Honble SAXENA, J.—The petitioner through his elder brother Shri Mohammad Hanif has challenged the correctness and validity of his detention order dated 12.8.1991 (Annex. 22) passed under section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (in short PITNDPS Act) as well as the order of confirmation dated 27.1.1992 (Annex. 25) passed under section 9(f) of the Act directing his detention for a period of one year from the date of his detention i.e. 15.11.1991 and prayed that the said orders be quashed and he be ordered to be set at liberty. (2) Briefly, the grounds on which the impugned detention has been made are that on 9.3.1991, acting on a specific information the officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur Zonal Unit, searched the rented house/work-shop of one Shri Babu Lal Suthar situated in Arya Nagar, near Badala, out side 3rd Pole, Mahamandir, Jodhpur and recovered two polythene bags containing 42 packets of black coloured material. Out of those packets 20 packets bore the marking of Lion and 22 packets had the marking of Scorpion brands. The said material was tested with the help of drug testing kit and was prima facie found to be charas. During the said search Shri Babu Lal Suthar owner of the work-shop and his servant Shri Moola Ram Suthar were also present. Shri Moola Ram disclosed that the said recovered polythene bags were kept in the under-ground of the said premises by one Shri Alfoodin son of Shri Subhan Ji Ghoshi resident of Mansagar, Mahamandir, Jodhpur at about 4 a.m. on 9.3.1991. The recovered charas weighed 42.060 kg. and was seized under the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short NDPS Act, 1985) and the recovery memo in presence of two motbirs was drawn on the spot. Representative samples of 25 gms. each were, drawn from the two different lots of Lion & Scorpion brands seized charas for chemical analysis. On 9.3.1991 said Babu Lal Suthar in his statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, 1985 admitted the said recovery, but denied having knowledge or connection with the seized charas. However, in his further statement dated 10.3.91, he identified Alfoodin Ghoshi from his photograph as his friend. On 9.3.1991 said Babu Lal Suthar in his statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, 1985 admitted the said recovery, but denied having knowledge or connection with the seized charas. However, in his further statement dated 10.3.91, he identified Alfoodin Ghoshi from his photograph as his friend. Moola Ram Suthar in his statement dated 9.3.1991 said that those two polythene bags were kept by Alfoodin Ghoshi at about 4 a.m. on 9.3.1991 and that he had told him that the said polythene bags contained some books. On 9.3.1991 the residential premises of Alfoodin Ghoshi were also searched. His statement was recorded on 9.3.1991 & 10.3.1992, wherein he admitted about the ownership of the consignment of the charas. He further admitted that he had secreted the said charas in the under-ground premises of Babu Lal Suthar. He disclosed that the said charas was purchased by him from petitioner Gani Khan at the rate of Rs. 1200/-per Kilogram. He further disclosed that he had personally gone to Pokharan on 8.3.1991, where the petitioner was running a shop under the name & style of M/s Janta Electric Works and that the petitioner had agreed to supply his charas at the price of Rs. 1200/- per Kilogram for delivery at Jodhpur. Alfoodin further disclosed that he had given Rs. 27,000/- as advance to the petitioner and told him to deliver the charas in the night intervening 8th & 9.03.1991 at Jodhpur at a pre-decided place near Badala, outside 3rd Pole, Mahamandir, Jodhpur. He also stated that in the early morning of 9.3.1991 at about 3 a.m., petitioner in Mahindra Jeep bearing registered No. RST 4780 came at the aforementioned pre-decided place and gave him 42 packets of charas in two polythene bags and that thereafter, the said charas was secreted by him in the under ground of the rented premises of Babu Lal Suthar. On 10.3.1991, Alfoodin was arrested and produced before the Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody. On 10.3.1991, Alfoodin was arrested and produced before the Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody. On 18.3.1991, Shri Ram Narain Gandhi in his statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, 1985 inter alia stated that he was owner of Mahindra Jeep No. RST 4780, that on his direction, his driver Shri Mehardin had handed over the said vehicle to the petitioner on 8.3.1991 at 7.30 p.m. and that on 9.3.1991 at about 8 a.m., the petitioner had handed over the said vehicle back to Shri Mehardin, driver. He further stated that the petitioner had gone to Jodhpur in the said vehicle and transported some goods to Jodhpur and that he knew that the petitioner was indulging in smuggling of heroin, charas & opium. The chemical test report dated 19.4.1991 received from Government Opium & Alkolide Works, Neemach confirmed that the contents of the representative samples, after chemical analysis were found to be those of charas. It is alleged that on 10.3.1991, Gani Khan was not available at his residential premises and that summons dated 21.3.1991 for his appearance before the Intelligence Officer, N.C.B. Jodhpur on 1.4.1991 was sent vide registered post A.D., which was duly acknowledged by some body of the petitioners house, but he did not care to comply