JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.— In this revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs 1 to 3 are petitioners and defendants 1 and 2 have been arrayed as respondents in the same sequence as shown in the plaint. Thus, hereinafter they are being referred to as plaintiffs and defendants, 2. Two markets (fish market and meat market) adjoining each other but separated by 9 inch thick brick wail having independent and separate approach, had been constructed by defendant No 2. Fish market and meat market were meant for exclusive sale of fish and meat respectively. Stalls have been constructed in each market The allotment thereof is regulated by defendant No. 2, the owner, under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 (shortly hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Bye-laws framed there under Similarly, sale of articles like fish, meat, eggs and pork etc. is regulated by issuance of licences under a separate set of Bye-laws framed under the Act 3. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the allottees of stall Nos 10, 1 3 and in meat market and defendant No ! is a lessee of disputed stall, namely, fish stall No 2 in fish market under defendant No 2-Muoicipal Corporation, Shimla. Under the respective licences issued by defendant No 2, the plaintiffs are regulating the sale of meat in their respective stalls referred to above, whereas defendant No 1. earlier to November, 1V89, used to sell fish in his stall but thereafter carried on the sale of meat therein till the filing of (he suit. 4. Licences for the sale of a particular commodity in particular stall in the above said markets used to be and are issued year-wise by the defendant No. 2. 5. The facts leading to this revision are that plaintiffs filed a suit for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining defendant No. 2 from issuing any licence for the sale of meat in favour of defendant No. 1 in the disputed stall No. 2 on various grounds, viz. 5. The facts leading to this revision are that plaintiffs filed a suit for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining defendant No. 2 from issuing any licence for the sale of meat in favour of defendant No. 1 in the disputed stall No. 2 on various grounds, viz. (i) that defendant No 1 procured licence for the sale of meat in the disputed stall in between the period 1989 till the filing of the suit Dot only by mis-representation of facts but also by exercising political pressure upon the authorities and contrary to the provisions of the Act and Bye-laws framed there under (ii) that fish market was meant for the sale of fish exclusively and sale of meat by defendant No. 1 in the disputed stall No 2 is illegal, unauthorised and affected the business of the plaintiffs inasmuch as defendant No 1 has started the sale of meat cot only in meat market through his family members in stall No. 7 thereof, but defendant No. 2 is also allowing the sale of meat in fish market also ; (iii) that the sale of the two commodities—fish and meat, Is not only contrary to the policy decision of defendant No. 2 but also is unhygienic and injurious to the health of the public in general, as the same is likely to spread epidemic diseases like, botulism, vibroisis, fugue, gestro-entritis and USD etc,; (iv) that the exhibition of meat in the stall in question is visible to the passers-by on the main road confronting the fish market and the sale of meat in such a situation, affects religious feelings not only of the plaintiffs but also of citizens of Shimla in general, particularly, vegetarians. 6. Defendants contested the suit but admitted the regulation of allotment of stalls and issuance of licence in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Bye-laws However’ it is pleaded that there is no Bye law prohibiting the sale of different commodities like fish and meat etc. in one and the same market. They further pleaded that there exist no such bye- law framed under the Act which prohibits the conversion of a stall used earlier for a particular purpose, to another purpose in future. in one and the same market. They further pleaded that there exist no such bye- law framed under the Act which prohibits the conversion of a stall used earlier for a particular purpose, to another purpose in future. Thus, as per their contention, the licence for the sale of meat in the disputed stall has validly been issued by defendant No 2 Defendant No. 1 further contended that though he had to involve himself in litigation- civil suit filed by him and Civil Writ Petition No. 246/991 titled Govind Ram and another v Municipal Corporation, Shimla and another (ultimately both proceedings withdrawn), he had built a glass cabin by erecting a glass wall in this disputed stall at the behest of and to the satisfaction of defendant No 2-Mumcipal Corporation which, in turn, renewed his licence for the sale of meat, He denied the allegations regarding the danger of spreading of any disease or epidemic as alleged Rather, according to him the present suit is the consequence of professional rivalry and plaintiffs possess no legal right to debar him from carrying on business of his choice in the premises in dispute in a hygienic condition, 7. Alongwith the plaint, the plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking temporary injunction restraining defendant No 2 to renew the licence of defendant No. If and defendant No. 1 to carry on the sale of meat in the stall in question, This