JUDGMENT Sunil Kumar Guin, J.: FMAT No. 2186/92 has been filed by the Chairman, Haldia Notified Area Authority against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge on 1.7.92 on the writ petition of Amalendu Jana and others. FMAT No. 2187/92 has been filed by the same appellant against the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge on 1.7.92 on the writ petition of Mrs. Krishna Pradhan and others. FMAT No. 2446 of 1992 has been filed by the State against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge on 1.7.92 on the writ petition of Mrs. Krishna Pradhan and others. The aforesaid two writ petitions were directed against the impugned order of requisition passed by the Collector, Midnapore under S. 3(1) of the West Bengal Land Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act II of 1948) in respect of the petitioners' land situated in Mouza Brojonath Chak. The learned trial Judge disposed of both the writ petitions by single order whereby he allowed the writ petitions and set aside the impugned requisition proceedings. 2. It appears that Haldia Notified Area Authority (hereinafter referred to as HNAA) was constituted under the provision of section 93A of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as the B.M. Act) and section 98 of the same Act appears to have been made applicable to HNAA. To prevent irregular and haphazard growth of the area and to develop the other essential services like water supply, electric installation, drains, road etc. and better living condition, the HNAA appears to have passed two resolutions one on 8.2.90 and the other on 8.6.90 for acquisition of lands in Mouza Brajanath Chak and other area. The Screening Committee for land acquisition proposal of Haldia Development Authority in a meeting held on 17.7.90 approved of the said resolution of the HNAA and directed the Chairman of HNAA to move the Administrative Department for sanction of the scheme. Accordingly the Chairman HNAA appears to have written to Local Government & Urban Development Department for acquisition of land. The Screening Committee for land acquisition proposal of Haldia Development Authority in a meeting held on 17.7.90 approved of the said resolution of the HNAA and directed the Chairman of HNAA to move the Administrative Department for sanction of the scheme. Accordingly the Chairman HNAA appears to have written to Local Government & Urban Development Department for acquisition of land. The said Department by its order dated 20.6.91 appears to have accorded sanction to the proposal and directed the Collector, Midnapore to proceed with the requisition of lands for establishment of housing and commercial zone as well as for maintenance and development of others essential services like roads, drains, water supply, electric installation etc. and rural upliftment under the provision of Act II of 1948. In pursuance thereof the Collector Midnapore appears to have initiated land requisition proceeding being LA Case No. 36/91-92 and after preliminary survey passed the impugned orders under section 3(2) of the Act II of 1948 on 2.2.92 fixing 17.2.92 for delivery of possession of the requisition land. It has been claimed by the State-appellant the said orders were served by the process server on 15.2.92 that some of the owners/occupiers, accepted the orders and that the others refused. On their refusal, the said orders are claimed to have been served by affixation on their main gate. On 14.2.92 the instant writ petitions were filed and interim orders were obtained. On 17.2.92 some of the lands sought to be requisitioned were taken possession of but possession in respect of the rest of the land could not be taken because of the said interim orders. 3. The writ petitioners appear to have contended before the learned trial Judge that in 1969 the State of West Bengal acquired the entire land in Brajanath Chak under the Land Acquisition Act, that a writ petition was filed challenging such acquisition but without any success, that on appeal the writ petitioners were successful, that in appeal before the Supreme Court the order of the Appellate Court was modified or changed and that thereafter on 29.8.86 the entire land was released from acquisition by the State of West Bengal. So it was contended that because of such earlier acquisition and subsequent release, the State cannot requisition it again under Act II of 1948. So it was contended that because of such earlier acquisition and subsequent release, the State cannot requisition it again under Act II of 1948. The writ petitioners also appear to have contended that they have not been given any opportunity of being heard and were not served with any order of requisition, that the purpose of requisition was absolutely vague, that impugned order was not signed by the Collector and that the impugned order being violative of section 98 of the B.M. Act was ultra vires and illegal and was liable to be set aside. 4. The Chairman HNAA originally was not made a party to the writ proceedings but subsequently on his prayer was added as party respondent to the writ proceeding and certain other respondents were also added as parties. The respondents resisted the writ petitions before the trial Court. 