with the directions. Again summons dated 18.4.1991 were despatched to the petitioner through registered post A.D., which were received back undelivered with the remark that the addressee had left Pokaran without leaving any address. Third time summons of the petitioner were delivered personally to his father Shri Haji Mangal Khan on 26.5.1991 for petitioners appearance before Superintendent, N.C.B., Jodhpur on 7.6.1991, but he failed to appear. It is alleged that on 7.4.1991, the petitioner filed an anticipatory bail application in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, which was dismissed by the court on 9.7.1991. After investigation a criminal complaint was filed against Alfoodin under the NDPS Act, 1985 in the court of competent jurisdiction. The sponsoring authority sent all the relevant material to the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India. After investigation a criminal complaint was filed against Alfoodin under the NDPS Act, 1985 in the court of competent jurisdiction. The sponsoring authority sent all the relevant material to the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India. The Joint Secretary to the Government of India (respondent No. 2) after having his subjective satisfaction that the petitioner Gani Khan engaged himself in sale and purchase of narcotic drugs and if not prevented, he will continue in indulging in the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and that there existed compelling necessity, in view of the likelihood of petitioner being released on bail under normal law and his indulging in the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, passed the impugned detention order dated 12.8.1991 (Annex. 22). It is alleged that the petitioner had gone underground and was absconding. However, on 15.11.1991 he was arrested by the Police party of Police Station, Nachana for the alleged smuggling of 822 bottles of contraband liquor without licence under the Rajasthan Excise Act and was produced before the Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody. Thereupon on 15.11.1991, the order of detention (Annex. 22) along with the grounds of detention (Annex. 23) was served on the petitioner in the jail. The detenue made a representation (Annex. 24) against his detention on 21.12.1991, which was rejected by the respondents by order dated 23.1.1992 Annex. X. The case of detenue Gani Khan was also placed before the Advisory Board, which confirmed the detention order and the respondent No. 3 by his order dated 27.1.1992 (Annex. 25) passed under section 9 (f) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 confirmed the detention order and directed that the detenue be detained for a period of one year from the date of his detention i.e. from 15.11.1991. Hence this writ petition. (3) It may be mentioned here that this court vide its order dated 4.5.1992 had granted temporary release of detenue Gani Khan and he remained on parole from 6.5.1992 to 10.8.1992 and hence after expiry of the period of one year from the date of his detention w.e.f. 15.11.1991, he is still under detention due to the extended period of detention caused by the parole. (4) We have heard the learned Advocates for the parties at length and perused the relevant record. (5) Shri Sandeep Mehta has vehemently challenged the impugned detention order on four counts. (4) We have heard the learned Advocates for the parties at length and perused the relevant record. (5) Shri Sandeep Mehta has vehemently challenged the impugned detention order on four counts. He has submitted that though the contraband charas was recovered on 9.3.1991, the detention order was made on 12.8.1991 and there is no explanation for this undue and unreasonable delay. According to him this unexplained inordinate delay vitiates petitioners detention. For this he has relied on T.A. Abdul Rahman vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (1), Issaq Babu vs. U.O.I. & Anr. (2) and Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs. Shri S. Ramamurthi & Ors. (3), wherein it has been held that unreasonable and unexplained delay in passing the detention order vitiates the detention. (6) We have given our thoughtful consideration. It is well settled that when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities of the detenue and the passing of the detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily explained such delay and has afforded a tenable and a reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. Unexplained delay in passing the detention order may throw considerable doubt on genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. (7) In the instant case, from the statement of Alfoodin dated 10.3,1991 and statement of Ram Narain Gandhi dated 18.3.1991 recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act, 1985, it was revealed that detenue Gani Khan had sold & supplied the 42 packets of the seized charas to Alfoodin in the jeep at Jodhpur. In Para No. 13 & 14 of the grounds of detention (Annex. 