JUDGMENT K.P. Balanarayana Marar, J. 1. The appeal is against the judgment in O. P. 7945 of 1988. Respondents therein are the appellants herein, 2. Petitioners in the original petition, respondents herein were appointed as Junior Engineers in the erstwhile Travancore Cochin State. On the formation of the State of Kerala they were promoted as Assistant Engineers (since then redesignated as Assistant Executive Engineers) on various dates. Their juniors as per the integrated gradation list as on 1-11-1956 were promoted to that cadre on 18-12-1956. Petitioners also were given the benefit of retrospective promotion from the date on which their juniors were promoted, but this order was subsequently cancelled. The order was challenged before this Court in O. P. 5053/80. The petition was allowed and the Government was directed to refix the emoluments of the petitioners consequent on their notional promotion and disburse the arrears of emoluments consequent on such refixation. This order was challenged in writ appeal but without success. Government thereafter directed disbursement of arrears of emoluments consequent on refixation. While giving effect to this order the directions of this Court was not implemented in full. Petitioners had therefore to approach this Court again. By judgment in O.P. 9611/83 petitioners were directed to make representations and respondents were directed to look into those representations and pass final orders. Those representations were disposed of by the Government. Regarding reoption they were directed to submit individual petitions. Representations were made by petitioners. The reoption was accepted in the case of petitioners 1, 2 and 5. In the case of petitioners 3 and 4 no order has been passed on their representation. The request for arrears of emoluments as also the benefit of refixation on account of subsequent orders was not granted. That necessitated the filing of the present original petition, O. P. 7945/88 by which petitioners sought a writ of certiorari quashing the orders to the extent to which the authorities refuse to disburse the arrears of emoluments due to the pensioners as per the directions in the judgement in O. P. 5053/80 and the order issued by the Government in pursuance thereto. A writ of mandamus was also prayed for directing the first respondent - first appellant to allow petitioners 3 and 4 to exercise reoption and for disbursement of arrears of emoluments on such reoption. 3. A writ of mandamus was also prayed for directing the first respondent - first appellant to allow petitioners 3 and 4 to exercise reoption and for disbursement of arrears of emoluments on such reoption. 3. Though notice of the original petition was served on the respondents in May 1989 no counter affidavit was filed for a period of more than three years. Learned Single Judge after hearing the counsel for petitioners and the Government Pleader directed the appellants to compute the monetary benefits due to the respondents herein on the basis of the refixation of salary. The arrears due to petitioners 1, 2 and 5 were directed to be quantified and disbursed without any delay. It was also directed that final orders on the option statements submitted by petitioners 3 and 4 should be passed without further delay and consequent on refixation their salary also must be fixed in the new scales of pay and on that basis arrears are to be calculated and paid. Appellants were further directed that the monetary benefits should be paid within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment failing which the amount will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Aggrieved by this decision the State has come up in appeal. 4. Heard counsel for appellants Sri. N. Sankara Menon, Senior Government Pleader. 5. The main argument advanced by the learned Government Pleader is that the decision in O. P. 5053/30 is against the law declared by the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of this Court and has therefore to be treated as per incuriam. The contention is that the Learned Single Judge should have rejected the claim for arrears of emoluments for the reason that the court is not bound by the decision in O. P. 5053/80. 6. Per incuriam is the legal language for inadvertent mistake or ignorance of a statutory provision or a relevant authority. The court of appeal dealing solely with civil cases decided in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 1 KB 718 that it is bound by its own decisions except in three specified instances of which one is that it is not bound to follow a decision of its own given per incuriam. The court of appeal dealing solely with civil cases decided in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 1 KB 718 that it is bound by its own decisions except in three specified instances of which one is that it is not bound to follow a decision of its own given per incuriam. What is meant by 'incuria' was considered by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. 1991 (4) SCC 139 . In Para.40 of the judgment at page 162 the Supreme Court observed thus; "Incuria' literally means 'carelessness.' In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium.' of a statute or other binding authority. Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Art.141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law." The Supreme Court further observed that a decision which is not expressed and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have binding effect as is contemplated by Art.141. While observing that uniformity and consistency are the core of judicial discipline the Supreme Court held that that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. The following observation in Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry ( AIR 1967 SC 1480 ) was quoted by the Supreme Court: "It is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent." It is further observed that restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. 