JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order dated January 25, 1992, passed by the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gulabpura, by which the learned Munsif dismissed the application filed by the defendant and held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit. 2. Plaintiff Rastriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Kharigram, Gulabpura, and its office-bearers Mohammed Ilias and others filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction against the defendant Satya Narain Sharma, Bhartiya Textiles Sharmik Vikas Sangh, Gulabpura. It is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff is a registered trade union registered under the Trade Union Act, 1936 (for short, 'the Act, 1936,) and has a right to represent the cases of the workers of its union before the Court under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, (for short ' the Act, 1947,). The defendant Satya Narain Sharma is the name of a fake union Bhartiya Textiles Sharmik Vikas Sangh, Gulabpura, is collecting the subscription from the labourers by misleading them. The Bhartiya Textiles Shramik Vikas Sangh - a fake union formed by the defendant Satya Narain Sharma - is neither in existence nor has its own constitution nor has it any duly elected office-bearers. This union is not even a registered union. He has opened a branch of this union at various places and all these unions have neither their constitution nor the elected office- bearers. Even these unions are neither in existence nor are they recognised or registered. The defendant Satya Narain Sharma has, also, shown the registered office of his Union at Bhilwara and its sphere of working has, also, been shown at Bhilwara, but he has not even sent the returns as required under the Trade Union Act to the Registrar. The defendant has got printed the letter head in the names of the defendants No. 2 and 3 and has shown that these unions have been affiliated with the Bhartiya Mill Mazdoor Sangh. It has been further averred that the defendant is threatening the office-bearers of the plaintiff union and by his illegal acts and with the active connivance of his followers, he is disturbing communal harmony which may result in Hindu-Muslim riots. It is, also, averred in the plaint that the defendants are illegally representing the workers before the Labour Courts. It has been further averred that the defendant is threatening the office-bearers of the plaintiff union and by his illegal acts and with the active connivance of his followers, he is disturbing communal harmony which may result in Hindu-Muslim riots. It is, also, averred in the plaint that the defendants are illegally representing the workers before the Labour Courts. It was, therefore, prayed that by a mandatory injunction, the defendants may be restrained from representing the workmen before various Labour Court's as well as before the Labour Tribunal, Deputy Labour Commissioner and others. It was also prayed that it may be declared that the unions operated by the defendant No. 1 may be declared as illegal and fake and the defendant may, also, be restrained from collecting the subscription from the workers on behalf of the defendants No. 2 and 3 and the defendant No. 1 be restrained from working on behalf of the defendants No. 2 and 3. It was, also, prayed that the defendant No. 1 may be restrained from holding any gate meeting at the gate of the Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills, Kharigaon (district Bhilwara) and may not create disturbance. This suit was contested by the defendants. During the pendency of the suit, an application was moved by the defendant-petitioner on 13.7.1992, challenging the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit. This application was opposed by the plaintiff and the learned Munsif, by its order dated January 25, 1992, dismissed the application filed by the defendant and held that no industrial dispute has been raised in the plaint and, therefore, the suit is triable by the Civil Court. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner-defendant. 3. The controversy involved in the present case is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to try the present case or the controversy raised in the plaint can be decided by the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act or by the Registrar appointed under the Trade Union Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on two grounds : firstly, that the Registrar of the Trade Unions appointed under the Trade Union Act is the authority charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the Act and, therefore, this controversy can be decided only by the Registrar. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on two grounds : firstly, that the Registrar of the Trade Unions appointed under the Trade Union Act is the authority charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the Act and, therefore, this controversy can be decided only by the Registrar. The second ground, on which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been challenged is that the plaintiff has raised an industrial disputes which can be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal or by other competent authority appointed under the Industrial Dispute Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit. 4. The first question which requires consideration in the present case, therefore, is : whether the Registrar of the Trade Unions, who is appointed under the Trade Union Act and who is charged with the duty of adjudicating the dispute, has jurisdiction to resolve such type of controversy as has been raised by the plaintiff in the present suit or it is the Civil Court who can try and decide the controversy in the civil suit. Generally the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit for vindication of the existing civil rights unless the jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly ousted by any particular law. The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon a trade dispute if it concerns enforcement of certain rights and liabilities created under the Trade Union Act. The Trade Union Act has been enacted with an object to provide for the registration of the trade unions and in certain respects to define the law relating to the registered unions. 