Judgment :- Sreedharan, J. Appellant is the writ petitioner in O.P. No. 12214/91. That petition was filed praying for a declaration that election to the 4th respondent Co-operative Society is null and void. Writ petitioner is a member of that Society. It was the case of the writ petitioner that election was attempted to be held without following statutory requirements and without giving the members an opportunity to file objections against enrolment of members. Large scale enrolment was effected without scrutinising the applications and verifying the eligibility of the applicants. It was also contended that scrutiny of voters list as required under Rule 35 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules was not done by the returning officer. 2. Along with the original petition, application was filed for staying the process of election. This Court granted an interim order staying the counting of votes polled and also further proceedings. This court further directed that suspect votes i.e. votes cast by ineligible persons should be collected in a separate box to be dealt with later. 3. To the counter affidavit filed by contesting respondents, writ petitioner filed reply affidavit dated 12-7-92. In that reply affidavit, it was contended that the 4th respondent society has its area of operation lying within two circles, that returning officer to such a society can be appointed only by a Joint Registrar and the returning officer in this case was appointed by an Assistant Registrar. Consequently, writ petitioner took the stand that no returning officer, as per law, has been appointed and consequently the entire proceedings taken by him are null and void. The election notification stated that the newly elected Board is to have a term of five years. But the Co-operative Societies Amendment Act provided that the term of elected Body can only be for a period of five years. Accordingly, the Notification for election to the Board for a period of five years is null and void. 4. Learned Single Judge found that the 4th respondent society is having its area of operation over two Taluks and consequently the jurisdiction exceeds one circle. In such a case, for the purpose of Rule 35(2), Joint Registrar is the authority to appoint returning officer. In the instant case, Assistant Registrar who is not competent to issue order, appointed the returning officer. In such a case, for the purpose of Rule 35(2), Joint Registrar is the authority to appoint returning officer. In the instant case, Assistant Registrar who is not competent to issue order, appointed the returning officer. Therefore it was observed that objection raised by the writ petitioner in this regard is well-founded. But the learned Single Judge took the view that the only relief asked for by the amendment is a declaration that the election Notification is null and void, that the challenge was only to the proceedings taken pursuant to Ext. P2 and not to its issue and consequently petitioner is not entitled to any other reliefs. In this view, original petition was dismissed leaving the writ petitioner to raise all disputes regarding the election under S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act. Returning Officer was also directed to count the votes polled in the election held on 15-12-91 inclusive of the votes polled in the separate box. This decision of the learned judge is under challenge. 5. It is conceded before us that the 4th respondent Co-operative Society has its area of operation spread over more than one circle. The previous Managing Committee took a decision to hold the election on 15-12-91. Pursuant to that decision, Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, exercising the power of Registrar under Rule 35 of the Rules, appointed second respondent as the returning officer. As per the Explanation to Clause (2) of Rule 35, an Assistant Registrar can exercise the power of Registrar to appoint returning officer only in the case of Primary Societies, the jurisdiction of which does not exceed one circle. In the case of Societies, the jurisdiction of which exceeds one circle, the Joint Registrar of the District concerned, is to appoint the returning officer. Since second respondent was appointed as returning officer by an Assistant Registrar, it is contended that the entire proceedings are devoid of any validity and the entire election process should be declared as nonest. 6. Second respondent was appointed as returning officer for conduct of the election to the Board of Directors of the 4th respondent society by an Assistant Registrar. As stated earlier, Explanation to Rule 35(2) empowers an Assistant Registrar to appoint returning officer for conduct of an election to a Primary Society, the jurisdiction of which does not exceed one circle. The jurisdiction of the 4th respondent Co-operative Society exceeds one circle. As stated earlier, Explanation to Rule 35(2) empowers an Assistant Registrar to appoint returning officer for conduct of an election to a Primary Society, the jurisdiction of which does not exceed one circle. The jurisdiction of the 4th respondent Co-operative Society exceeds one circle. Pursuant to the order of appointment given by the Assistant Registrar, second respondent completed the entire election proceedings. In such a situation, what are the legal consequence of the actions taken by the second respondent? Second respondent can be considered as a returning officer who exercised jurisdiction de facto. When it is found that his appointment was not strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, are his actions to be declared as nonest? The answer can only be in the negative. This is especially so when it is seen that the appointment of second respondent as returning officer has not been sought to be interfered with. This is so since the writ petitioner has questioned the very appointment of second respondent as the returning officer. 