7. In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1990 (3) SCC 682 - Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court - it was held : "The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. 7. In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1990 (3) SCC 682 - Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court - it was held : "The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when a High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court." 8. Learned Government Pleader has drawn our attention to the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y. Nageswara Rao v. Government of A. P. ( 1989 (2) ALT 612 ). It is observed therein that when a decision rendered by the High Court is directly in conflict with the ratio laic! down by the Supreme Court, the former falls within the inhibition of the doctrine of per incuriam. The Learned Judge quotes the following statement of C. K. Alien, a renowned British Jurist : "Incuria means literally 'carelessness' which apparently is considered less uncomplimentary than ignorantia; but in practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignorantiam." 9. The statement of law in Norelle v. Wakeling ( 1955 (2) QB 379 that the principle of per incuriam should be limited to decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness, of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned was approved by the Supreme Court in Namleshwar v. Kanchaiya Lal ( AIR 1975 SC 907 ). It was then held that the doctrine will not be extended to cases which were merely not fully argued or which appear to take a wrong view of the authorities or to misinterpret a statute. 10. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1987 SC 1073 ) the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. In a later decision - Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Gurnam Kaur ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ) it was held that Quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. In a later decision - Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Gurnam Kaur ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ) it was held that Quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. It is observed that one of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority. 11. For certainty of the law a decision once rendered must bind similar cases later. It is also in the interest of public, that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdictions. But as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1975 SC 907 (supra) at page 909 in a case where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and the result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. The Supreme Court cautioned that it should be a clear, a glaring case, an obstructive omission. While noticing this principle the Supreme Court in Punjab University v. Vijay Singh ( AIR 1976 SC 1441 ) observed that judicial consistency is not the highest state of legal bliss. Law must grow, it cannot afford to be static. Judges are therefore to apply an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. The observation of Lord Macmillan that precedents should be "stepping stones and not halting places" was quoted by the Supreme Court. 12. In the light of the principles aforementioned we are of the view that the doctrine of per incuriam does not apply to the present case. The learned Single Judge has only directed the appellants to comply with the earlier judgment of this Court rendered "inter parties" in O. P. 5053/80 and as such there was no necessity of considering the eligibility or otherwise of the claim and to advert to the law on that aspect. While rendering the decision in O.P. 5053/80 the decisions now relied on by the Government Pleader may not have been noticed. While rendering the decision in O.P. 5053/80 the decisions now relied on by the Government Pleader may not have been noticed. The same question, according to the Government pleader was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Philomina v. State of Kerala ( 1984 KLT 59 ) where it was held that no government servant is entitled to be paid for work which he has not done subject to certain exceptional cases. In general a person who has got the benefits of retrospective promotion cannot justifiably claim salary for the period when he actually did not work in the higher post even if it be for no fault of his. The Division Bench observed that this is unavoidable and it must be endured with grace. Attention was also drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1977 (1) SLR 419 - State of Maharashtra v. Vinayak. The sole question which arose for determination in that appeal by the Supreme Court was whether the respondent was entitled to arrears of pay with effect from the date on which he would have been promoted in the normal course if his seniority were recognised as it eventually came to be recognised under the seniority list. The Supreme Court was interpreting R.21 of the Allocated Government Servants (Absorption, Seniority, Pay and Allowances) R.1957 by which arrears of pay and allowances "which may become due to an allocated government servant" on the fixation of his pay as on 1-11-1956 shall