)SLR 628 . 26. This view has been reiterated though in different words in Srinivas Reddy v. Union Bank of India, 1990(3)SLR 628 . 26. In Mohmmod Umar v. R.S.E.B., 1993 (1) WLC 253 , I have observed : "A trial for criminal offence and a departmental/domestic inquiry do not stand on the same footing. The degree of proof required in the departmental proceedings is not the same as it is in a criminal case. In a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove beyond doubt the guilt of a person charged with an offence, unless by some special provision of law the burden of proving innocence is placed on the person accused of an offence. But in a departmental inquiry the charge can be established on the basis of some legally admissible evidence which may in all case by not sufficient for bringing home the charge of a criminal offence. However, in departmental inquiries also the primary burden lies on the charging authority to lead sufficient evidence to prove the allegation. Mere suspicion can not be made basis for punishing a person in a departmental inquiry." "It is one of the well recognised principle of law that the employer may hold a departmental enquiry in respect of some act of delinquency which can also give rise to prosecution in a Court of law. However, if the disciplinary proceeding is based on the same set of facts on which a criminal action has already been initiated, it is always proper for the employer to await the result of the prosecution before a competent court. If the employer proceeds simultaneously with the departmental action during pendency of criminal prosecution, the Court may on petition of the employee stay the prosecution once it is satisfied that two actions are based on the same facts and the same cause." It has further been observed : "Once the Court gives a verdict of conviction by holding an employee guilty of an offence, the employer has an absolute right to pass an order of punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank.The evidence recorded by the court and appreciation of the same made by the Court for recording a finding of guilt against the employee is treated as conclusive. The employer is not required to hold any departmental inquiry in respect of the allegations which constituted the basis of criminal charge. The employer is not required to hold any departmental inquiry in respect of the allegations which constituted the basis of criminal charge. The employer is not required to record evidence afresh for holding. the employee guilty of such charge. The only thing which is required to be done by the employer is to look into the conduct of the employee which led to his conviction on a criminal charge. This is required to be done only for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment, which the employer may impose on the employee. The employee does not have a right of hearing by the employer before an order of punishment is passed by the employer on the ground of the conduct of the employee which led to his conviction. At one time their Lordships of the Supreme court had in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellapan, AIR 1975 S.C. 2216 , took the view that even after conviction of an employee by a court for an action which amounts to criminal offence it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the employee concerned about the proposed punishment and give him an opportunity to make representation against the proposed punishment. Subsequently, that decision has been overruled by a majority of 4 : I in a Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel ( AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 ) . The same principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Trikharma v. V.K. seth, AIR 1988 S.C. 285 . In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench and the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the employee even on the question of quantum of punishment which it decides to impose on the basis of the conviction of the employee by a competent court. This decision clearly brings out the intendment of the law making authority in respect of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and similar other provisions." "When the Legislature has thought it proper to confer finality to the decision of the Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the conviction of an employee on a criminal offence the Court must give full effect to this intention of the legislature while interpreting the relevant provisions of the rules. If the employer can act on the basis of finding of guilt recorded by a court for punishing an employee, converse of it must also be treated as correct. It is therefore, logical to hold that the employer cannot ignore the finding of not guilty recorded by a court and proceed with the disciplinary action on the basis of same allegation which constituted the part of the criminal charge. The finality which is attached to the conclusion arrived at by a Court of law cannot be discarded in the case of a finding of not guilty. When the disciplinary authority can act on the basis of the conviction of an employee recorded by a competent court, for the purpose of imposing punishment, it is not open to the employer to ignore the acquittal of the employee by such court and record a conclusion which is contrary to the finding of the Court and then punish the employee for an act of alleged delinquency which constituted a part of the charge in the criminal case, in which the employee has been acquitted. I am clearly of the opinion that once a competent court records a finding of not guilty against an employee in respect of an act involving criminal offence, it is not open to the disciplinary authority to proceed against the employee departmentally on the same facts and pass an order of punishment by holding the employee guilty. This principle of law will of course be not applicable where the employer proceeds against an employee on some different charge after a finding of not guilty has been recorded by the competent court or where the acquittal is based on technical grounds like lack of jurisdiction, want of sanction or bar of limitation etc." 27. This principle of law will of course be not applicable where the employer proceeds against an employee on some different charge after a finding of not guilty has been recorded by the competent court or where the acquittal is based on technical grounds like lack of jurisdiction, want of sanction or bar of limitation etc." 27. Ordinarily, an employer should not proceed with the departmental enquiry on the same set of allegation which constitute a basis of prosecution of the employee in a court of law. If the employer exercises his right to proceed with the departmental enquiry the employee can move the Court for staying the proceedings of the departmental enquiry. However, if the inquiry is held on the basis of charges which are different than the those constituting the basis of prosecution though, both relate to the same incident, the inquiry proceedings cannot be interfered with by the Court. It further follows that if an employee is acquitted by the Court of law or discharged in a criminal case on account of the bar of limitation or breach of some statutory provisions or on some other technical grounds the employee does not get immunity against the departmental action. The reason is that an acquittal/ discharge on technical grounds does not depend on consideration of the allegations on merits. However, if the acquittal of the employee is ordered by the Court after evaluation of the evidence and consideration of the whole case on merits, the departmental enquiry cannot be held on the same allegation. If the employer proceeds against the employee departmentally on the basis of the same allegations the employee can seek appropriate remedy in a court of law because, the employer cannot ignore the evidence recorded in the criminal case and on which a verdict has been given by the Court by disbelieving the witnesses. 28. In the light of the above, if the facts of this case are examined once again, it becomes clear that the petitioner was prosecuted on the allegation of having received money from Heera Lal Kumawat for being deposited in his R.D. account and he mis-appropriated the same. The testimony of Heera Lal and other witnesses who appeared in support of the prosecution has been considered by the Court and the Court has specifically held that testimony of Heera Lal is not worthy of reliance for holding the petitioner guilty. The testimony of Heera Lal and other witnesses who appeared in support of the prosecution has been considered by the Court and the Court has specifically held that testimony of Heera Lal is not worthy of reliance for holding the petitioner guilty. Now the inquiry has been initiated against the petitioner on the same allegation. It is not possible to accept the plea of the respondents that now the Bank can in the departmental enquiry hold the petitioner guilty on the basis of the evidence of those very persons who have not been believed by the Court. It is, thus, held that charge No. 2 cannot be made basis for holding departmental enquiry against the petitioner initiated after a lapse of 12 years and six months. 29. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. Charge-sheet dated, 30.1.92 is quashed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******