application was also resisted and hotly contested by defendant No. i on the same grounds as raised by him in his written statement 8 After considering the pros-and-cons of the pleadings of the parties and the material annexed therewith, the learned trial Court (Sub-Judge 1st Class (4), Shimla) vide his order dated 2i-9-1992 allowed the application and directed interim injunction restraining defendant No. 2 from issuing licence for the sale of in«at and defendant No. 1 from carrying on the business of the sale of meat in the stall in question till the final disposal of the suit. 9. Defendant No. 1 successfully assailed the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Court in the Court of District Judge, Shimla, who vide his order dated January 19, 1993, accepted the appeal, reversed the order dated September 21, 1992 of the trial Court and dismissed the application. 9. Defendant No. 1 successfully assailed the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Court in the Court of District Judge, Shimla, who vide his order dated January 19, 1993, accepted the appeal, reversed the order dated September 21, 1992 of the trial Court and dismissed the application. 10. The petitioners, aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge has approached this Court by way of this Revision Petition on the grounds, firstly, that the Appellate Court below has acted with material illegality in exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by law in allowing the appeal of defendant No 1 and setting aside the well reasoned order of the trial Court on wholly conjectural grounds, particularly, by ignoring the object with which different markets were constructed by defendant No. 2 ; secondly that the Appellate Court has made a wrong approach to the oral and documentary evidence showing that the sale of fish and meat from the same premises was not only injurious to public health but also result in infection and spreading of verious epidemic diseases referred to above and thirdly, that a prima-facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs existed and the Court below did not further consider that the refusal of the interim relief was likely to result in irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiffs which could not be compensated with costs. In any case the judicial discretion has not been exercised by the Appellate Court in accordance with the settled principles of law in dismissing the application in question, asserts learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs. 11. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has referred to sections 327 and 328 of the Act and the Shimla Municipal Corporation (Municipal Markets) Bye-laws, 1986 as also Shimla Municipal Corporation (Sale of meat, fish and poultry) Bye-laws, 1987 (hereinafter referred to shortly as Bye-laws of 1986 and Bye-laws of 1987 respectively) According to him, condition No (vi) in particular relating to the lease of a market stall under Bye-laws of 1986 and, clauses 5 to 7 of Bye-laws of 1987 are material to see as to for what purpose, in what manner and under what circumstances, such stall can be used. Reliance has also been placed on the observations made in the case of Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros, Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249; Mange Ram and another v. Dewak Ram and another, 1984 PLR 618; Gopal Krishan Kapoor and others v. Ramesh Chander Nijhawan and others, 1973 Del. Law Times 390 and Terene Traders v. Ramesh-Chandra Jamnadas & Co and another, AIR 1987 SC 1492 Lastly, on the strength of the observations made in the case of S. P. Gupta and others v. Union of India and others^ AIR 1982 SC 189, it is submitted that legal wrong or an injury by the sale of meat in fish market is not only being caused to the plaintiffs but also to the public at large—citizens of Shimla by reason of violation of a legal right or in the alternative, burden imposed upon defendant No. 1 not to sell the meat and fish from the same platform in fish market in contravention of legal provision or without authority of law. It is urged that legal injury apprehending the spreading of epidemic due to the conduct of defendant No. 1 is threatened and the public at large is unable to approach the Court for the relief and, therefore, plaintiffs having filed the instant suit seeking temporary injunction, should be given equitable relief by issuing appropriate directions pending the decision of the main suit On the other hand, Shri H R. Thakur, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the defendant No 2-Municipal Corporation, has attempted to support the plaintiffs by submitting that fish market is exclusively meant for the sale of fish only ; that sale of meat and fish in that market is Injurious to the health of the public in general and is likely to spread epidemic, as has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. He has attempted to show that the issuance of licence to defendant No. I for the sale of meat in the stall in question has been issued by the Commissioner, Shimla Municipal Corporation (defendant No. 2) without seeking the report of Market Superintendent and Health Officer concerned which was imperative under the Bye-laws. 12. He has attempted to show that the issuance of licence to defendant No. I for the sale of meat in the stall in question has been issued by the Commissioner, Shimla Municipal Corporation (defendant No. 2) without seeking the report of