be payable only with effect from the date from which he became available for service in the State of Bombay or would have been so available but for the causes mentioned in R.2(d) of those rules. The Supreme Court held that R.21 is not in the nature of an entitlement whereas it restricts the right of the allocated government servant to receive pay and allowances "only with effect from the date" from which he became available for service in the State of Bombay or would have been so available except for the causes mentioned in R.2(d). These two decisions are not seen to have brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who decided O. P. 5053/80. The applicability of the doctrine of per incuriam is also not seen to have been advanced before the learned Single Judge. These two decisions are not seen to have brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who decided O. P. 5053/80. The applicability of the doctrine of per incuriam is also not seen to have been advanced before the learned Single Judge. Even if it be so, we have our own doubts as to whether those pleas could be entertained in the present original petition, whatever that be the principle of per incuriam cannot be advanced by the Government Pleader in order to assail the judgment the learned Single Judge. 13. The plea of the Government Pleader has to be discounted on the principle of res judicata. The enforcement of fundamental right is part the administration of justice. Rules of evidence and procedure and the doctrine of res judicata are therefore applicable to the enforcement of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the applicability of the rule of res judicata to a proceeding where a fundamental right was sought to be enforced in Daryao v. U. P. ( AIR 1961 SC 1457 ). Speaking for the Bench Gajendragadkar. J. held thus: "...... the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest: that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Art.32." In a later decision of the Supreme Court in Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi ( AIR 1970 SC 898 ) it was contended that the right guaranteed under Art.32 of the Constitution could not be defeated by the plea of laches or delay. Rejecting this plea the Supreme Court held that in giving relief under Art.32 the Court cannot ignore all laws of procedure, evidence, limitation, res judicata and the like. 14. The order of the Government denying petitioners their legitimate promotion and arrears of salary on such promotion were challenged in O. P. 5053/80. This Court after hearing both sides allowed those claims. 14. The order of the Government denying petitioners their legitimate promotion and arrears of salary on such promotion were challenged in O. P. 5053/80. This Court after hearing both sides allowed those claims. It was specifically directed that arrears should be calculated and paid on refixation of salary. The appeal preferred by the State was dismissed the result is that the decision rendered therein has become final. It may be open to the appellants to bring in the principle of per incuriam on a future occasion when an identical question arises for adjudication in another case. As between the parties to the earlier O. P. the decision is final and operates as res judicata. This distinction was brought out by the Supreme Court in the following observation in Para.27 of AIR 1988 SC 1531 - A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak. "This Court ought to recognise the distinction between finality of judicial orders qua the parties and the reviewability for application to other cases. Between the parties even a wrong decision can operate as res judicata." It was further held that a judgment of a High Court is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case; more so, a judgment which was unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court. The principle squarely applies to this case. As between the parties to O. P. 5053/80 the decision therein is binding, more so, when it was unsuccessfully challenged in appeal. In all subsequent proceedings in the same case and in proceedings initiated subsequent thereto for enforcement of that decision the principle of res judicata applies and the parties are bound by that decision. 15. By the judgment in O. P. 5053/80 this Court directed the appellants to refix the emoluments of petitioners consequent on their notional promotion with effect from the dates on which their juniors were promoted as Assistant Engineers and disburse the arrears of emoluments consequent on such refixation including the annual increment so fixed. In spite of that order Government did not refix and disburse the emoluments which necessitated another original petition praying for issue of directions to the Government. In spite of the directions issued therein the emoluments were not refixed or disbursed. In spite of that order Government did not refix and disburse the emoluments which necessitated another original petition praying for issue of directions to the Government. In spite of the directions issued therein the emoluments were not refixed or disbursed. Petitioners were therefore constrained to move this Court again by the present O. P. The learned single Judge has only directed the Government to carry out the directions contained in the earlier judgment and the order issued by the Government. The earlier final order rendered inter parties was given effect to. No error has been committed in issuing such directions warranting interference in appeal. For the aforesaid reasons we see no merit in this appeal which is dismissed in limine.