D. M. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 under S. 482 S. 401 S. 307 This is a composite petition Cr. P. C. filed by the informant of a Sessions Case under Section 307 I. P. C. The informant-petitioner assails the order of acquittal of the opposite parties in the sessions case. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case is, on 7. 9. 1988 at about 6 A. M. while P. Ws. 1 and 2, two brothers, were proceeding to work in their field, near Mianpoichaka, the opposite parties carried on a combined assault on P. W. 1 by means of lath is causing bodily injuries. The matter was reported at the police station. P. W. 1 was treated as an indoor patient from 7. 9. 1988 to 30. 9. 1988 for fracture of his leg. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted and the opposite parties faced trial and were acquitted as stated above. The defence was a case of mere denial of the occurrence. ( 3 ) MR. K. N. Jena, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the opposite parties is an error and is liable to be set aside. It was further submitted by Mr. Jena that a proper appreciation of the case would indicate that the decision of acquittal of the opposite parties has resulted in total miscarriage of justice and, therefore, this Court should interfere, Mr. P. K. Dhal and Mr. S. K. Nayek, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the lower court. ( 4 ) IN view of the competency of the High Court to entertain a revision at the instance of a private party against the order of acquittal, this court docs not feel it necessary to entertain the prayer under section 482 Cr. P. C. The matter can be disposed of in a revision vide decision reported in l3ansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh. Hence petition under section ( 5 ) IT is to be seen as to under what circumstances an order of acquittal can be interfered with in a revision. P. C. The matter can be disposed of in a revision vide decision reported in l3ansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh. Hence petition under section ( 5 ) IT is to be seen as to under what circumstances an order of acquittal can be interfered with in a revision. This is so done only in a case where the judgment or order is found wholly unreasonable so as to characterise it as perverse and that such a judgment has resulted in a total miscarriage of justice. A finding which is patently erroneous in a suitable case, it is hot only the right but the duty of the Court to interfere in the interest of justice. Keeping the above proposition of law in view, I proceed to find out whether the impugned order is liable to be aside. ( 6 ) P. W. 1 is the injured, P. W. 2 is his brother who is also an eye witness to the occurrence and is the informant. P. W. 3 is supposed to be an eye-witness. While discussing the evidence of these P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 the learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed that the evidence of these witnesses corroborated each other. She has also found that the medical evidence of the doctors (P. Ws. 4 and 5) corroborated the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 that P. W. 1 was injured. She has also found that P. W. 1 was treated in the hospital for the bodily injuries as noted by her in the judgment. Thus the learned Additional Sessions Judge has given a finding that P. W. 1 was assaulted and was treated in the hospital as an indoor patient. She has also given a finding that the evidence of P. W. 1, injured, and P. W. 2, his brother, has been duly corroborated but strangely enough no where she stated that she did not accept the evidence of any of them. She has also given a finding that the evidence of P. W. 1, injured, and P. W. 2, his brother, has been duly corroborated but strangely enough no where she stated that she did not accept the evidence of any of them. ( 7 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that although P. W. 1, the injured, stated giving out that all the three opposite parties dealt lathi blows separately on different parts of the body, yet, according to her, this was not reflected in the F. I. R. The learned lower court became oblivious to the fact that it was in the evidence of P. W. 2 that he witnessed the occurrence from a distance and it was he who lodged the F. I. R. and not P. W. 1. The Court was conscious of the position that the F. I. R. is not an encyclopedia as she mentioned this in the judgment. Law is well settled that the F. I. R. is not supposed to give a detailed description of the incident/occurrence in a photographic manner. Its real purpose is to set the law in motion by providing the police agency with that much of information, which is necessary for the purpose of proceeding with an investigation for any offence. Had it been lodged by P. W. 1, the injured, such an omission certainly would have been a material omission so as to cast a doubt in the prosecution case. ( 8 ) HAVING come to a finding that the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 corroborated each other, the learned court has omitted to give the reason as to why she did not believe the evidence of these witnesses. I find, no reason has been given for this except, of course, she had mentioned that the prosecution case suffers from certain infirmities. Law is well settled that a conviction can be based even on the sole testimony of a single witness, if the evidence of the witness is acceptable and is believed to be true and does not suffer from any infirmity. Law is well settled that a conviction can be based even on the sole testimony of a single witness, if the evidence of the witness is acceptable and is believed to be true and does not suffer from any infirmity. In the instant case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not given any reason as to why and under what circumstances the evidence of the sole eye witness (P. W. 1) should not be believed and should be discarded: More strangely she has not commented anything on the evidence of P. W. 1. In the absence of such a