7. In Cooley's 'Constitutional Limitations', Eighth Edition, Volume II at p. 1355 it is said:- "An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence though having no right in fact. His colour of right may come from an election or appointment made by some officer or body having colourable but no actual right to make it; or made in such disregard of legal requirements as to be ineffectual in law; or made to fill the place of an officer illegally removed or made in favour of a party not having the legal qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the qualifications or it may come from public acquiescence in the officer holding without performing the precedent conditions, or holding over under claim of right after his legal right has been terminated; or possibly from public acquiescence alone when accompanied by such circumstances of official reputation as are calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke official action on the supposition that the person claiming the office is what he assumes to be. An intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence. An intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the same of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by some one claiming the office de jure, orexcept when the person himself attempts to build upsome right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. There is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally". 8. Lord Denning M.R. made the following observations in Re James (An Insolvent) ((1977) 2 W.L.R.1) on the question of the effect of the invalidity of the appointment of a judge on the judgments pronounced by him. "He sits in the seat of a judge. He wears the robes of a judge. He holds the office of a judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent so long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they arc erroneous they m ay be upset on appeal. But if not erroneous they should be upheld". In Immedisetti Ramkrishniah Sons Anakapalli and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 193) the question as to the validity of the actions taken by a Market Committee whose nomination was later set aside by the High Court came up for consideration. In that case, Government nominated 9 persons to a Market Committee. In Immedisetti Ramkrishniah Sons Anakapalli and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 193) the question as to the validity of the actions taken by a Market Committee whose nomination was later set aside by the High Court came up for consideration. In that case, Government nominated 9 persons to a Market Committee. Later the nomination was set aside by the High Court. But before the High Court rendered its decision, the Market Committee functioned as if it had been properly constituted. Between the date of its constitution and the date of the High Court's decision, it had taken several decisions. The High Court took the view that all those actions of the Market Committee were de facto performed within the scope of its assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit and therefore are valid and binding as if they were performed by a de jure Committee. In Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1981 SC 1473) the facts were as follows:-State Government appointed Additional Sessions Judges. Their appointment was declared invalid by the Supreme Court. The validity or otherwise of the decisions rendered by the Additional Sessions Judges between the dates of their appointment and the pronouncement by the Supreme Court came up for decision. After making thorough survey of the entire case law, Their Lordships observed "A Judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the sake efficasy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he may be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no Judge. A Judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence 'the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question a judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course, such a Collateral attack". In P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala (I.L.R.1969 (II) Kerala 391 at p. 416) a Full Bench of this court considered the de facto doctrine and observed: "This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being dne in strict point of law. But although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid". 9. Second respondent was appointed by an Assistant Registrar. He had no right to make the appointment. But he made the appointment purporting to be under Rule 35 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. The appointment of the second respondent as returning officer was not in question in the original petition. Pursuant to that order of appointment, second respondent infact exercised all the powers of a Returning officer. Exercise of that power was not for his benefit. It was for the benefit of the society. Election was held on the day fixed by the previous Board of directors. That election and the declaration of the result thereon cannot be open to collateral attack. Exercise of that power was not for his benefit. It was for the benefit of the society. Election was held on the day fixed by the previous Board of directors. That election and the declaration of the result thereon cannot be open to collateral attack. This is so because writ petitioner has not challenged the very appointment of second respondent. The acts of the second respondent performed by him within the scope of his authority as Returning Officer were done in the interest of the public and not for his own benefit. Such actions are valid and binding as if they were the acts of officers appointed de jure. 10. By the time this appeal was filed, newly elected Members of the Board of Directors of the 4th respondent society assumed office. They have been impleaded as additional respondents 5 to 12 in this Writ Appeal as per order dated 31-8-92 on C.M.P. No. 6314/92. Since ihey have assumed office and arc functioning as members of the Board of Directors, no relief can be given to the appellant. His remedy, if any, as observed by the learned Single Judge, is under S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In view of what has been stated above, we find no merit in this Writ Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.