23), it has been clearly mentioned that out of the 4 samples drawn from 42 packets of seized charas, two samples were sent for chemical analysis to the Government Opium and Alkolid Works, Neemach and that the chemical test report dated 23.4.1991 received therefrom confirmed the contents of those samples as covered under the narcotic drugs defined as charas. In para 14 of Annexure 23, it has also been specifically mentioned that the petitioner was not available for examination on 10.3.1991 at his house and that despite summons dated 21.3.1991, 18.4.1991, and 26.5.1991 sent to him, he was not available. In para 14 of Annexure 23, it has also been specifically mentioned that the petitioner was not available for examination on 10.3.1991 at his house and that despite summons dated 21.3.1991, 18.4.1991, and 26.5.1991 sent to him, he was not available. Even the summons sent through registered A.D. was served on his father Haji Mangal Khan on 26.5.1991 for petitioners appearance before the Superintendent, N.C.B., Jodhpur on 7.6.1991, but he failed to appear. It has also been mentioned that the petitioner detenue filed an anticipatory bail petition dated 4.7.1991 in the court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, which was turned down by the Court on 9.7.1991. The respondents in their reply vide para No. 15 & 16 have specifically averred that all efforts were made to examine the petitioner immediately after the seizure and disclosure of source of supply of the seized charas, but he remained under ground till he was arrested by the police party of Police Station, Nachana on 15.11.1991 in a case registered against him under the Rajasthan Excise Act. (8) We have gone through the cases cited by Shri Sandeep Mehta to wit A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225 (supra), 1990 (4) SCC 135 (supra), J.T. 1992 (3) SC 261 (supra). We respectfully agree with the law laid down therein, but the facts of those cases are clearly distinguishable with the facts of the case in hand. (9) In M. Ahamedkutty vs. Union of India & Anr. (4), the Apex Court has held that delay in passing the detention order will not by itself vitiate the detention order if the order has been passed after detailed investigation and consideration of facts. The Apex Court has observed as under : — "Where the seemingly long time taken for passing the detention order after the prejudicial act is the result of full and detailed investigation and consideration of the facts of the case, the ground can not be held to be remote and the detention can not be held to be bad on that ground." In that case the detenue was intercepted by the Custom Officials on 31st Jan., 1988 and 13 gold sheets weighing 1280 gms. were recovered concealed inside plywood panels of his suitcase at the Trivendrum Air Port and the order of detention was passed on 25.06.1988. were recovered concealed inside plywood panels of his suitcase at the Trivendrum Air Port and the order of detention was passed on 25.06.1988. The Apex Court after considering all the facts & circumstances of the case held that the nexus was not snapped and the ground was not rendered stale and that the order of detention was not rendered invalid thereby. Whether the time lag between the commission of the offence and the detention was enough to snap the reasonable nexus between the prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention would depend upon the facts & circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical calender test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months and days between the offending act and the order of detention. The question is whether the activities of the detenue were such that the detaining authority could reasonable come to the conclusion that the detenue was likely to continue in his unlawful activities. (10) In the case in hand, the delay in passing the order of detention has been properly explained by the respondents. The petitioner in his representation made to the detaining authority as well as in this writ petition has not cared to explain at all as to why he did not appear before the Investigation Officer/Superintendent, NDPS Cell, Jodhpur despite the fact that his house was searched on 10.3.1991 and thereafter as many as three times summons were sent to him through registered post A.D. and especially when one of the summons was received by his father Haji Mangal Khan. On the other hand petitioner went under ground. His application for anticipatory bail was also rejected by the Sessions Judge on 9.7.1991. The detaining authority on the basis of the aforementioned circumstances and after taking into consideration the material on record was satisfied that the petitioner was engaged in the sale and purchase of the narcotic drugs and that with a view to preventing him from in such nefarious activities, it was essential to detain and keep him in custody. In such circumstances, to our mind, the delay in passing the detention order (Annex. 22) has been satisfactorily explained and it can not be held that the grounds mentioned in Annex. 23 were stale or illusory or that there was no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. In such circumstances, to our mind, the delay in passing the detention order (Annex. 22) has been satisfactorily explained and it can not be held that the grounds mentioned in Annex. 