5. Chapter II of the Act deals with the registration of the trade union. Section 3 deals with the appointment of the Registrar, Section 4 relates to mode of registration; Section 5 makes provisions for the application for the registration of the trade union and Section 6 provides that a trade union shall not be entitled for registration under the Act unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder provided for the matters mentioned in this Section. Section 7 deals with the powers of the Registrar to call for further particulars and to require alteration of the name. Section 7 deals with the powers of the Registrar to call for further particulars and to require alteration of the name. This Section further provides that the Registrar can refuse to register a trade union until the information required by him under Section 7 is supplied and can refuse to register the trade union if the name proposed is identical to that of some other existing trade union. Section 8 deals with the powers of the Registrar concerning the registration. As per Section 8, if the trade union has complied with all the requirements of the Act with regard to the registration, the Registrar shall have to register the trade union by making an entry in the Register maintained and after the registration shall issue a Certificate under Section 9 of the Act. Section 10 gives powers to the Registrar for the cancellation of the Certificate of Registration issued by it if the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake or that trade union cases to exist or if it has come to the notice of the Registrar that the trade union has contravened any of the provisions of the Act which is required by Section 6. This cancellation of the Registration can be made after giving two months' prior notice in writing specifying the grounds. Section 28 of the Act provides that every registered trade union shall send annually to the Registrar on or before such date, as may be prescribed, a General Statement audited in prescribed manner of all the receipts and expenditure and of the assets and liabilities of the Union existing on 31st of December every year and the statement shall be prepared in such form and shall comply with such provisions as may be prescribed. Form 'D' has been prescribed under the Rajasthan Trade Union Regulation, 1959, by the State Government vested with the powers under the Trade Union Act, 1936. Regulation 11 provides that the Return should be submitted to the Registrar under Section 28 of the Act, 1936, by the 31st July of each year in Form 'D'. The Registrar, under the Act, has to perform this administrative function and he can undertake a reasonable enquiry within the scope and ambit of Sections 8 and 28 of the Act to ascertain who are the elected office-bearers and to register their names. The Registrar, under the Act, has to perform this administrative function and he can undertake a reasonable enquiry within the scope and ambit of Sections 8 and 28 of the Act to ascertain who are the elected office-bearers and to register their names. The scope of the enquiry is limited only for the purpose of ascertaining these facts. The Registrar, under Section 28 of the Trade Union Act does not discharge any quasi-judicial functions, but he discharges only administrative function. No party under the Act is entitled to lead any evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses. No detailed and elaborate enquiry is envisaged under the Act for determining the controversy between the two rival factions of the union. He has merely to perform a summary enquiry to satisfy himself for registration of the union and for effecting the changes in the Register. Neither the Act nor the Regulations framed under the Act gives powers to the Registrar to hold any quasi-judicial enquiry, to record the evidence and to decide the claims of the claimants of the rival trade unions. The Registrar, therefore, cannot decide the dispute between the rival office-bearers of the trade union under Section 28 of the Act. The dispute in the nature of rival claims of the office-bearers of the trade unions is a private dispute which can be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court only and not by the Registrar under the Act. 6. The next ground, on which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been challenged is that the dispute raised by the plaintiff in the present suit is an industrial dispute which can be decided only by way of making a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(k) of the Act defines the words 'industrial dispute'. According to sub-section (k), 'industrial dispute' is one which must be connected with the employment or unemployment or the term of employment with the condition of the labour or any person. The controversy envisaged in Section 2(k) of the Act is, thus, a controversy in which the workman is directly or substantially interested. It must, also, be a grievance felt by the workman which the employer is in a position to remedy and the dispute must relate to the terms of the employment and the conditions of labour in which the workmen are interested. It must, also, be a grievance felt by the workman which the employer is in a position to remedy and the dispute must relate to the terms of the employment and the conditions of labour in which the workmen are interested. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit where the dispute raises a question for enforcement of any right, obligation or liability under the Industrial Disputes Act and that dispute has to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Dispute Act, but if the dispute relates to the enforcement of any obligation or liability under the general law or the common law then that matter can be decided by the Civil Court which generally has the jurisdiction to try the case. The question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or the Industrial Tribunal in various disputes came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of the Premier Automobiles Ltd. versus Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke , ( AIR 1975 SC 2238 ) wherein the Apex Court, after considering the law on the point, summed up the following principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute in the following terms:- "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V - A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." The scheme of the Industrial Dispute Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with respect to the remedy, which is available under the Act and for which a detailed procedure has been provided under the Act. If the dispute does not fall within the definition of the Industrial Dispute Act and the dispute relates to the individual civil right then that matter can be decided by the civil court alone and not by the Industrial Tribunal. The dispute referred in the present case is not a dispute which falls within any of the categories mentioned as 'industrial disputes'. It is not a dispute as enumerated in the definition nor is it a dispute connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment with the condition of labour or of any person. The dispute raised in the present case is that the defendant is collecting the subscription from the various workmen in the name of the defendants No. 2 and 3, which are the fake unions. It is a dispute between the two rival unions and their entitlement to represent and watch the interest of the workmen. The dispute raised by the plaintiff, in the present case, is not a dispute between the employer and the employer, employer and the workmen or between the workman and the workman connecting with the employment or term of the employment or with the condition of the labourers and, therefore, the dispute raised in the suit cannot be said to be an 'industrial dispute'. The dispute is, therefore, neither any industrial dispute nor is it a trade dispute as defined under Section 2 (g) of the Trade Union Act and, therefore, it is only the Civil Court which can adjudicate upon such a dispute and try the plaintiff's suit. 7. The dispute is, therefore, neither any industrial dispute nor is it a trade dispute as defined under Section 2 (g) of the Trade Union Act and, therefore, it is only the Civil Court which can adjudicate upon such a dispute and try the plaintiff's suit. 7. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******