5. The learned trial Judge appears to have rejected almost all the contentions except one. With regard to the first contention he has held that it has got no substance inasmuch as the Supreme Court could not have held that the petitioners' land could not be requisitioned or acquired for all time to come. He was of the opinion that the question whether or not the impugned orders were served was a question of fact which could not be gone into and decided in writ jurisdiction. However, she found no reason to disbelieve the process server's report on the basis of which he appears to have held that the orders were served. He has also held that the impugned orders were duly signed by the Collector, Midnapore. However, he has held that the impugned orders of requisition being violative of section 98 of the B. M. Act are• invalid and cannot be sustained and that the land for the HNAA which is an authority constituted under section 9:3A of the B. M. Act can only be acquired in accordance with the provision of section 98 of the B. M. Act and not otherwise. With these findings he allowed the writ petitions and set aside the impugned requisition proceedings. 6. Being aggrieved the Chairman, HNAA and the State of West Bengal have preferred the instant appeals as mentioned above. 7. With these findings he allowed the writ petitions and set aside the impugned requisition proceedings. 6. Being aggrieved the Chairman, HNAA and the State of West Bengal have preferred the instant appeals as mentioned above. 7. It has not been disputed before us that HNAA has been constituted under section 93A of the B. M. Act, nor has it been disputed that section 98 of the said Act has been made applicable to HNAA. Mr. Bhunia appearing for the Chairman, HNAA has argued that though section 98 applies to HNAA still at the• request of HNAA the State Government may requisition and acquire land for the purposes as mentioned in section 3 of the Act II of 1948 and that the learned Judge has fallen into error by setting aside the requisition proceedings. Mr. Ukil learned advocate appearing for the State-appellant has adopted the argument of Mr. Bhunia and has further argued that since it is a requisition by the Government which may acquire the requisitioned land or derequisition it and since the HNAA has not come into the picture as yet, section 98 is not applicable. He has also argued that the requisition orders were duly signed by the Collector, Midnapore and were duly served upon the recorded owners as per rules. 8. Mr. Chatterjee learned advocate appearing for the respondents-petitioners has argued that the HNAA can acquire land only under section 98 of the B. M. Act and not otherwise, that there can be no requisition of land by the notified area authority, and that the instant requisition proceeding being violative of section 98 of the B. M. Act have rightly been set aside by the learned trial Judge. 9. The main point that arises for determination in these appeals is whether in view of the specific provision for acquisition of land as contained in section 98 of the B. M. Act, the impugned proceedings for requisition and acquisition of land under Act II of 1948 are maintainable and can be sustained. Before we deal with the main point, let us dispose of some other points which have been raised in the instant cases. It appears that sometimes in 1969 the State of West Bengal acquired the entire land of Mouza Brajanath Chak and other Mouza for the purpose of Calcutta Port Trust Commissioners. Before we deal with the main point, let us dispose of some other points which have been raised in the instant cases. It appears that sometimes in 1969 the State of West Bengal acquired the entire land of Mouza Brajanath Chak and other Mouza for the purpose of Calcutta Port Trust Commissioners. Some of the writ petitioners along with others appears to have fought against such acquisition of the land up to the Supreme Court. The order passed by the Supreme Court is not before us. But it has not been disputed that on or about 29.8.86 the entire land was released from acquisition under the provision of section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Simply because the land was acquired earlier for the purpose of Calcutta Port Trust Commissioner and was released subsequently, it cannot be said that the said land cannot be requisitioned or acquired for all time to come, specially when the judgment of the Supreme Court is not before us. Though the land was acquired for the purpose of the Calcutta Port Trust Commissioner and was subsequently released under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, there can be no legal bar in subsequent requisition or acquisition of the same land for any other purpose. The learned trial Judge appears to have rightly rejected this contention. The learned trial Judge also appears to have rightly rejected the contention of the writ petitioner that they have not been served with the impugned order of requisition as required under section 3(2) of the Act II of 1948. The question whether or not the impugned orders were served upon the writ petitioners is a question of fact and such disputed fact cannot be gone into and dealt with in the writ proceedings. According to the State, the impugned orders were served upon the recorded owners, some of them accepted the copy of the orders and some refused and those who refused to accept were served by affixation on their main gate. There is a copy of process server's reports to that effect. In the circumstances the learned trial Judge held that the impugned orders were duly served and we see no reason to differ from him. The writ petitioners' contention that they were not given any opportunity of being heard cannot be upheld. The impugned proceedings were the proceedings under the provision of Act II of 1948. In the circumstances the learned trial Judge held that the impugned orders were duly served and we see no reason to differ from him. The writ petitioners' contention that they were not given any opportunity of being heard cannot be upheld. The impugned proceedings were the proceedings under the provision of Act II of 1948. The impugned orders were passed by the Collector, Midnapore under the provision of section 3(1) and 3(1A) on the Act II of 1948. The Act does not require a hearing to be given to the owner or occupier before the making of an order under section 3. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Nilkamal Bezboruah vs. State of West Bengal 86 CWN 1046. So this contention is also rejected by us. It has also been contended that purpose of requisition was absolutely vague. It appears that the Government by its order dated 20. 6. 91 directed the Collector, Midnapore to proceed with requisition and acquisition of land under Act II of 1948 for the purpose of establishment of housing and commercial zone as well as for maintenance and development of other essential services like roads, drains, water supply etc. and rural upliftment. The Collector, Midnapore proceeded accordingly and passed the impugned orders on 2.2.92. In the impugned orders the purpose of requisition has been stated as maintaining supplies and providing proper facilities for services essential to the life of the community viz. for establishment of housing and commercial zone etc. It is true that the details of the purpose have not given in the notice. But it is now almost well settled that the purpose of the requisition need not be articulated in the notice in details. If purpose has been substantially notified, that would be the sufficient. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court presided over by my learned brother A. M. Bhattacharjee J. in the case of Mahamaya Roychowdhury vs. Land Acquisition Collector reported in 96 CWN 1043. We have looked into the copy of the impugned order and we are of the opinion that purpose of requisition has been substantially notified. As such this contention also fails. We have looked into the copy of the impugned order and we are of the opinion that purpose of requisition has been substantially notified. As such this contention also fails. The contention that the impugned orders were not duly signed by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Collector has got no substance at all. We have looked into the copy of the orders that has been placed on record and we are of the opinion that it has been duly signed by the Collector on 2.2.92. 10. Now let us advert to the main contention that has been raised in these appeals. It is not disputed that HNAA has been constituted as a notified authority under section 93A of the B.M. Act and that section 98 of the same Act is applicable to it Sub-section (1) of section as of this Act runs as follows: "When any land whether within or without the limits of a municipality is required- (a) for the purposes of this Act, or (b) for the recoupment of the cost or any portion of the cost of carrying out any such purpose, the State Government may, at the request of the Commissioners at a meeting, proceed to acquire it under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)." Sub-section (2) of section as runs as follows: "Before requesting the State Government to acquire land for the purpose referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the Commissioner shall obtain previous sanction of the State Government and give due notice of the intention and an opportunity to any objector, who appears within such period as they may fix, to be heard in this connection". 11. From above it is clear that the land may be acquired for the purposes of this Act as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) or for the recoupment of the cost or any portion of the cost carrying out any such purpose as mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1). When the land is to be acquired for the purpose as mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the Commissioners before requesting the State Government to acquire such land shall have to obtain previous sanction of the State Government and give due notice of their intention and an opportunity to the objector of being heard in this connection as required under sub-section (2). But no such previous sanction is to be obtained or no such prior notice or an opportunity of being heard is to be given when the land is going to be acquired for the purposes as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1). It is nobody's case that the HNAA made any request to acquire the land for the purpose of recoupment of cost or any portion of the cost of carrying out any such purpose. The HNAA requested the Government for acquisition of land to prevent irregular and haphazard growth of the area and for construction of housing and commercial zone and also for maintenance and development of other essential services like water supply, t electric installation, drains, rural upliftment for better living condition etc. It did not request for acquisition of land for recoupment of any cost. So provision of section (2) of section 98 was not attracted to the request for acquisition of land as made by HNAA. As such we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge has fallen into error in holding that initiation of the proceeding for requisition was vitiated by the failure on the part of the HNAA to obtain prior sanction of the Government and to issue due notice of their intention to acquire the land in question and by not granting any opportunity of being heard to the objector. We, therefore, set aside this finding of the learned trial Judge. 