JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—The order passed by the District Judge, Una on 26th June, 1992 allowing the application of the plaintiffs/respondents seeking permission to amend the plaint is under challenge in this civil revision by the defendants. 2. In order to appreciate the arguments, which have been addressed at the Bar, it will be necessary to give some background of the case. On 2nd November, 1981, a suit was filed by the plaintiffs/respondents No.1 to 3 (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) against the petitioners and respondents No. 4 to 7 claiming decree for mandatory injunction directing the petitioners and respondents No. 4 and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) to demolish the construction alleged to have been raised by them on the southern part of Khasra No.1296 abutting Una-Bangana Road. Decree for prohibitory injunction was also claimed restraining the defendants from raising any further construction till partition. It was alleged that the suit property was jointly owned and possessed by the parties. Taking undue advantage of the closure of Civil Courts, the defendants with a view to grab valuable portion of the land forcibly commenced construction by deploying considerable labour and were successful in raising the construction for which they had no right. The defendants being co-owner could not change the nature of the suit property in any manner whatsoever. Simultaneously, application for temporary injunction was made, in which interim injunction was granted by the Court. Suit was contested by the defendants, who admitted that plaintiff No. 3 and defendants No.1 to 5 alone were joint owner, but denied that they were in joint possession. It was claimed that the defendants have been in exclusive Hissadari possession of their share and were entitled to raised construction. The suit was ultimately dismissed by the trial Court on 20th August, 1985. 3. On the same day, the plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal and simultaneously obtained an order of injunction of status quo. The appeal ultimately was dismissed by the Appeal Court on 16th August, 1988. Instead of carrying the matter in further appeal, the plaintiffs sought review of the judgment by preferring review petition ob 22nd August, 1988. The District Judge, Una through his judgment dated 14th November, 1988 allowed the review petition holding that the judgment and decree of dismissal of appeal deserved to be reviewed. Instead of carrying the matter in further appeal, the plaintiffs sought review of the judgment by preferring review petition ob 22nd August, 1988. The District Judge, Una through his judgment dated 14th November, 1988 allowed the review petition holding that the judgment and decree of dismissal of appeal deserved to be reviewed. As a consequence thereto, judgment and decree of dismissal of appeal was recalled. The appeal was ordered to be restored to file. 4. Feeling aggrieved, defendants filed FAO No. 11/89 in this Court against the order passed on 14th November, 1988 by the District Judge, Una in the review petition. The defendants appeal was ultimately dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 4th October, 1991. The parties were directed to appear before the District Judge, Una on 11th November, 1991. The appeal thereafter was posted for hearing arguments. It was at the arguments stage that an application was made on 20th April, 1992 by the plaintiffs seeking amendment of the plaint. 5. It was alleged in the application that after the dismissal of appeal on 16th August, 1988 defendants/petitioners No.1 and 2 forcibly raised construction of shops by making it a double storeyed. Since construction had been raised during the pendency of litigation, it had become necessary for the plaintiffs to seek amendment of the plaint, and consequently it was prayed that they be allowed to amend the plaint by seeking demolition of the double storeyed building, instead of single storey building. By way of amendment, it was contended that neither original cause of action, nor nature of case would change. This application was opposed by the defendants, who denied that any forcible construction had been raised and alleged that the amendment sought to incorporate the subsequent events, would change the nature and character of the suit as also the cause of action. It was also alleged that amendment sought was unnecessary as also irrelevant and fictitious. The lower Appellate Court allowed the application through an order, which is under challenge in this revision. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the suit originally was filed in the year 1981, for which it was alleged in the plaint that the cause of action had arisen in July, 1981. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the suit originally was filed in the year 1981, for which it was alleged in the plaint that the cause of action had arisen in July, 1981. A different cause of action was sought to be added to the original cause of action by saying that between 16th August, 1988 and 14th November, 1988, further construction had been raised unauthorisedly. It being a totally different cause of action, cannot be allowed to be added to the original cause of action mainly on two grounds. Firstly, that as on the date of moving the application seeking amendment of the plaint, claim on the cause of action, namely, 16th August, 1988 would be barred by limitation, and secondly it would change the entire cause of action by introducing a different claim, which is not permissible in law. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents has tried to support the impugned order by urging that the Courts have always been liberal in allowing amendments to be carried out and irrespective of all considerations, in order to avoid multiplicity in proceedings, amendment can be allowed to be carried out in the plaint to incorporate subsequent developments which have happened during the pendency of the litigation. Since the construction was raised during the pendency of litigation, by way of amendment, same relief was being sought in modified form for which neither the nature of suit is changed nor it will amount to introducing a different cause of action There is no question of prejudice being caused to the defendants and there is no question of limitation coming up in the way in allowing the amendment since it was during the pendency of litigation that necessity arose to seek amendment and amendment in case the same is allowed always relates back to the date of filing of the suit. 7. The lower Appellate Court allowed the amendment after noticing a well known principle that when it is necessary for determination of real controversy in the suit and it does not injuriously affect the rights of the opposite party, which cannot be compensated in terms of costs, amendment deserves to be allowed. 7. The lower Appellate Court allowed the amendment after noticing a well known principle that when it is necessary for determination of real controversy in the suit and it does not injuriously affect the rights of the opposite party, which cannot be compensated in terms of costs, amendment deserves to be allowed. The Court further observed that by allowing the plaintiffs to amend the plaint by incorporating subsequent developments, which had happened during the pendency of the litigation, there was no question of defendants being injuriously affected in its defence. 8. The questions for determination need no elaborate discussion since the same already stands answered in the number of judgments of the Apex Court. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others, AIR 1957 SC 363, the question was considered as to when amendment to the pleadings can be allowed In case, the amendment had the effect of taking way right accrued to a party by lapse of time, the same deserved to be disallowed. In holding so the Court approved the following principles enunciated by Batchelor, J. in his judgment in Kisandass Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, ILR 33 Bom 644 : All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties..........but I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendments must be refused ; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same ; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not ? 9. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same ; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not ? 9. Subsequent to the aforementioned decision, again in L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. and another v. Messers Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357, the Court held that as a rule amendment should be declined, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation, on the date of application for amendment. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. 10. L.J. Leachs case (supra) was followed in Nichhalbhai Vallabhai and others v. Jaswantlal Zinabhai and others, AIR 1966 SC 997, in which the Court held that as the object of the rule for allowing amendments to the plaint was to avoid multiplicity of suits, the Court should allow the plaint to be amended, otherwise if amendments are refused, plaintiff would have to bring another suit. Following the ratio of the judgment in Pirgonda and Leachs cases {supra), in A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96, it was held that in the matter of allowing amendment of pleadings the general rule is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action, particularly when a suit on the new cause of action is barred. Where, however, the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment is to be allowed, even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. The expression cause of action, in the context of allowing amendment was held not to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed It was held that expression only means a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. The words new case means new set of ideas. Consequently, it was held that no amendment will be allowed to introduce new set of ideas to prejudice any rights acquired by any party by lapse of time. 11. The words new case means new set of ideas. Consequently, it was held that no amendment will be allowed to introduce new set of ideas to prejudice any rights acquired by any party by lapse of time. 11. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267, the Court held that : "...............A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be composed for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side................" (Emphasis supplied) 12. What may be noticed in the instant case that the case had already been made out by the plaintiff, when the suit was instituted in the year 1981 against the petitioners and Respondents No. 4 and 5, praying for demolition of the construction, alleged to have been raised by them. Decree for prohibitory injunction was also claimed. The ground on which the decree was prayed for was that the property was joint and the opposite party had no right to change or alter the nature of the property till partition, since the nature of the part of the property had already been changed, the decree for demolition was prayed and for the remaining property, prohibitory injunction was claimed. By way of amendment, what is sought to be pleaded is that during the pendency of litigation, namely, after disposal of the appeal and before the revision petition was allowed, further construction was raised and for the same reasons, which had already been incorporated in the original plaint, the same was also liable to be demolished. This amendment in view of the ratio in A.K. Guptas case definitely does not mean a new claim made on new basis constituted by new facts. Cause of action in this case, as construed in A.K. Guptas case (supra) continues to remain the same, namely, the illegal action of defendants in changing the nature of the property, till partition. 13. This amendment in view of the ratio in A.K. Guptas case definitely does not mean a new claim made on new basis constituted by new facts. Cause of action in this case, as construed in A.K. Guptas case (supra) continues to remain the same, namely, the illegal action of defendants in changing the nature of the property, till partition. 13. The amendment, as contended, was necessitated due to the subsequent development, which had happened during the pendency of the litigation, and there was no question of limitation coming in the way since during the pendency of litigation, there was an injunction operating against the petitioners Moreover, the Courts have ample power to take notice of the events which have happened after the institution of the suit and to afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances, where it is shown that the relief claimed originally, by the reasons of subsequent change of circumstances has become in-appropriate or where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances, in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. Reference may be made to Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha and others AIR 1974 SC 1178. Approving the propositions of law laid in Rai Charan v. Biswanath, AIR 1915 Cat 103, in Shikharchand Jains case, the apex Court held that : “...........Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court including a Court of appeal to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate ; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation, or (3) to do complete justice between the parties..............." 14. In Pesupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409, similar proposition was laid by holding that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date when cause is brought to the Court, but the Court is not powerless to take into consideration subsequent development in order to do complete justice amongst the parties. In para 4 of the judgment, court held : “...............It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the Us has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of molding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice—subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed..............." (Emphasis supplied). 15. In Rameshwar and others v. Jot Ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49, the Court held that note of subsequent events can be taken and relief can be moulded, accordingly, in exception circumstances. 16. 15. In Rameshwar and others v. Jot Ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49, the Court held that note of subsequent events can be taken and relief can be moulded, accordingly, in exception circumstances. 16. In the instant case, the amendment is sought on the ground that after the appeal had been disposed of and before review was allowed, construction has been raised for which the application filed by the plaintiffs seeking permission to amend the plaint to claim further relief of demolition of construction is based on the same allegations that the defendants had no right to raise construction till partition, In the light of what has been observed above, it cannot be said that the Court below has committed any jurisdictional error This is more so to avoid further litigation necessitating the filing of Civil Suit by the plaintiffs. Limitation would not come into the plaintiffs way since it had happened during the pendency of the instant litigation. It was not the right which had accrued to the plaintiffs before institution of the suit. Had it been a case of such like nature, the Court would have definitely refused to exercise its discretion Amendment is sought due to the high-handed act on the part of the defendants in having raised some construction during the pendency of the litigation. There is no question of any mala fide or inaction on the part of the plaintiffs in seeking amendment. Order granting review was under challenge at the behest of the petitioners, for which purpose, as is contended by the plaintiffs-respondents, amendment could not be sought. 17. In view of the aforementioned discussion, the revision petition deserves dismissal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 500. : Revision petition dismissed.