Judgment :- “A” party in M.C.No. 53 of 1992 A-3 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Thanjavur has filed this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C, praying to call for the records in the above case and to quash the order passed on 27. 1993. 2.Short facts are: On the F.I.R. filed by the seventh respondent, initially an order was passed on 5. 1992 under Sec.147(3), Crl.P.C, whereunder counter-petitioners of ‘A’ party were prohibited from conducting prayers in R.S.No. 519/1A of Thiruvaiyaru West Village for a period of three months from the date of order. In that order, ‘B’ party as well were prohibited from erecting Vinayaka idol or any other Hindu diety at the spot abutting R.S.No. 519/1A The order dated 5. 1992 was for three months. Thereafter, for every three months similar orders were passed and ultimately this impugned order was passed on 27. 1993. 3. Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C, pertains to user of land and in this case the right claimed was, performing prayers in the property purchased by the petitioners and hence the dispute would not fall within Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C. His further submission is that the impugned order was passed under Sec. 147(3), Crl.P.C., and none of the requirements needed for passing an order under Sec. 147(3), Crl.P.C., exists here. On the above two grounds the learned senior counsel seeks quashing of that order. Per contra, Mr. Shanmugha Velayutham, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, would submit that the claim to conduct prayer in a particular land would also fall within the clause user of the land" and inasmuch as the dispute that arose in this case relates to the rights of contending parties with regard to conduct of prayers in this land, it would fall within Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C. Mr.Shanmugha Velayutham would further submit that though there is no specific provision under Sec. 147, Crl.P.C., to pass an interim order, by virtue of the decisions of the courts of law, the Sub Divisional Magistrate has got power to pass an interim order for the purpose of ultimately passing a final order. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsel. I shall first consider the submission which relates to the applicability of Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C. to the facts of this case. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsel. I shall first consider the submission which relates to the applicability of Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C. to the facts of this case. To consider this submission relevant clause in Sec. 147(1), Crl.P.C. needs extraction and it reads as follows: "...regarding any alleged right of use of any land...." (Italics supplied). In the instant case, the right claimed by A party is to conduct prayers in this land and the right claimed by the B party is to erect Vinayaka idol in the place abutting it. In Chinnubhai Chandulal Parikh v. Dhanyakumar Motiram Belokar, 1971 Crl.L.J. 1597, Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court had occasion to consider this aspect of the case. Justice Chandurkar, as he then was held in para 7 as follows: "The right regarding which a dispute is likely to cause breach of peace contemplated by Sec. 147(1) is a right of user of any "land or water" as explained in Sec. 145(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.145 provides that "for the purposes of this section the expression "land Or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land and the rents or profits of any such property". Thus the word "land" in Sub-sec(1) of Sec.147 includes a building and a temple is obviously a building, and therefore covered by "land in Sec.147(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right of worship is a right to use the temple in a particular manner, and therefore, the right to worship must inevitably become a part of the right to use land, within the meaning of Sec. 147(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is, therefore, no doubt not only having regard to the words used in Sec. 147(1), but also having regard to the authorities refered to above that a proceeding under Sec. 147(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code can validly be taken where there is a dispute with regard to a right of worship of a deity in the temple. It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants that the entire proceedings were without jurisdiction". I am in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Judge. The ‘right of user of the land’ brings within its purview the right of user of land in any fashion. It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants that the entire proceedings were without jurisdiction". I am in respectful agreement with the view of the learned Judge. The ‘right of user of the land’ brings within its purview the right of user of land in any fashion. The right to conduct prayers in the particular land is one mode of ‘user’ of the land’. So, I am of the opinion the dispute with regard to the right of worship in a particular land squarely falls within the clause ‘right of user of any land’ and hence Sec.147(1), Criminal Procedcure Code is applicable to this case. 5. To consider the second submission, Sec. 147(3), Crl.P.C., needs extraction and it reads as follows: "If it appears to such Magistrate that such rights exist, he may make an order prohibiting any interference with the exercise of such right, including in a proper case, an order for the removal of any obstruction in the exercise of any such right. Provided that no such order shall be made where the right is exercisable at all times of the year, unless such right has been exercised within three months next before the receipt under Sub-scc.(1) of the report of a police officer or other information leading to the institution of the inquiry, or where the right is exercisable only at particular seasons or on particular occasions, unless the right has been exercised during the last of such reasons or on the last of such occasions before such receipt." Straightaway I shall refer to the relevant para in the impugned order, viz., para. 2. It reads as follows: "In the reference 3rd cited the Inspector of Police (Law and Order), Thiruvaiyaru has reported that in view of the situation prevailing over the issue the vigil over both the parties has to be continued for maintaining law and order, public peace and religious harmony and to avert any untoward incident, the order already issued under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec.147, Crl.P.C, hasto be extended for a further period of 3 months". It is needless for me to state that the relevant para in the impugned order does not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 147(3), Crl.P.C. On that ground the impugned order is liable to be quashed. (3) of Sec.147, Crl.P.C, hasto be extended for a further period of 3 months". It is needless for me to state that the relevant para in the impugned order does not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 147(3), Crl.P.C. On that ground the impugned order is liable to be quashed. At this juncture, I would like to make it clear that it is open to the sub Divisional Magistrate to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, as the situation in the scene place warrants. 6. With the above observation, this petition is allowed and the proceedings in and by virtue of the order dated 27. 1993 in M.C.No. 53/93-A3 shall stand quashed.