23 were stale or illusory or that there was no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Therefore, petitioners detention does not stand vitiated on this ground. (11) That next argument of Shri Sandeep Mehta is that though the detention order was passed on 12.8.1991, the same was served on the petitioner as late as on 15.11.1991 and that this delay of three months has not been well explained, which vitiates the order of detention. According to him if the detenue had absconded, proceedings under section 8 of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 should have been initiated against him, but no such proceedings were initiated. According to him no affidavit has been filed of the officer, who made the efforts to arrest the detenue, and therefore, this unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and date of serving the detention order throws considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenue with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. For this he has relied on the case of Shafique Ahmed vs. District Magistrate, Meerut (5). (12). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that after the detention order, petitioner Gani Khan had deliberately gone under ground, that efforts were made for his arrest on 16.8.1991, 27.8.1991, 17.9,1991, 28.9.1991, 29.9.1991, 4.10.1991, 5.10.1991, 16.10.1991 and 1,7.10.1991, but he always managed to escape. They have further submitted that Narcotic Control Bureau with Head Office, New Delhi was approached on 12.11.1991 for taking up the matter with the Central Government for the early issue of declaration under section 8(1) (b) PITNDPS Act, 1988 but since the petitioner was arrested by the police party, Police Station Nachana, while smuggling contraband liquor on 15.11.1991 and was remanded to judicial custody, the efforts for issue of declaration under section 8(1) (b) were abandoned and the detention order was served on him in the jail on 15.11.1991. Thus, there was no delay on the part of the detaining authority at any stage and that the time lag has duly been explained. (13). We have given our anxious and careful consideration on this aspect. In para No. 4 & 9 of the reply submitted to the rejoinder by the respondents, it has been specifically pleaded that proper procedure as laid down in the PITNDPS Act, 1988 was adopted to serve the detention order as well as the grounds of detention. In para No. 15 & 16 Shri T.S. Sandhu, Under Secretary to the Government of India, respondent No. 4, in his affidavit dated 5.5.1992 has clearly deposed that the department made all efforts to examine the detenue immediately after the seizure and disclosure of source of supply of the dope by him, but he remained under ground till he was arrested by the police party, Police Station, Nachana and that thereafter the detention order served on him without any delay. At para 9, he has also deposed that it is a recorded fact that the police party, Nachana had apprehended two smugglers including Gani Khan on 14.11.1991 under section 4 of the Rajasthan Excise Act and under section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 in an area near Indira Gandhi Canal between villages Ghatiyali and Chejhes along with one jonga jeep No. RNS 6999 with 813 bottles of Indian made foreign liquor. (14) Shri T.S. Sandhu in his affidavit dated 12.5.1992 vide para 2 & 4 has further deposed that after the issue of the detention order all efforts were made to apprehend Gani Khan, but he always managed to escape and remained under ground and that efforts for his apprehension made on 16.8.1991, 27.8.1991, 17.9.1991, 28.9.1991, 29.9.1991, 4.10.1991, 5.10.1991, 16.10.1991 and 17.10.91 could not materialise. He has also deposed that Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi was approached on 12.11.1991 for taking up the matter with the Central Government for early issue of declaration under section 8(1) (b) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 and that since Gani Khan was sighted in the court on 15.11.1991, the detention order was served on him on that very day. The petitioner has not cared to refute these specific averments. (15) In Shafiq Ahmed vs. District Magistrate, Meerut & Ors. (cited supra), the order of detention was passed on 15.4.1988, but the detenue was arrested on 2.10.1988. The petitioner has not cared to refute these specific averments. (15) In Shafiq Ahmed vs. District Magistrate, Meerut & Ors. (cited supra), the order of detention was passed on 15.4.1988, but the detenue was arrested on 2.10.1988. From 15.4.1988 to 12.5.1988 no attempt was made to contact or arrest the detenue and no explanation was given for that period. It was, however, stated on behalf of the detaining authority that from May, 1988 to September, 1988, the entire police force was extremely busy in controlling the law and order situation. The Apex Court held that if the law and order was threatened and prejudiced, it was not the conduct of the detenue but because of the inadequacy or inability of the police force to control the situation, and therefore, the delay was unexplained, not warranted by the facts of situation and that the said ground was not tenable and the detention was vitiated. Apparently such are not the facts of the case in hand. Therefore, Shafiq Ahmads Case renders no assistance to the petitioner. (16) On the other hand in M. Ahamedkutty vs. U.O.I. & Anr. (supra), it has been observed that where after passing of the detention order the passage of time is caused by the detenue. himself by absconding, the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be doubted and the detention can not be held to be bad on ground of delay in execution of the order. It was held that in the facts & circumstances of that case, there was no inordinate or unexplained delay of 38 days between the detention and its execution so as to snap the nexus between the two or to render the grounds stale or to indicate that the detaining authority was not satisfied as to the genuine need for detention of the detenue. (17) Therefore, keeping in view all the facts & circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the respondents have well explained the delay in serving the detention order dated 12.8.1991 (Annex. 