Judgment : This revision petition is directed against the order directing delivery of possession of the suit property without giving notice to the petitioner/judgment-debtor. 2. The short facts are: Respondent has filed the suit in O.S.No.1311 of 1981 on the file of District Munsifs Court, Poonamallee, for declaration, possession and permanent injunction. After an elaborate trial, the learned District Munsif has decreed the suit on 212. 1988. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed an appeal and the same was dismissed on 29. 1989. Thereafter, the respondent has filed E.P.No.181 of 1991 in the trial court and delivery was ordered on 8. 1991 without notice to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition. 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner, would submit that under the provisions of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C., notice has to be given to the petitioner and that the order of delivery without notice is clearly untenable. Learned counsel relied on the decisions in Gauri Lal v. Sujham Devi, A.I.R. 1986 H.P. 3, Muthammal v. Kaveriammal, A.I.R. 1987 Mad. 103, Kamalammal v. M.Kanthanuna, (1971)1 M.L.J. 471 and Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramanujachariar, I.L.R. 47 Mad. 288. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent, would submit that when the appeal was filed and was dismissed, the date of judgment of the appellate court alone should be taken into account and the appeal having been dismissed on 29. 1989 and the order in the execution petition having been passed on 8. 1991 which is within two years, notice is not required and the order is perfectly in order. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsels. The entire question falls within a short compass viz. whether the date of decree of the trial court alone is to be taken into account for computing the two year period contemplated in 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C. or whether the date of judgment of the appellate court is the date which is to be taken into account. For the purpose of convenience, I extract the relevant portion of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C, which reads as follows: “22. (1) Notice to show cause against execution in certain cases-Where an application for execution is made: (a) more than two years after the date of the decree, or (b)..... (c)..... For the purpose of convenience, I extract the relevant portion of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C, which reads as follows: “22. (1) Notice to show cause against execution in certain cases-Where an application for execution is made: (a) more than two years after the date of the decree, or (b)..... (c)..... Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in consequence of more than two years having elapsed between the date of the decree and the application for execution, if the application is made within two years, from the date of the last order against the party against whom execution is applied for, made on any previous application or execution....” To construe the clause (a) which puts the date of two years after the date of decree, necessarily we have to see what is the “decree”. “Decree” is defined in Sec.2(2), C.P.C., and it reads as follows: “(2)” decree “ means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Sec.144, but shall not include- .(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or .(b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.” InKungammalv. Krishna Chettiar, (1953) 2 M.L.J. 185 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 170: 66 L.W. 558: 1953 M.W.N. 451, a Division Bench of this Court has laid as follows: “The law is well settled that when a decree is taken in appeal to a higher court, the decree passed in appeal supersedes that of the court below and becomes a decree in the suit itself and that thereafter that is the only decree which is capable of execution and the period of limitation for execution would run from the date of that decree.” This ruling of the Division Bench was followed subsequently by Justice Balasubrahmanyan in Yesudasan v. Grant, (1980)2 M.L.J. 152. 6. 6. In Gauri Lal v. Sujham Devi, A.I.R. 1986 H.P. 3, it was held that in cases where an application for execution is made more than two years after the date of decree, no process in execution can issue unless a notice to show cause is served on the judgment-debtor or the service of such notice is dispensed with in accordance with law. It was further held that where a decree for possession was passed and decree-holder filed execution proceedings nearly six years later from date on which decree was passed and executing court without issuing a show cause notice to the judgment-debtor issued a warrant for possession, the executing court could not be regarded to have assumed jurisdiction legally and validly in issuing the warrant for possession without a show cause notice having been first served upon the judgment-debtors. In Kamalammal v. M.Kanthamma, (1971)1 M.L.J. 471 , it was held that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for executing the mortgage decree, the time during which the injunction was thus presumed to be in force is liable to be deducted. In Muthammal v. Kaveriam-mal, A.I.R. 1987 Mad. 103, it was held that where after the dismissal of the first execution petition filed beyond a period of two years from the date of the decree by the second appellate court, a second execution petition was filed on the same day, a notice to the judgment-debtor under 0.21, Rule 22 would be necessary and the proviso to 0.21, Rule 22 would not be attracted in such a case because the dismissal of the first execution petition could not be said to be an order against the judgment-debtor, rather the dismissal of the execution petition would be in favour of the judgment-debtor. In Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramanujachar-iar, I.L.R. 47 Mad. 288, it was held that execution of sale without notice to the judgment-debtor is a nullity. 7. From the above rulings, the following principles can be deduced: “(i) In an execution petition, if notice is required under the provisions of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C., and if notice was not issued but execution was proceeded with, the executing court could not be regarded to have assumed jurisdiction legally and validly without a show-cause notice having been first served upon the judgment-debtor. (ii) When a decree is taken in appeal to a higher court, the decree passed in appeal supersedes that of the court below and becomes the decree in the suit itself and the period of limitation for execution would run from the date of that decree of the appellate court”. 8. Applying the above principles to the facts of the case before me, the date of judgment of the appellate court viz. 29. 1989 alone is to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the period of two years for the purpose of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C. If so taken, the execution petition, having been ordered on 8. 1991, which is within a period of two years from 29. 1989 is well within timeand is in order. 9. Mr.R.Sankarasubbu’s further submission is that after the passing of new Limitation Act, the period of two years is to be considered only from the date of the trial court decree and not the decree of the appellate court. I do not find any support to this submission in the provisions of the Limitation Act. The crucial word which is to be interpreted for the purpose of 0.21, Rule 22, C.P.C, is the “decree”. Regarding the interpretation of the “decree” the definition of “decree” and the rulings referred to supra and the principle (ii) which I have deduced above would show that only the date of appeal decree is to be construed as the date of the “decree”. Hence, neither this submission would hold good. 10. In view of the above, this civil revision petition has to be necessarily dismissed and shall stand dismissed.