Market Superintendent and Health Officer concerned which was imperative under the Bye-laws. 12. Shri Chhabil Dass, Advocate, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No. 1 has vehemently contended that under the provisions of the Act or Bye-laws, there exists no such Bye-law which either debars the sale of different kinds of commodities referred to above in one and the same market nor there is any prohibition under the Bye- laws for the conversion of a stall earlier used for one purpose, to another purpose by the authorities concerned-Municipal Corporation. Farther, it is contended that apprehension of the diseases or epidemic due to the sale of meat in fish market by defendant No. 1 is misconceived inasmuch as it is not the case of the plaintiffs that contaminated meat or fish is being sold by defendant No I Rather, according to the learned Counsel no policy decision has been taken by defendant No- 2-Municipal Corporation at any time My attention his been drawn to the fact that the plaintiffs earlier through their co-businessmen, namely, Shri Gcvind Ram & others, who also carry on the sale of meat in the meat market, had involved defendant No. 1 in litigation through C. W. P No. 246 of 1991 referred to above, which was ultimately withdrawn by them and defendant No. 2-Municipal Corporation had thereafter granted licence for the sale of meat in the stall in question. Plaintiffs in fact had not raised any objection for the sale of meat by defendant No.I in the stall in question for the years 1990-91 (1-4-1990 to 31-3-1991) and 1991-92 (1-4-1991 to 31-3-1992). The suit in question has, for the first time, been filed by the plaintiffs on 11-6-1992 seeking the relief in question. Therefore, it being a case of professional rivalry and seeing the conduct of the plaintiffs, no prima-fade case is made out for the grant of interim relief nor balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs. Learned Counsel, thus, supports the findings of the Appellate Court on the reasonings given by him in the impugned order. 13. Learned Counsels have taken me through the entire record. Learned Counsel, thus, supports the findings of the Appellate Court on the reasonings given by him in the impugned order. 13. Learned Counsels have taken me through the entire record. Finding that none of the parties had appended any document alongwith their pleadings indicating whether any policy debarring the sale of fish and meat together from one platform had been framed by defendant No 2 or what were the Bye laws relating to the allotment of the stalls or for the issuance of licence for the stall of different commodities referred to above or on what basis, the defendant No 2 in earlier suit had contended that the sale of fish and meat from the same platform or same market is not only injurious and unhygienic but also likely to spread various diseases detailed above, this Court directed Shri H. R. Thakur, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant No 2, to produce the entire record or photo-stat copies thereof regulating the allotment of the stalls, issuance of licences pertaining to the sale of fish meat and poultry etc. as also the Bye-laws. Learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the contesting parties were also allowed to inspect the record and produce documents there from in support of their respective claim, particularly in view of the allegation qua the spreading of diseases/epidemic due to the sale of fish and meat from the same platform m the same market, la compliance with this order, all the parties have produced documents which hive been made the part of this file. 14. I have gone through the entire pleadings and the entire record minutely and I have also considered the submissions of the learned Counsels for the contesting parties. After considering the entire facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the findings arrived at by the learned District Judge are well reasoned, cogent and convincing. The ad-interim injunction sought for by the plaintiffs has rightly been refused. There is no dispute that in granting or refusing to grant a temporary Injunction, Courts have very wide discretion The exercise of the discretion should be in a judicial manner, depending upon the circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for the guidance of the Courts as regards the exercise of such jurisdiction. There is no dispute that in granting or refusing to grant a temporary Injunction, Courts have very wide discretion The exercise of the discretion should be in a judicial manner, depending upon the circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for the guidance of the Courts as regards the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is also not disputed that the High Court over and above the powers which it enjoys under the Code of Civil Procedure possesses an equitable jurisdiction to issue an injunction in appropriate cases. However, in normal course, this Court does not as a rule interfere with an interlocutory order except under very exceptional circumstances. Thus, the question is whether exceptional circumstances attracting interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the judicial discretion exercised by the learned District Judge, exist in the instant case ? The answer is in the negative 15. In order to justify issuance of a temporary injunction, the following conditions are required to be satisfied; (i) Existence of a prima facie case ; (ii) Accruing of Irreparable injury and substantial loss, which cannot be compensated with costs, if injunction is not granted ; (iii) Existence of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs in comparison to the opposite party ; (iv) Non-existence of any other efficacious remedy by which plaintiff could protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury ; and lastly (v) The conduct of the plaintiff, Bye laws of 1986 have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by sections 327 and 395 read with section 397 of the Act These pertain to the procedure for allotment of Municipal markets and use thereof. Condition (vi) of the said Bye-laws is to the following effect ?