reasoning, the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not correct. ( 9 ) IT has been held in the judgment that non-mention of the name of P. W. 3 who was examined as an eye witness, in the F. I. R. is an infirmity affecting the prosecution case. This may be an infirmity. The learned trial court has not given any reason as to what extent such an infirmity affected the case of the prosecution as a whole. It may be pointed out that the Supreme Court even have gone to the extent of holding that in peculiar circumstances in view of the convincing corroborating evidence on record, the omission of the name of the accused in the F. I. R. is not fatal to the prosecution case (vide Bharvad Bhikha Valu and others v. The State of Gujarat. Here the case. stands on a better footing since it is a case of non-mention of the name of a witness. The learned court below should have taken pain to analyse the case of the prosecution in the light of the above proposition of law rendered by the Apex Court. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that non examination of the only eye s witness named in the F. I. R. was an infirmity. But in it is not always so. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case; for example, in a case where there is no other witness except the sole b witness and in that case, if the name of such witness is not stated at the first instance, it may I cast a serious doubt in the prosecution case. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case; for example, in a case where there is no other witness except the sole b witness and in that case, if the name of such witness is not stated at the first instance, it may I cast a serious doubt in the prosecution case. But in the case at hand, the learned Additional Sessions to Judge has found the evidence of the witnesses to have corroborated each other. Therefore when she observed that this was an infirmity, it was incumbent on her part to give finding as to how to such non-examination has affected the prosecution case, particularly in view of the evidence of the eyewitnesses. Such a finding is wanting, ( 11 ) IT would be opposite at this place to h mention that it is also settled by the Apex Court vide decision reported in Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh and others, that the evidence of at witness cannot be discarded if the same is found to a have been corroborated by the F. I. R. and the medical evidence. The learned trial court there fore, should have given her reasons for not accepting the evidence of P. W. 1 the injured, whose evidence, according to her finding, has been corroborated by other evidence. In the absence of any reasoning the finding is vulnerable. ( 12 ) THE judgment indicates that the learned trial court considered the evidence of P. W. 3 as an evidence of a partisan witness. The law is well settled that merely because the witness is a partisan witness, the evidence cannot be outright rejected; rather the same has to be scrutinised more thoroughly to find out the intrinsic value-of the testimony vide decision reported in Han Har Singh etc. v. The State of U. P. ( 13 ) THE learned trial court held that the prosecution introduced that P. W. 1 was assaulted by a knife and since this did not find place in the F. I. R. , according to the learned trial court, it is an infirmity in the prosecution case. I may point out that the F. I. R. was not lodged by the injured (P. W. 1 ). He was examined on the same day after the matter was reported to the police. I may point out that the F. I. R. was not lodged by the injured (P. W. 1 ). He was examined on the same day after the matter was reported to the police. He (P. W. 1) stated to have been assaulted by a knife and no inconsistency was found in his earlier statement under section 161 Cr. P. C. The learned trial court lost sight of this aspect. Had the F. I. R. been lodged by the injured himself, certainly, this would have cast a serious doubt in the prosecution case. But as I have indicated in the earlier paragraph, the F. I. R. was lodged by the brother who witnessed the occurrence from a distance. ( 14 ) THE infirmities as indicated by the learned trial court are no doubt infirmities, but the learned trial court has not any where mentioned that these infirmities in effect shook the cornerstone of the prosecution case, so as to render the prosecution case doubtful. By this observation, this Court does not mean that the prosecution case has been proved to the hilt nor the purpose is to influence the mind of the lower court to record an order of conviction. The judgment is consorted because it does not contain the reasoning for arriving at the finding recorded by the learned trail court. The trial court has also, as indicated by me above, not dealt with the settled proposition of law with regard to the appreciation of the evidence on record. If the infirmity is in the evidence of a particular witness, reasons must be indicated to what extent such infirmity has affected the veracity of the witness. If, on the other hand, there is infirmity in the prosecution case, it must be shown that such an infirmity has unsettled the main prop of the prosecution story. I am of the view that the judgment has resulted in total miscarriage of justice and, therefore, is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. ( 15 ) IN the result, the order of acquittal is set aside. The case is remitted back to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadrak for fresh disposal without being influenced by any observation of this Court. There shall be no fresh trial nor recording of any additional evidence whatsoever except that the defence, if they so like, may adduce evidence from their side. The case is remitted back to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadrak for fresh disposal without being influenced by any observation of this Court. There shall be no fresh trial nor recording of any additional evidence whatsoever except that the defence, if they so like, may adduce evidence from their side. Revision is allowed. Revision allowed. Matter remanded. .