22) on detenue on 15.11.1991, that genuine efforts were made to apprehend him but he went under ground, and that this delay is not fatal and the same does not vitiate the order of detention. Hence, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner also fails. 22) on detenue on 15.11.1991, that genuine efforts were made to apprehend him but he went under ground, and that this delay is not fatal and the same does not vitiate the order of detention. Hence, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner also fails. (18) Shri Sandeep Mehta next submitted that the detenue had made his representation on 21.12.1991, that the same was received in the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue, New Delhi on 23.12.1991 , but the same was rejected by order Annexure X dated 23.1.1992. Thus, there was a delay of one month and 3 days, which can not be said to be reasonable and that on this ground alone the detention stands invalidated. For this he has relied on the following cases: — Harish Pahwa vs. State of U.P. (6), Ram Dhondu Borade vs. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police & Ors. (7), and Mahesh Kumar Chauhan vs. U.O.I. & Ors. (8). (19) In Harish Pahawas case, the detenue was detained under the COFEPOSA Act. His representation dated 3.06.1980 was rejected on 24.6.1980 and was communicated to the jail authorities two days later. The case of the State was that the representation was with the Customs Authorities, who were formulating their comments from 7.6.1980 to 12.6.1980 and that the representation was under consideration of the Government for 4 days from 13.6.1980 to 16.6.1980 and its Law Department from 17.6.1980 to 19.6.1980 and again for its own consideration for 6 days from 19.6.1980 to 24.6.1980. The Supreme Court held that the representation made by the detenue was not considered within reasonable time and that the delay invalidated the detention in view of the provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court observed as under: — "The representation made by a detenue has to be considered without any delay. The Supreme Court does not look with equanimity upon delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. The Supreme Court does not look with equanimity upon delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. It is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representations with the utmost expedition which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenue. Where this is not done, the detention has to be declared unconstitutional." (20) In Rama Dhondus case (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court has formulated the following proposition: — "The detenue has an independent constitutional right to make his representation under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. Correspondingly there is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenue forwards his representation questioning the correctness of the detention order clamped upon him and requesting for his release, to consider the said representation within reasonable dispatch and to dispose the same as expeditiously as possible. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect but if this constitutional imperative is observed in breach, it would amount to negation of the constitutional obligation rendering the continued detention constitutionally impermissible and illegal. Since such a breach would defeat the very concept of liberty the highly cherished right which is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. True, there is no prescribed period either under the provisions of the Constitution or under the concerned detention law within which the representation should be dealt with. The use of the word as soon as may be" occurring in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution reflects that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with due promptitude and diligence and with a sense of urgency and without avoidable delay. What is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. What is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. However, in case the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the authority is so unreasonably long and the explanation offered by the authority is so unsatisfactory, such delay could vitiate the order of detention." (21) In Mahesh Kumar Chauhans case (cited supra), it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court that a representation of a detenue, whose liberty is in peril and deprived should be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible; otherwise the continued detention will render itself impermissible and invalid as being violative of the constitutional obligation enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and that if any delay is occurred in the disposal of a representation, such delay should be explained by the appropriate authority to the satisfaction of the court. In that case the representation was forwarded to the concerned sponsoring authority on 25.8.1989 and the comments from the sponsoring authority were received by the Department on 11.9.1989 and there was absolutely no explanation as to why such a delay had occurred. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the undue and unexplained delay was in violation of the constitutional obligation enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India rendering the detention order invalid. (22) However, in a later pronouncement the Apex Court in Kamarunnissa vs. U.O.I. & Ors. (9) has held that the representation of the detenue should be decided expeditiously, but whether the delay has been properly explained depends on the facts of each case, that seeking the comments of sponsoring authorities is necessary and consequent reasonable delay of about 4-5 days is unavoidable. It has observed that having regard to the process of receiving a representation from the detenue by the Jail authorities and sending it to the detaining authority, obtaining comments of sponsoring authority, taking of decision by the concerned Minister and communicating the same to the detenue, as also the non-working days and postal days should be taken into consideration while deciding as to whether the representation of the detenue was decided without delay or not. Therefore, the delay occurred due to postal despatch as well as the number of non-working days and holidays have to be taken into consideration. Therefore, the delay occurred due to postal despatch as well as the number of non-working days and holidays have to be taken into consideration. (23) In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. vs. C. Subramani (10), the Honble Supreme Court has made the following observations : — "It may be noted that a recent constitution bench of this Court in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi vs. Union of India ( 1991 (1) SCC 476 ) has dealt with the question of time taken in dealing with the representation and the words "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. This Court has observed as under: (S.C. p. 484 para 12) — "The words as soon as may be occurring in clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal." "Thus, the question of any period taken in dealing with the representation has to be decided in the particular facts and circumstances of each case and it cannot be determined on the basis of any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases. A leeway has to be given in considering such representation by the Government and no inference of delay leading to the violation of constitutional mandate enshrined in Clause (5) of Article 22 can be drawn unless it shows that the authorities dealing with the representation had adopted, an attitude of leisureliness, supine indifference, slackness, unduly protracted procrastination or callous attitude in considering such representation. Thus, in the facts of the present case, we were clearly of the view that the Government has sufficiently explained the period spent in dealing with the representation of the detenues. Thus, in the facts of the present case, we were clearly of the view that the Government has sufficiently explained the period spent in dealing with the representation of the detenues. The High Court was wrong in quashing the order of detention on the aforesaid ground." (24) In the light of various judgments of the Supreme Court and the proposition laid down therein, we have to see whether in the instant case the constitutional propriety of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India has been observed or not and whether the representation filed by the petitioner has been considered expeditiously or with supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude. (25) A chronology of the dates in dealing with the representation of the detenue, which is discernable from the pleadings of the parties is detailed ad infra: — 21.12.1991 representation made by the detenue (Annex, 24) through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jodhpur. 23.12.1991 representation received at 4 p.m. in the PITNDPS Cell 28.12.1991/29.12.1991 closed holidays 3.1.1992 representation forwarded to the N.C.B., Jodhpur, Zonal Unit for comments; 15.1.1992 comments submitted by the N.C.B., Jodhpur Zonal Unit 16.1.1992 comments were received at 4 p.m. in the PITNDPS Cell, New Delhi; 18.1.1992/19.1.1992 closed holidays; 22.1.1992 representation rejected by the Minister; 23.1.1992 order for rejecting the representation Annexure X; 25.1.1992 rejection order Annex. X was conveyed to the detenue. (26) Shri P.P. Choudhary, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the Department of Revenue and the Ministry of Finance are located in the North Block, New Delhi while the PITNDPS Cell is located in the Indian Oil Building Connaught Place, New Delhi. The representation was received in the PITNDPS Cell on 27.12.1992 at 4 p.m., that 28th & 29th Dec, 1991 were closed holidays being Saturday & Sunday. He has further contended that the staff of the Cell was busy for the urgent work due to close of the year and, therefore, petitioners representation was examined some time on 2nd Jan., 1992 and a letter was issued on 3.1.1992 for the comments from the sponsoring authority i.e. N.D.P.S. Department, Jodhpur. The letter for comments was sent by the registered post to the Dy. Director, Narcotic Department, Jodhpur and the time taken during the transit in post was 6 days (to and fro), which is excludable. The letter for comments was sent by the