— "that he shall not carry on or permit to be carried on any other trade or occupation in premises except that for which the stall is intended, and that he shall not use or suffer to be used any portion of the premises as a living or sleeping room ;" 16. Now adverting to Clauses 5 to 7 of Bye laws of 1987, the same have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by section 395 (I) H read with section 397 of the Act. They pertain to the sale of meat, fish and poultry. The relevant bye-laws are as under; — "5. Now adverting to Clauses 5 to 7 of Bye laws of 1987, the same have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by section 395 (I) H read with section 397 of the Act. They pertain to the sale of meat, fish and poultry. The relevant bye-laws are as under; — "5. Subject to the provisions of bye-laws 4, a license for premises to be used for the sale of or preparation or exposure for sale of meat, fish and poultry shall be issued by the Health Officer, or in his absence any officer authorised bf the Corporation on the application of the owner or occupier of such premises and shall be granted in Form “A" appended to these bye-laws payment of such a fee as may be fixed by the Corporation, from time to time subject to the conditions specified in the said Form "A". 6. Every place licensed for the sale or preparation for sale of meat, fish or poultry shall be fitted with a chopping block or a table of which the top shall be covered with zinc sheet or with a slab or marble, slate or stone for cutting of meat, fish or poultry and also with metal scales and weights and shall at all reasonable times be open for inspection by the Health Officer or any other officer or official as may be authorised by the Corporation in this behalf. 7. Every place licensed for the sale or preparation or exposure for sale of meat, fish or poultry and all implements, tables, receptacles, vessels or other things used therein, shall at all times be kept in a clean and hygienic conditions and every such place shall at every time be provided with sufficient supply of water for cleaning the same and disinfected at least once in a day or as often as may be required by the Health Officer” 17. Pleadings of the parties show that plaintiffs are meat vendors and defendant No. I before 1989 was selling fish only in the stall in question in pursuance of the licence issued by the defendant No 2 The record further shows that there are 4 meat markets, namely, Old Meat Market, Halal Meat Market-primarily meant for Mohamedans, Meat Market and New Fish and Meat Market Stall No. 1 has been allotted to Balwant Singh and Puran Singh and stall No. 2 to defendant No 1. These two stalls are opposite to each other intervened by a path in-between. Puran Singh is the father of defendant No 1. In Govind Rams writ petition (supra), defendant No I was respondent. On the basis of the affidavit given by defendant No. 2, writ petition was withdrawn. According to the petitioners in this writ petition, the sale of meat in the stall in question by defendant No 1 was un-authorised and contrary to the provisions of the Act and Bye laws. Obviously, withdrawal thereof meant that defendant No. 1 became entitled to use the stall in question for the purpose for which licence had been issued to him by defendant No. 2 Municipal Corporation. Record shows that thereafter a proper cabin with thick glass wall in the stall in question was constructed to the satisfaction of defendant No 2, separating it from stall No. L located opposite to the other stalls. The licence was, thus, issued for the sale of meat to defendant No. 1. 18. Now none of the Bye-laws, referred to above, debars the sale of the two commodities together at one a id the same place. The fact that clause (vl) of Bye-laws of 1986 prohibits the sale of any other article in the stall in question located in Fish Market, is not borne out from the record of defendant No. 2-Municipal Corporation, nor it shows that policy decision had been taken by defendant No 2 to specifically prohibit the sale of different commodities from the stalls located in the same market. Even record of the defendant No. 2 pertaining to the previous years 1971 to 1975 regarding allotment of stalls located in New Meat and Fish Market, shows that there are 15 stalls In this Market. The lessees of stalls 1 to 3, 5 to 7 and 14 used to sell fish in these stalls However, lessees of stalls 3 to 5 had also been permitted to sell meat through the same licence issued by defendant No 2 and this commodity was allowed to be sold together with fish by the lessees of stall holder Nos. 3 and 5- Similarly, lessee of stall No. 9 used to sell meat and eggs pursuant to the licence issued by defendant No 2. 