JUDGMENT D.P. Sood, J.— By this petition under section 482/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as the "Code") read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated September 16, 1993 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla Division, Shimla. By the impugned order, the learned Sessions Judge has quashed the issuance of process directed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (I), Shimla, against respondent Smt. Enakashi Mahajan. 2. In order to understand the real controversy arising in between the parties, the facts, in brief, are essential to be narrated Complainant complains that on 8-4-1990 at about 10.30 P.M. the respondents entered into his property in his absence and without his consent with a view to damage his property and acquire right of passage through his stairs. Allegedly, boundaries of the property belonging to the parties to the instant lis, adjoins each other. It is alleged that respondents not only illegally trespassed over the property of the complainant, but respondent 1 also damaged the gate affixed by him (complainant) in between the boundary of the properties of both the parties but also threatened the latter with an injury to his person. He also alleges that he lodged a First Information Report with the police, but of no avail, as no action had been taken by the investigating agency. Consequently, a complaint with respect to the alleged commission of offence under sections 4479 425, 500 and 506, I.P.C. was lodged by him in the Court below. 3. The learned Magistrate, after recording the statement of the complainant and also his witnesses on oath, considered the preliminary evidence and concluded that there doth exist a material evidence to proceed against the accused persons as mentioned in the complaint for having committed offence punishable under sections 447/500/506, I.P.C. and resultantly, directed the issuance of summons against both the respondents. 4. 4. Respondent Enakshi Mahajan filed revision petition in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, who vide the impugned order quashed the proceedings against her on the grounds, firstly, that the issuance of summons based on the consideration of material by the learned Magistrate qua the satisfaction of the Magistrate regarding the commission of the offence under sections 447, 500 and 506, I.P.C. does not amount to interlocutory order and as such, the same is revisable and secondly, that the name of respondent Enakshi Mahajan does not appear in the F.I.R., voluntarily lodged by the complainant without any fear or pressure and it being earlier in time, no case is made out against the respondent. 5. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 16-9-1993, quashing the issuance of summons against the respondent, the petitioner has come up by way of this petition and sought a direction that the impugned order be set aside as it amounts to abuse of the process of Court by the learned Sessions Judge in having assessed preliminary evidence adduced by the petitioner, meticulously and thereafter he has wrongly come to the conclusion that no case is made out against the said respondent. It is also urged that issuance of process against respondent, on consideration of the preliminary evidence recorded by the Magistrate, was the consequence of the exercise of the judicial discretion by the said authority, which order should not have been reversed by interfering into the powers of the Magistrate, it being an interlocutory order. In support of his claim, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the observations made in Smt Swaran Anand and others v. Chief Judicial Magistrate and “mother” 1977 Cr LJ 355 ; Satyanarayan Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 2904 and Madhu Limaye v, State of Maharashtra, 1978 Cr LJ 165. 6 On the contrary, Shri Chandel has vehemently contended that had the summons been not issued pursuant to the orders of the Magistrate concerned, respondent would have been a free person. By issuance of such summons, her liberty has been curtailed which right being a fundamental right, cannot be taken away by the Magistrate without having any evidence on record to that effect. By issuance of such summons, her liberty has been curtailed which right being a fundamental right, cannot be taken away by the Magistrate without having any evidence on record to that effect. The language of the order passed by the Magistrate does not show that it is in the nature of interlocutory order passed by it and the learned Sessions Judge has rightly termed it as a revisable order, being not interlocutory order in terms of section 397 (2) of the Code. Further, the learned Counsel has stressed that F.I.R. in respect of the commission of the offence lodged by Shri Surinder Singh, petitioner, does not firstly indicate the name of respondent Enakshi Mahajan to have participated in the commission of the crime and secondly it having been lodged with respect to the incident on 8th of April, 1990, it also does not reflect her participation with respect to the incidents occurred on 6th and 7th of April, 1990. On the above said submissions, he supports the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Reliance has been placed on the observations made in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra), wherein the decision in Amar Nath and others v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185, has been reviewed and affirmed. 7. In Amar Naths case (supra), it has been laid down that : "It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decide certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision against that order. For insane, summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders bail, calling for reports and such further steps in aid of the pending proceeding, are interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2). For insane, summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders bail, calling for reports and such further steps in aid of the pending proceeding, are interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be interlocutory orders so as to bar revision." In Madhu Limayes case (supra), it has been observed : "Interlocutory Order5 cannot be equated as invariably being converse of "final order" ; an order passed during the course of a proceeding may not be final but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order, pure and simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two which must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. The bar of section 397 (2) is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, is an order of this kind not being an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2)." Agreeing with the exposition of law in Madhu Limayes case (supra), it has been reiterated that the term interlocutory order has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final. 8. Applying the above said tests to the facts of the instant case, it is apparent that the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class amounted to curtailment of right of liberty of the respondent Thus, uphold the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in this behalf. Even otherwise, if the contents of the complaint and the preliminary evidence of conflicting nature, adduced by the petitioner, are taken at its face value, prima facie a doubt is created regarding the complicity of the accused Enakshi Mahajan in the commission of the offences in question and on this basis, the learned Sessions Judge could correct the error crept in the proceedings consequent to the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. This Court has the power to quash the proceedings in case it is found that there is abuse of the process of the Court. The well settled principles laid down by the apex Court, whereunder High Court is empowered to exercise its inherent powers are : (i) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party ; (ii) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice ; (iii) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The above-said powers are to be exercised by the High Court in rare of the rarest cases where there appears to be compelling circumstances for the exercise of inherent powers. 9. As already observed, no illegality has been committed by the learned Sessions Judge in passing the impugned order. As such, no interference is called for. The petition is accordingly dismissed in terms to the above. Petition dismissed. -