registered post to the Dy. Director, Narcotic Department, Jodhpur and the time taken during the transit in post was 6 days (to and fro), which is excludable. Further, there were two Saturdays falling on 4th & 11th Jan., 1992 and two Sundays falling on 5th & 12th Jan., 1992. Thus, the effective days left for offering the comments were only 3-4 days. In such circumstances, the comments were sent by the sponsoring authority expeditiously and without undue delay. Again 18th & 19 Jan., 1992 were Saturdays & Sunday i.e. closed holidays. Therefore, the actual working days were only 16th, 17th & 20th Jan., 1992. During this period the representation of the detenue running into 21 pages and comments of the sponsoring authorities running into 4 pages were examined and processed in the Ministry and the representation was rejected on 22.1.1992. Thus, no unreasonable time was taken in deciding the representation of the detenue. (27) Hence, from the chronology of the events dealing with the representation as well as taking into consideration factum of closed holidays, and the fact that the comments were sent for through registered post from New Delhi to Jodhpur and thereafter received therefrom by registered post as well as the fact that in the last week of December, 1991 staff was busy in dealing urgent cases, in our considered opinion, there do not exist sufficient and valid grounds to hold that the detenues representation was disposed of with undue delay or with supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude of the respondents. In the case in hand, the delay in disposing the representation has been properly and satisfactorily explained, which does not tantamount to breach of the constitutional imperative and, therefore, there is no contravention of the Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. Hence on this ground also the detention of. the petitioner does not vitiate or become illegal. (28) Shri Sandeep Mehta has lastly argued that as per order dated 27.8.1992 (Annex. 25), the detention period of one year of the detenue from the date of detention i.e. 15.11.1991 expired on 14.11.1992 but despite that he has not been released by the respondents on the pretext that he was on parole under the order passed by this Court from 6.5.1992 to 10.8.1992. 25), the detention period of one year of the detenue from the date of detention i.e. 15.11.1991 expired on 14.11.1992 but despite that he has not been released by the respondents on the pretext that he was on parole under the order passed by this Court from 6.5.1992 to 10.8.1992. According to him, the parole was granted to the petitioner due to undue delay and laxity on the part of the respondents in filing the reply and that respondents can not take advantage of their own fault and more over, the Supreme Court in Sunil Fulchand Shah vs. U.O. I. and Ors. (11) has expressed a doubt on the correctness of the earlier view taken by it on this point. He has, therefore, submitted that the period of detention can not be extended by adding the period of the parole on which petitioner was on parole and prayed that the petitioner be ordered to be released immediately. (29) On the other hand, Shri P.P. Choudhary has strenuously contended that the period of parole is excludable from the period of detention and that till this day the Honble Supreme Court has not reviewed/ reversed its earlier view taken in State of Gujrat vs. Adam Kasam Bhaya (12), State of Gujarat vs. Mohd. Ismail Zumma (13), Smt. Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawa (14) and Pushpa Devi M. Jatiya vs. M.L. Wadhawa (15). (30) The Honble Supreme Court has consistently held in the afore-mentioned four cases cited by the respondents that the period of detention intended by the detention order is not a fixed period but it can be correspondingly extended if the detenue absconds before he can be apprehended and detained or the period of detention is interrupted by an erroneous judgment of a High Court and the detenue is set free or when the detenue is released on parole. The Honble Judges in Sunil Fulchand Shahas case (cited supra) have, however, expressed that one possible view can be that when a parole is granted, the period of parole should be counted within the total period of detention and not out side. The Honble Judges have, therefore, referred the case to five Judges Bench for reconsideration of the law on this point, but the learned counsel for the parties have submitted that no such Bench of five Honble Judges of the Supreme Court has been constituted so far. The Honble Judges have, therefore, referred the case to five Judges Bench for reconsideration of the law on this point, but the learned counsel for the parties have submitted that no such Bench of five Honble Judges of the Supreme Court has been constituted so far. Therefore, the law propounded by the Apex Court in its earlier four judgments mentioned above has remained intact and has not been reversed. ]In such circumstances, it can not be held that the period of parole should be included in the period of detention. Even if the petitioner was released on parole on the ground of non-filing of reply by the respondents, still then, the period of parole can not be included in the period of detention order. Therefore, this argument is also not tenable. (31) In the premises of above discussion, this writ petition is devoid of any force and substance and the same is hereby dismissed.