JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The petitioner and proforma respondents No. 5 to 10 before this Court are the tenants while respondents 1 to 4 are the landlords of the tenanted premises comprising of a shop in Ward No. 7, Main Bazar, Una The parties are being referred to as the tenants and landlords respectively hereinafter. 2. The landlords sought the eviction of the tenants from the tenanted premises under section 14 of the H P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short "the Act") on the following grounds : — (a) non-payment of rent at the rate of Rs 60 per month with effect from 1-8-1986, The arrears of rent claimed uptil the date of petition, that is, 31-5-1988 were Rs. 1320 ; (b) The tenanted premises were required bonafide by the landlords for rebuilding as the same had outlined its normal life ; and (c) The tenanted premises had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 3. The tenants while resisting the petition denied the arrears of rent. It was pleaded that up-to-date rent stood paid to the landlords. Bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises by the landlords for the purpose of rebuilding was denied. It was averred that the tenanted premises were in good condition and fit for human habitation. 4. The learned Rent Controller, Una, on 1-7-1992 allowed the petition of the landlords for the ejectment of the tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent. The tenants were held guilty of non-payment of rent with effect from 1-8-1986. The learned Rent Controller, however, directed that if the tenants pay the arrears of rent of Rs, 1320 for the period 1-8-1986 to 31-5-1988 to the landlords within 30 days from the date of the order, the petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent would be deemed to have been dismissed 5. The other two grounds of eviction of the tenants did not find favour with the learned Rent Controller He, therefore, declined the eviction of the tenants on these grounds. 6. The tenants did not assail the findings of the learned Rent Controller holding them to be in arrears of rent since 1-8-1986 and directing their eviction on such ground They, however, deposited the arrears of rent of Rs, 1320 in terms of the orders of the learned Rent Controller on 1-7-1992, the day of the order of the learned Rent Controller itself. 7. 7. The landlords assailed the findings of the learned Rent Controller declining the ejectment of the tenants on the other two grounds, byway of an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, Una. 8. The appeal preferred by the landlords came to be heard and decided by, the learned Appellate Authority on 20-5-1993. The learned Appellate Authority upheld the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the tenanted premises had neither become unfit or unsafe for human habitation nor the same were required bona fide by the londlords for rebuilding. However, taking note of the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, 1993 (1) SLJ 651, the learned Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the deposit of Rs. 1320 as arrears of rent by the tenants was not in consonance with the provisions contained in the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act, they were, therefore, liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises on the ground of nonpayment of rent on their failure to comply with the terms of the said third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act. 9. The findings of the learned Appellate Authority have been assailed by the tenants by virtue of the present revision petition under section 24 (5) of the Act. It has been contended that there was a specific direction by the learned Rent Controller for the deposit of Rs, 1320 being the arrears of rent within 30 days of the order. Such directions were duly complied with by the tenants on their having deposited such arrears within the stipulated period of 30 days. If the order of the learned Rent Controller was wrong, the tenants could not be made to suffer therefore., It has further been contended that since the order of the learned Rent Controller was found to be wrong by the learned Appellate Authority, the stipulated period of thirty days would be reckoned from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority, that is, from 20-5-1993. It has also been contended that the entire "amount due" within the meaning of third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act stood deposited within 30 days from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority and as such, the order of ejectment on the ground of non payment, of rent has become un-executable. 10. It has also been contended that the entire "amount due" within the meaning of third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act stood deposited within 30 days from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority and as such, the order of ejectment on the ground of non payment, of rent has become un-executable. 10. The learned Counsel for the landlords, on the other hand, has contended that the statutory period of 30 days allowed under the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act for the deposit of the amount due by a tenant cannot be extended by any other authority The Appellate Authority under the Act does not fall within the definition of the word "Controller" while deciding an appeal Therefore, the benefit of the said third proviso cannot be allowed to a tenant who has been ordered to be evicted by the Appellate Authority Since the tenants failed to pay/deposit the entire "amount due" within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of the order of the learned Rent Controller, they are liable to be evicted in execution of the order of ejectment passed against them and they are not entitled to claim the benefit of another 30 days from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority. 