Judgment :- Appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 51 of 1991 who is the accused in Sessions Case No. 68 of 1990 of the Assistant Sessions Judge (Principal), Palakkad is the revision-petitioner. The learned Judge found him guilty of the offence punishable under section 20(b)(i) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short the Act'), convicted him and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 4 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 29,000/-; in default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 2 years. He challenged the said conviction and sentence in Crl. Appeal No. 51 of 1991 before the Sessions Judge, Palakkad. The said appeal was dismissed. 2. PW 1, Sub-Inspector of Police, Palakkad Town North Police Station while on patrol duty on 5-9-1990 at 5.45 p.m. along with police constables, found the accused near the Government Victoria College. On seeing the police party, he retreated which created suspicion and hence PW 1 and others stopped him and questioned him. Thereafter, on examination of his person, they found MO-1 ganja concealed in the fold of his dothi at the waist. MO-1 ganja was weighed and sealed in the presence of witnesses; the petitioner was also having MO-3 currency notes with him. PW-1 prepared Ext. P1 mahazar in the presence of witnesses. He arrested the accused and produced him along with the seized articles before the police station. Crime 388 of 1990 was registered under section 20(b)(i) of the Act. Ext. P2 is the FIR. 3. PW-5, Assistant Sub-Inspector of the said Police Station conducted the further investigation. He went to the scene and prepared Ext. P3 scene mahazar. He produced the material objects before the court on 6-9-1990 and also submitted a report for sending the MO-1 for chemical examination; Ext. P4 is the certificate issued by the Chemical Analyst. He completed the investigation and laid the charge before the court. 4. Learned counsel for the revision-petitioner submitted that there was violation of Sections 50 and 57 of the Act and, therefore, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. P4 is the certificate issued by the Chemical Analyst. He completed the investigation and laid the charge before the court. 4. Learned counsel for the revision-petitioner submitted that there was violation of Sections 50 and 57 of the Act and, therefore, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that, this revision itself is not competent and alternatively contended that, there is no violation as alleged and that even if there was any violation since the same has not caused any prejudice or failure of justice, the same cannot be a ground for acquittal of the accused. 5. Admittedly this case was detected and tried at a time when no Special Court as per Section 36 of the Act was constituted. Section 36-D of the Act, provides for transitional provisions. As per the said Section, until a Special Court is constituted under section 36, such cases shall be tried by a Court of Session. 6. In the decision in Ahmed Koya v. State, 1991 (1) KLT 332, it is held that, the Court of Session contemplated under section 36-D of the Act could take in Assistant Sessions Judges also and in such circumstance they are also competent to exercise jurisdiction over the cases made over to them by the Sessions Judge. In this case also, the case was made over to the Assistant Sessions Judge by the Sessions Judge. Thus, there was jurisdiction for the Assistant Sessions Judge who tried the case. 7. The next question for consideration is which is the forum to challenge the said conviction. It was contended by the learned counsel for the revision-petitioner that the sentence awarded to the accused by the Assistant Sessions Judge being only two years and fine as per Section 374, Cr.P.C., the appeal was properly filed before the Sessions Judge and hence the revision against the said conviction is competent. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that, the only forum for preferring an appeal from a conviction is the High Court as per Section 36-B of the Act, and consequently Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be applicable to a conviction by a Special Court. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that, the only forum for preferring an appeal from a conviction is the High Court as per Section 36-B of the Act, and consequently Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be applicable to a conviction by a Special Court. With due regard to the scheme of the Act, the decision by a Sessions Court under section 36-D in the circumstances could only be as a Special Court because by the force of Section 36-D when the Court of Session exercises the jurisdiction under Section 36-D, the Sessions Court would be exercising the jurisdiction as a Special Court. Consequently the right of appeal being a right that has to be conferred by the statute, the forum where the appeal is to be preferred has to be judged with due regard to the provision in the Act itself. As noticed, Section 36-B of the Act provides for the forum of appeal and revision. As per Section 36-B, the High Court is conferred with the power to exercise all the powers conferred under Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Criminal Procedure Code. When the special enactment has provided for a forum for appeal, the only court which can entertain the appeal from a conviction is the High Court. Thus, in view of the above, the appeal preferred before the Sessions Court, Palakkad against the conviction in Sessions Case No. 68 of 1990 was not competent. 8. Now what has been preferred by the accused is only a revision and not an appeal. Under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court can, in the interest of justice, treat an application for revision made before the High Court as an appeal. With due regard to the circumstances under which the appeal happened to be filed before the Sessions Court, in the interest of justice it is necessary to treat the revision as an appeal. 