3 and 5- Similarly, lessee of stall No. 9 used to sell meat and eggs pursuant to the licence issued by defendant No 2. Excepting stall No 15 wherein pork used to be sold by its lessees, the other stalls including 3 to 5 referred to earlier, business of sale of fish was being carried on by their respective lessees. 19. In the initial stages of the arguments, learned Counsel for the defendant No. 1 submitted that various commodities from the same plat form were being sold in the stalls of New Fish and Meat Market which was controverted by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. This controversy resulted in the appointment of the Local Commissioner, who was directed to inspect the spot and produce his report alongwith the photograph, if any, relevant in compliance of the order passed by this Court. The perusal of the report of the Local Commissioner and that of photographs annexed therewith show the sale of meat and fish from the same platform. Learned Counsel for defendant No. 2 has not been able to clarify as to how and under what circumstances, this business is being carried on by the lessees thereof However, he submits that legal action shall be taken against them. 20. Another fact which Is crucial, is the stage when plaintiffs have approached the Court for seeking the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction. As pointed out above, defendant No. 1 had started the sale of meat in the stall in question in November, 1989 regarding which action had been taken by defendant No 2. However, he continued to carry on the sale of meat from 1-4-1991 to 31-3-1992 without any objection from any corner under the licence issued by defendant No. 2. In addition, the sale of meat in this stall was being carried out by him (defendant No. 1) to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, 21. Another important document on record is the lease deed entered into in-between defendants inter se This document shows that stall in question (Fish Stall No. 2) was allotted for the purpose of sale of meat to defendant No. 1 by defendant No 2 for a period of one year commencing from 23-1-1993 to 22-1-1994 against payment of Rs. 6,041 per annum. 6,041 per annum. In these circumstances, defendant No. 1 was and is at liberty to choose his trade and he had chosen to sell the meat in the stall allotted to him for the licence of which he had applied for in accordance with the Bye-laws framed under the Act, Thus, he cannot be restricted with the trade offish for all times to come unless it appears to be violative of the rights of the plain tiffs. 22. As regards the consequences arising from the sale of two commodities—fish and meat in the same market, only opinion of the Market Superintendent has been produced. Record of Municipal Corporation shows that at one time the State had directed defendant No. 2-Municipal Corporation not to allow the import of fish seeds from Calcutta because of some epidemic having spread there by the sale of the said commodity along- with the meat in the same market. In the absence of any allegation with respect to the sale of contaminated fish or meat on the part of the plaintiffs, nothing can be said at present, yet it has to be determined by the Court below whether sale of these two commodities is injurious to the public health as alleged by the plaintiffs. In otherwise case too, it is for defendant No. 2 to take a policy decision to this effect in view of the alleged apprehension of the spreading of epidemic due to the sale of the two commodities from the same platform or in the same market though from different stalls. Mere opinion now brought to the notice of defendant No. 2 by the Market Superintendent, cannot over-rule the Bye-laws or the provisions of the Act The subject needs detailed discussion including the obtaining of advice from the Experts by defendant No 2-Municipal Corporation and this procedural discussion may lead to resolution or some amendment in the Bye-laws with which topic at present I am not concerned for the purpose of disposal of this revision petition. Without any cogent evidence on record, it cannot be held that a legal wrong or legal injury has been caused to the public in general. It is true that in S. P. Guptas case (supra), the constitutional Bench of the Apex Court has laid down as under t "17. Without any cogent evidence on record, it cannot be held that a legal wrong or legal injury has been caused to the public in general. It is true that in S. P. Guptas case (supra), the constitutional Bench of the Apex Court has laid down as under t "17. It may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or a legal injury Is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any con situational or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.” In this revision petition this Court cannot adhere to the mode so suggested by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. 23. In view of the above, I am in agreement with the findings of the learned District Judge that no case has been made out by the plaintiffs for the reason that essential requisites necessitating issuance of temporary injunction have not been established. The revision petition is, thus dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to suffer their respective costs. 24. Any observations made or opinion expressed hereinabove in respect of the disposal of this revision petition, shall have no effect on the merits of the case. 25. The files of the Courts below be returned forthwith. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 10-6-1993. Order accordingly.