11. There is no denying that a sum of Rs. 8170 stands deposited by the tenants as under :— Sl. No. Amount deposited Date of deposit 1. Rs. 1,320 1-7-1992 2. Rs. 1,850 16-10-1992 3. Rs. 11. There is no denying that a sum of Rs. 8170 stands deposited by the tenants as under :— Sl. No. Amount deposited Date of deposit 1. Rs. 1,320 1-7-1992 2. Rs. 1,850 16-10-1992 3. Rs. 5,000 15-6-1993 Section 14 (2) (i) of the Act insofar as it is relevant for the purpose of the present case reads :— "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied :— (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable : Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid : Provided further that if the arrears pertain to the period prior to the appointed day, the rate of interest shall be calculated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum ; Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order ; or......." 11. The expression "amount due" appearing in second proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 of corresponding to third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act, came to be interpreted by a learned Single Judge (V.P. Gupta, J.) of this Court in Koli Doss v. Swaran Singh, ILR 1980 HP 191, as under :— “.... Naturally the amount due’ in the second proviso can only be interpreted as the amount which is calculated in accordance with the first proviso of section 14 (2) (i), i.e. it will include arrears of rent payable on the date of application and interest up-to-date of actual payment of 6% per annum on such arrears of rent which were payable together with costs of application as assessed by the Controller. Besides this amount the tenant will be liable to pay any other amount, i.e., costs etc. of the litigation which may be the result of final order of eviction.” 12. A similar question again came up for consideration before another learned Single Judge (P.D. Desai, C.J) in Om Parkash v. Sarla Kumari, C.R. No, 228 of 1985). It appears that the interpretation given to the expression "amount due" in Kali Dasss case (supra) did not find favour with the then my Lord the Chief Justice. His lordship, therefore, referred the following question of law to a larger Bench :— "Whether, on a true and proper construction of the third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, the expression the amount due’ therein occurring compromises of arrears of rent together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum on such arrears and the costs of the eviction petition as assessed by the Controller or as comprising only the rent due as found by the Controller ?” The Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble V.K. Mehrotra and Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, JJ in Om Prakash v, Sarla Kumari, 1991 (1) Sim. L.C. 45, while answering the question referred, observed : "The expression the amount due occurring in the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) comprises only the arrears of the rent due’ and not the arrears of rent together with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on such arrears and the cost of eviction petition as assessed by the Controller.” 13. Following the above said ratio and the interpretation given to the expression the amount due, the learned Rent Controller in the present case, while holding the tenants to be in arrears of rent with effect from 1-8-1985 to 31-5-1988 amounting to Rs. Following the above said ratio and the interpretation given to the expression the amount due, the learned Rent Controller in the present case, while holding the tenants to be in arrears of rent with effect from 1-8-1985 to 31-5-1988 amounting to Rs. 1320 and while passing an order of ejectment against them on the ground of non-payment of rent, had directed in the following terms :— "It is, however, clarified that if the respondents pay to the petitioners-landlords or deposit into the court the aforesaid amount of Rs 1320 within a period of 30 days hereafter, the present petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed on such ground as well failing which the order shall be executable in accordance with law..........." In Madan Mohan and another v, Krishan Kumar Sood, 1993 (1) SLJ 651, the meaning of the words "amount due” occurring in the third proviso to section l4 (2) (i) of the Act came up for consideration before the apex Court. Their Lordships did not agree with the interpretation of the words "amount due" given by the Division Bench of this Court in Om Parkash’s case (supra). It was held :— "It will be noticed that there is no provision in the Act for giving powers to the Controller to direct payment or deposit of "pendente lite" rent for each month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the tenant. First proviso to subsection (2) of section 14 shows that in order to show payment or valid tender as contemplated by clause (1) or sub-section (2) of section 14 by a tenant in default, he has to pay on the first date of hearing the arrears of rent alongwith interest and costs of the application which are to be assessed by the Controller. Surely where a tenant does not avail of the first opportunity and contest the eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and fails to show that he was not in default and court finds that the ground has been made out, an order of eviction has to follow. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that such a tenant who contests a claim and fails to avoid order of eviction can still avoid it by merely paying the rent due till the date of the filing of the application for ejectment. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that such a tenant who contests a claim and fails to avoid order of eviction can still avoid it by merely paying the rent due till the date of the filing of the application for ejectment. The third proviso to clause (i) of sub section (2) of section 14 should also receive an interpretation which will safeguard the rights of both the landlord and tenant. The "amount due” occurring in the third proviso in the context will mean the amount due on and upto the date of the order of eviction. It will take into account not merely the arrears of rent which gave cause of action to file a petition for eviction but also include the rent which accumulated during the pendency of eviction petition as well. If the tenant has been paying the rent during the pendency of the eviction petition to the landlord, the amount due" will be only arrears which have not been paid The landlord, as per the scheme of the section, cannot be worse off vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enough to deposit in court the arrears of rent together with interest and costs on the first date of hearing If the interpretation given by the High Court is accepted the result would be that the tenant will be better off by avoiding to pay the arrears of rent with interest and costs on the first date of hearing and prefer suffering order of ejectment after contest and then merely offer the amount due as mentioned in the application for ejectment to avoid eviction. This could not be the intention of the legislature.” 14. In view of the interpretation given to the words "amount due" occurring in the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act by the apex Court, the learned Appellate Authority while disposing of the appeal in the present case, held that the deposit of only Rs. 1320 by the tenants, which amount represented merely the arrears of rent for the period 1-8-1985 to 31-5-1988 was not a valid tender within the meaning of the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act and, therefore, the tenants were liable to be evicted execution of the order of ejectment passed against them on the ground of non-payment of rent. As stated above, a sum of Rs. As stated above, a sum of Rs. 8170 stands deposited by the tenants by 15-6-1993. Such amount has been deposited within 30 days of the order dated 20-5-1993 of the Appellate Authority. Learned Counsel for the landlords has conceded that such amount covers the "amount due", that is, arrears of rent up to the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority, interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum as well as the costs. 15. Therefore, the only question which requires consideration is whether the deposit made by the tenants within 30 days of the order of the Appellate Authority can be treated as a valid deposit/tender so as to save the tenants from ejectment within the meaning of third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act. 16. There is no denying that the statutory period of 30 days as provided under the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act cannot be extended. A tenant in order to save himself from eviction has to deposit the amount due within 30 days from the date the order of ejectment is passed against him on the ground of non-payment of rent. 17. The question is as to from which date the period of thirty days is to be reckoned in the present case—whether from 1-7-1992, that is, the date of order of the learned Rent Controller or from 20-5-1993, that is, the date of the order of the learned Appellate Authority ? 18. The learned Counsel for the landlords has contended that the statutory period of thirty days has to be reckoned from the date of order of the learned Rent Controller since it was by this order that the tenants were found guilty of non-payment of rent. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the tenants that the "amount due” within the meaning of the third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act was specifically determined by the learned Rent Controller to be Rs 1320 in terms of the interpretation of the expression "amount due" given by a Division Bench of this Court in Om Parkash’s case (supra) Such amount was deposited by the tenants on the day of the order itself. It has further been contended that if during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority the term "amount due" has come to be differently interpreted by the apex Court, the tenants cannot be penalised for the same and the statutory period of 30 days should be reckoned from the date of the order of the learned Appellate Authority. 19. There is force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenants. It is not that in no case the period of 30 days can be reckoned from the order of the learned Appellate Authority. There may arise some cases in which such period of 30 days may begin to run only from the date of the order of the learned Appellate Authority. To illustrate, in a given case filed by the landlords seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of payment of rent, the Rent Controller may come to the conclusion that the tenant was not in a arrears of rent and that the arrears as limed by the landlord were not due. On appeal if such findings are set-aside by the Appellate Authority and the tenant is held to be in arrears of rent, then the period of thirty days, prima facie, will have to be reckoned from the order of the Appellate Authority. Similarly, in cases where the period for which the rent is found to be in arrears or the rate at which is rent is claimed is varied in appeal, a fresh period of thirty days will have to be reckoned from the date of the order of the Appellate Authority, provided, however, that in the latter cases, the "amount due" as per the order of the Rent Controller stood deposited within 30 days from the date of order of the Rent Controller. 20. In the present case as well, a fresh period of 30 days has to be reckoned from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority since the "amount due" as assessed by the learned Rent Controller came to be varied in appeal in view of the interpretation of the expression “amount due" occurring in third proviso to section 14 (2) (i) of the Act by the apex Court in Madan Mohans case (supra) during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. 21. 21. Since the entire "amount due” stands deposited within the statutory period of 30 days from the date of order of the learned Appellate Authority, the tenants are not liable to be evicted farm the tenanted premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. Resultantly, the present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 20-5-1993 of the learned Appellate Authority directing eviction of the tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent is set-aside, No orders as to costs. Petition allowed. -