12. Under section 98 the HNAA may request the Government for acquisition of the land for the purpose of the Act. It appears to us that the HNAA, as a matter of fact, has made such request. Now it is for the Government to consider whether they will proceed to acquire land as per request of the HNAA. Sub-section (1) of section 98 of the B.M. Act provides that on such request being made, the State Government may proceed to acquire the land under the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is true that this section does not provide that the Government may also requisition and acquire the land under the provision of the Act II of 1948. As a matter of fact no such provision could be made in this Act in as much as when this Act was passed the Act II of 1948 was not on the Statute Book. As a matter of fact no such provision could be made in this Act in as much as when this Act was passed the Act II of 1948 was not on the Statute Book. Now the question is whether at the request of the HNAA the State can only proceed to acquire the land under the provision of Land Acquisition Act 1894 or whether it can proceed to acquire it under the provision of other Act as is available to it at the time of such request. On reading this section as a whole we are of the opinion that there can be no bar if the State Government in its discretion proceeds for acquisition of land under the provision of other Act, i.e., Act II of 1948. As the Section itself has not imposed any embargo the Government may, in our opinion, proceed under the other Act that is in force at the time of request. In this connection our attention has been drawn to the decision in case of Mahamaya Roychowdhury vs. Land Acquisition Collector (Supra). The Calcutta Improvement Act 19l1 which provides for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, does not provide for any requisition of Land. In that case on request being made by the Calcutta Improvement Trust the land was requisitioned by the State Government under Act II of 1948. It was contended by the owner/occupier that requisition of land for Improvement Trust under the Act II of 1948 was illegal. But the Division Bench of this Court rejected this contention and held as follows: "It will be too bold an argument to contend that since the Calcutta Improvement Act does not provide for requisition there cannot be requisition of land for any purpose connected with the Improvement Trust. Requisition is very often a preliminary step to acquisition and goes to enable the authorities concerned to finally decide as to whether they would final1y proceed to acquire the land. Such a power cannot be denied to the State Government and the same has been expressly conferred on the State Government by the 1948 Act. Under the 1948 Act such requisition by the State Government can be for any of the public purposes mentioned in section 3 which may relate to the Improvement Trust also. Such a power cannot be denied to the State Government and the same has been expressly conferred on the State Government by the 1948 Act. Under the 1948 Act such requisition by the State Government can be for any of the public purposes mentioned in section 3 which may relate to the Improvement Trust also. That being so the fact that the land has been requisitioned under 1948 Act for the purpose connected with the Improvement Trust cannot be assailed on the ground that Calcutta Improvement Act of 1911, of which the Improvement Trust is the creature, does not expressly provide for requisition. We have, therefore, no doubt that a requisition even if it is for the purpose of acquisition in future for Calcutta Improvement Trust, can be validly and legally made under the Act of 1948." 13. We see no reason to differ from the view as expressed in the decision as mentioned above. It appears to us that purposes as mentioned in the impugned order also relate to the purposes of the Act i.e. the B.M. Act. So we hold that at the request of the HNAA the State Government in its discretion may proceed to requisition and subsequently acquire the land under the provision of Act II of 1948. So, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders are not illegal or ultra vires and the learned trial Judge was not justified in interfering with the same or setting aside the proceedings in which the said orders were made. 14. Moreover the instant requisition of the land has been made by the Collector and for the matter of that by the State Government Section 3 of Act II of 1948 has empowered the State Government to requisition land• for the purposes as mentioned therein. The land has only been requisitioned. The State Government may derequisition it or subsequently acquire it. Barring a request being made by the HNAA for acquisition it has not come into the picture as yet. After the orders are made under Section 4 of the Act II of 1948, the requisitioned land shall vest in the State Government and thereafter it may transfer the same to the HNAA on execution of necessary transfer deed. Till then the HNAA has got no say in the matter. After the orders are made under Section 4 of the Act II of 1948, the requisitioned land shall vest in the State Government and thereafter it may transfer the same to the HNAA on execution of necessary transfer deed. Till then the HNAA has got no say in the matter. Since it is a requisition by the State Government under Act II of 1948 the provision of section 98 of the B.M. Act cannot be attracted to the present case. 15. So in any view of the matter the learned trial judge was not justified in setting aside the requisition proceedings under Act II of 1948. Appeals are allowed. The judgement and order appealed against arc set aside. The writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to cost. 16. This Judgment shall govern FMAT Nos. 2186; of 1992, 2187 of 1992 and 2446 of 1992. A. M. Bhattacharjec, C. J.: I agree. Appeals allowed. Writ petitions dismissed.