9. As noticed, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Sections 50 and 57 of the Act having been not complied with the conviction cannot be sustained. The evidence of PW-1 would show that, on seizure of MO-1, he weighed it, packed and sealed the same and prepared Ext. P1 mahazar. PWs 2 and 3 are the attestors to Ext. P1. The evidence of PW-1 would show that, on seizure of MO-1, he weighed it, packed and sealed the same and prepared Ext. P1 mahazar. PWs 2 and 3 are the attestors to Ext. P1. Though they were declared hostile and were permitted to be cross-examined, they admitted to their having signed Ext. P1. 10. PW-2 has sworn to his having seen the weighing and sealing of ganja and the preparation of Ext. P1 mahazar at the scene itself. PW-2 also admitted to his having signed Ext. PI. His evidence also would show that, he saw the detection of the ganja, and that detection was from the fold of his (accused) dothi at the waist. Simply because a witness has been declared hostile that does not mean that his whole evidence must be rejected; such of the portions of the evidence of the said witness which inspires confidence to be acted upon can be relied on. Thus, the seizure and sealing of the ganja are satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. 11. PW-5 said, he sent the material object on the next day to the court and gave report for sending it for chemical analysis. The evidence of PW-1 would show that, when he is away from the police station, PW-5 would discharge the function of the Station House Officer. The evidence of CW-1, the Chemical Analyst also reveals that, when he received the ganja the same had seal and the seal was intact, CW-1 in one portion said, he did not get the specimen seal; that in the circumstance, particularly in the context of the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 cannot have such importance. Ext. P-4 is the certificate of the Chemical Analyst. Ex. P4 shows that the substance was ganja. 12. It was contended by the learned counsel that, since PW-1 did not take the accused to the Gazetted Officer before the search was made, the seizure itself is vitiated. In the cross-examination of PW-1, he has sworn to the effect that he asked the accused whether he has to be taken to the Magistrate or to a Gazetted Officer. 12. It was contended by the learned counsel that, since PW-1 did not take the accused to the Gazetted Officer before the search was made, the seizure itself is vitiated. In the cross-examination of PW-1, he has sworn to the effect that he asked the accused whether he has to be taken to the Magistrate or to a Gazetted Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sudarshan Kumar, 1989 Cri LJ 1412, to contend that, the Officer is bound to inform the accused of his right to be taken to the nearest Gazetted Officer mentioned in Section 42 of the Act and that if he fails to do so, the onus is on the prosecution to prove that association of such witness was not possible on facts and circumstances of the case, that the said provision is mandatory and violation of the same per se would be fatal to the prosecution case. This court had occasion to consider this aspect and in the decision in Ahammed Koya v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) KLT 405, it is held that, Section 50 of the Act does not require the Officer who wants to effect the search to ascertain the opinion of the accused as to whether he wants the search to be conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, and that the Section clearly shows that it is for the accused to make such a request before the search is made. Further, the very wording of the Section is such that it is for the accused to require that he should be taken to the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate, and on the working of the said Section, it is not possible to agree that it is for the Officer to ask the accused whether the search is to be made in the presence of the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. 13. As regards the contention on the basis of Section 57 of the Act, that within 48 hours of the arrest full report of the particulars of the arrest was not made to the superior officer, it has to be observed that, every breach of the condition cannot result in vitiating the conviction and trial. 14. 13. As regards the contention on the basis of Section 57 of the Act, that within 48 hours of the arrest full report of the particulars of the arrest was not made to the superior officer, it has to be observed that, every breach of the condition cannot result in vitiating the conviction and trial. 14. In the decision in Ismail v. State of Kerala, ILR 1991 (2) Kerala 820 : (1991 Cri LJ 2945) it is held that, non-compliance or delayed compliance or insufficient compliance could vitiate the prosecution only if it resulted in prejudice and failure of justice. In the decision in Sulaiman v. State of Kerala, 1992 (2) KLT 879 it is held : "The plain language of Sections 50, 52, 53, 55, 56 and 57 of the Act, leave no doubt that these are mandatory provisions. But, violation of a mandatory provision per se, will not vitiate the conviction, unless prejudice thereby to the accused is shown." In paragraph 5 of the said decision it is observed : "Whether prejudice has resulted to the accused has to be ascertained from the circumstances of each case. If basic safeguards designed to ensure the authenticity of the material, upon which a conviction is based, are violated that will be prejudice, in law." Therefore, the question is whether the basic safeguards intended to ensure the authenticity of the material are violated. As already noticed, the seizure was followed by weighing, packing and sealing. The evidence would show that procedure with respect to the authenticity of the material has been followed. The evidence does not in any way show prejudice or failure of justice was occasioned on account of the non-compliance with Section 57 of the Act. The contention thus, is not acceptable. 15. The Crl. R.P. is without any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed which accordingly is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.